PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM

SEPTEMBER
OCTOBER | 1967



SPECIAL ISSUE

Nationalities and Nationalism in the USSR

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SEPT-OCT 1967
VOL. XVI 5

PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM

Problems of Communism is a bimonthly publication. Its purpose is to provide analyses and significant background information on various aspects of world communism today. Opinions expressed by contributors do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of the United States Government. Editorial office: U.S. Information Agency, 1776 Pennsylvania Avenue N.W., Washington, D.C., 20547.

How to Subscribe: Outside of the United States, *Problems of Communism* may be obtained free of charge by writing to the nearest office of the U.S. Information Service. Residents of the United States may purchase annual subscriptions or single copies by writing to the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402. Price per copy: $.50. Subscription price: $2.50.

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Nationalities and Nationalism in the USSR

EDITORS' NOTE: As the largest multinational state in the world, the Soviet Union has been faced, since its inception, with the problem of granting some form of cultural and administrative autonomy to the approximately 100 nationalities residing within its borders, while at the same time, true to its ideological proclivity for political centralization, establishing and consolidating control over the entire country. The problems with which Soviet leaders, from Lenin to Brezhnev, have had to grapple have been enormous, ranging from irredentist movements in the Ukraine to nomadism in Central Asia, from the Tsarist legacy of oppressive colonial practices, including cultural Russification, to the traditional interracial animosities that in the past have turned Tatar against Armenian, Uzbek against Tadjik, Ukrainian against Jew. The official claim, of course, is that all these problems have now been decisively solved, that Russia's 200 million citizens live in a spirit of harmony and "brotherly friendship." Yet this hopeful picture hardly seems to be confirmed either by the evidence at our disposal, or, indeed, by Soviet sources themselves. Local nationalism, if anything, seems to be on the rise; assimilation—still part of the official dogma—has in effect been postponed until the indefinite future; traditional animosities not only persist but seem to be thriving; and the early dreams of equality have been replaced by a set of narrow, bureaucratic practices which perpetuate the favored position of the Great Russian rulers on the one hand, and the subservient status of many smaller nationalities on the other.

How and why this has come about, how Soviet policies affect one ethnic group as against another, which measures have failed and which have succeeded, and what the outlook is for the future of Russia as a multinational state—these are the problems to which this issue is addressed. A few remarks on the contents are in order: First, though the subject of religion in the Soviet Union is in some ways *sui generis,* its close bearing on the status of what might be termed "ethno-religious" groups, such as the Central Asian Muslims and the Jews, and the similarity of the problems faced by both national and religious groups as minorities justify, in our opinion, the inclusion of two articles on this subject. Secondly, we have not tried to present an all-inclusive survey of the status and treatment of the many peoples of the USSR, but rather have selected certain nationalities or groups as case studies. Nevertheless, we regret the omission of an article on the nearly three million Georgians, one of the largest and most interesting national minorities. Though such an article was contemplated, it has had to be postponed until a future issue.

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What's in a Nation?

By Grey Hodnett

On October 25, 1966, Leonid Brezhnev—attended by other Politburo members—unveiled a statue in Moscow of Shota Rustaveli, in celebration of the 800th anniversary of the Georgian national poet's birth. The following week Brezhnev went to Tbilisi, where he gave the Georgians not only an Order of Lenin and a word of praise for a more recent Georgian hero, but also a lecture on their economic responsibilities toward the other republics. Brezhnev's conciliatory, but at the same time demanding, attitude toward Georgia reflects the new official approach to nationality affairs that has emerged since Khrushchev's overthrow.

To retrace recent history, the 20th CPSU Congress in 1956 produced a straightforward commitment to the "flourishing" (*rastvet*) of individual nations within the Soviet federation. By 1958, however, references to the "coming together" (*sblizhenie*) and even "merging" (*sliianie*) of nations began to appear with increasing frequency in the Soviet press. This ideological trend found official expression in a passage of the Party Program adopted at the 22nd Congress in 1961:

The boundaries between the union republics within the USSR are increasingly losing their former significance. . . . Full-scale Communist construction signifies a new stage in the development of national relations in the USSR in which the nations will draw still closer together *and their complete unity will be achieved.* (Author's italics.)[1]

Yet in another passage the Program avowed that

. . . under socialism nations flourish and their sovereignty is strengthened.

The fundamental ambivalence in these statements was underscored in Khrushchev's report on the Party Program, in the key "methodological" assertion that the "two tendencies" for nations to develop —and at the same time to come together—under socialism were both "progressive."

The guidelines on nationality policy set by the 22nd Congress were thus internally contradictory.

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[1] For text of the Party Program, see Charlotte Saikowski and Leo Gruliow, eds., *Current Soviet Policies IV*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1962, p. 26.

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Nevertheless, by stressing fusion processes they brought the party much closer to endorsing rapid "merging." The Program did not explicitly equate "complete unity" with "merging," and Khrushchev's report seemed to deny that they were identical. Yet the Program did leave the impression that the process of "internationalization"—which it saw operating *simultaneously* along a broad demographic, economic, social, cultural, psychological, linguistic, and political front—was leading toward the eventual fusion of nations into a single, nationally-homogenized society.

In the wake of Khrushchev's fall there was a departure from this position. In his report to the 23rd Congress (March 1966), Brezhnev ignored the Party Program's formulas on nationality policy; while he mentioned the "coming together of peoples," he approved the dual patriotism of Soviet citizens to nation as well as to multinational community, and declared:

The party and all Communists . . . are called upon to continue to work indefatigably to bring about the further comprehensive strengthening of the friendship and fraternity of the peoples of the Soviet Union and to make their economic, cultural, and spiritual ties closer and more varied. In solving any problem, whether it be of the political, economic, or cultural development of our country, the party will continue to show solicitude for the interests and national differences of each people. . . .[2]

The objectives implied in Brezhnev's report were brought into sharper focus throughout 1966. "Complete unity" had been jettisoned—for the time being, at least—as a programmatic goal of nationality policy. Any intention to denationalize the non-Russian peoples ("national nihilism") was condemned, as was the resort to "administrative measures" in solving nationality problems. "Flourishing" and "coming together" were treated as equal, interrelated and *parallel* processes which were leading to a pluralistic integration of nations within a firmly unified multinational community, rather than to their amalgamation into a single ethnically undifferentiated whole.

Theory and Practice

Despite the fact that changes have occurred over time in the general formulation of the official position on national relations in the USSR, no detailed, all-embracing, and fully operational party line has existed in recent years. The official position has been vague and subject to different interpretations, while disputes over practical issues have indicated clearly that the Soviet nationality problem is far from solved. The leaders themselves appear to consider this a serious matter, yet they evidently disagree over how it should be handled. The choices open to them range from conciliation to coercion, but these options—especially the latter—cannot be articulated for public consumption. Obviously, neither officials nor commentators can speak of using force against entire nations, or even against significantly large social groups within nations.

This constraint exerts a profound influence on the way in which nationality policy preferences are expressed. Thus, what is really a conflict over what *ought* to be done assumes the guise of a debate over the *facts* of national relations. The policy struggle takes the external form of an analytical controversy dealing with the "laws of development" (*zakonomernosti*) of nations. In this controversy, points of view tend to polarize. Assimilationists, who wish to see a rapid merging of nations, have taken the offensive against moderates, who foresee the prolonged existence of nations.

Disagreement is reflected at its most abstract in the logical inconsistencies in the Party Program. It becomes more overt in the speeches of important political figures. It can be detected without difficulty in the writings of semi-official commentators on nationality policy. But differences of emphasis turn into open polemics in the specialized academic literature on the subject.

The dispute at each of these levels deals with the same fundamental problem—"merging" or nonmerging; that is, coercion or conciliation. The type of argument found in the programmatic documents and speeches of top leaders on the one hand, and in agitprop and academic writings on the other, is identical. But the latter sources—in which the same sets of individuals write repeatedly and in some depth about the same special questions—give us information which does not ordinarily come through in the circumspect remarks of politicians. The academicians, whose political connections are occasionally suggested by their authorship of articles in *Kommunist* or their presentation of reports at party-sponsored meetings, stick tenaciously to their personal theoretical positions over long periods of time.

It is this continuity which makes it possible to use their writings in some measure as a mirror of attitudes. What they say provides an idea of which

[2] The 23rd CPSU Congress, *Stenographic Report* (in Russian), Moscow, Politizdat, 1966, I, p. 104.

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problems are felt to be acute; it offers some guide to the inventory of arguments which are available to members of the political elite; it indicates which of these are probably being used behind the scenes; and it reveals some important issues of fact and value which underlie the general controversy over nationality policy but which must—of necessity—remain implicit.[3] Last but not least, this literature illustrates the way in which excerpts are drawn from the corpus of Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist writings and then recombined to fashion effective doctrines for promoting unofficial ideologies.

The scholars' views on nationality policy have been set forth in intense discussion both in the press and at various conferences.[4] Among recent writings on nationality affairs, a symposium conducted by *Voprosy istorii* in 1966-67 is of particular importance. Billed as a "Discussion of the Concept: The Nation," the symposium deserves attention for three reasons. First, it represents the most serious attempt undertaken since the adoption of the Party Program to lay respectable theoretical foundations for rapid "internationalization": although the series has been presented as a disinterested search for truth through a comradely and scholarly exchange of ideas, several considerations suggest that it may well have been a politically-inspired move supported by those elements in the elite who fear non-Russian nationalism and favor a faster assimilation of the national minorities.[5] Secondly, the roster of participants in the symposium is suggestive of the points of view which the editorial board of *Voprosy istorii* thought *had* to be accommodated in the discussion, possibly *hinting as well at the sources of support within the* intellectual community for faster assimilation.[6] Thirdly, the discussion in *Voprosy istorii* focuses upon what, for a Marxist-Leninist, is the most vital problem involved in analyzing nationality problems: "methodology."

[3] The most important factual issues center upon the degree of inequality existing now and in the past among nations in the Soviet Union, the extent of Tsarist oppression, the causes of non-Russian nationalism, the relative danger of Russian chauvinism as against local nationalism, the dynamic tendencies of nationalism and "internationalism," and the relative *effectiveness* of coercion as against conciliation in solving nationality problems. Different feelings about the worth of non-Russian cultural and political life, and about the sort of unity among nations that is desirable now and in the future, influence these perceptions of the realities of Soviet national relations.

[4] Among the latter, the most important gatherings were a theoretical conference in Tashkent in May 1962 (see *Voprosy istorii*, 1962, No. 11, p. 101-123); an All-Union conference on "The Development of National Relations under Conditions of Transition from Socialism to Communism," held in Frunze in October 1963 (see *Sovetskaia Kirgiziia*, October 10-13, 1963, and *Voprosy filosofii*, 1964, No. 2, pp. 158-61); and an inter-republic seminar on "Problems of Propagandizing the Ideas of Friendship of Peoples" held in Frunze in September 1966 (see *Sovetskaia Kirgiziia*, September 16-17, 20, and 24, 1966). A number of regional meetings have occurred as well in the Baltic states, Ukraine, Moldavia and Uzbekistan.

[5] *Voprosy istorii*, along with *Filosofskie nauki* (the organ of the Ministry of Higher and Secondary Specialized Education), has in the past tended to favor assimilationist writers in its selection of articles. In contrast, other leading journals —*Istoriia SSSR*, *Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo*, *Voprosy filosofii*, and *Voprosy istorii KPSS*—have maintained more balance. It is unclear why *Voprosy filosofii* was not chosen in the first place as a more appropriate forum for such a discussion. Among the individuals associated with the symposium either as rapporteurs, discussants, or contributors of articles, persons who have stressed "internationalization" in their writings would seem to be overrepresented. The fact that at least three of five authors of assimilationist articles do not appear fully qualified to discuss the subject (see footnote 6) also casts a shadow of doubt upon the motives behind the symposium.

[6] Among the five assimilationist authors whose articles have so far appeared, only two have had a serious long-standing professional interest in domestic nationality problems. These are Pavel Grigorevich Semionov (of Russian nationality), a specialist on Soviet federalism at the Institute of State and Law of the Academy of Sciences, and Nikolai Pavlovich Ananchenko (believed to be Ukrainian), of the Department of Philosophy and Scientific Communism of the Moscow Physical-Technical Institute. Piotr Mikhailovich Rogachev (Russian), head of the Department of Philosophy and Scientific Communism of the Volgograd Civil Engineering Institute, is a specialist in historical materialism. His collaborator, Matvei Abramovich Sverdlin (Jewish), the head of the Department of Marxism-Leninism of the Volgograd Medical Institute, is a specialist in the philosophy of science. Their first article dealing primarily with domestic nationality affairs was printed by *Kommunist* at the time of the June 1963 ideological plenum of the Central Committee. Before then they had written several articles which dealt primarily with intra-bloc relations and the international Communist movement. Suren Tigranovich Kaltakhchian (Armenian), at one time head of the Social Science Administration of the USSR Ministry of Higher and Secondary Specialized Education, and now affiliated with the Department of the History of Marxist-Leninist Philosophy of Moscow University, is a specialist in dialectical and historical materialism. He too has written about nationality problems from a foreign as well as domestic standpoint.

Viktor Ivanovich Kozlov (Russian), whose writings do not place him clearly in either camp, is a specialist on foreign nationality and demographic problems at the Institute of Ethnography of the Academy of Sciences. All four of the moderate authors in the symposium (as of April 1967) are domestic nationality experts and—to a greater or lesser extent —historians. Maskhud Sadykovich Dzhunusov (Kirghiz), at one time head of the Philosophy Department of the Kirghiz State University and now affiliated with the Institute of Philosophy of the Academy of Sciences in Moscow, is the author of many books on nationality problems in the underdeveloped regions of the USSR. He is the leading Soviet authority on how certain peoples of the Soviet Union "bypassed capitalism," and has frequently been entrusted with delivering official reports at conferences on nationality affairs. Mkrtych Oganesovich Mnatsakanian (Armenian), affiliated with the Department of Philosophy and History of the CPSU of the Orekhovo-Zuevo Pedagogical Institute, is a specialist on the history of national relations in the USSR. Tatiana Iulevna Burmistrova (Russian), a Doctor of Historical Sciences and professor in the Department of Scientific Communism at Leningrad University, is a specialist on the prerevolutionary nationality policy of the Bolsheviks. Nikolai Avetovich Tavakalian (Armenian) the author of a number of historical works on the Chechen-Ingush ASSR, is the academic dean of the Chechen-Ingush Pedagogical Institute.

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"Methodology" signifies the conceptual framework that must be used in selecting, organizing, and interpreting information about nationality affairs within—and to some extent outside—the USSR. Its elements include (a) the set of characteristics which do or do not define nationhood (that is, which are indispensable—or dispensable—for national existence); (b) a formula explaining how and why nations differ under "capitalism" and "socialism"; and (c) a formula that reveals the dynamics of change in "socialist" nations. The conceptual framework plays a major role in defining and justifying the "laws of development" (*zakonomernosti*) of nations, and these "laws" in turn suggest the feasibility and desirability of certain policy choices rather than others. It should be noted that among Soviet writers on nationality affairs there is a high degree of specialization and division of labor. "Methodology" is the core sub-discipline, because it provides all the others (*e.g.*, linguistics, literature, art, music, education, demography, ethnography, history, constitutional law, economics, *etc.*) with the concepts needed for elaborating their own "laws of development."

Stalin's Contributions

Until the 22nd Party Congress, nationality problems were discussed by Soviet authors almost entirely in terms of all methodological categories set forth by Stalin in *Marxism and the National Question* (1913) and *The National Question and Leninism* (1929). Lenin's works present neither an explicit definition of nationhood nor a concrete statement of the "laws of development" of nations.[7] Soviet writers have therefore drawn upon Lenin for only two methodological ideas: the notion that under capitalism the "two tendencies" for nations to develop and for national distinctions to be eliminated are in complete contradiction (and thus can be reconciled only through the domination of weaker nations by stronger nations), whereas under socialism the same tendencies are in complete harmony; and the notion that under capitalism "two cultures" (*i.e.*, bourgeois and proletarian) exist within each nation, as opposed to socialism's single culture.

In *Marxism and the National Question* Stalin defined nationhood in terms of four characteristics (see box, p. 15): common language, territory, economic life, and psychological makeup (which he equated with "national character"). He asserted that a nation ceases to be a nation if one of the characteristics is absent. A nation, he indicated, was not a racial or tribal community, but rather an "historical category belonging to a definite epoch, the epoch of rising capitalism." The bourgeoisie played the leading role in the consolidation of nations, and thus—it apparently followed—nationalist movements were basically bourgeois in nature. Stalin's other relevant work, *The National Question and Leninism*, rejected the addition of possession of national statehood as a fifth characteristic of nationhood, denied the existence of nations before capitalism, and distinguished sharply between "bourgeois" and "socialist" nations. "Bourgeois" nations were thoroughly dominated by the bourgeoisie and by nationalist political parties, and were united—however artificially—by a spirit of expansionism and xenophobia. "Socialist" nations, which arose "on the ruins of the old, bourgeois nations," were—on the contrary—united internally by a firm alliance between working class and peasantry and externally by deep bonds of friendship:

These new [socialist] nations arose and developed on the base of old, bourgeois nations, as a result of the elimination of capitalism—by their radical transformation on socialist lines. Nobody can deny that the present socialist nations of the Soviet Union . . . radically differ from the corresponding old bourgeois nations of old Russia both in class composition and spiritual complexion and in social and political interests and aspirations.[8]

Yet Stalin did not draw the conclusion that this presumed solidarity of socialist nations within the USSR would lead to their merging. Indeed, he explicitly stated that

the victory of socialism in one country does not create the necessary conditions for the merging of nations and national languages, . . . on the contrary, this period creates favorable conditions for the renaissance and flourishing of the nations that were formerly oppressed by tsarist imperialism. . . .[9]

Only after the victory of socialism on a worldwide scale would national differences wither away and nations merge together.

Together with the theory that defines culture as "national in form, socialist in content," this set of concepts constituted the unchallenged methodolog-

[7] See Alfred D. Low, *Lenin on the Question of Nationality*, New York, Bookman Associates, 1958, p. 29.

[8] *The National Question and Leninism*, Moscow, Foreign Language Publishing House, 1950, p. 16.

[9] *Ibid*, p. 23.

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ical foundations for understanding national relations up until 1961.

The "laws of development" implicit in Stalin's methodological principles could be expressed as follows: *Nations, which are related to peoples (narodnosti) and other prenational ethnic forms by language but not blood ties, arose with the development of capitalist economic relationships, found their leading ideological and political force in the bourgeoisie, and—despite inner class contradictions —had a definite, if perverse, psychological unity that manifested itself in hostility toward other nations. The overthrow of capitalism and victory of socialism produced a radical transformation in the basis of internal cohesion of nations and eliminated the socio-economic sources of antagonisms among nations. Nevertheless, nations are eduring social groups which will flourish in the socialist present and merge only in the remote future.*[10]

Seeds of Dispute

After Stalin's death, conditions changed but the doctrine did not. With official admission (especially at the 20th Party Congress) of the injustices committed against the nationalities under Stalin's rule, and with the decline of terror, it became possible once again to argue—however guardedly—about solutions to the nationality problem. A literal reading of Stalin's methodological principles now tended to support the moderate rather than the assimilationist position, because these principles left some room for the notion of "national character," insisted on the presence of *all* the defining characteristics of nationhood, and foresaw the continued existence of nations. In addition, the reclassification of a number of nationalities as "peoples" (*narodnosti*) rather than nations, with reference to the prerevolutionary period (for how else could they be presented as models for "bypassing capitalism"?) helped to draw the sting out of the "bourgeois nation" concept.

At the same time, however, other factors—the potentially contagious example of East European nationalism, the signs of local nationalism that appeared in the republics in the course of cultural destalinization and economic decentralization, and the deepening schism between Russia and China with its possible implications for Soviet Central Asia —reinforced the hand of those who urged a harsher line in nationality policy. Also, the apparent inability of the orthodox methodology to produce the desired answers when applied to the analysis of nationalism in the Third World helped to justify the appeal for doctrinal revision.

The Party Program's "complete unity" passage, together with its assertion that a qualitative change had occurred in class relationships in the USSR and that "communism"—of sorts—lay around the corner, provided the pro-"merging" writers with an opening that they were quick to exploit. In an authoritative exposition of the tasks of historians that appeared late in 1961, Yevgeni Zhukov—the Academic Secretary of the Academy of Sciences' Division of Historical Sciences, and an authority on revolutionary movements in Asia and Africa—claimed that Stalin's definition of a nation was now obsolete (see box, p. 15). Zhukov's article was the opening gun in a campaign to whittle away the attributes of nationhood in preparation for rapid "merging." This campaign led eventually to the *Voprosy istorii* symposium.

In the *Voprosy istorii* articles we see two contrasting approaches to "methodology," which in varying ways point toward two opposed interpretations of the "laws of development." The assimilationist methodology—as reflected in articles by Sverdlin and Rogachev, Kaltakhchian, Semionov, and Ananchenko—is *spiritually Stalinist, doctrinally "revisionist,"* and leads to "laws of development" which have *politically radical* implications. In oversimplified form, the essence of the assimilationist "laws" might be summarized as follows: *Nations, which have no deep tie with prenational ethnic forms, arose with capitalism and even at birth were marked by deep class conflict. The ideological and emotional bonds linking the toilers of one nation with those of others were therefore stronger than the bonds linking the same toilers with other classes in their "own" nation. The overthrow of capitalism and victory of socialism in the USSR eliminated class antagonisms within the Soviet nations, leveled differences of social structure among*

[10] Stalin's doctrine—which cannot be equated with his own chauvinistic operational ideology ("Stalinism")—nevertheless was geared to serve this more or less illegitimate set of private convictions. It rationalized his implacable hostility toward the outside "capitalist" world; minimized the precapitalist derivation of the culture of non-Russian nations of the USSR; reduced to almost naught elements of prerevolutionary tradition to which these nations could legitimately refer; made it virtually impossible to mention the existence of national inequality or tensions among "socialist" nations (which had its bloc implications as well); facilitated a conspiratorial explanation of non-Russian nationalism in the Soviet Union; and contributed to the political consolidation that Stalin evidently sought in his declining years.

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these nations and thereby bound each one of them even closer to all the rest. No objective obstacles prevent their further "coming together" and "merging" in the not-too-distant future.

The moderate approach, on the other hand—as reflected in articles by Dzhunusov, Mnatsakanian, Burmistrova, and Tavakalian—is *spiritually anti-Stalinist, doctrinally "orthodox,"* and leads to "laws of development" which have *politically conservative* implications. It projects the existence of nations farther back into the past and farther forward into the future; recognizes more continuity between "peoples," presocialist nations and socialist nations; assigns greater weight to interclass social and psychological ties in presocialist nations; and more openly admits the presence of tensions between nations both before and after the socialist revolution.

Assimilation—For and Against

The different preconceptions and implicit objectives which the participants brought to the *Voprosy istorii* symposium suggest the existence of conflicting notions of a private ideological sort about the assimilation of non-Russian minorities. The symposium articles as well as the past writings of those who favor accelerating assimilation characteristically include positive references to the "merging of nations," although the authors cover themselves by indicating that merging cannot occur immediately. In a series of increasingly radical articles Sverdlin and Rogachev have long made clear their predilection for merging.[11] They assert, as they put it in one study, that "it is necessary . . . to focus upon the fact that processes of merging must occur sooner within the USSR than in the world as a whole." [12]

P. G. Semionov has been attacked by many Soviet specialists on nationality affairs for his assertion in 1961 that

. . . the mutual assimilation of nations in essence denationalizes national-territorial autonomous units and even union republics, bringing Soviet society even from

[11] See *Voprosy filosofii*, No. 11, 1959, and No. 10, 1964; *Filosofskie nauki*, No. 2, 1960, No. 5, 1962 (Sverdlin), No. 1, 1963, and No. 2, 1964; *Kommunist*, No. 9, 1963.
[12] *Filosofskie nauki*, No. 2, 1964, p. 134.



Population Distribution and Ethnic Composition

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this standpoint closer to the point at which the full state-legal merging of nations will become a matter of the foreseeable future.[13]

From the publication of his first major article in 1959, Semionov has set himself the task of proving —largely through the exegesis of Lenin's writings— that national statehood is not connected *in principle* with the development of nations in the Soviet Union.[14] The main theme of his article in the *Voprosy istorii* symposium is that national statehood cannot be considered a defining characteristic of nationhood.[15] The attacks on Semionov's views by other specialists strongly suggest that they think he is really advocating the disappearance of the non-Russian nations as well as national state borders within the USSR.

The case against aggressive denationalizing, on the other hand, has been repeatedly argued by M. S. Dzhunusov. In numerous articles and books written over the course of the past decade he has supported a policy of national integration based on genuine *equality*. (The emphasis on equality is one of the main characteristics of the moderate ideology, sharply distinguishing it from cryptonationalism.) Dzhunusov frequently implies that "great-power chauvinism" has been no less of a hindrance to the achievement of ideal relations among the Soviet nations than "local nationalism." Coercion, he warns, will not lead to integration, but will merely enliven nationalist sentiments. Dzhunusov's outlook is shared by M. O. Mnatsakanian, who in an outspoken article appearing in 1963 recalled the harmful effects on national relations of the "cult of personality," attacked the chauvinism of the "anti-party group," defended the expansion of union republic rights in the post-Stalin period, and advocated the consolidation of these rights in the new Constitution of the USSR.[16] In the symposium, he strongly opposes Semionov's views. Burmistrova has also emphasized the danger of Russian chauvinism (even hinting at antisemitism) and has vigorously criticized Stalin's nationality policy.[17]

Definitions of Nationhood

If the assimilationists are thus "Stalinist" in sentiment while the moderates are anti-Stalinist, these roles are reversed with respect to doctrine. Sverdlin and Rogachev, for example, have been the most vociferous advocates of revising the orthodox definition of the characteristics of nationhood. They argue in *Voprosy istorii* that an ethnic community may be termed a nation even if all the characteristics are not "fully developed"; it is wrong, they say, to approach this question rigidly. The central aim underlying their definition of a nation (see box, p. 15) is to minimize the significance of psychological or racial dimensions of nationhood and maximize the role of "objective factors, especially economic and territorial community." To accomplish this purpose they not only thoroughly subordinate "subjective" to environmental determinants of nationhood, but even further minimize the psychological aspects of nationality by arguing that most ideas or traits are a product of class membership rather than ethnicity, or by asserting that many national traits are really "international" in character. Hence they reject the concepts of "national character" and "common psychological makeup," both of which had been used by Stalin, as well as the concept of "common spiritual makeup" proposed by Burmistrova in her books on the party's prerevolutionary nationality policy.[18] They admit "national self-consciousness" as a characteristic of some presocialist nations, but deny that it is a permanent feature of nationhood that applies in the postrevolutionary setting.[19] In this fashion they arrive at "consciousness of national belonging," by which they mean the mere "elemental self-consciousness" people show when declaring their ethnicity to the census-taker.

Although S. T. Kaltakhchian criticizes Sverdlin and Rogachev on some details, he agrees with them that the full set of characteristics descriptive of one type of nation (*e.g.*, the socialist nation) will not fit other nations, that one must apply definitions flexibly, and that a nation may exist even when some of the elements of nationhood are not entirely present. The essential feature of his definition of a nation (see box, p. 15), is his denial of the applicability of Stalin's "fourth characteristic" (community of psy-

[13] *Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo*, No. 12, 1961, p. 25.

[14] See *ibid.*, No. 3, 1959, and No. 12, 1961; *Teoriia gosudarstva i prava*, Moscow, Yurizdat, 1965, Ch. XII; *Voprosy istorii*, No. 12, 1965; and *Lichnost, obshchestvo i gosudarstvo*, Moscow, "Nauka," 1966, Ch. VII.

[15] *Voprosy istorii*, No. 7, 1966.

[16] *Voprosy istorii KPSS*, No. 10, 1963. Also see his article in *Izvestia Akademii Nauk Armianskoi SSR, Obshchestvennye nauki*, No. 8, 1963.

[17] *Voprosy istorii KPSS*, No. 2, 1965, pp. 40-41, 51. In *Voprosy istorii* No. 12, 1966, p. 106, she remarks that "just as with any other nationality," the psychology of the Jewish worker is fundamentally different from that of the Jewish merchant or entrepreneur.

[18] See footnote 27.

[19] "National self-consciousness" includes consciousness of national belonging, attachment to national values, feeling of national pride, consciousness of community of interests in the liberation struggle, and attitude toward other nations.

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chological makeup manifested in a common culture) to presocialist nations. In his view, Stalin failed to see that

. . . to assert the stability of community of psychological makeup of the people of a given nation, and consequently of exploiter and exploited in an antagonistic society, means to view the nation as a naturalistic [*prirodno-yestestvennuiu*] and eternal, not social-historical community. With such an understanding of the essence of the nation, it [the nation] would turn out to be not a transient but an eternal category, and matters would not be altered by accepting the changeability of national character. No matter how national character changed, it (and consequently the nation) would be an eternal category by virtue of its naturalistic foundation.[20]

Much the same argument is presented by Ananchenko, who complains that reducing the complex and changing reality of nationhood to a "metaphysical model of the nation equipped with such-and-such mandatory and fixed formal attributes" goes hand in hand with treating the nation as "a sort of eternal category." (V. I. Kozlov, who disagrees with the assimilationists on a number of issues, nevertheless comments on the difficulty of applying Stalin's four attributes in practical research.[21])

The moderates disagree fundamentally with the revision of the orthodox definition of nationhood as proposed by Sverdlin, Rogachev, and Kaltakhchian.

In his contribution to *Voprosy istorii*, Dzhunusov defends Stalin's definition of nationhood.[22] He does so in order to support his argument that there is a significant ethnic continuity in the evolution of human social forms and a certain non-correspondence, or at least lag, between ethnic and class change. Dzhunusov suggests, implicitly contradicting Sverdlin and Rogachev, that the essence of nationhood cannot be reduced to any single one of the defining characteristics—in particular to economic, territorial, or linguistic community. Rather, a nation must be viewed as an "integral social-ethnic organism," a "subject of specific traditions, social will, varied interests, and a system of social feelings."[23] The most striking feature of his definition of a nation (see box, p. 15) is the *relatively* large role it assigns to psychological factors. He strongly criticizes those writers, such as the well-known ethnographer S. A. Tokarev, who wish to exclude ethnic psychology as a characteristic of nationhood. Yet he also criticizes those who speak of "community of culture," ignoring Lenin's precept of "two cultures" in each presocialist national culture.

In his contribution to the symposium, M. O. Mnatsakanian, who is especially interested in Soviet federalism, revises Stalin's definition of a nation in that he omits any reference to the ethnic psychology of presocialist nations (see box, p. 15). But he argues that Marx, Engels, and Lenin included statehood among the defining characteristics of nationhood:

National statehood is not simply a progressive factor of enormous significance that influences national life, a condition that facilitates national consolidation. It is an important integral element of a nation which determines its [the nation's] essence, its immanent character.[24]

His main target is, of course, Semionov, who, he says, ignores Lenin's criticism of Stalin's plan to grant the large non-Russian nations merely national "autonomy" within the RSFSR. His central defensive aim is to demonstrate that national statehood in a socialist multinational federal state by no means encourages centrifugal tendencies and is fully compatible with the economic development of the whole (witness Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, he argues).

N. A. Tavakalian, stating that "the nation is characterized by four attributes in Marxist literature," argues that Engels considered "national character" to be an "important" element of nationhood. "National character is formed not in years or decades, but over the course of centuries." Tavakalian also suggests that national statehood "is becoming one of the attributes of the socialist nation."[25]

Burmistrova admits that Stalin's definition of a nation lacked precision. But, she says,

. . . in criticizing a formula that does not satisfy us today, one must not repudiate what has been won by Marxist thought over the past hundred years and has become thoroughly accepted in scientific usage.[26]

In her own definition of a nation (see box, p. 15), she retreats from her earlier assertion that the same "spiritual makeup" is common to all members of a

[20] *Filosofskie nauki*, No. 5, 1964, p. 28.
[21] *Voprosy istorii*, No. 1, 1967, p. 89.
[22] *Ibid.*, No. 4, 1966, pp. 19-20.
[23] *Ibid.*, pp. 16, 21.
[24] *Ibid.*, No. 9, 1966, p. 30.
[25] *Ibid.*, No. 2, 1967, pp. 115, 120-21.
[26] *Ibid.*, No. 12, 1966, p. 105.

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given nation [27] but insists on the less inclusive "character and culture." The psyche of any person—his character, abilities, temperament—is determined by a variety of factors, largely non-ethnic (*e.g.*, class, profession, climate, sex, age). Nevertheless:

Even in the culture of a bourgeois nation (despite the two ideological lines in this culture) there are elements which belong to the nation as a whole.[28]

In essence Burmistrova presents a refined and qualified version of Stalin's "four characteristics."

The distinction Stalin drew between "bourgeois" and "socialist" nations underscored the radical difference between nations under capitalism and those under socialism, but only by conceding the notion of "national character"—an idea that now blocks the path of rapid assimilation. In a letter published by *Voprosy filosofii* in 1964, Sverdlin and Rogachev argued that Stalin, who had "dogmatized the concept of 'bourgeois nation,' " obscured the difference between oppressor and oppressed nations and "extended the characteristics of the ruling bourgeois and imperialist state to the entire nation, . . . equated the concept of nation and social structure." [29] He thus ignored Lenin's idea of "two nations" in each presocialist nation.

In their contribution to the *Voprosy istorii* symposium, Sverdlin and Rogachev carry the attack on the "bourgeois nation" concept to its logical conclusion by distinguishing between "socially heterogeneous," "transitional," and "socially homogeneous" nations. These labels, they argue, are based upon the correct principle of categorizing nations—namely, the character of class relations within them. While the term "bourgeois nation" could lead to "conclusions which are scientifically or politically unfounded," the term "socially heterogeneous nation" points up the existence of class conflict without exaggerating the role of the bourgeoisie. "Transitional nation" reflects the possibility for some nations to "bypass" capitalism. And "socially homogeneous nation" calls attention to the pervasive *intra-* and *inter*-national unity of socialist nations.[30]

Moderates are probably no more pleased with the "bourgeois nation" idea than assimilationists. However, the substitute scheme proposed by Sverdlin and Rogachev would in some ways accentuate the undesirable effects of the old methodology. Hence, the moderates seem prepared to live with Stalin's formula. In his article Dzhunusov to some extent questions the concept, but he does so on the grounds that *social* rather than *ethnic* groups are the "bearers" of inequality and antagonism. He illustrates this point by criticizing the discriminatory cast of mind implicit in Stalin's distinction between "warmongering" and "peaceloving" nations, and in the 1949 campaign against "cosmopolitanism." Nevertheless, as Kaltakhchian critically points out, he is reluctant to discard the concept altogether. Burmistrova, defending the orthodox distinction between the two types of nations, throws back at the proponents of the "socially heterogeneous" formula their own argument that this "plays down the main thing—the class character of a nation." Tavakalian rejects the "socially-heterogeneous" and "socially-homogeneous" terminology on the grounds that it underestimates the extent to which the entire bourgeois nation falls under the influence of bourgeois ideology, while it overestimates the class homogeneity achieved in socialist nations.

Perhaps the best single indicator of a Soviet writer's position on nationality policy is the way in which he interprets the "dialectic" of the flourishing and coming together of nations under socialism. Is the present historical phase one of flourishing, coming together, or—as most writers assume—both flourishing and coming together? If both processes are stressed, do nations come together through flourishing, or flourish through coming together? Considerable scholastic ingenuity is exercised by individual writers in propounding the "correct" formulation of this problem. Their absorption with the "dialectic" is understandable, because this element of the methodology has the most immediate operational implications.

The positions of the symposium participants on this issue are completely predictable. Sverdlin and Rogachev, for example, argue that coming together is now the leading tendency in national relations. They even perceive "certain elements of merging"

[27] See T. Yu. Burmistrova, *Leninskaia politika proletarskovo internatsionalizma v period obrazovaniia RSDRP (1894-1903 gg.)*, Leningrad, Izdatelstvo Leningradskovo Universiteta, 1962, p. 144; *Natsionalnaia politika partii bolshevikov v pervoi russkoi revoliutsii 1905-1907 gody*, Leningrad Izdatelstvo Leningradskovo Universiteta, 1962, p. 59; *Voprosy istorii KPSS*, No. 2, 1965, p. 41.

[28] *Voprosy istorii*, No. 12, 1966, p. 105.

[29] *Voprosy filosofii*, No. 10, 1964, p. 179.

[30] *Voprosy istorii*, No. 1, 1966.

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among nations in the USSR and attack Stalin for postponing merging to the distant future in *The National Question and Leninism*. Dzhunusov's version of the dialectic, on the contrary, is more balanced: it pays its due both to flourishing and coming together, although flourishing receives somewhat greater attention. His stand on merging is unequivocal:

The process of the merging of nations and their cultures can be fully completed with the victory of communism throughout the entire world. Therefore one must not artificially force the merging of national cultures for which the social-economic conditions have not yet matured.

Only stupid people can suppose that the time has already come to curtail the development of the national statehood, culture and language of the peoples of the USSR.[31]

Laws of Development

The three components of methodology—a set of defining characteristics of nationhood, a formula for distinguishing socialist from presocialist nations, and an interpretation of the dialectic—are utilized by participants in the symposium as they depict the rise and decline of the nation as a form of social organization. How certain issues are treated in these images (which are partly explicit, partly implicit) of the laws of development is of crucial importance. The following appear to be the most significant points of controversy: the extent to which nations are related to prenational ethnic forms (*plemia, narod, narodnost*); the extent to which the existence of nations is pushed back into the past; the extent to which presocialist nations are internally split by class antagonisms and thus distinguished by psychological and ideological conflict; the extent to which relations between the masses of different presocialist nations are marked by friendship or mistrust; the extent to which the Revolution altered inter- and intra-national relations in the USSR; the extent to which the present socialist nations of the Soviet Union have uniform social structures united by strong indigenous working classes, and thus the extent to which centripetal social, psychological and ideological forces are now pulling these nations together; and finally, the extent to which the merging of nations will occur in the foreseeable future. A comparison of the writings of the symposium participants reveals markedly divergent images of the laws of development.

By assigning first priority to "community of economic life" as the main factor leading to the consolidation of nations, Sverdlin and Rogachev deliberately emphasize the discontinuity between nations and prenational ethnic groups (*e.g., narodnosti*). Yet by including the "tradition" of liberation struggle in their definition of nationhood they make room for nation-building in colonial and ex-colonial countries where the will to nationhood far outstrips the level of economic development. The fixation on class as a determinant of thought and behavior leads Sverdlin and Rogachev to discount the presence of elements of social and cultural unity in "heterogeneous" nations, their main concession being the admission that language is a form of cultural community within such nations. By the same token, however, they claim that in the Russian empire ties of friendship between the masses of different nations and peoples were very strong, and that the tendency for nations to come together had become predominant even under capitalism. Predictably, Sverdlin and Rogachev stress the internal psychological and cultural cohesion of the "homogeneous" socialist nations of the USSR, linking this to changes in class structure brought about by the rapid overcoming of economic backwardness. Intranational unity at the same time signifies international unity, because proletarian ideology is the dominant element in the homogeneous culture of Soviet nations, and this ideology is international by nature.

Not surprisingly, Sverdlin and Rogachev set a rapid timetable for the movement of Soviet nations toward "full unity." By asserting that socially homogeneous nations are the "highest" type of nation, they imply that nations in the Soviet Union have already approached the peak of their existence. They view the "Soviet people" (*sovetskii narod*)—a new and higher ethnic group to which all Soviet citizens are said to belong—as a transitional community bridging national and "national-less" (*beznatsionalnoe*) social life.

The implications of Kaltakhchian's methodology are likewise revealed in his views about presocialist nations. He suggests, for instance, that even the *narodnost* (people) stage of ethnic development is permeated with class conflict. He also points out that "the nation does not have a mandatory direct genetic connection with . . . prenational forms of

[31] *Istoriia SSSR*, No. 3, 1962, p. 43. In his *Voprosy istorii* article, Dzhunusov explains (p. 29) that "development" means not only industrial and agricultural programs, but also growth in national self-awareness and pride.

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community of people [primitive human herd, family tribe, people] either biologically or psychologically." [32] Sverdlin and Rogachev, he indicates, inadvertently exaggerate the cohesion of socially heterogeneous nations by speaking of "community of economic life"; rather, one should speak merely of "community of economic ties" among antagonistic classes. He emphasizes, as they do, that "Marx and Engels proved that from the time nationalities, and then nations, arose, the popular masses were always their foundation, their nucleus." [33] This assumption makes it easier for him to argue that

On the one hand, V. I. Lenin points out the need to take into account the polarization of character and culture of antagonistic classes in one and the same nation, while on the other hand he shows how people of different nations (in the given case V. I. Lenin has in mind the toiling masses) can have many features in common.[34]

Kaltakhchian's definition of nationhood implies a still sharper contrast between presocialist and socialist nations than that of Sverdlin and Rogachev. He even criticizes the latter for underestimating the "real community of national culture and national character" of socialist nations, heavily stressing instead the "internationalization" that has taken place. Tensions among the Soviet nationalities are dismissed with the observation that "with the disappearance of social antagonisms, national antagonisms also disappeared in the USSR." His projection of existing trends into the future foresees the simultaneous "flourishing" and "coming together" of nations and their "merger" when a "mature Communist society" is created in the Soviet Union.

The moderate interpretation of the "laws of development" of nations in the USSR can be seen in Dzhunusov's writings. His article in *Voprosy istorii* distinguishes "ethnic community" from "social community" (class, occupational, and geographical groups). "Ethnic community" (defined in terms of common language, ethnic territory, economic ties, ethnic self-consciousness, and specific features of culture and character) is the substance which underlies ethnic evolution. "The categories, 'tribe,' 'people,' 'nation' express stages of development of the ethnic community of people. They have not just different but common features. . . ." [35] Consequently, the roots of nations extend far into the past. In the post-Stalin period Dzhunusov has been among those who have denied that the Central Asian peoples ever developed into "bourgeois nations." Accordingly he minimizes the emergence of class differentiation in this region before the Revolution.[36] At the same time he points to the oppressed colonial status of the peoples of prerevolutionary Central Asia, the Caucasus, and neighboring areas to the South, openly admits the existence of conflict in Central Asia between natives and Russian settlers, and calls attention to the prerevolutionary "national-liberalism movement." Stressing the damage which the "cult of personality" inflicted on national relations in the USSR, he indicates that certain inequalities still persist and that a conscious effort must be made to prevent "collisions" among "national interests." He asserts that nations will exist in the USSR well after class differences have disappeared, and criticizes Sverdlin and Rogachev for implying the opposite by including "existence of a working class" among the characteristics of nationhood. He foresees a continued conversion of "peoples" (*narodnosti*) into nations and a further growth of the nations themselves.

Mnatsakanian also warns that one should not "absolutize" the differences between the three basic types of nations: "nations of capitalist society, socialist and Communist [*sic*] nations." They are linked to one another by "deep continuity." A socialist economic system, Mnatsakanian argues, will not by itself assure unity in a multinational country. There must also be "democratic political institutions and political mutual relations based on the principles of equality and respect for the state independence and sovereignty of nations." [37] *Political* as well as economic and cultural functions still remain to be performed by national state forms. National statehood will provide the necessary setting in which the two *equally* important and mutually reinforcing tendencies of "flourishing" and "coming together" of nations can find their fullest expression. It will also guarantee the ultimate "merging" of nations, and thus must continue to exist *until* the latter takes place. But the merging of nations, Mnatsakanian notes, is "a very lengthy process."

Burmistrova's view of the laws of development does not differ fundamentally from Dzhunusov's or Mnatsakanian's. Her interpretation is marked, however, by its emphasis on the distinction between

[32] *Voprosy istorii*, No. 6, 1966, p. 35.
[33] *Ibid*, p. 31.
[34] *Filosofskie nauki*, No. 5, 1964, p. 31.
[35] *Voprosy istorii*, No. 4, 1966, p. 22.
[36] *Istoriia SSSR*, No. 4, 1961, pp. 5-6.
[37] *Voprosy istorii*, No. 9, 1966, p. 34.

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premonopoly capitalist nations and imperialist nations. She also evokes the distinction between oppressed and oppressing nations under Tsarist rule, attributing the nationalism of the former to a reaction against the chauvinism of the latter.[38] Needless to say, most if not all of the non-Russian nations of the Russian empire fall into the premonopoly capitalist/oppressed category.

More Disagreements

The same controversy over facts and values that appears in all the literature on nationality policy (see footnote 3) can be detected in the *Voprosy istorii* articles. But there are some special issues as well. The most important of these is the evident disagreement over how important class relationships are in understanding nationality problems. The assimilationists take an unrefined "class" approach in their writings. Moderates, on the contrary, think that "one must not forget the complex correlation and interweaving of class and national features in culture." [39]

Another issue—less explicit—concerns the extent to which empirical facts and actual popular attitudes, rather than citations from the "classics" and policy objectives, should govern the description of national relations. Most assimilationists present little in the way of hard data to support their conclusions, preferring quotations from Marx, Engels, Lenin, and even—in the case of Kaltakhchian—19th-century Russian radicals. In contrast, Dzhunusov's appeal for an empirical, multidisciplinary approach (he includes social psychology and ethnography) to the analysis of nationality problems is especially noteworthy.

Still a third area of disagreement involves the connection between domestic nationality policy and the Soviet Union's foreign environment. Those writers who are attempting to revise the concept of nationhood wish to emphasize the opportunities for successful Communist-led class struggle in Western Europe, while constricting the sphere of independent activity on the part of the East European states. At the same time they are eager to remove analytic obstacles which hinder the expansion of Soviet influence in underdeveloped countries. They seem particularly sensitive to the problem of Chinese racist appeals. Thus we find Sverdlin and Rogachev arguing that the "bourgeois nation" concept led to an underestimation of the combined strength of anticapitalist forces in Western nations, prevented a proper understanding of the "class content of the national liberation movement" in underdeveloped countries, and hindered the "struggle against bourgeois and reformist ideology, against sectarians and dogmatists." [40] Kaltakhchian explains his opposition to psychological interpretations of nationhood on the grounds that they lead to racism and national communism.

The writers who oppose revision of the definition of nationhood are less attuned to foreign policy in general, and to an activist, dynamic foreign policy in particular. They appear interested mainly in proving that a favorable domestic nationality policy image is relevant to the achievement of Soviet objectives abroad. In addition, they urge, *sotto voce*, that relations between nations within the USSR could benefit from the example provided by other multinational socialist countries and even by intrabloc relations. Dzhunusov, who has specialized on the subject of how the backward national minorities of the USSR have "bypassed capitalism," [41] not unnaturally dwells upon the imperialists' fear that ex-colonial nations will be attracted by the Soviet Central Asian model of economic and social development. He sees more of a place in history for the trail blazed in Central Asia than that in China. Just as other countries can learn from the Soviet Union, so theories about national relations developed in other multinational socialist countries, as well as experience drawn from relations among socialist countries, can enrich Soviet thinking.

Mnatsakanian repeatedly argues that high stakes are involved in foreign as well as domestic perceptions of Soviet nationality policy:

> **Belittling the role of national statehood in general, and Soviet [statehood] in particular, cannot serve the goal of further consolidating the friendship of peoples of the USSR, of strengthening the unity of the socialist system, nor the goal of winning over ideologically and politically the masses of both developed capitalist states and of young countries liberated from colonial oppression.[42]**

Assimilationists ignore the image argument. Their silence can plausibly be interpreted to mean

[38] See *Voprosy istorii KPSS*, No. 2, 1965, pp. 41, 46.
[39] Dzhunusov, *Voprosy istorii*, No. 4, 1966, p. 18.
[40] *Voprosy filosofii*, No. 10, 1964, pp. 179-80.
[41] The literature on "bypassing capitalism," including Dzhunusov's own writings, stresses flexibility in the implementation of centrally-determined policies and sensitivity toward the feelings and needs of the nationalities being guided from precapitalist social structures to socialism.
[42] *Voprosy istorii*, No. 9, 1966, p. 34.

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either that they think people in other countries are indifferent to what happens in the Soviet national republics, or that they consider rapid "internationalization" at home more important than any possible propaganda losses abroad. Perhaps they are also concerned about the influence of foreign models on domestic life.

Ideology and Politics

What are the implications of the *Voprosy istorii* symposium? The directions in which the two models of methodology and laws point are obvious enough. To say that all the defining characteristics of nationhood need not be present for a nation to exist is to tolerate, or even advocate, infringement of the characteristics. To stress the primacy of economic ties as the foundation of nationhood while minimizing psychological factors is to hold that as the economies of the national republics become increasingly merged into a single indivisible whole, so the nations will automatically dissolve. The argument that presocialist nations were racked by class conflict implies that the lines between "progressive" and "reactionary" ideologies were sharply drawn, which in practice means to label "bourgeois" most indigenous prerevolutionary political and intellectual movements. And to suggest that nations under socialism are utterly different from presocialist nations in the sense that no tensions exist within or among them is in effect to deny the existence of a "nationality problem," thereby gainsaying both the need for therapeutic measures and the presence of "objective" obstacles preventing the merging of nations.

But do the symposium articles represent anything more than the strictly personal views of the individual participants? The articles *are*, to be sure, expressions of personal positions. At the same time, they do reflect a number of important features of the general academic discussion of national relations in the Soviet Union. They bring into focus the two ideological models which for some years have competed for favor among the specialists. They offer some evidence that within the academic community assimilationist policies have attracted greater support among the "philosophers" than among the more empirically-oriented disciplines. They illustrate that there is no necessary correlation between doctrinal orthodoxy and political Stalinism, or between theoretical innovation and practical reformism. They demonstrate that even when a press organ seems to favor one particular line in the discussion of nationality, pressures exist which compel publication of opposing opinions. And they show how the ranks on either side include both Russians and non-Russians.

Under present conditions it is highly unlikely that the discussions will *directly* determine how specialists in history, linguistics, literature, and other disciplines will treat their subjects with respect to the nationality problem, even though the matters discussed in the symposium are of obvious theoretical relevance. Not only has there been no authoritative editorial summing-up of the discussion as yet, but it is doubtful whether anyone would feel bound by such an expression of sentiment if it were not backed by a party resolution. The discussions are, however, an important battle in a many-sided struggle to capture support within the academic community for either rapid or slow "internationalization."

The question remains whether it makes any difference what Soviet academicians think or say about nationality policy. The first observation to be made is that the connection between academic views and "reality" is very close in many activities which influence mass or elite attitudes (*e.g.*, literary criticism or history textbook writing). Secondly, it is inevitable that the ideological guardians of tomorrow, if not of today also, will be affected by ideas abroad in the intellectual community. Thirdly, it is difficult to see how some academicians (like Sverdlin and Rogachev, or Dzhunusov) could not be receiving direct or indirect support from like-minded politicians. If this assumption is warranted, then it follows that the academic debate in all likelihood mirrors differences of opinion within the political elite.

The very fact that there has been a continuing academic discussion of nationality affairs without an official line being laid down is highly significant. Nationality policy is an overtly political matter which has a direct and profound bearing upon the stability of Soviet rule. The relatively broad freedom of expression enjoyed by individual debaters of diametrically opposed views already seems to have led to the crystallization of a non-official public opinion about this highly sensitive question. Such a development in itself represents a certain diffusion of political power. During Stalin's reign the right to define the issues in national relations was a jealously-guarded prerogative of the leader. The party leadership's failure so far to intervene overtly in nationality discussions may reflect a desire at the

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moment not to set long-term guidelines. But continued abstinence could indicate an inability to reach minimal agreement over policy. Signs of nationalist feelings, especially among the non-Russian intelligentsia, have not been lacking in recent years. Nevertheless, it is questionable how significant these feelings can be in the face of a united and determined Communist leadership. If—as suggested above—differences of opinion do exist *within* the leadership as well, this cannot help but complicate the problem of managing national relations in the Soviet Union.

A MATTER OF DEFINITION(S)

A nation is an historically evolved, stable community of people, formed on the basis of a common language, territory, economic life, and psychological makeup manifested in a common culture.

—Josef Stalin, *Marxism and the National Question*, Moscow, Foreign Language Publishing House, 1950, p. 16.

Such characteristics of a nation as community of territory and economic community have in the given case almost completely lost their former significance. Community of psychological makeup, manifesting itself in a community of culture, has also undergone serious modification. Among the contemporary nations of the Soviet socialist state only community of national language is fully preserved, and this undoubtedly will exist for a very long time. Thus, of the four criteria of a nation which are obligatory, according to Stalin, only one has permanent significance while the three remaining ones will gradually die away. But the nations will continue to exist. This means that the time has come to review the formula which says that if all four of the characteristics noted above are not present, then a nation does not exist. Under the new historical conditions this formula is no longer applicable.

—Ye. M. Zhukov, *Voprosy istorii*, No. 12 ,1961, p. 9.

A nation is an historically evolved community of individuals, characterized by stable community of economic life (with the existence of a working class), territory, language (especially a literary language), and self-consciousness of ethnic identity, as well as by some specific features of psychology and traditions of everyday life, culture and struggle for liberation.

—M. A. Sverdlin and P. M. Rogachev, *Voprosy istorii*, No. 1, 1966, p. 45.

A nation . . . is a social-historical phenomenon, it evolved into a stable community of people in the capitalist stage of social development. The main characteristic features of a nation are community of territory, language, and economic ties of people.

—S. T. Kaltakhchian, *Filosofskie nauki*, No. 5, 1964, p. 27.

A nation is a large group of people distinguished by stable community of language, ethnic territory, national self-consciousness, and specific national traits of culture and character, formed in the course of development of either capitalist or socialist economic relationships.

—M. S. Dzhunusov, *Voprosy istorii*, No. 4, 1966, p. 20.

A nation is an historically evolved, stable community of people who have a common language, common territory, common economic ties and a common state structure.

—M. O. Mnatsakanian, *Voprosy istorii*, No. 9, 1966, p .35.

A nation is a social-ethnic community of people manifested in the unity of an industrial economy, territory, written language, character, and culture.

—T. Yu. Burmistrova, *Voprosy istorii*, No. 12, 1966, pp. 108-09.

A nation is a concrete-historical community of people, in which the most stable ethnic attributes (language, territory, specific features of character, culture, and ethnic self-consciousness) have grown into elements of national life, are combined with the developed economic and social-political relations of class society (bourgeois and socialist), and with the primary forms of those broad international ties which are creating the basis for the growth of the nation into an international community of people.

—N. P. Ananchenko, *Voprosy istorii*, No. 3, 1967, p. 95.

The nation, which has historically evolved in the epoch of capitalism and socialism, is a complex, highly-developed, uniform, stable, dynamic community of people who are firmly bound together by an organic unity of language, territory, economic life, self-consciousness of ethnic identity and national character—of psychological makeup which is revealed in all spheres of social life, especially and more noticeably in various . . . forms of material and spiritual culture, and in everyday life, traditions, morals and customs.

—N. A. Tavakalian, *Voprosy istorii*, No. 2, 1967, p. 118.

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The Rulers and the Ruled

By Yaroslav Bilinsky

In a report published under the auspices of UNESCO five years ago, I. P. Tsamerian and S. L. Ronin described the "general nationality policy of the Soviet state" as designed "to insure the more rapid development of formerly backward nations in all fields," adding that "only such a policy is capable of bringing about genuine equality between all the republics which make up the great land of socialism, the Soviet Union, and between all the peoples and nationalities inhabiting it." [1] Similar enthusiasm for this policy was voiced just last year by T. Usabaliev, the native First Secretary of the Communist Party of Kirghizia. "One of the remarkable results of the development of Soviet Kirghizia," he wrote, "has been the creation of her own national cadres. In our epoch, this constitutes one of the most significant indices of a nation's maturity and the most important condition of its geuine progress." [2]

If these quotations are taken at face value, the central objective of Soviet nationality policy would appear to be to raise the cultural, political, social and economic level of the various minority peoples of the USSR so as to ensure their attainment of "genuine equality" as Soviet citizens. The present article proposes to examine in detail one of the most important criteria of the attainment of this proclaimed objective: namely, the extent of political participation by the diverse nationalities as measured by their representation in the major organs of political rule in the USSR.

The problem of nationality representation has been an extraordinarily complex one for the Soviet Union. The Soviet census of 1959 listed as many as 109 different ethnic groups, 22 of which numbered more than 900,000 members each. Russians constitute a majority in the country as a whole and in the Russian Federative Republic, but they are a minority in the other union republics. The non-Russian peoples, on the other hand, are minorities in the total Soviet population, but virtually all of them (except the Kazakhs and the Kirghiz) constitute majorities in their own native regions, which were conquered by the Russian Tsars at different times, some as late as the second half of the 19th century. To add to the complexity, some of these regions were as much, if not more, advanced economically and socially than the Russian metropolis, while others (*e.g.*, in Central Asia) were inhabited

[1] I. P. Tsamerian and S. L. Ronin, *Equality of Rights Between Races and Nationalities in the USSR*, Paris, UNESCO, 1962, p. 100.

[2] T. Usubaliev, "Internatsionalizm—istochnik nashevo razvitiia," *Kommunist*, No. 15 (October) 1966, p. 15. This article was dedicated to the 40th anniversary of the Kirghiz SSR.

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by semi-nomadic tribes. The Jews, who were openly discriminated against under the Tsars, presented a special problem of their own.

Evolution of Nationality Policy

Before 1917, governing power rested in the hands of Russians and a sprinkling of Russified Germans, Ukrainians and others. Much to the credit of the Soviet regime, it explicitly recognized the existence of the nationalities problem, barred antisemitic discrimination (at least during the 1920's), set up formally sovereign union republics for the larger peoples, and went about training indigenous personnel in all walks of life. The less developed the area, the more accelerated was to be the pace of advancement: indigenous cadres were to be produced as quickly as possible and by the thousands. Partly to facilitate this process and partly to appeal to the already existing indigenous intelligentsias, the native languages were introduced as the principal medium of instruction in the rapidly expanding school systems of the non-Russian republics. This was, in essence, the famous policy of *korenizatsiia*—a term sometimes translated as "indigenization" [3]—which was initiated about 1921.

The controlling purpose of this policy was, however, precisely what its name implied: an effort by the central authority to take root in the non-Russian areas. The results soon became apparent. To take Kazakhstan as an example, only 349, or 4.4 percent, of the 8,618 members of the Kazakh Communist Party organization were native Kazakhs at the beginning of 1922, but by January 1, 1937, the proportion of Kazakhs had risen to 48.8 percent.[4] In the middle 1930's, however, the policy of *korenizatsiia* was abandoned. A respectable minimum of indigenous personnel had been trained and placed. At the same time, some of the newly-installed native party leaders began arguing that *korenizatsiia* was a poor substitute for real political and cultural autonomy and started questioning the continued absolute predominance of the central authorities. They were at first eliminated one by one—Sultan Galiev, Khvylovy, Skrypnyk—and then liquidated by the thousands during Stalin's Great Purge. Above all, strict centralization and the utilization of existing cadres from the more advanced nationalities (Russians, Georgians, Armenians, Ukrainians, and Jews) were considered more compatible with centralized planning and rapid industrialization than a policy emphasizing the systematic advancement of the less-developed nationalities.

The first seven postwar years saw a trend toward extreme glorification of everything Russian, which was heralded by Stalin's well-known toast to the Russian people on May 24, 1945. Although the growth of the native intelligentsia in the non-Russian republics continued, it was less openly favored by the regime, and the emerging *natsionaly* were subjected to heavy pressures for Russification. As for the Jews, Stalin instituted a particularly strident policy of discrimination against them in 1948, and a decision taken in the same year aimed at the destruction of Soviet Jewry as a community.

Stalin's death brought relief to all the non-Russian peoples with the exception of the Jews. In his drive to power between 1953 and 1958, Khrushchev deliberately courted party officials in the outlying republics, where he faced less challenge than in Moscow itself, and this benefited local non-Russian party leaders. Some of them were elevated to responsible positions in Moscow, and at the same time their fellow countrymen in the republics were given greater authority in economic administration and more leeway in cultural policy.

Recent Policy

In mid-1958, however, Khrushchev reversed the more liberal nationalities policy which he himself had instituted. With the defeat of the "anti-party group," the ouster of Zhukov in 1957, and Bulganin's forced resignation in 1958, Khrushchev may have felt that his position was sufficiently consolidated so that he need no longer woo the support of the non-Russian party organizations. At the same time, in the wake of the essentially nationalist-inspired upheavals of 1956 in Poland and Hungary, unrest was beginning to spread to the non-Russian republics of the USSR. One manifestation of this was an attempt by the Latvian party organization to place restrictions on non-Latvian personnel, which led to a wholesale purge of its leadership in mid-1959.[5] Still another factor which influenced the

[3] See Tsamerian and Ronin, *op. cit.*, pp. 52-53, for a description of the policy in Kazakhstan. For an excellent concise analysis, see Merle Fainsod, *How Russia Is Ruled* (2nd Ed.), Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1963, pp. 360-64, especially the resolution of the 10th Party Congress.

[4] N. A. Barsukov, A. R. Shaydullin, and I. N. Yudin, "KPSS—partiia internatsionalnaia," *Voprosy istorii KPSS*, No. 7 (July) 1966, p. 12.

[5] See the well-documented account by V. Hazners, "Nationalism and Local Tendencies in Occupied Latvia," *Baltic Review*, No. 19, March 1960, pp. 43-47.

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
Source: TsSU SSSR, Itogi vsesoyuznoy perepisi naseleniya 1959 goda (Results of the All-Union Census of Population of 1959), Moscow, Gosstatizdat, 1962 and 1963. (15 volumes.)
PERCENT RUSSIAN
90 to 100
70 to 89.9
50 to 69.9
30 to 49.9
10 to 29.9
Under 10
(Shadings for areas surrounding capital cities do not take into account data for the capital)

Russians as a Percent of the Population, by Administrative Area: January 1959

Reproduced from *New Directions in the Soviet Economy*, Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States, US Government Printing Office, 1966, p. 635.

shift in nationalities policy was Khrushchev's decision, spurred by the ideological challenge from Communist China, to accelerate the Soviet advance toward communism. "Building communism" became the slogan of the extraordinary 21st Party Congress in January 1959 and the premise of the new Party Program of 1961. (Though this theme has since been deemphasized somewhat, and the timetable for the attainment of communism extended, the Program still remains binding.)

In the field of nationality relations, this policy has entailed a more pronounced subordination of the interests and aspirations of the individual nationalities to the interests of the Soviet Union and its predominant ethnic group, the Russians. The teaching of Russian in the schools of the non-Russian republics has been pushed despite protests from several of these republics.[6] So has the large-scale immigration of workers and other personnel from the more advanced Soviet republics even though it resulted in lowering the indigenous peoples' share in the population of their own republics. This was justified on the ground that the less advanced non-Russian republics could not develop their own resources without outside help,[7] and also that the exchange of people and cadres would contribute towards a harmonious fusing together of nationalities and thus hasten the advent of communism. That a breakdown of national barriers could result in ethnic inequality and discrimination was admitted only for capitalist countries.[8]

Since Khrushchev's fall, the emphasis on inter-republican exchange of personnel has continued and in the long run may threaten the progress of the less advanced peoples towards autonomy and full political equality. Usubaliev's earlier-quoted article

[6] For documentation of this, see author's "The Soviet Education Laws of 1958-59 and Soviet Nationality Policy," *Soviet Studies* (London), October 1962, pp. 138-57.

[7] P. Rogachev and M. Sverdlin, "Sovetskii narod—novaia istoricheskaia obshchnost liudei," *Kommunist*, No. 9 (June) 1963, p. 15. See also E. V. Tadevesyan, "Dalneisheie sblizheniie sotsialisticheskikh natsii v SSSR," *Voprosy filosofii*, No. 6 (June) 1963, p. 5.

[8] Tadevosian, *loc. cit.*

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on the 40th anniversary of the Kirghiz SSR is quite revealing on this score. Noting that the past policy of the Communist Party had been to encourage indigenous cadres in the various republics to assume responsibility for their affairs, he said that at the present stage the situation is different because "now we have well-trained personnel in all fields of activity." (Curiously enough, he had just remarked on the preceding page of his article that of the 300,000 workers in industry, construction and transport, and in the sovkhozes of the Kirghiz republic, "more than 66 thousand"—actually, only 22 percent—were Kirghiz.[9]) He went on to explain:

The significance of training personnel (kadrov) from among the indigenous nationality remains. But this problem now assumes a new character. Now we must concentrate our attenton not merely on the nationality of the cadres, but especially on their real abilities, their talents, qualifications, and know how. We must pick the best.[10]

Representation in the Party

Having briefly surveyed the general trend of Soviet nationality policy, let us proceed to look at some of the key measures of political participation by members of the indigenous nationalities in the non-Russian republics. Since membership in the Communist Party is a basic prerequisite for political participation and advancement, a highly important measure is to be found in statistics showing what proportion of party members in a particular republic are citizens of the indigenous or "titular" nationality (*i.e.*, Armenians in the Armenian Republic, Kirghiz in the Kirghiz Republic, etc.). Soviet writers on nationality questions do not speak of a quota system as such in this connection, but it has been claimed that admissions to party membership generally follow the ethnic composition of the population in the individual republics. Thus, *e.g.*, an article published in July 1966 stated:

In 1964 the relative share of persons of the indigenous nationality among those admitted to candidate status in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union constituted: in the CP of Armenia, 91.8 percent; Belorussia, 78.6 percent; Georgia, 78.2 percent; Lithuania, 76.1 percent; Azerbaijan, 74.4 percent; Ukraine, 71.7 percent; Tadjikistan, 68.5 percent; Estonia, 61 percent; Uzbekistan, 60.3 percent, etc. This data reflects to a definite degree (*v opredelennoi mere*) the relative share of the indigenous nationality among the population of this or that union republic. At the same time it also shows that the Communist Party of each republic constitutes a genuinely international organization including representatives of many nations and peoples.[11]

The article further claimed that all public organizations in the USSR follow the party's model in distributing their membership among the various nationalities.

Certainly, however, the correlation between the proportion of newly-admitted candidate members of the titular nationality and that nationality's share in the total population of the particular republic is not very precise. For instance, according to the 1959 census, Armenians constituted only 88.0 percent of the population of the Armenian Republic,[12] as compared with the 91.8 percent cited above as the Armenians' share of new party admissions in 1964. In the case of Estonia, the discrepancy is much greater and in the opposite direction: Estonians in 1959 constituted 74.6 percent of the population of the Estonian SSR, whereas their share of new party admissions in 1964 was only 61 percent. For some of the non-Russian republics, such as the Kazakh SSR, similar data on party admissions have not been published.[13]

Data showing the nationality composition of the republican parties as a whole have been relatively little publicized, but there is reason to believe that the discrepancies here may be even more pronounced than in the case of new party admissions in a single year. For example, Ukrainians constituted only 60.3 percent of the membership of the Ukrainian CP in 1958,[14] as contrasted with their 76.8 percent share of the population and 71.7 percent of 1964 new party admissions. Similarly, Lithuanians made up only 61.5 percent of the Lithuanian CP membership in 1965,[15] as compared

[9] Usubaliev, *loc. cit.*, pp. 15-16. In 1959, the Kirghiz constituted 40.5 percent of the republic's population. (See Tsentralnoe Statisticheskoe Upravlenie pri Sovete Ministrov SSSR, *Itogi vsesoiuznoi perepisi naselenia 1959 goda: SSSR*, Moscow, 1962, p. 208. Hereafter cited as *Itogi perepisi.*)

[10] Usubaliev, *loc. cit.*, p. 16.

[11] Barsukov *et al.*, *loc. cit.*, p. 13.

[12] Census figures cited here and subsequently are taken from *Itogi perepisi, op. cit.*, pp. 202-10 (Table 54).

[13] The percentage figures quoted above on party admissions in non-Russian republics were apparently taken from an earlier article ("KPSS v tsifrakh, 1961-1964 gody") in *Partiinaia zhizn*, No. 10 (May) 1965, p. 12. This article, too, omits figures for several republics.

[14] "KPU v tsifrakh," *Partiinaia zhizn*, No. 12 (June) 1958, p. 59; or Y. Bilinsky, *The Second Soviet Republic: The Ukraine after World War II*, New Brunswick, Rutgers University Press, 1964, p. 231.

[15] S. Atamukas, "Kommunisticheskaia partiia Litvy v tsifrakh," *Kommunist* (Vilnius), No. 9 (September) 1965, p. 33. (Reference by courtesy of Professors Panas Fedenko and V. Stanley Vardys.)

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with their 79.3-percent proportion of the population and 76.1 percent of new admissions in 1964.

Nevertheless, the July 1966 article referred to above clearly implies that not only the Communist Party but all public organizations in the USSR, at least in the recruitment of new members, follow a system of nationality quotas roughly proportional to the ethnic composition of the republican populations. This assumption is reinforced by evidence obtained by Nicholas DeWitt regarding the existence of a system of "equivalent balances" used to determine actual nationality quotas for admission

TABLE I

Nationality Representation in the Leading Organs of Union Republics

REPUBLICS	Percent tit. naty.* 1959	YEAR	PARTY PRESIDIUM (POLITBURO) AND SECRETARIAT			COUNCIL OF MINISTERS				
			1st Secy.	2nd Secy.	Remaining Members	Chairman	1st Deputy Chairmen	Deputy Chairmen	Chm. Gos-plan	Chm. KGB
Russian	83.3	1961	R**	R	8 R, 1 Uk	Uk	1 R	4 R, 2 X	R	***
		1966	0	0	0	R	3 R	1 R, 4 X	R	***
Ukrainian	76.8	1961	Uk	Uk	11 Uk	Uk	2 Uk	3 Uk, 2 X	Uk	Uk
		1966	Uk	Uk	12 Uk, 1 R, 1 BR	Uk	2 Uk	2 Uk, 3 X	X	Uk
Belorussian	81.1	1961	BR	BR	9 BR ,1 R, 2 X	BR	2 BR	2 BR, 1 X	R	R
		1966	BR	BR	8 BR, 2 R, 1 X	BR	1 BR	3 BR, 2 X	BR	R
Uzbek	62.2	1961	Uz	R	6 Uz, 4 R, 1 Ar, 1 X	Uz	1 R	3 X	X	R
		1966	Uz	R	7 Uz, 1 R, 2 X	Uz	1 Uz	1 Uz, 1 Ar, 4 X	X	R
Kazakh	30.0	1961	Ka	R	5 Ka, 2 R, 2 Uk, 1 Ui, 1 X,	Ka	1 Uk	2 Ka, 1 R, 1 TT, 1 X	R	X
		1966	Ka	Uk	3 Ka, 2 R, 1 Uk, 1 Ar, 1 TT, 2 X	Ka	1 X, 1 Ar	1 Ka, 1 TT, 3 X	TT	R
Georgian	64.3	1961	G	R	11 G, 1 Uk, 1 X	G	1 G	2 X	X	G
		1966	G	R	10 G, 1 Uk, 1 X	G	1 G	1 G, 4 X	X	G
Azerbaijani	67.5	1961	Az	Uk	6 Az, 1 R, 5 X	Az	1 Az, 1 X	1 Az	Az	R
		1966	Az	R	5 Az, 1 Ar, 1 R, 3 X	Az	1 Az, 1 X	2 Az, 2 X	Uk	X
Lithuanian	79.3	1961	Li	R	7 Li, 7 X	Li	1 Li, 1 X	1 Li	Li	Li
		1966	Li	R	6 Li, 5 X	Li	1 Li	3 Li, 1 X	Li	Li
Moldavian	65.4	1961	M	R	2 M, 2 R, 1 Uk, 6 X	M	1 Uk, 1 X	1 M	X	X
		1966	M	Uk	5 M, 2 R, 4 X	M	1 R	4 X	X	X
Latvian	62.0	1961	La	R	10 La, 1 BR, 3 X	La	1 La	1 La	X	X
		1966	La	Uk	7 La, 1 Os, 2 X	La	1 La	2 La, 2 X	X	X
Kirghiz	40.5	1961	Ki	R	4 Ki, 2 Uk, 7 X	Ki	1 Uk	1 Ki, 1 X	X	X
		1966	Ki	R	4 Ki, 1 R, 5 X	Ki	1 R	1 Ki, 3 X	X	X
Tadjik	53.1	1961	Ta	Uk	3 Ta, 1 Uz, 2 R, 1 Uk, 2 X	Ta	1 R	1 Uz, 3 X	***	Uk
		1966	Ta	Uk	4 Ta, 2 R, 5 X	Ta	2 R	1 Uz, 2 X	X	R
Armenian	88.0	1961	Ar	Ar	8 Ar, 4 X	Ar	1 Ar	2 X	X	Ar
		1966	Ar	Ar	7 Ar, 5 X	Ar	1 Ar	4 X	X	Ar
Turkmen	60.9	1961	Tu	R	4 Tu, 3 R, 5 X	Tu	1 R	2 X	X	R
		1966	Tu	R	4 Tu, 1 Uz, 1 R, 4 X	Tu	1 R	4 X	X	R
Estonian	74.5	1961	E	E	5 E, 8 X	E	1 E	2 X	E	X
		1966	E	E	5 E, 5 X	E	1 E	2 E, 2 X	E	X

NOTES: * Percent of titular nationality, *e.g.*, Kirghiz in Kirghizia, Uzbeks in Uzekistan, *etc.*

** Key to nationality abbreviations: Ar—Armenian; Az—Azerbaijani; BR—Belorussian; E—Estonian; G—Georgian; Ka—Kazakhs; Ki—Kirghiz; La—Latvian; Li—Lithuanian; M—Moldavian; Os—Ossetian; R—Russian; TT—Tatar; Ta—Tadjik; Tu—Turkmen; Ui—Uigur; Uk—Ukrainian; Uz—Uzbek; X—Nationality unknown. *** Information not available.

SOURCES: Percentage of titular nationality from Tsentralnoe Statisticheskoe Upravlenie pri Sovete Ministrov SSSR, *Itogi vsesoiuznoi perepisi naselenia 1959 goda: SSSR* (Moscow, 1962), Table 54, pp. 202-08. Party Presidium and Secretariat data for 1961 from Institute for the Study of the USSR, Research Section, *XXII Party Congress and Personnel Changes among the Top Staff of the CPSU and the CP's of the Union Republics* (Munich, 1961; mimeo); those for 1966 from Bolshaia Sovetskaia Entsyklopediia, *Yezhegodnik BSE. na 1966 god* (Moscow, 1967), pp. 115, 120, 124, 130, 134, 138, 144, 148, 178, 182, 196, and from *Bakinskii Rabochii*, February 27, 1966, p. 1, *Kommunist Tadzhikistana*, March 4, 1966, p. 1, and *Radianska Ukraiina*, March 19, 1966, p. 1.

Councils of Ministers in 1961 from Dr. Heinrich E. Schulz & Dr. Stephen S. Taylor eds., *Who's Who in the USSR 1961/62* (Montreal: Intercontinental Book & Publishing Co., 1962), pp. 936-63; those for 1966 from Institute for the Study of the USSR, Biographic Section, *Key Officials of the Government, Part II: The Union Republics* (Munich 1966; 2nd ed.)

Nationality identification based on: *Deputaty Verkhovnovo Soveta SSSR: shestoi sozyv* (Moscow, 1962) and *ibid.: sedmoi sozyv* (Moscow, 1966), supplemented by *Deputaty Soveta Soiuza i Soveta Natsionalnostei: piatyi sozyv* (Moscow, 1958).

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to Soviet higher educational institutions. The basic principle of this system is that "the representation of any national or ethnic grouping in overall higher educational enrollment should be kept at approximately the same percentage level as the relation of the size of that body to total USSR population." [16]

While it is logical to suppose that some such quota system is followed in the recruitment of "national cadres" in the non-Russian republics, three important qualifications must be made. First, the quotas seem to apply primarily to what has aptly been called the "grassroots" membership of the party and not necessarily to the party *aktiv*, or elite.[17] Given the recent emphasis on the planned exchange of higher-level personnel among the various republics,[18] it may be assumed that certain key offices in the republican party hierarchies are filled according to a special, unwritten system of distribution. Secondly, certain ethnic groups, such as the Jews, who are not granted political autonomy as a group and enjoy few, if any, *communal* as opposed to *individual* rights,[19] may be subjected to extraordinary discrimination. Thirdly, and most important, certain nationalities may be especially favored at different times for political reasons.

Access to Key Republican Posts

Let us now see to what extent persons of the titular or indigenous nationality are represented in the key party and government positions in their own republics. Table 1 presents this data for the fifteen union republics, identifying by nationality the first and second party secretaries and the remaining members of the Politburo and Secretariat; and on the government side, the chairmen, first deputy chairmen and ordinary deputy chairmen of the republican Council of Ministers, and the heads of the republican Gosplan and KGB (security service). Column 2 shows the titular nationality's percentage of the total republican population. Data are given for two different years, 1961 and 1966, in order to indicate new trends in representation.

It is apparent to begin with that the party first secretary has been in all cases a person of indigenous nationality, while in most cases the second secretary has not. This is significant, for while the first secretary occupies the formally more prominent position and bears general political responsibility for affairs in his republic, the second secretary is as a rule the person in charge of the *kadry* and as such wields practical control over the entire republican party apparatus. In the Russian, Ukrainian and Belorussian republics, both posts are held by persons of the indigenous nationality, reflecting the favored status of these three Slavic nationalities. The two other exceptions—Estonia and Armenia—are less readily explainable, although in the case of Estonia the explanation may lie in the fact that the party leadership was purged for its excessive nationalism in 1950 and has since been dominated by a "Muscovite faction" made up of Estonians who spent the interwar years in the Soviet Union. In all the remaining ten republics, the second secretary is either a Russian or a Ukrainian, with the Russians predominating (though less so in 1966 than in 1961). Especially striking is the fact that the strong Georgian party, which had a Georgian second secretary from at least early 1949 until August 1956, has since had a Russian occupying that post—probably as a consequence of the disturbances which occurred in Georgia in March 1956 after Khrushchev denounced Stalin.

One significant phenomenon that is not apparent from the table is the high political casualty rate among the native first secretaries of the non-Russian republics. Between December 1958 and February 1966, the first secretaries of the Turkmenian, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, Latvian, Tadjikistan, Kirghizian and Armenian parties were all dishonorably relieved of office, and the first secretary of Kazakhstan was temporarily demoted to chairman of the Council of Ministers. Space does not permit detailed discussion of these cases, but in all of them except the Azerbaijan and Armenian dismissals, policy relating to the selection of cadres appears to have been one of the issues. For example, the first secretary of the Turkmenian party, S. Babaiev, who was dismissed in December 1958, was publicly castigated for having tried to give preference to indigenous rather than imported, non-native cadres.[20] Thus, the native party first

[16] Nicholas DeWitt, *Education and Professional Employment in the USSR*, Washington, D. C., National Science Foundation, 1961, p. 358 b.

[17] Michael Rywkin, *Russia in Central Asia*, New York, Collier, 1963, p. 104.

[18] The planned character of the exchange of cadres between republics is stressed in E. V. Tadevosian's report on the Frunze conference of October 1963, published in *Voprosy filosofii*, No. 2 (February) 1964, p. 159.

[19] On this distinction, see William Korey, "The Legal Position of the Jews in the Soviet Union," *Midstream*, May 1966, p. 57.

[20] See editorial, "The Leninist Forms of Party Life Must be Strictly Observed," *Kommunist Turkmenistana*, No. 2, 1959, as quoted in "'Nationalism' in the Soviet Muslim Republics," *Central Asian Review*, Vol. VII (1959), pp. 341-42.

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secretary may be only a figurehead, but it is one that is often likely to be cut off.

Turning to the major government posts in the republics, Table 1 shows that, as in the party, the top-ranking post—in this case, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers—is uniformly held by a person of indigenous nationality (although, curiously enough, a Ukrainian held the post in the RSFSR in 1961). The same appears to be true of the first deputy chairman(-men) in all the republics except those of Central Asia (Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kirghizia, Tadjikistan, Turkmenia), where one generally finds non-natives as first deputy or ordinary deputy chairmen. Of particular interest is the nationality of the chiefs of the republican KGB. In the Ukrainian, Georgian, Lithuanian and Armenian republics, they have been positively identified as persons of indigenous nationality; and, judging by the names, they may also have been natives in Kazakhstan (1961), Latvia (1961), and Estonia. On the other hand, in Belorussia, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan (1966), Azerbaijan, Tadjikistan and Turkmenia, the KGB chiefs were definitely either Russians or Ukrainians, and the same was probably true for Moldavia, Latvia (1966), and Kirghizia, although the nationality of the incumbents could not be positively ascertained.

Representation at the Center

Given the extreme centralization which characterizes the Soviet governing system, the representation of the different nationalities within their own respective union republics, "autonomous republics" or "autonomous regions" is far outweighed in importance by their representation in the central organs of power. Tables 2 and 3 endeavor to give a comprehensive overall picture of this representation in the top party organs—the full Central Committee and the Politburo/CC Secretariat combined—as well as in the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the all-Union Council of Ministers. As in Table 1, data are again given for two different years in order to pinpoint any new trends, the 1961-1962 figures representing the last Supreme Soviet, top party bodies, and Council of Ministers chosen under Khrushchev, and the 1966 figures representing the same bodies after the consolidation of Brezhnev's leadership. Table 2 also includes data showing the ethnic composition of the Communist Party as a whole in 1961 and 1965; however, it should be noted that in both years official figures were given only for those nationalities having union republics, leaving out of account almost 10 percent of total party membership.

First, a few general observations regarding the data presented in Table 2. For one thing, the figures showing the ethnic distribution of overall CPSU membership bring out the fact that the Central Asian, Baltic and Moldavian nationalities are generally underrepresented in the party on the basis of their percentage-shares of the total Soviet population. Secondly, as one scans the rest of the table from left to right—moving from the more representative to the more powerful, or (to use Bagehot's terms) from the more "dignified" to the more "efficient" institutions—it is apparent that the representation of the smaller nationalities thins out, while that of the three largest and most favored nationalities—the Russians, Ukrainians and Belorussians—becomes progressively more preponderant.

Taking a closer look at the individual institutions included in Table 2, it is striking that in the Supreme Soviet—the most representative national body but also the least powerful—the Russians and, to a lesser extent, the Ukrainians and Belorussians are actually underrepresented in relation to their proportions of the total population, while there is an overrepresentation of many of the lesser nationalities such as the Kazakhs, Georgians, Armenians, Azerbaijanis, Kirghiz, Latvians, Estonians, Bashkirs, etc. In large part, this stems from the system of representation in the second chamber of the Supreme Soviet, the Council of Nationalities, where each union republic, regardless of its population, has 32 delegates, each autonomous republic 11, and each autonomous *oblast* (region) five.[21] In specific cases, other factors may enter in: *e.g.*, the nearly triple overrepresentation of the Georgians may perhaps be explained in part by their proverbial national pride and the fact that, despite their small number, they are among the best-educated national groups in the USSR.[22]

In sharp contrast to the overrepresentation of some of the relatively insignificant nationalities is the approximate one-third underrepresentation of the Jews, who constitute 1.09 percent of the Soviet population while there are only five Jewish depu-

[21] See *Deputaty Verkhovnovo Soveta SSSR: sedmoi sozyv*, Moscow, 1966, pp. 3, 536 ff.

[22] According to the 1959 census, 375 out of 1,000 Georgians had secondary or higher education as compared with an all-Union average of 281 per thousand. (See *Itogi perepisi, op. cit.*, p. 234.) In 1960, the Georgians ranked fifth (after the Russians, Ukrainians, Jews, and Belorussians) in number of employed college graduates, though ranking only eighth in population. (See *Vysshee obrazovanie v SSSR: Statisticheskii sbornik*, Moscow, 1961, p. 67.)

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TABLE II

National Representation in the USSR Supreme Soviet and the CPSU

NATIONALITY	Population 1959		USSR Supreme Soviet 1962		USSR Supreme Soviet 1966		Communist Party (CPSU) 1961		Communist Party (CPSU) 1965		Central Committee, CPSU 1961 Full Ms.		Central Committee, CPSU 1961 Alternates		Central Committee, CPSU 1966 Full Ms.		Central Committee, CPSU 1966 Alternates		Presidium (Politburo) & Secretariat *** 1961		Presidium (Politburo) & Secretariat *** 1966	
	N('000)*	%	N**	%	N	%	N('000)	%	N('000)	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Russians	114,114	54.65	626	43.38	645	42.52	6,116.7	63.54	7,335.2	62.38	102	58.29	80	51.61	113	57.95	85	51.52	13	61.90	14	58.33
Ukrainians	37,253	17.84	211	14.62	200	13.18	1,412.2	14.67	1,813.4	15.42	35	20.00	24	15.48	36	18.46	21	12.73	3	14.29	4	16.67
Belorussians	7,913	3.79	54	374	56	3.69	287.0	2.98	386.0	3.28	6	3.43	5	3.23	10	5.13	2	1.21	1	4.76	2	8.33
Uzbeks	6,015	2.88	43	2.98	52	3.43	142.7	1.48	193.6	1.66	4	2.29	3	1.94	3	1.54	2	1.21	1	4.76	1	4.17
Kazakhs	3,622	1.73	33	2.29	36	2.37	149.2	1.55	181.3	1.54	2	1.14	1	0.65	4	2.05	1	0.61	0		1	4.17
Georgians	2,692	1.29	46	3.19	50	3.30	170.4	1.77	194.3	1.65	2	1.14	0		2	1.03	1	0.61	1	4.76	1	4.17
Azerbaijanis	2,940	1.41	45	3.12	47	3.10	106.1	1.10	141.9	1.21	1	0.57	1	0.65	1	0.51	1	0.61	0		0	
Lithuanians	2,326	1.11	30	2.08	32	2.11	42.8	0.44	61.5	0.53	1	0.57	2	1.29	1	0.51	2	1.21	0		0	
Moldavians	2,214	1.06	19	1.32	22	1.45	26.7	0.28	40.3	0.34	1	0.57	1	0.65	1	0.51	1	0.61	0		0	
Latvians	1,400	0.67	21	1.46	28	1.85	33.9	0.35	44.3	0.38	2	1.14	1	0.65	3	1.54	1	0.61	0		1	4.17
Kirghiz	967	0.46	19	1.32	23	1.52	27.3	0.28	35.0	0.30	1	0.57	1	0.65	1	0.51	1	0.61	0		0	
Tadzhiks	1,397	0.67	28	1.94	35	2.31	32.7	0.34	41.9	0.36	1	0.57	1	0.65	1	0.51	1	0.61	0		0	
Armenians	2,787	1.33	40	2.77	48	3.16	161.2	1.67	187.9	1.60	3	1.71	2	1.29	3	1.54	2	1.21	1	4.76	0	
Turkmens	1,002	0.48	19	1.32	27	1.78	27.3	0.28	32.4	0.28	1	0.57	1	0.65	1	0.51	1	0.61	0		0	
Estonians	989	0.47	27	1.87	29	1.91	24.4	0.25	33.9	0.29	1	0.57	2	1.29	1	0.51	2	1.21	0		0	
Finns	93	0.04	2	0.14	1	0.07	—†	—	—	—	1	0.57	0		0		0		1	4.76	0	
Jews	2,268	1.09	5	0.35	5	0.33	—	—	—	—	1	0.57	0		1	0.51	0		0		0	
Poles	1,380	0.66	4	0.28	5	0.33	—	—	—	—	0		1	0.65	0		1	0.61	0		0	
Bashkirs	989	0.47	12	0.83	9	0.59	—	—	—	—	1	0.57	0		1	0.51	0					
Buriats	253	0.12	8	0.55	9	0.59	—	—	—	—	0		1	0.65	0		1	0.61				
Kabardinians	204	0.10	6	0.42	6	0.40	—	—	—	—	0		1	0.65	0		1	0.61				
Kalmyks	106	0.05	6	0.42	6	0.40	—	—	—	—	0		0		0		1	0.61				
Karelians	167	0.08	5	0.35	6	0.40	—	—	—	—	0		0		0		1	0.61				
Komis	431	0.21	8	0.55	9	0.59	—	—	—	—	0		0		0		0					
Maris	504	0.24	6	0.42	5	0.33	—	—	—	—	0		0		0		0					
Mordvinians	1,285	0.62	7	0.49	7	0.46	—	—	—	—	0		0		0		0					
Ossetians	413	0.20	13	0.90	14	0.92	—	—	—	—	0		1	0.65	0		1	0.61				
Tatars	4,968	2.38	14	0.97	18	1.19	—	—	—	—	1	0.57	0		1	0.51	1	0.61				
Tuvinians	100	0.05	8	0.55	8	0.53	—	—	—	—	0		1	0.65	0		1	0.61				
Udmurts	625	0.30	6	0.42	6	0.40	—	—	—	—	0		0		0		0					
Chechens	419	0.20	5	0.35	6	0.40	—	—	—	—	0		0		0		0					
Chuvashes	1,470	0.70	9	0.62	8	0.53	—	—	—	—	0		1	0.65	0		1	0.61				
Yakuts	237	0.11	8	0.55	5	0.33	—	—	—	—	0		1	0.65	0		1	0.61				
Kara-Kalpaks	173	0.08	6	0.42	5	0.33	—	—	—	—	0		0		0		0					
Abkhazians	65	0.03	7	0.49	7	0.46	—	—	—	—	0		0		0		0					
Others	5,046	2.42	37	2.56	42	2.77	—	—	—	—	1††	0.57	1†††	0.65	1††	0.51	0					
Unknown	0		0		0		866.1	9.00	1,035.3	8.80	7	4.00	22	14.19	10	5.13	31	18.79				
TOTAL	208,827	100.00	1,443	100.00	1,517	100.00	9,626.7	100.00	11,758.2	100.00	175	100.00	155	100.00	195	100.00	165	100.00	21	100.00	24	100.00

NOTES: * Absolute number in thousands. ** Absolute number. *** Full and alternate Presidium-Politburo members and Secretaries. Joint appointments to Presidium and Secretariat have been counted only once.
† Information not available. †† An Avarian. ††† An Uigur.
SOURCES: Population figures from Tsentralnoe Statisticheskoe Upravlenie pri Sovete Ministrov SSSR, *Itogi vsesoiuznoi perepisi naseleniia 1959 goda: SSSR*, Moscow, 1962, Table 53, pp. 184-89. Supreme Soviet representation from *Deputaty Verkovnovo Soveta SSSR: shestoi sozyv*, Moscow, 1962; and *ibid., sedmoi sozyv*, Moscow, 1966. 1961 party membership from "The Party in Figures, 1956-1961," *Partiinaia zhizn*, No. 1 January 1962), pp. 44 ff.; figures refer to July 1, 1961. 1965 party merbership figures, referring to Jan. 1, 1965, from "KPSS v tsifrakh (1961-1964 gody)," *Partiinaia zhizn*, No. 10 (May 1965), p. 12. For the membership of the leading party organs see *Pravda*, No. 1, 1961, p. 2, and April 9, 1966, p. 2. Sources for nationality identification cited in Table I.

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ties [23] in the Supreme Soviet, or only 0.35 percent of its membership. The tiny Abkhazian group of 65,000 (0.03 percent of the total USSR population) sends more deputies (seven) to the Supreme Soviet than do the 2.3 million Soviet Jews.[24] The present low level of Jewish representation, it should be noted, reflects a sharp decrease from as late as 1947, when there were 32 Jewish deputies in the Supreme Soviet.[25] This decline appears to be the result of a deliberate policy initiated by Stalin in 1948, and continued under Khrushchev, of imposing restrictive quotas on the Jews not only in political activity but in other areas as well.[26]

Turning to the Central Committee and the Politburo-Secretariat, we find a single Jew on the Central Committee—V. E. Dymshits, who for all his imposing titles (see footnote 23) appears to be more of a high-ranking economic technician than a policymaker. We further find the Ukrainians still strongly represented—next to the Russians—on both the Central Committee and the Politburo, although, as explained below, this is no longer true of the Secretariat alone.

The marked influx of Ukrainians into high party positions during the Khrushchev era has already been ably analyzed in this journal by Seweryn Bialer, who attributed it to a combination of two factors: Khrushchev's close personal ties with leading members of the Ukrainian party, of which he had once been first secretary, and the inherent importance of the Ukrainian republic (second largest in the USSR) in Soviet politics.[27] This trend appears to have reached its peak with the elevation of Nikolai V. Podgorny, in June 1963, to the Secretariat, where another Ukrainian, Vitali N. Titov, was already a secretary and chairman of the Central Committee's Commission on Party-Organizational Questions, and with the 1964 promotion of P. Ye. Shelest to full membership in the Politburo. Since the accession of the Brezhnev-Kosygin leadership, however, both Titov and Podgorny have been relieved of their Secretariat posts—Titov in April 1965, when he was quietly demoted to second secretary of the Kazakh party;[28] and Podgorny in April 1966, when he was not reelected to the Secretariat so that he might devote himself more fully to his new but largely honorific post as Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet.[29] As a result, though they still retain their four-man representation in the Politburo (Podgorny, D. S. Polianski, Shelest, and alternate member V. V. Shcherbitski), the Ukrainians are now completely out of the Secretariat, which consists entirely of Russians.[30]

In contrast to the ebbing political fortunes of the Ukrainians, there has been a notable rise in Belorussian representation in the central party organs since the fall of Khrushchev and the advent of the Brezhnev regime. As Table 2 shows, in the Central Committee elected by the 23rd Congress in April 1966, the Belorussians increased their number of full members to ten as compared with six on the 1961 Central Committee (although there was a drop in the number of alternate members). Moving to the more select Politburo, we now find one Belorussian full member: K. T. Mazurov, who was elevated from candidate to full membership and also made a first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers in March 1965;[31] and P. M. Masherov,

[23] In the present Supreme Soviet elected in 1966, the five Jewish deputies are: R. Khersonski, a lathe operator elected as the only Jewish representative from the remote Jewish Autonomous Oblast of Birobidzhan (with about 14,000 Jews out of a total 163,000 inhabitants in 1959); V. E. Dymshits, a deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and Chairman of the State Committee for Material-Technical Supply; the scientist, Yu. Khariton; the editor of *Literaturnaia gazeta*, A. Chakovski; and the prominent author, Ilya Ehrenburg. (See *Deputaty Verkhovnovo Soveta SSR: sedmoi sozyv*, pp. 149, 466, 479, 507.)

[24] In order to camouflage the ridiculously low representation of the Jews, Soviet spokesmen frequently cite figures which include Jewish delegates to republican and local soviets. (See, *e.g.*, a statement by Moscow Radio analyst Nina Alekseeva, cited in U. S. House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Europe, *Hearings on Anti-Religious Activities in the Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe*, Washington, D. C., Government Printing Office, 1965.) According to the latest available information, however, there were in 1963 only 13 Jews among the total 5,761 deputies to the union republic soviets, and 11 among the 2,842 deputies to the soviets of the autonomous republics. In 1965, 8,124 out of the 2,010,540 deputies to local soviets were Jews. (See *Vestnik statistiki*, Moscow, No. 3, 1967, p. 92. Reference by courtesy of the Research Section of the Institute for the Study of the USSR, Munich.) *Cf.* also the testimony of Dr. Joseph Schechtman before the Congressional subcommittee, *loc. cit. supra*, p. 101.

[25] Testimony of Dr. Schechtman, *loc. cit. supra.*

[26] Anti-Jewish discrimination in the Soviet executive branch was indirectly admitted by Yekaterina Furtseva, then a candidate member of the Central Committee Presidium (Politburo) and a CC secretary, in an interview published in *National Guardian* (New York), June 25, 1956, quoted in Korey, *loc. cit.*, p. 59. See also Joseph B. Schechtman, *Star in Eclipse: Soviet Jewry Revisited*, New York, Thomas Yoseloff, 1961, pp. 52 ff.; and DeWitt, *op. cit.*, pp. 358-60.

[27] Seweryn Bialer, "How Russians Rule Russia," *Problems of Communism*, No. 5 (September-October) 1964, pp. 51-52.

[28] *Pravda*, April 6 and Sept. 30, 1965.

[29] *Izvestia*, Dec. 10, 1965; *Pravda*, April 9, 1966.

[30] It should also be mentioned that another Ukrainian, V. Ye. Semichastny, was removed from the chairmanship of the State Security Committee (KGB) in May 1967, being replaced by a Russian, Yu V. Andropov. The late Marshal Malinovski, however, has been succeeded by another Ukrainian, Marshal Grechko, as Minister of Defense.

[31] *Pravda*, March 27, 1965.

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TABLE III

Nationalities in the USSR Council of Ministers, 1962 and 1966

Nationality	1962				1966			
	All Members *		Core **		All Members *		Core **	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Russians	37	66.07	8	61.54	50	72.46	8	50.00
Ukrainians	10	17.86	4	30.77	14	20.29	6	37.50
Belorussians	0		0		1	1.45	1	6.25
Armenians	1	1.79	1	7.69	1	1.45	0	
Jews	1	1.79	0		1	1.45	1	6.25
Tatars	0		0		1	1.45	0	
Komis	1	1.79	0		1	1.45	0	
Unknown	6	10.71	0		0		0	
TOTAL	**56**	**100.00**	**13**	**100.00**	**69**	**100.00**	**16**	**100.00**

NOTES: * Exclusive of Republican Prime Ministers, who are *ex officio* members of the USSR Council of Ministers. ** Defined as the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, all the Vice-Chairmen, the Ministers of Higher Education, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and the Chairman of the Committee of State Security (KGB).
SOURCES: *Pravda*, April 26, 1962, pp. 1-2, and August 4, 1966, pp. 1-2. Nationality identification as in Table 1, above.

who was elected a candidate member of the Politburo at the 23rd Congress. In 1961, Mazurov had been the only Belorussian on the Politburo, and only as a candidate member; now, as senior first deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers, he outranks his Ukrainian colleague, Polianski, both on the Politburo and in the Soviet government. Masherov's rise to candidate membership on the Politburo was even more remarkable, for he had only become a full member of the Central Committee in November 1964 after having been an alternate since 1961. His promotion to the Politburo in April 1966 was therefore exceptionally fast.

The reasons for the apparent shift of influence from the Ukrainians to the Belorussians are no doubt political. As pointed out earlier, Khrushchev's personal ties with Ukrainian party leaders probably led him to favor them as a means of bolstering his support in the top party organs. On the other hand, Professor Robert M. Slusser, in an article published on the heels of Khrushchev's fall, found evidence to indicate that the opposition to Khrushchev, as early as the 22nd Party Congress in 1961, had deliberately courted the support of the small but solid Belorussian party organization.[32] The somewhat diminished Ukrainian representation in the central party organs and the strengthened position of the Belorussians would thus appear to reflect a settling of political scores by the new regime.

In analyzing the favored position of both the Ukrainians and the Belorussians in the overall nationalities picture in the USSR, it should be borne in mind that these two peoples, together with the Russians, belong to the East Slavic group, and that all three share many cultural traits and historical traditions. The Ukrainians selected by Khrushchev to serve as watchdogs of the central party authorities in some of the Central Asian republics, for example, are doubtless hardly distinguishable from Russians so far as the Kazakhs and Kirghiz are concerned. Similarly, the promotion of Belorussians to influential party posts may be viewed by Brezhnev as a more natural and safer course than the elevation of, say, Armenians or Georgians to positions of authority.

Table 3, showing the ethnic composition of the USSR Council of Ministers, needs little commentary. The predominance of Russians is now even more accentuated than in 1962, while the Ukrainian representation has also increased contrary to the trend already noted in the higher party organs. Together, Russians and Ukrainians occupy 64, or 92.8 percent, of the 69 Council posts, with the remaining five positions divided among a scattering of other nationalities. The Belorussians, who were not represented in 1962, now have a single but highly-placed representative by virtue of K. T. Mazurov's 1965 appointment as first deputy chairman of the Council. The lone Jewish member is V. E. Dymshits, who is a deputy chairman and also chairman of the State Committee for Material and Technical Supply. Armenia, formerly represented by First Deputy Chairman Anastas Mikoyan, is now

[32] Robert M. Slusser, "Die Sonderstellung Belorusslands," *Osteuropa* (Stuttgart), No. 11 (November) 1964, pp. 860-64.

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represented by L. A. Kostandov, Minister of Chemical Industry. The single Komi, both in 1962 and 1966, is economist Vladimir N. Starovski, who has headed the Central Statistical Office of the Council of Ministers since 1948, and the newly added Tatar is Fuad B. Yakubovski, Minister of Assembling and Special Construction Work. The last four mentioned certainly are on the Council of Ministers not by virtue of their nationality but because of their special individual expertise in certain areas.

The Quota System—An Assessment

The main burden of this article has been to show the operation of a *limited* nationality-quota system in filling political offices in the USSR. With certain exceptions, seats in the Supreme Soviet are allocated to the various nationalities in rough proportion to their respective numbers in the total Soviet population, but as has been pointed out, this principle tends to be applied more and more restrictively and discriminatorily as one moves to the higher organs of state and party where real power is centered. Within the non-Russian republics themselves, under the recently emphasized policy of interrepublican exchanges of personnel, we find Russians and Ukrainians holding key positions in the republican party organizations. At the center, Russian-Ukrainian predominance has been even more pronounced, with the Belorussians recently coming into increased prominence. The really crucial positions in the party Secretariat, however, are now held exclusively by Russians.

The way in which the nationality-quota system operates poses the moral question of whether it is just to discriminate among citizens of one and the same state on grounds other than ability and merit. Its application to Soviet Jewry in particular makes the question more poignant, for the regime is apparently trying to destroy the Soviet Jews as a group while continuing to discriminate against them as individuals. Soviet morality, however, makes the interests of the state paramount.

How do the lesser nationalities feel about the operation of the quota system? It would seem that the principle of proportional representation would be popular with them insofar as it enables their representatives to attain leading political offices in their own republics, responsible positions in the more "dignified" central organs in Moscow, and at least secondary positions in the more "efficient" organs of central power. That it is definitely a matter of concern to them to be adequately represented not only at the all-Union level but, above all, in their own republics is evident from the following statement made by G. O. Zimanas, a member of the Central Committee of the Lithuanian CP, in an article published last year:

> **The representatives of any Soviet nation whatsoever judge their rights, including their nationality rights, not only and not so much by what functions their deputies (*poslantsy*) fulfill in the all-Union organizations, but also by what they can actually accomplish themselves in the sphere of administering state and public affairs [in their own republic].**[33]

It is precisely the ability of the lesser nationalities to run their own national affairs that is threatened by the new emphasis on the interexchange of responsible personnel between republics. Certainly, the Kazakhs or the Kirghiz cannot be enthusiastic about the immigration into their republics of so-called "elder brothers"—mainly Russians and Ukrainians—to assume important positions in the local party and state administration. To please the smaller peoples, the regime is continuing to train indigenous cadres, but to a more limited extent than in the 1920's and 1930's, and their hopes of advancement would appear to be diminishing under the present policy.

On the other hand, the more socio-economically and culturally advanced but less numerous nationalities, such as the Georgians and Armenians, not to mention the Jews, may very well resent the fact that the operation of the quota system restricts them to all but token representation in the central organs of political authority. The Georgians, who once enjoyed a favored position under Stalin, now find themselves reduced to but two full members and one alternate in the Central Committee and a single member of the Politburo—and they must resent even more the fact that the Georgian CP itself has had a Russian second secretary since 1956. The Armenians, too, cannot be happy over the unceremonious retirement of Anastas Mikoyan from the Politburo, which leaves them without representation there.

The nationalities problem thus remains a difficult and thorny one for the Soviet leaders. As the 50th anniversary of the Communist regime draws near, they must have learned that there is one thing more difficult than conquering an empire—and that is maintaining it.

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[33] G. O. Zimanas, "O sushchnosti protsessa sblizheniia sotsialisticheskikh natsii," *Voprosy filosofii*, No. 7 (July) 1966, p. 7.

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The Union Republics: How Much Autonomy?

By Samuel Bloembergen

October 1967 will mark the 50th anniversary of the first Communist state. It was five decades ago that the basis was laid for the Soviet Union, a federation of republics now 15 in number. Western observers generally waste few words on the subject of the status of the union republics (hereafter referred to as "republics") as political entities, and may even deny that they have any such status at all.

In the Soviet Union, on the other hand, the subject is taken very seriously. Recent Soviet textbooks on constitutional law report a marked tendency toward continuous increase in the powers of the republics in almost all branches of state administration.[1] This increase in power is said to imply an important change in the relationship between the spheres of authority of the federal government and those of the republics, and an elimination of superfluous centralism in individual areas of administration.[2] Yet the alleged improvement in the status of the republics has taken place only since Stalin's death, and upon examination, proves to be relatively modest.

In order to present a clear picture of the issue, and possibly to suggest some trends, the author will analyze the most important legal provisions of the past 50 years which have a direct bearing on the status of the republics.

The Pre-Union Years

From the dust clouds caused by the collapse of the Great Russian Empire in 1917, a number of independent, sovereign socialist republics emerged.

[1] A. I. Lepeshkin and others, *Kurs sovetskovo gosudarstvennovo prava,* (Course in Soviet State Law), Part II, Moscow, 1962, p. 161.

[2] *Osnovy sovetskovo prava i sovetskovo stroitelstva,* (The Principles of Soviet Law and State Structure), Leningrad, 1965, p. 160.

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The first to arise as a result of the October Revolution was the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR). Next, in December of 1917, the Ukraine was established as a Soviet Socialist Republic. Eventually these two were joined by other republics: Belorussia, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia. (In 1922 the last three formed the Trans-Caucasian Federation.) These republics were all fully sovereign states that conducted their own external relations.[3]

Early in 1919, the first movements toward a union became apparent. The need for a union between the Ukrainian republic and Soviet Russia, on the basis of a socialist federation, was stressed in a Declaration of the Temporary Workers' and Peasants' Government of the Ukraine of January 28, 1919.[4] In the same vein, a Declaration of the First Belorussian Congress of Soviets of February 3, 1919, ordered the opening of negotiations with the RSFSR on the establishment of federative relations between the two republics. Beyond this, it urged all independent socialist brother states to follow its example and start negotiations toward federation with the RSFSR.[5]

To implement these ideas of unification, the RSFSR and the Ukraine merged their economies on April 12, 1919.[6] On May 20, 1919, the Ukrainian Central Executive Committee resolved that the Soviet republics should merge their armed forces to form a united front against enemies.[7]

The culmination of these individual attempts at unification was the Decree of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the RSFSR on the Unification of the Soviet Republics, issued on June 1, 1919. The decree provided for unification of the war ministries and defense organizations, finances, and labor commissariats of the Soviet socialist republics of Russia, the Ukraine, Lativa, Lithuania, Belorussia and the Crimea.[8]

In the field of foreign relations, steps were also taken toward unification. A resolution of the fourth party conference of the Ukrainian Communist Party, adopted on March 18, 1920, contemplated the unification of the People's Commissariats for Foreign Affairs.[9] A declaration issued by Belorussian party and trade organizations determined that all diplomatic statements of the Belorussian Soviet Republic would conform to those of the RSFSR.[10] It even became fashionable for the other Soviet republics to be represented by the RSFSR at international conferences. This is shown by an agreement concluded February 22, 1922, transferring power to the RSFSR to represent the Soviet republics at the general European Economic Conference.[11] In addition, from 1921 onward, all Soviet republics had a number of representatives accredited to the RSFSR government "in view of the coordination of their foreign policies and with the aim of providing them with the opportunity to participate in negotiations with the representatives of foreign states in Moscow."[12] Apart from the unification of the economic, defense and foreign relations functions of the Soviet republics, steps were taken to establish a degree of formal cooperation between their central executive committees. Thus the RSFSR Central Executive Committee resolved on June 16, 1920, to include in its membership, at the request of the Ukraine, 30 members of the Ukrainian Central Executive Committee.[13] A similar request was made by the three Trans-Caucasian republics on December 27, 1921.[14]

The formation of the Union, which became a fact with the signing of the Union Treaty on December 30, 1922,[15] was the natural consequence of the above developments. The indications are that the signing of the treaty was a pure formality, since, for a document of such importance, little time was spent coming to an agreement on the text. A Conference of Representatives of the Soviet Socialist Republics, which met on December 29, examined and approved the draft of the Union Treaty and of an additional Declaration. Apparently there were very few comments or none at all, for the Conference ordered that the treaty be signed the next day at the First Congress of Soviets of the USSR.[16]

It is worth pointing out—in the light of later developments—that at about the time the Union Treaty was signed, a serious conflict arose between Lenin and Stalin about the form the new Soviet

[3] See P. E. Nedbailo and V. A. Vasilenko, "Mezhdunarodnaia pravosubektnost sovetskikh respublik," (The Soviet Union Republics as Subjects of International Law), *Sovetskii yezhegodnik mezhdunarodnovo prava: 1963*, Moscow, 1965, p. 90.
[4] *Istoriia sovetskoi konstitutsii (v dokumentakh) 1917-1956* (History of the Soviet Constitution [in Documents] 1917-1956), Moscow, 1957, p. 183.
[5] *Ibid.*, p. 186.
[6] *Ibid.*, p. 205.
[7] *Ibid.*, p. 206.
[8] *Ibid.*, pp. 207-08.
[9] *Ibid.*, p. 230.
[10] *Ibid.*, p. 236.
[11] *Ibid.*, pp. 337-38.
[12] Nedbailo and Vasilenko, *op. cit.*, p. 93.
[13] *Istoriia sovetskoi konstitutsii*, p. 234.
[14] *Ibid.*, p. 313.
[15] *Ibid.*, pp. 394 ff.
[16] Nedbailo and Vasilenko, *op. cit.*, p. 95.

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state was to take. If Stalin had had his way, the USSR would have become a unitary state, rather than a federative state, since his "autonomization plan" provided for the incorporation of the Soviet republics into the RSFSR as mere autonomous republics.[17]

The 1924 Constitution

Whatever the theoretical construction of the Soviet Union, our essential concern is to determine what powers the republics actually held. Both the Union Treaty of 1922 and the Constitution of 1924 (the contractual character of the latter is indicated by the fact that its second part consists of the Union Treaty) start with a detailed enumeration of what constitute Union affairs. A comparison of this list as it apeared in the Treaty and later in the Constitution reveals an interesting increase in Union powers. Below is a partial summary of what the Treaty called Union affairs, and how these were enlarged:

1). Representation of the Union in international relations. *The Constitution of 1924 added to this the conduct of all diplomatic relations and the signing of political and other treaties with other states.*

2). Alteration of the external frontiers of the Union. *The Constitution added the regulation of questions concerning the alteration of frontiers between the republics.*

3). The transacting of foreign state loans. *The corresponding phrase in the Constitution reads: "the transacting of foreign and national loans of the USSR and the authorization of the foreign and national loans of the republics."*

4). The determination of a foreign and internal trade system. *The Constitution changed this to: "the direction of foreign trade and the determination of the internal trade system."*

5). The determination of principles and a general plan for the entire national economy of the Union, and also the signing of concessionary contracts. *The Constitution added: "the determination of the branches of industry and individual enterprises which are of all-Union importance." It also specified that the Union bodies would sign concessionary contracts not only for the Union, but also in the name of the republics.*

6). The determination of principles for the organization of the armed forces of the USSR. *The Constitution read: "the organization and direction of the armed forces of the USSR."*

A slight increase in the powers of the republics in the field of legislation may be deduced from the fact that while the Treaty made civil and criminal legislation all-Union affairs, the Constitution reserved to the federal government only the determination of the principles of civil and criminal legislation.

What did the Constitution of 1924 leave to the republics? It determined that their sovereignty was limited only in the 24 spheres defined in the Constitution, and only in matters falling within the authority of the all-Union Government. It should be noted, however, that this last could cover practically everything. The Constitution added that apart from these spheres each republic was to exercise its state authority independently, and that the USSR would protect the sovereign rights of every republic.

In order to emphasize this sovereignty, the Constitution declared that each republic had the right of secession from the USSR. This right was undoubtedly a concession to the newness of the Union, for it was, and is, very narrowly construed as we shall discuss later. The Constitution also provided that the republics could amend their own constitutions as long as they remained in conformity with the Union Constitution. The territory of the republics could not be altered without their consent. Further, any modification, restriction or abrogation of the right of secession was subject to the consent of the republics. For the citizens of the republics, the Constitution established a uniform Union citizenship.

The way in which the Constitution defined spheres of authority of the Union and the republics invites the conclusion that the sovereignty of the republics was from the start subordinate to that of the central government. Some Soviet commentators have tried to argue otherwise, however: for example, P. E. Nedbailo and V. A. Vasilenko, who criticize the structure of the Constitution on this score, assert that the sovereignty of the republics has in actuality been unlimited, and that the Constitution should not be seen as defining spheres

[17] A. I. Lepeshkin, "Konstitutsionnoe razvitie sovetskovo soiuznovo gosudarstva" (Constitutional Development of the Soviet Union State), *Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo* (Moscow) Vol. 32, No. 12, 1962, p. 27.

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of authority, but rather as expressing the fact that the republics carry out their functions either directly or through the Union.[18]

Under the provisions of the 1924 Constitution, each republic was given 25 representatives in the Soviet of Nationalities, which together with the Soviet of the Union formed the Central Executive Committee (called the Supreme Soviet after 1936). It might be pointed out here that the participation of the republics in the activities of Union bodies has slowly increased through the years. Since March 15, 1946, the republics have been represented in the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union; the president of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of each republic automatically becomes one of the vice-presidents of the Supreme Soviet of the Union.[19] Since 1957 the republics have been similarly represented in the Supreme Court of the Union.[20] (The right to such representation was initially granted in the Statute of the Supreme Court of November 23, 1923,[21] but was abolished under a law of August 16, 1938, on the judicial system of the USSR, the Union, and the autonomous republics).[22] A constitutional amendment of December 9, 1965, determined that the presidents of the republics' Councils of Ministers[23] were *ex officio* members of the Union Council of Ministers.[24]

A separate chapter of the 1934 Constitution provided a number of directives for the exercise of state authority by the republics. *Inter alia*, the Constitution prescribed in detail the composition of the Council of People's Commissars (Sovnarkom) of the republics, even indicating the individual People's Commissariats. Missing from this list, of course, was the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, hereafter referred to as NKID (*Narodnyi Kommissariat Inostrannykh Del*). How-

[18] Nedbailo and Vasilenko, *op. cit.*, p. 97.
[19] *Istoriia sovetskoi konstitusii*, p. 827.
[20] *Ibid.*, p. 10 of the supplement.

[21] *Ibid.*, p. 449.
[22] *Ibid.*, p. 801.
[23] A law of March 15, 1946, renamed the Council of People's Commissars as Council of Ministers; *Istoriia sovetskoi konstitutsii*, p. 826.
[24] *Vedomosti Verkhovnovo Soveta SSR* (Gazette of the USSR Supreme Soviet), No. 49, 1965, Text No. 719.

Political Divisions of the Soviet Union

Reproduced from Georges Jorre, *The Soviet Union: The Land and Its People*, 2nd edition, London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1961, p. 97. Reprint permission granted by the publisher.

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ever, the republics were not excluded entirely from the Union's foreign policy-making agencies.

To elaborate—toward the end of 1923, all republics had liquidated their NKID's. At the time, there were rumors that some republics—especially the Ukraine, which had extensive relations with foreign nations—resented the abrupt way they had been silenced in this area. Thus a device had to be invented to give the republics at least some part in the conduct of the Union's foreign policy. The Statute of the NKID of the USSR, issued on November 12, 1923,[25] contained a number of provisions intended to meet this need. Article 1 of the statute stated that the NKID would be charged with the exercise of the diplomatic relations of the USSR, and of the individual republics that had joined the Union, with other states. The statute went on to specify and to institutionalize four ways in which a republic could participate in the Union's foreign policy—all based on practices which had already come into use:

1). The republics were to be in permanent contact with the NKID via the plenipotentiaries, the so-called "*upolnomochennye*" of the NKID, who were accredited to the governments of the republics. The *upolnomochennye* informed the republics' authorities of what happened in Moscow, and kept Moscow informed of what was happening in the republics. (Other *upolnomochennye* were those representing the Union's People's Commissariats for defense and maritime affairs, foreign trade, communications, and post and telegraph.)

2). The republics were to be represented in the "Collegium" of the NKID.[26] The Collegium was a product of the theory of "collective leadership." This theory implied that the People's Commissar was to be assisted, but also checked, by a "collegium," which even had the power to appeal his decisions to the Council of People's Commissars. In March 1934, the 17th Party Congress resolved that personal responsibility should be strengthened, and abolished the collegia.[27] The pertinent amendment of the Constitution duly followed on February 5, 1935.[28]

3). Each republic was to have its permanent representatives accredited to the Union government. These officials, who were allowed to "address meetings of the highest organs of the State administration on matters of foreign policy," [29] were the successors to the former plenipotentiary representatives, who in the days before 1922 were accredited to the Soviet Government. With the formation of the Union, however, their diplomatic status had been abolished, and consequently they were no longer considered nor named "plenipotentiaries." [30]

4) Each republic would have a diplomatic advisor on the staff of the Soviet delegations to those countries in which the republic had a particular interest. There was, however, no direct contact between republic and adviser. The *upolnomochennyi* was always the necessary go-between.

The 1936 Constitution

The USSR Constitution of 1924 seemed to possess a contractual character, but the 1936 Stalin Constitution, which was approved on December 5, 1936, and is still in force today, and which had to reflect and consolidate the victory of socialism in the Soviet Union, made no reference to the Treaty or the Declaration on the formation of the Union.

What has been the fate of the republics under the new Constitution? The lengthy list of Union affairs has generally remained the same, although a few changes may be noted. These include among others: (1) the safeguarding of the security of the State, and (2) the confirmation of the formation of new territories ("*krais*"), regions ('(*oblasts*"), and of new autonomous republics within the union republics. The last provision shows that the republics are no longer free to determine the administrative division of their territories; now they may only "confirm" them. No reference to the external frontiers of the Union can be found in the 1936 Constitution. Any alteration of the boundaries between the republics must be confirmed by the all-Union government. In the field of legislation, more power is given to the federal government, since the Constitution reserves the drafting of civil and criminal codes exclusively to the Union.

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[25] *Sovremennoe mezhdunarodnoe pravo, sbornik dokumentov* (Contemporary International Law, a Collection of Documents), edited by V. K. Sobakin, Moscow, 1964, pp. 357 ff.

[26] Nedbailo and Vasilenko, *op. cit.*, p. 100.

[27] Derek J. R. Scott, *Russian Political Institutions*, London, 1968, p. 79.

[28] *Istoriia sovetskoi konstitutsii*, p. 698.

[29] Nedbailo and Vasilenko, *op. cit.*, p. 100.

[30] A. M. Krokhotin, "Postoiannye predstavitelstva-organy sviazi Sovetov Ministrov Soiuznykh Respublik s Sovetom Ministrov SSSR" (The Permanent Representatives as Contact Organs between the Union Republic Council of Ministers and the Union Council of Ministers), *Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo*, Vol. 32, No. 11, 1962, p. 90.

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As in the Constitution of 1924, the enumeration of federal powers in 1936 is followed by the provision that the sovereignty of the republics is limited only in the spheres defined in the Constitution. Yet the addition of "all other affairs falling within the competence of the Union," which figured so conspicuously in the 1924 Constitution, has been left out this time. Not new, but reworded, is the provision that each republic has its own constitution, which takes into account the specific features of the republic, and which is drawn up in full conformity with the Constitution of the USSR. The right of each republic to secede freely from the Union remains unchanged, but the rule that any modification, restriction or abrogation of this right requires the consent of all republics has disappeared.

In the chapter dealing with the organs of state administration of the republics, there is again a detailed description of the composition of the Council of People's Commissars. The *upolnomochennye* are still there, but the Constitution no longer mentions which all-Union Commissariat they represent.

On February 1, 1944, two laws were issued which seemed to improve the status of the republics: a law on the creation of military forces of the republics,[31] and a law empowering the republics to conduct their own foreign relations.[32]

The first of the two laws, aimed at strengthening the defense potential of the USSR, led to a number of amendments to the Constitution. The Union's control of defense was from now on described as encompassing: the organization of the defense of the USSR; the direction of all armed forces of the USSR; and the determination of directing principles governing the organization of the military forces of the republics. A new article was added to the Constitution which provided that each republic was to have its own republican military force. Lepeshkin points out that these forces were to be considered integral parts of the federal armed forces. He mentions the cooperation between the republics and the all-Union bodies concerned with keeping the army and navy in perfect fighting trim. He also reports that the republics, under the direction of the Union bodies concerned, could participate in organizing the regular conscriptions for military service and the construction of defense installations situated on their territories.[33] There has been no evidence to suggest, however, that the republics actually do have their own military forces.

In their comments on the 1944 law granting the republics the right to enter into direct international relations, Nedbailo and Vasilenko sum up a number of facts which led to the creation of this law. They explain that the republics' economic and cultural development, as well as the development of their national statehood, gave rise to a great number of specific political, economic and cultural needs in the field of international relations. In addition, the republics which had suffered seriously during the war were attempting to win a place in the international arena in order to be able to prevent a repetition of the horrors of World War II. These manifold international interests could thus no longer be represented by one Union body.[34] Western observers stress, on the other hand, the fact that the USSR was seeking as many as 16 seats at the United Nations, as Stalin requested at Dumbarton Oaks and at Yalta. At present Belorussia and the Ukraine as well as the USSR are members of the UN, a compromise that was worked out at that time.

As a result of the law of February 1, 1944, another new article was added to the Constitution, which provided that each republic had the right to enter into direct relations with foreign nations and to conclude agreements and exchange diplomatic and consular representatives with them. However, the Constitution reserved to the Union the right "to establish the general procedure governing the relations of the republics with foreign nations." Although, pursuant to this law, each of the republics established its own People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, only the Ukraine and Belorussia actually entered the international arena. As members of the United Nations, these two republics have signed the United Nations Charter, the Peace Treaties of 1947 and the Test Ban Treaty of 1963. In addition, they participate directly in the activities of UN organs and specialized agencies.[35]

[31] *Istoriia sovetskoi konstitutsii*, p. 823.
[32] *Ibid.*, p. 824.
[33] Lepeshkin, *Kurs . . . .*, p. 157.
[34] Nedbailo and Vasilenko, *op. cit.*, pp. 101-02.
[35] *Mezhdunarodnoe pravo* (International Law), by a collection of authors, edited by F. I. Kozhevnikov, Moscow, 1964, p. 155.

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I. P. Blishchenko and V. N. Durdenevski, in their textbook on diplomatic and consular law, indicate that apart from the Ukraine and Belorussia, no separate delegation from any of the republics ever takes part in international relations.[36] However, Nedbailo and Vasilenko manage, with great difficulty, to find an example to the contrary, namely that "together with the Ukraine and Belorussia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldavia and Estonia participate in the International Organization for Radio Broadcasting and Television." [37]

Republics are usually represented in the official Soviet delegations to those conferences which pertain to their special interests. To date, none of the republics has resumed consular relations, or appointed diplomatic representatives to foreign nations.[38] The Soviet legal expert I. I. Lukashuk, as is the fashion, puts the blame for this on the capitalist countries, which refuse to recognize the republics as international entities and thus prevent them from actively participating in international relations.[39]

The status of the republics was affected, directly and indirectly, by a constitutional amendment of February 25, 1947.[40] This restated and designated certain powers as belonging to the federal jurisdiction, namely, the confirmation of USSR treaties with foreign nations, the confirmation of newly-formed autonomous oblasts within the republics; and the determination of the principles of legislation concerning marriage and the family.

The Past Ten Years

Commenting on the 1936 Constitution in a 1962 legal study, A. I. Lepeshkin admits that it reflected a significant increase in the power of the central government at the expense of the republics. In his opinion, such an increase was justified where rigid centralization was required for the administration of key branches of the economy and the distribution of material resources, in the interest of the country as a whole. However, he goes on to say that in a number of cases, the increase in the authority of the all-Union government and the restrictions regarding the powers of the republics reflected "a tendency to excessive centralization, which occurred in the period of the spread of the personality cult of Stalin, who tried to collect in his own hands all branches of state administration." [41]

When the Stalin era ended, the lot of the republics improved significantly. This gain was con-

Rights—with Restrictions

The union republics, in the absence of any judicial instance to which they can appeal to test the validity of all-Union legislative or administrative acts which may infringe republican constitutional rights, are left to such redress as they can exercise through their representation in the all-Union government. . . . The result has been that over the years the degree of actual autonomy enjoyed by the union republics has depended on decisions emanating from the all-Union government. It is this circumstance which explains the apparent paradox that in the Soviet Union, alone of all federal governments, the generally observable trend towards the growth of the power of the central government has in the past decade been reversed. In most federal systems the federal government has advanced its power step by step against the entrenched resistance of the component states, cantons or provinces. . . . No such process has taken place in the Soviet Union. Here the overwhelming power enjoyed by the party and the government at the center made possible nearly complete centralization of all control in Moscow. But this in turn gave rise to considerable administrative congestion and inefficiency, as well as to dissatisfaction in the union republics. Hence, beginning in 1954, there has been a gradual extension of the powers and responsibilities of the republican governments. Not all the powers won since 1954 have to date proved permanent. But there is no doubt that republican government is now considerably more of a reality than it was in 1953.

—Leonard Schapiro, *The Government and Politics of the Soviet Union*, New York, Random House, 1965, pp. 144-45.

[36] I. P. Blishchenko and V. N. Durdenevski, *Diplomaticheskoe i konsultskoe pravo* (Diplomatic and Consular Law), Moscow, 1962, p. 40.
[37] Nedbailo and Vasilenko, *op. cit.*, p. 103.
[38] Blishchenko and Durdenevskii, *op. cit.*, p. 41.
[39] I. I. Lukashuk, "Ob uchastii sovetskikh soiuznykh respublik v mezhdunarodnykh dogovorakh" (The Participation of the Soviet Union Republics in International Treaties), *Sovetskii yezhegodnik mezhdunarodnovo prava, 1958*, Moscow, 1959, p. 512. For a Western view on the issue see V. V. Aspaturian, *The Union Republics in Soviet Diplomacy*, Paris, 1960.
[40] *Istoriia sovetskoi konstitutsii*, pp. 828 ff.
[41] Lepeshkin, *Kurs . . . . .*, pp. 123-24.

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solidated in 1956 at the 20th Party Congress. A great number of federal laws which involved a transfer of powers from the federal government to the republics emanated from that Congress. For example, a decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the All-Union Council of Ministers of May 30, 1956, ordered the transfer of enterprises in a number of branches of the economy from the authority of the Union to that of the republics.[42] Heavy industries, however, were not included in the transfer. In another decision of the same day, also aimed at reducing superfluous centralization, the Central Committee of the CPSU and the All-Union Council of Ministers ordered the abolition of the Union Ministry of Justice and the transfer of its functions to the Ministries of Justice of the republics.[43] Thereupon the latter abolished their own Ministries of Justice and transferred these functions to their own Supreme Courts.[44] This might be seen as a step backward, not only because of the hierarchical order of the federal Supreme Court and those of the republics, but also because, since 1957, the president of the Supreme Court of each republic has been a member of the plenum of the All-Union Supreme Court, and consequently may be called to account for his actions by the federal government. Note, too, that the USSR Supreme Court, according to Article 2 of its Statute of February 12, 1957,[45] is in turn answerable to the Supreme Soviet and, during the time between sessions of that body, to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet.

Three laws which tended further to strengthen the position of the republics were issued on February 11, 1957, by the Supreme Soviet: 1) The republics were empowered to issue their own laws concerning their judicial systems and judicial procedure, and their civil and criminal codes, although the determination of general principles in these fields was still reserved to the all-Union government. 2) The republics were given the right to authorize the formation of krais and oblasts in their territory. The Union was confined to confirming any new divisions. 3) The all-Union ministries of the river fleet, automobile transport and highways were abolished, and the administration of the enterprises and organizations subordinate to them was transferred to the republics.[46]

On the same day, the Soviet of Nationalities, one of the two chambers which together form the Supreme Soviet, ordered the establishment of an economic parliamentary commission.[47] The task of this commission, which was to consist of 30 members (*i.e.*, two members from each republic), was to work out a uniform set of principles, acceptable to all republics, regarding their economic and cultural structure. These principles would be reflected in all-Union legislation.[48]

On May 10, 1957, a law was enacted that transferred important powers to the republics in the industrial and building sectors. As a result of this law, the administration of industry and building, "with a few exceptions," came under the direct authority of the republics.[49] In the field of industry, for example, administration was to be executed by the national economic councils, the "sovnarkhozes," which were directly responsible to the governments of the republics. Originally, each republic was divided into economic regions (raions), and the industry in each raion fell under the jurisdiction of a sovnarkhoz. All-republic sovnarkhozes, supervising the sovnarkhozes of the raions, were formed in the RSFSR, the Ukraine and Kazakhstan in January

[42] *Istoriia sovetskoi konstitutsii*, p. 924.
[43] *Ibid.*, p. 927.
[44] Lepeshkin, *Kurs . . . . .*, p. 160.
[45] *Izvestiia sovetov deputatov trudiashchikhsia SSSR* (Bulletin of the Soviets of Workers' Delegates of the USSR), Feb. 12, 1957.
[46] *Idem.*
[47] *Idem.*
[48] *Osnovy sovetskovo prava i sovetskovo stroitelstva* (The Principles of Soviet Law and State Structure), Leningrad, 1965, p. 161.
[49] Lepeshkin, *Kurs . . . . .*, p. 126. Excluded are, *inter alia*, the entire heavy and defense industry, the chemical industry, etc.

The Union Over All

Of course, the border regions of Russia, the nations and tribes, which inhabit these regions . . . possess the inalienable right to secede from Russia . . . but the demand for secession . . . at the present stage of the revolution is a profoundly counterrevolutionary one.

—J. V. Stalin, Pravda, Oct. 20, 1920. From Sochineniia, Vol. IV, pp. 353-354.

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and July 1960, mainly as correctives to "localism" on the part of the raion units.[50] But the process of undoing Stalin's extreme centralization ended, and some recentralization was begun in November 1962 when the sovnarkhozes were reduced in number from 10 to 40 odd, and in March 1963, when a Supreme Sovnarkhoz of the USSR (Vesenkha) to coordinate and direct the activities of the republic-level sovnarkhozes was formed.[51] After the fall of Khrushchev, his successors gave even further impetus to recentralization by dismantling all of the sovnarkhozes and the *Vesenkha* following the September 1965 party plenum. The union republics thus lost the responsibility for economic activities that they had held for eight years.

Myths and Realities

The future formal status of the republics will not be known until the draft of the new Union Constitution is published. (The commission charged with its preparation was appointed by the Supreme Soviet on April 25, 1962.)[52] However, there is no reason to believe that its essential character will be altered. Most important, the striking contrast between formal rights on the one hand, and actual rights on the other, will undoubtedly continue.

This contrast, which has characterized the status of the republics almost from their very inception, can be easily illustrated. In spite of the two laws of February 1, 1944, mentioned earlier, the republics do not possess their own armed forces, nor do they maintain any diplomatic relations with foreign countries. The visitor to the Soviet Union will find that in many cases the foreign ministry of a union republic is housed in dingy offices, and that its representatives are hardly ever there.

The right of each union republic to secede from the Union is another case in point. The right was granted in the 1924 Constitution to mollify fears on the part of the constituent republics that their new status would be extremely restrictive. The right was sustained by the 1936 Constitution, and hence is theoretically still in effect today, but Lepeshkin, for one, admits that in practice secession would be "inexpedient" for a republic. He points out that the republics, during the years of building socialism, have become powerful industrial states, highly dependent on the states around them. He goes on to quote from the 1961 Party Program to the effect that each republic can now prosper *only* in the "great family of brotherly socialist nations of the USSR."[53] To this statement might be added Khrushchev's warning, at the close of the 22nd Party Congress, that "even the slightest vestige of nationalism should be eradicated with uncompromising Bolshevik determination."[54]

The efforts of Soviet writers to present the USSR as a union of truly sovereign republics cannot convince any impartial observer that the republics are more than provinces possessing only a limited measure of self-government. In comparison with the Soviet Union, for instance, the cantons in Switzerland or the states of the US are virtually independent countries.

At the same time, the position of the republics in the administrative structure of the USSR should not be underestimated. The attempts at decentralization since 1954 were aimed at expanding the role of the republics as the major administrative subdivisions of the USSR. These were not benevolent gestures on the part of the Soviet government towards the republics, but rather measures of expediency. But in the re-evaluation of these measures that followed the advent of the post-Khrushchev leadership, the republics lost some of their responsibility and status again in the name of economic and political expediency.

To sum up, then, the rights and prerogatives acquired by the republics since 1954 are far less meaningful than Soviet authors would want us to think. Any legislative, planning or budgetary initiative is, after all, circumscribed by the limits set forth in the All-Union Constitution. Even more importantly, it must be borne in mind that the Soviet Union is ruled, in the final analysis, by the Communist Party. The primary alliegance of all government officials, central and republican alike, is to the party—to its ideology, to its overall program and to its specific directives and instructions. And nowhere in the Party Program is there any indication that the union republics are to have any more power than they now enjoy.

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[50] *Osnovy sovetskovo gosudarstvennovo stroitelstva i prava* (The Principles of the Soviet State Structure and Law), Moscow, 1965, pp. 265-67.

[51] *Ibid.*, p. 256.

[52] *Osnovy sovetskovo prava i sovetskovo stroitelstva*, p. 110.

[53] "*Kurs . . .*," pp. 134-35.

[54] N. Khrushchev, *On the Communist Program*, Report on the Program of the CPSU to the 22nd Congress of the Party, Oct. 18, 1961, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, p. 88.

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Nationalism and History

By Lowell R. Tillett

On May 16, 1934, a resolution of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee "On the Teaching of Civic History in the Schools of the USSR" opened a far-reaching campaign to harness the Soviet historical profession and put it to the service of the party's goals. Under this and subsequent directives,[1] Soviet historians were called upon to play a vital role in the construction of the new Soviet society, and one of their most difficult assignments has been the support of Soviet nationality policy. They have been among the chief architects of the new "Soviet patriotism," which purportedly cuts across nationality lines to create a love of the multinational Soviet motherland. They have rehabilitated the Russian past, so maligned by the first generation of Soviet historians, in order to rekindle the pride of the Soviet citizen in his country. They have artificially reconstructed the history of all the peoples now contained in the Soviet family from ancient times, so as to give the impression that nationalities as diverse as the Estonians and Georgians, the Moldavians and Yakuts, were somehow involved in a common historic march which reached its destination in the present Soviet state. They have inculcated the doctrine of Great Russian leadership by demonstrating the superiority of Russian culture and pointing out the many advantages which the non-Russian peoples have derived through their association with the Russians. But their most challenging task—and the one they have been most reluctant to undertake—has been the rewriting of the history of the non-Russian peoples of the USSR in such a way as to picture

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[1] The 1934 Central Committee resolution was published in *Izvestia*, May 16, 1934, and has been translated in Anatole G. Mazour, *Modern Russian Historiography* (2nd ed.), Princeton, N. J., Van Nostrand, 1958, pp. 194-95. Early in 1936 the Central Committee passed another resolution setting up a commission of twelve members, headed by Zhdanov, to examine and pass on history textbooks. *Pravda's* issue of January 27, 1936, which was devoted largely to the teaching of history, contains this resolution and the observations of party leaders. The most detailed directive to historians before World War II was a decision of the Zhdanov commission in August 1937 regarding the selection of a textbook for the schools. The text of this decision, containing twelve specific suggestions for historians, is in *Direktivy VKP(b) i postanovleniia sovetskovo pravitelstva o narodnom obrazovanii. Sbornik dokumentov za 1919-1947 gg.* (Directives of the VKP (b) and resolutions of the Soviet government on public education. Collection of documents, 1919-47), Moscow-Leningrad, 1947, pp. 188-90. For general discussions of Soviet historiography, see, in addition to Mazour's book, C. E. Black (Ed.), *Rewriting Russian History*, New York, Praeger, 1956; and Konstantin F. Shteppa, *Russian Historians and the Soviet State*, New Brunswick, N. J., Rutgers University Press, 1962.

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their relations with the Russians and with one another as uniformly friendly and devoid of frictions in every epoch.

Druzhba Narodov

The concept of the friendship of peoples (*druzhba narodov*) is a fetish of Soviet nationality policy that is constantly reaffirmed not only by *agitprop* orators, but by scholars as well. The non-Soviet reader is likely to be more familiar with the term in its international application, but it also has an important domestic usage, referring to the mutual trust and good will which allegedly exist among all the Soviet peoples. The Bolsheviks have always maintained that hostility between peoples is based on class hatred rather than on feelings of nationalism. In their prerevolutionary program on nationalities, they promised to create a friendship of peoples in the Russian state through the elimination of class differences, and since about 1930 they have loudly proclaimed that Leninist nationality policy had attained this objective, producing a completely new historical phenomenon—a multinational state free of hostility among its peoples.

Up to World War II, this accomplishment was represented as strictly a Bolshevik victory: the Revolution was the great dividing line between the dark night of national hatreds and the bright new day of friendship. The historian's task in this period was comparatively simple—he merely affirmed the party line on the triumph of Soviet nationality policy. But after the war he was given new directives which were very difficult to follow. Some party propagandists, who had raised such themes as the heroic alliance and common struggle of the Soviet peoples to a new pitch during the war, were not content to confine the friendship of peoples to the recent past and present. They asked the historians to prove that the concept had a historic dimension—to show that friendly relations among the Soviet peoples not only antedated the Revolution but had indeed existed from the moment of their first contacts. The engineers of the new "Soviet man" wanted to get at the roots of national hatreds through a kind of Pavlovian conditioning: the Soviet schoolboy would be taught to believe not merely that hostilities no longer existed in Soviet society, but that they had *never* existed.

The execution of this task involved nothing less than turning the old history inside out. Early Soviet historians—most notably, their leader, M. N. Pokrovski—had considered Russia culturally inferior to the West and had treated Tsarist conquests and the resulting colonial empire as prime examples of imperialist oppression by the capitalist class enemy. Tsarist brutalities and exploitation had been discussed in detail and contrasted with the "progressive" Soviet reformation of nationalities policy. To square these well-known interpretations with a prerevolutionary friendship of peoples obviously presented monumental difficulties and was not easily accomplished. There were many scholarly casualties along the way.

The Kazakhs and the New History

Opposition to the new history with its idyllic picture of a friendly family of peoples, even before the Revolution, has come notably from the Kazakhs, who have a long record of resistance to the Russians. A Turco-Mongol people with a fierce military tradition, the Kazakhs were troublesome subjects of the Tsars almost from the start of the Russian absorption of their lands early in the eighteenth century. Sparsely settled in a vast open territory (the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic is second in size only to the Russian republic), they fell comparatively easy prey to initial Russian conquest, but there were dozens of subsequent native resistance movements, and the Kazakhs played an important part in the Central Asian Revolt of 1916. A strong nationalist movement continued to exist after the Revolution, particularly the Alash Orda, which opposed the Bolsheviks well into the 1920's. The Kazakh Communist Party itself has frequently been charged with "bourgeois nationalist" tendencies—that is, with placing the Kazakh over the Russian or Soviet heritage. Because of its great resources and its unruliness, Kazakhstan was heavily colonized both before and since the Revolution: the 1959 census showed 43 percent of its 9,300,000 population to be Russian, and only 29 percent Kazakh.

All this has rendered the production of an officially acceptable history of the Kazakhs a task of unparalleled difficulty. In fact, the first historical survey of the Kazakh SSR which proved satisfactory to party reviewers was published only in 1957, more than twenty years after the party's call for "scientific, Marxist-Leninist" histories of the union republics. There had been five previous attempts at compiling a Kazakh history that satisfied the party's specifications. These attempts involved a small army of historians, including some of the most prominent Russian as well Kazakh scholars, but virtually all of them who committed anything

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to print on the Kazakhs before the middle 1950's were later reprimanded for error and their views denounced as not only obsolete but ideologically harmful. Many of them disappeared from print until they had made their peace with the party; others were banished from the profession. At least one lost his life—S. D. Asfendiarov, Director of the Kazakh Branch of the USSR Academy of Sciences, whose *History of Kazakhstan*, published in 1935, was the first of these ill-fated efforts.[2] In 1936, his work was violently attacked in a party journal,[3] and he himself vanished in the Great Purge a few months later.

Perhaps the greatest factor that has complicated the task of historians, not only of the Kazakhs but of other non-Russian nationalities within the USSR, has been the changing demands of the party in the realm of historiography. Over a twenty-year period beginning in 1934, the party itself was evolving its views of the past, and these views changed not only in accordance with the evolution of nationality policies, but also in conformity with more immediate shifts in Soviet domestic and foreign policy. One of the Soviet historian's peculiar nightmares is the realization that he must attune his interpretations to official policies that are constantly changing, which means that to write a lasting history he must be a virtual seer.

As a typical example of this sort of dilemma facing historians of the Kazakhs, one may cite the changing official view of the role of the British in Central Asia in the 19th century. When Asfendiarov's pioneer history of Kazakhstan was published in 1935, the approved line was that Britain and Tsarist Russia had been engaged in a typical great-power struggle for colonies in Central Asia, and that their moves were equally reprehensible. By the time the second history appeared early in 1941, however, both sides of the equation had changed. On the one hand, treatment of the Russian conquests had been softened somewhat by the party in an effort to bind the Soviet peoples together in the face of the conflict in Europe; on the other, the Nazi-Soviet Pact had impelled Moscow to blame the British as fomenters of the current "imperialist war." In line with this, the historians were required to place more one-sided stress on the role of "British imperialism" in the Central Asian past and to represent the Russian military campaigns there as a countermove. Then, within just a few months, this version, too, became embarrassing. Hitler invaded the Soviet Union, and the British became Russia's allies. As a result, the third history of the Kazakhs published in 1943 made no mention of the past British threat in Central Asia. However, the British have since reappeared as villains in all the later histories written against the backdrop of the Cold War. Today 19th-century "British imperialism" is depicted as having been the greatest menace to the peoples of Central Asia, who in most instances are said to have turned to the Russians for deliverance.

Trouble Spots of Kazakh History

In their efforts to reconcile historical facts with party directives, Soviet historians dealing with the Kazakhs have been faced with four main problem areas. These center around (1) how the Kazakhs came under Russian rule; (2) how to evaluate the numerous Kazakh uprisings and resistance movements and the historic role of their leaders; (3) the comparative status of the Kazakh economy and culture before and since annexation; and (4) relations between the Kazakh and Russian peoples during the colonial period. Each of these problems was the subject of repeated discussion and controversy, and satisfactory answers were not reached until 1957.

The process by which the Kazakh nation came under Russian imperial rule was admittedly complicated. Beginning in the 1730's, Khan Abulkhair sought Russian military help against encroachments by hostile neighbors, and the Kazakh area became a Russian protectorate in the course of that century. Its absorption into the Tsarist empire was a long process characterized by blurred episodes which make it susceptible to different interpretations. It is not quite clear what Abulkhair surrendered of his powers and of Kazakh independence in exchange for Russian aid, and the extension of Russian political control was accomplished by small, gradual steps rather than by the pitched battles of other areas. The early Soviet view, which prevailed in Asfendiarov's history, was that the Russian expansion into Kazakhstan constituted simple

[2] S. D. Asfendiarov, *Istoriia Kazakhstana s drevneishikh vremen* (History of Kazakhstan from Earliest Times), Alma-Ata, 1935.

[3] T. Ryskulov, "Protiv izvrashcheniia istorii kazakhskovo naroda i kharaktera oktiabria v Kazkhstane" (Against Distortions in the History of the Kazakh People and the Character of October in Kazakhstan), *Revoliutsiia i nationalnosti* (Revolution and Nationality), No. 6, 1936, pp. 62-67.

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conquest: Abulkhair was duped by the Tsar, and the Kazakh people suffered under a "double yoke" of Kazakh feudal and Russian imperial oppression. Any suggestion that the Kazakhs had voluntarily joined Russia was scorned as an apology for the Tsars. The first edition of the *Great Soviet Encyclopedia*, in its article on Kazakhstan, stated flatly that "the legend of the voluntary submission of the Kazakh people, which is increasingly being spread by the great-power chauvinists and Kazakh bourgeois-nationalists, is an obvious lie." [4]

This line underwent partial modification in 1937, when a party statement took the position that Russian annexation of Georgia and the Ukraine had been a "lesser evil" than the alternative that faced their peoples, namely, incorporation into Poland or Turkey.[5] Thereafter Soviet historians for a time extended the "lesser evil" formula to Tsarist expansion in general, but this, too, became outdated as more and more stress came to be placed on the blessings of Russian civilization. The presently accepted interpretation is that most of the non-Russian peoples, including the Kazakhs, voluntarily accepted Russian political tutelage. Khan Abulkhair has thus become a wise statesman who carried out the wishes of his people.

During Kazakhstan's history as a Tsarist colony, however, there were dozens of revolts and prolonged resistance movements against Russian control. In the early Soviet view (as embodied in the first three Kazakh histories referred to earlier), these movements were progressive "national liberation" struggles for Kazakh independence, and their leaders were national heroes. Indeed, the historic reputation of the most famous Kazakh of the colonial period rested on his military exploits against the "Russian colonizers." He was Sultan Kenesary Kasymov, leader of the most serious anti-Russian revolt, which lasted from 1837 to 1845. Among the non-Russian national heroes accorded a place of honor in Soviet histories, Kenesary ranked second only to the legendary Shamil of the Caucasus.[6]

But this early view of Kenesary and his movement ran afoul of the party's wartime and postwar historical line stressing the historic roots of the friendship of Soviet peoples. He had not only pitted the Kazakh people against the Russians, but what was still worse from the standpoint of its implications in the 1940's and since, he had led a separatist movement. In the presently accepted view, therefore, Kenesary's revolt was a reactionary "feudal-monarchal" movement aimed at restoring his feudal powers and leading his people away from progress under Russian leadership back to the old patriarchal order. Of all the Kazakh armed uprisings against the Russians, only a few minor ones which were of peasant composition and not separatist in nature are now treated as progressive.

On the question of whether or not the Kazakhs benefited economically and culturally from Russian rule, Soviet historians until the late 1940's generally took the line that the Kazakhs were incomparably worse off under grinding Russian exploitation, which was superimposed upon the oppression they already suffered at the hands of their own feudal leaders. They were also pictured as victims of Tsarist cultural oppression, much being written about Russian efforts to suppress the national culture because it was suspected of inspiring revolt. Now, however, the official version is that the Kazakh economy and culture were stagnant prior to annexation, and that they flowered under Russian leadership. Accordingly, the recent histories are full of information about Kazakh factories, mines, and railroads built by the Russians, as well as about the cultural achievements of the Kazakhs under the influence of the Russian intelligentsia.

The attempt to project the concept of the friendship of peoples back to the colonial period also dictated a reversal of the hitherto approved Soviet view of past relations between the Kazakh and Russian peoples. The old view held these relations to have been typical of the relations between a conquered people and their colonial masters: the subject Kazakhs hated their Russian rulers, lived separately from them, and resisted their encroachments. The earlier Soviet accounts of the Kazakh revolts noted that the rebellious Kazakhs frequently killed all Russians in sight—men, women and children—and that the Russian soldiers were especially brutal in dealing with the rebels, whom they regarded as uncivilized. Asfendiarov even accused the Tsars of a policy of genocide.[7] The revised

[4] *Bolshaia sovetskaia entsiklopediia*, 1st ed., Vol. XXX, Col. 590.

[5] *Direktivy, op. cit.* (footnote 1), pp. 200-01.

[6] Shamil (1789-1871) was the *imam* (spiritual leader and ruler) of Dagestan, who led a spectacular fight against Russian armies in the Caucasus for a quarter of a century. He was a great hero in Soviet history until 1950, when he was denounced by party spokesmen because he had led a separatist movement with a religious goal, and with the alleged support of Turkey and Britain.

[7] Asfendiarov, *op. cit.*, p. 110.

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version, however, is that the Kazakh people were never hostile towards the Russian masses, even when the influx of Russian settlers threatened them with dispossession from their hereditary lands. Such Kazakh resentment as existed was always aimed at Tsarism, never at the Russian people. Indeed, the Russian settlers and Kazakh masses are now pictured as having joined forces in a common struggle against Tsarism culminating in the victorious October Revolution, the Revolution thus becoming a multinational triumph of all the Soviet peoples.

The Travails of the Historians

The first serious attempt by Soviet historians to meet the party's changing requirements with respect to the history of the Kazakhs came only in the writing of the third history, which went to press in 1943. The second, written by M. P. Viatkin and published in 1941,[8] had adhered to most of the views of Asfendiarov's ill-fated volume. One of the foremost Russian specialists on Kazakh history, Viatkin devoted whole chapters to three of the major Kazakh resistance movements and pronounced them all progressive and heroic. In keeping with the growing emphasis on Soviet patriotism on the eve of the war, he toned down the evils of Russian colonialism and dwelled heavily on the great military traditions of the Kazakhs. He was a victim of bad timing, however, and his work had the unhappy fate of being condemned during the next decade for diametrically opposite reasons. During the war years, his emphasis on patriotic themes and nationalist military traditions were not nearly ardent enough to satisfy the party, while in the postwar years the book was relegated to the category of "bourgeois nationalism" because it dwelt upon Kazakh-Russian conflicts and glorified the Kazakh resistance movements. The author eventually published a long letter of apology in the leading history journal.[9]

The third history of Kazakhstan was written by a large collective of Russian and Kazakh historians during the early war years. It was produced under the auspices of three scholarly institutes as well as the close supervision of the Kazakh Communist Party, whose Central Committee scrutinized every chapter while it was in progress. One of the two editors was M. Abdykalykov, a secretary of the Kazakh party; the other, who was to take all the blame for its errors, was the well-known Russian historian, Anna Pankratova. The book appeared in the summer of 1943 and received a highly favorable review in *Pravda*.[10] But the party's views on many of the interpretations contained in it were rapidly changing, and in less than two years another party organ (*Bolshevik*) would condemn the work as extremely erroneous and ideologically harmful.

Some light was thrown on the controversies that had taken place between the party and the historians during the preparation of this book by a published account of a discussion held in October 1943 between the editors of *Istoricheskii zhurnal* and the editors and authors of the history.[11] Pankratova revealed that there had been prolonged arguments on two particular questions—the treatment of Kazakhstan's annexation and the assessment of the Kazakh revolts. On the first question, the authors had rejected the idea that the Kazakhs were annexed voluntarily, and they had also abandoned the "lesser evil" formula in favor of a return to the earlier view that Kazakhstan was acquired by plain conquest, although the friendship-of-peoples idea was protected to a degree by the authors' insistence that the conquest was to be charged to "Tsarist colonialism" and not to the Russian people. The reason for the scrapping of the "lesser evil" formula was that it did not suit the message which the authors, at the party's behest, wished to convey to the Kazakh people. With the Soviet Union engaged in a life-or-death struggle against Germany, adherence to the "lesser evil" formula would have meant telling the Kazakhs that annexation by a foreign power was, under certain conditions, a historically progressive event.

On the question of the Kazakh revolts, Pankratova revealed that here, too, the historians had done their work with the exigencies of the Soviet Union's wartime situation closely in mind. The urgent problem of the day was to stir the Kazakh will

[8] M. P. Viatkin, *Ocherki po istorii kazakhskoi SSR: I. S. drevneishikh vremen po 1870 g.* (Outlines of the History of the Kazakh SSR: I. From Earliest Times to 1870), Moscow, 1941.

[9] *Voprosy istorii* (Moscow), No. 2, 1952, pp. 157-59.

[10] M. Abdykalykov and A. Pankratova (Eds.), *Istoriia kazakhskoi SSR: S drevneishikh vremen do nashikh dnei* (History of the Kazakh SSR: From Earliest Times to Our Day), Alma-Ata, 1943. Reviewed in *Pravda*, July 10, 1943, by A. Piaskovskii.

[11] "Obsuzhdenie v redaktsii *Istoricheskovo zhurnal* knigi *Istoriia kazakhskoi SSR*" (Discussion by the Editors of the *Historical Journal* of *The History of the Kazakh SSR*), *Istoricheskii zhurnal*, (Moscow), Nos. 11-12, 1943, pp. 85-90.

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to fight in the defense of their country (and of the USSR). Although some of the authors had argued in favor of picturing the revolts as reactionary, the majority held that they should be treated as progressive and that the Kazakhs should be given full credit for their heroic military deeds. "We reasoned first of all," said Pankratova, "that the struggle of every people for its national independence is beyond question a progressive factor."

New Demands by the Party

Pravda's favorable review of the book indicated that these interpretations were "correct" in their day. But the situation changed rapidly. In the early part of the war, the party wanted, above all, patriotic fervor and cooperation from the non-Russian peoples, even at the expense of nourishing their nationalist traditions and sentiments. But after the military tide had turned and victory become assured, the party became concerned that excessive nationalism among the non-Russian peoples might become a dangerous centrifugal force in the Soviet family: the Kazakhs for example, might yearn for a latter-day Kenesary who would lead another resistance movement against Russian domination. Consequently, the Central Committee in 1944 and 1945 passed resolutions rebuking Bashkir and Tatar historians for idealizing their feudal leaders of the past (the Tatars had gone so far as to recall the heroism of Idegei of the Golden Horde,

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Evolving Interpretations of Kazakh History

On the Kenesary Movement of the 1840's

They [the Kazakh revolts of the 1820's] prepared the way for the greater mass movement, which engulfed the Kazakh steppe from 1837 to 1847. During that decade the majority of the population of the three Kazakh hordes rose under their leader, Kenesary Kasymov, for a liberation struggle against Russian colonizers and their agents, the Sultan's rulers. In its scope and significance, this was the most substantial uprising of the Kazakh people in the whole period of the colonizing policy of Russian Tsarism. In this uprising, which appeared as the sum and synthesis of all the previous movements, the Kazakh people demonstrated with particular force and clarity, through their freedom-loving and militant spirit, that they would not easily give up their national independence.

—***History of the Kazakh SSR* (1943), p. 220.**

The uprising of Kenesary, manifesting an anti-colonial character, played a progressive role in the history of the Kazakh people. Its progressiveness rested on the claims stated by Kenesary, who was striving to unite the Kazakhs into a single government, to overcome inter-tribal hatreds and feudal disintegration.

—***History of the Kazakh SSR* (1949), p. 296.**

The movement of Kenesary Kasymov was a reactionary, feudal-monarchal manifestation, aimed at holding the Kazakh people back and strengthening the patriarchal-feudal system, working toward the restoration of medieval Khan power, toward the alienation of Kazakhstan from Russia and the Russian people.

—***History of the Kazakh SSR* (1957), p. 321.**

On the Annexation of the Kazakhs

The conversion of Kazakhstan into a colony signified the end of the independent existence of the Kazakh people and their inclusion in the system of military-feudal exploitation, which was created by the domination of Tsarism for all the exploited peoples of the Tsarist "prison of peoples."

—***History of the Kazakh SSR* (1943), pp. 307-08.**

The inclusion of Kazakhstan in the Russian Empire had a positive influence on the development of the economy of Kazakhstan. The development of external, as well as domestic trade, facilitated the accumulation of trading capital; . . . an indigenous light industry developed, growing out of these markets; there was an intensive development of agriculture, and a greater number of nomads went over to a settled life.

—***History of the Kazakh SSR* (1949), p. 323.**

The annexation of Kazakhstan to Russia . . . had a progressive significance for the historic destiny of the Kazakh people, appearing at a crisis hour in their history. . . . [It] delivered the Kazakh people from enslavement by Dzhungarian feudal leaders. . . . Feudal disintegration in Kazakhstan was overcome, the constant feudal internecine fighting and wars were cut short, many surviving patriarchal-feudal institutions were liquidated, and slavery was abolished. . . . The most important result of the annexation was the drawing together of the Russian and Kazakh peoples in a common struggle against Tsarism, with Russian landlords and capitalists, and the Kazakh feudal leaders.

—***History of the Kazakh SSR* (1957), pp. 244-45.**

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who sacked Moscow in 1408!),[12] and in March 1945, *Bolshevik* dealt the *coup de grâce* to the 1943 history of the Kazakh SSR. The party journal published an article which condemned the authors of the book for dwelling on Kazakh military traditions, for neglecting the class struggle and failing to recognize the reactionary nature of Kenesary's movement, and for maintaining that the Russians had conquered Kazakhstan.[13] Ironically enough, the writer of this party-inspired diatribe was M. Morozov, who in 1942 had co-authored an article calling on historians to promote Soviet patriotism by popularizing non-Russian military heroes and the military traditions of their peoples.[14]

Under the impact of this denunciation, the Central Committee of the Kazakh Communist Party passed a resolution repudiating the 1943 history and setting up machinery for the production of a new history of Kazakhstan.[15] Needless to say, there was no mention of the Kazakh party's own role in the preparation of the condemned history, and its co-editor, Party Secretary Abdykalykov, was never mentioned in subsequent discussions. Indeed, his name has disappeared from all standard Soviet reference works, suggesting that he may have been purged.

But the plans for a new history of the Kazakhs did not go well. The historians made a determined rebuttal of the party's criticisms, causing delays which held up the completion of their task for more than a decade. Their leading spokesman was E. B. Bekmakhanov, a gifted Kazakh who had been a member of the collective which produced the 1943 history. Just turned thirty, he was a party member, a graduate of the Higher Party School, and had lectured for the party during the war. In October 1946, Bekmakhanov successfully defended his doctoral dissertation, a routine academic event which was reported in the journal of the Soviet Academy of Sciences.[16] It was, however, a quiet act of defiance, for Bekmakhanov had written on the Kenesary movement and had maintained the old view that it was a progressive national liberation movement for Kazakh independence. His dissertation was the most detailed account of the movement ever written and was based on painstaking research in the Tsarist archives. When the Kazakh Academy of Sciences published the study in 10,000 copies the following year,[17] the issue was joined.

Bekmakhanov's work was favorably reviewed in the Kazakh press, received a special award from the local branch of the Academy of Sciences, and (according to later reports) was even greeted with approval by many Kazakh party leaders. But there was an awesome silence from the central scholarly press. Meanwhile, a stream of articles and reports by Bekmakhanov appeared in Kazakh journals, leaving no doubt that he not only had the approval of his fellow historians but was becoming their spokesman. (By contrast, the main central historical journal, *Voprosy istorii*, never published anything by him.) Many of these articles defended and amplified Bekmakhanov's arguments regarding Kenesary's historic role.

Bekmakhanov vs. the Party

The first public indication that Bekmakhanov was in trouble came in response to one of his articles surveying the achievements of Kazakh historians in glowing terms. A party historian, A. Likholat, writing in *Kultura i zhizn*, accused Bekmakhanov of trying "to hide from the reader the unsatisfactory work of the Kazakh Institute of History." He further charged that Bekmakhanov still held the 1943 history in high regard, that he had "softened" the *Bolshevik* critique of that work to suit his own views, and that he had not acknowledged a word of criticism about his own book. Expressing alarm that Bekmakhanov was to have a part in writing the projected new history of the Kazakhs, Likholat concluded by asking ominously how it was comprehensible that Bekmakhanov's article praising Kazakh historians could have been published in the journal of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan.[18]

[12] The texts of these resolutions were published in the journal *Propagandist*, Nos. 15-16, 1944, pp. 19-22, and Nos. 3-4, pp. 16-18.

[13] M. Morozov, "Ob *Istorii kazakhskoi SSR*" (On *The History of the Kazakh SSR*), *Bolshevik*, No. 6, 1945, pp. 74-80.

[14] M. Morozov, V. Slutskaia, "Broshiury mestnykh izdatelstv o geroicheskom proshlom nashevo naroda i o geroiakh velikoi otechestvennoi voiny" (Pamphlets of Local Presses on the Heroic Past of Our People and the Heroes of the Great Patriotic War), *Propagandist*, No. 17, 1942, pp. 46-48.

[15] "O podgotovke 2-go izdaniia *Istorii kazakhskoi SSR*" (On the Preparation of a Second Edition of *The History of the Kazakh SSR*), *Bolshevik Kazakhstana*, No. 6, pp. 49-51.

[16] *Izvestiia akademii nauk SSSR-Seriia istorii i filosofii* (News of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR—History and Philosophy Series), Vol. IV (1947), No. 1, pp. 94-96.

[17] E. B. Bekmakhanov, *Kazakhstan v 20-40e gody XIX veka* (Kazakhstan from the 1820's Through the 1840's), Alma Ata, 1947.

[18] A. Likholat, "Putanaia statia o zadachakh istoricheskoi nauki v Kazakhstane" (A Muddled Article on the Tasks of Historical Science in Kazakhstan), *Kultura i zhizn* (Moscow), Dec. 20, 1947.

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The battle was again joined at two large public meetings held in Alma-Ata during 1948 to discuss Bekmakhanov's book. The first meeting heard a long report by Kh. Aidarova, a compliant Kazakh historian who was to make a name for herself by her efforts to impose the new party line. She marshaled all the arguments against Bekmakhanov: he had idealized the feudal Kazakh leader, Kenesary, he had confused the lines of the class struggle, and he had compromised the idea of the friendship of peoples. However, the six other speakers at the meeting (who included such prominent historians as Grekov, Bakhrushin and Druzhinin) staunchly defended Bekmakhanov.[19] The second meeting was evidently set up as a corrective to the first and went entirely in the other direction. *Voprosy istorii* reported that "the broad public of Alma-Ata was represented at the discussion," and that "a majority of the participating historians condemned E. Bekmakhanov's book as nationalistic." [20]

In the growing controversy Bekmakhanov had the solid support not only of the Kazakh branch of the Academy of Sciences, which continued to publish his articles up to the middle of 1950, but also of the great majority of reputable Kazakh historians and a number of important officials of the Kazakh Communist Party, including I. Omarov, a secretary of the Central Committee. Interestingly enough, the editors of *Voprosy istorii*, after remaining silent concerning Bekmakhanov's book for two years, finally entrusted a review of it to Kasym Sharipov, who was not a historian but a prominent Kazakh journalist known to be favorable to the author. While accusing his fellow Kazakh of "gross political errors" (which he did not specify), Sharipov agreed on the fundamental nature of the Kenesary movement and proposed a compromise, namely, that the movement be divided chronologically into progressive and reactionary phases. During most of the movement's duration, he acknowledged, Kenesary had the solid support of the Kazakh masses, but in the last two years he became corrupted by his own ambition and mounted an invasion of Kirghiz lands. Sharipov contended that from this point Kenesary lost popular support, leading to the collapse of his movement, and that this last phase was clearly anti-popular and reactionary, as indicated by the action of the masses in deserting their leader.[21]

Bekmakhanov was given the unusual privilege of replying to this review—but only in the Kazakh press. In an article entitled "Fair Criticism," he accepted Sharipov's views in nearly every particular and offered better-reasoned arguments in support of them.[22] This conciliatory move, however, was ignored by the party.

The Party's Final Triumph

At this point the long-anticipated revised edition of the 1943 history [23] made its appearance in print. The collective which had prepared it was headed by Pankratova and Party Secretary Omarov, the latter apparently acting as a kind of political commissar for the project, much as Abdykalykov had in the preparation of the 1943 history. The authors repaired many of their earlier "errors": they deemphasized military traditions, sharpened the Kazakh class struggle, and lengthened their discussion of Russian cultural influences. But on the most sensitive point, the evaluation of the Kenesary movement, they essentially held their ground. Nevertheless, the book was given a generally favorable review in *Voprosy istorii*. The reviewer, M. P. Kim, confined himself to chiding the authors for "overstating" Kenesary's progressive role, noting that they had given the movement twice as much space (26 pages) as they had given to the February Revolution.[24]

For a period of eighteen months thereafter, the central party press remained ominously silent on the whole question of the Kazakh history, while only the Kazakh scholarly journals continued to print Bekmakhanov's articles. This prolonged silence was probably accounted for by the party's preoccupation with an even more flagrant case of "bourgeois nationalism." A Central Committee resolution issued in May 1950 reprimanded historians of the Caucasus for idealizing Shamil, and

[19] "Obsuzhdenie monografii E. Bekmakhanova *Kazakhstana v 20-40e. gody XIX veka*" (Discussion of E. Bekmakhanov's Monograph *Kazakhstan from the 1820's Through the 1840's*), *Vestnik Akademii nauk kazakhskoi SSR*, No. 3, 1948, pp. 35-38.

[20] *Voprosy istorii*, No. 6, 1949, pp. 142-43.

[21] *Ibid.*, No. 4, 1949, pp. 109-14.

[22] *Vestnik akademii nauk kazakhskoi SSR*, No. 9, 1949, pp. 108-10.

[23] A. M. Pankratova and I. O. Omarov (Eds.), *Istoriia kazakhskoi SSR: S drevneishikh vremen do nashikh dnei* (History of the Kazakh SSR: From Earliest Times to Our Day), 2nd ed., Alma-Ata, 1949. Although this book was published in 25,000 copies, it was later suppressed so effectively that the writer has been unable to uncover a single copy in the course of extensive inquiries to European and American libraries.

[24] *Voprosy istorii*, No. 6, 1949, pp. 130-34.

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a campaign was launched to repudiate the historic role of this 19th-century nationalist hero. The denigration of Shamil had obvious implications for the historians of Kazakhstan, foreshadowing a resumption of the party's offensive against them. It finally came at the end of 1950 in a *Pravda* article entitled "For a Marxist-Leninist Elucidation of the Problems of the History of Kazakhstan," the co-authors of the article including Bekmakhanov's chief critic, Kh. Aidarova.[25] Bekmakhanov was singled out as the chief culprit and charged with spreading harmful nationalistic views. The article accepted the idea of dividing the Kazakh resistance movement into progressive and reactionary phases but drew the dividing line at the point when Kenesary took command in 1838. (Since it was admitted that he had widespread popular support for some time after that, there was an implicit admission that the masses had made a mistake.) The Kazakh people, said the article, deserted Kenesary when they became aware that he wanted "a restoration of the medieval khan regime and the separation of Kazakhstan from Russia and the great Russian people."

Once *Pravda* had spoken, the party leaders and historians of Kazakhstan had their work cut out for them, and the following months brought a series of corrective measures. The Kazakh Central Committee adopted a resolution condemning Bekmakhanov for "juggling quotations and facts" and for failing "to reveal the deeply progressive significance of the annexation of Kazakhstan to Russia." Omarov, the co-editor of the 1949 history, was relieved of his post as party secretary, and a new collective, which was already at work on a fifth Kazakh history, was urged to profit from *Pravda's* directives. Sharipov, who had been somewhat sympathetic in his review of Bekmakhanov's book for *Voprosy istorii,* and who had himself written an article commemorating the 100th anniversary of Kenesary's death, also lost his job.[26]

In the face of these threats, most of Bekmakhanov's fellow historians backed down and joined in criticizing him at a series of meetings.[27] Pankratova, Viatkin, and Druzhinin all apologized for their erroneous views, but Bekmakhanov remained silent. The Kazakh Institute of History then appealed to the Ministry of Higher Education to deprive Bekmakhanov of his professor's title and the degrees of *kandidat* and doctor of historical science, which it said had been "incorrectly conferred on him for harmful, bourgeois-nationalist work."[28] This action was duly taken, and Bekmakhanov went into a long period of professional silence, although *Pravda* charged in late 1952 that he was still being "protected" by the rector of the Kazakh State University.[29]

The Revamped History of the Kazakhs

Least of all is known about the fifth attempt to produce a history of the Kazakhs, although its preparation was widely reported and discussed in the early 1950's. The editors were Bekmakhanov's principal critics, including Aidarova. There were several conferences and progress reports, and a thousand copies of a "prospectus" of the work, in both Russian and Kazakh, were distributed for discussion. Just one chapter—significantly one entitled "The Voluntary Annexation of Kazakhstan to Russia"—was published in the journal of the Kazakh Academy of Sciences.[30] Sometime in 1953 or 1954, the project was apparently shelved, and a new collective of twenty-five editors and authors was formed to take over the task. The new group included only one survivor of the old editorial boards.

The historians in the new collective finally came to terms with the party, and the appearance in 1957 of their *History of the Kazakh SSR*[31] may be said to have marked the coming of age of the new Soviet historiography of the non-Russian peoples. In this volume the modern history of the Kazakhs is thoroughly coordinated with, and made subserviant to, the history of the Great Russians. The three long chapters on Kazakh cultural history might be more accurately titled "Russian influences on Kazakh culture." The authors accept Tsarist reforms at near face value, remarking that while they were primarily intended to strengthen the

[25] T. Shoinbaev, Kh. Aidarova, A. Iakunin, "Za marksistsko-leninskoe osveshchenie voprosov istorii Kazakhstana," *Pravda,* Dec. 26, 1950.

[26] On these developments, see *Pravda,* April 25, Sept. 29, and Oct. 20, 1951.

[27] *Izvestiia akademii nauk SSSR—Seriia istorii i filosofii,* Vol. VIII (1941), No. 2, pp. 195-201.

[28] *Voprosy istorii,* No. 2, 1952, pp. 146-51.

[29] *Pravda,* No. 22, 1952.

[30] G. Dakhsleiger, N. Apollova, "Dobrovolnoe prisoedinenie Kazakhstana k Rossii," *Vestnik akademii nauk kazakhskoi SSR,* No. 5, 1954, pp. 14-27.

[31] M. O. Auezov, S. B. Baishev, and seven others (Eds.), *Istoriia Kazakhskoi SSR,* Vol I, Alma-Ata, 1957.

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ruling classes, they were "objectively" of great progressive significance for the Kazakhs. All the major resistance movements are labeled "feudal-monarchal" in character, with the Kenesary movement reduced to a mere two pages (from a long chapter in 1943) and sketched in the darkest colors. The impression is given that there were never any hostile feelings between the Russian and Kazakh peoples, that they joined together in a sort of commonwealth of peoples and marched shoulder to shoulder toward the October Revolution. The book received a chorus of hurrahs in a ten-page review in *Kommunist*.[32]

Meanwhile Bekmakhanov had quietly surfaced during the period of relaxed cultural controls in 1956. His first article in six years, entitled "The Feudal-Monarchal Movements in Kazakhstan," was inconspicuously published in the scholarly journal of the Kazakh State University and was probably a *ballon d'essai*.[33] Acknowledging in an opening footnote that *Pravda's* article of December 20, 1950, condemning the 1949 history and evaluating the Kenesary movement as "feudal-monarchal" and "nationalistic" had given him "invaluable assistance," Bekmakhanov went on to refute his old arguments point by point. The following year he elaborated on these views in a detailed monograph, *The Annexation of Kazakhstan to Russia*, which is still highly regarded in the USSR.[34]

An Apology with a Difference

Bekmakhanov's new writings were accepted as admissions of error, and his professional standing was restored. But if one reads closely his account of the Kenesary movement in the article mentioned above and in the fourth chapter of the monograph, it becomes apparent that this is an apology with a difference. Bekmakhanov seems, in fact, to be employing a technique of evasion every bit as clever as those used by 19th-century Russian writers in trying to slip material by the Tsarist censors. He repeatedly restates his old arguments before proceeding to refute them. His restatements are solidly grounded on documentary evidence from the Russian archives, frequently given in direct quotations with page citations, while his refutations are based on nothing more than the thin air of recent party reinterpretations. On the surface, Bekmakhanov seems to acknowledge that he erred in taking the documentary evidence at face value, and that he later learned, with *Pravda's* help, that Kenesary's promises and policies as stated in the documents were fraudulent. Could it be that both Bekmakhanov and his readers were more interested in the restatements than the refutations?

Be that as it may, Bekmakhanov rapidly recovered his position as the foremost Kazakh historian. He even appears to have won the favor and confidence of the party, as evidenced by the fact that he was entrusted with writing a series of textbooks on Kazakh history for elementary schools. He also edited the most authoritative bibliography of historical works on Kazakhstan, in which he discreetly neglected to mention his own controversial book of 1947. He was on the editorial board of important Kazakh journals and occupied prominent positions at the Kazakh State University and in the Kazakh Academy of Sciences until his death in 1966.

In its obituary on Bekmakhanov, *Voprosy istorii* recounted in great detail the many accomplishments of "this staunch and devoted Communist," including his lectures to party officials, his propaganda work, and his part in training dozens of young cadres in the teaching profession. With regard to his contributions to Kazakh historiography, the journal attributed "especially great significance" to his "elaboration of questions relating to the friendship of the Kazakh and Russian peoples and their mutual struggle against a common enemy, Tsarism." But the curious reader may note that the obituary, which is studded with dates, has a conspicuous gap in it, as indicated by this sentence in the middle of the article: "In 1946-47 Ermukhan Bekmakhanov worked as deputy director of the Institute of History, Archeology and Ethnography of the Academy of Sciences of the Kazakh SSR; and from 1957 to May 1966 he was Chairman of the Department of History at the Kazakh State University."[35] The missing decade of his life has apparently been committed to the memory hole.

[32] I. Braginskii, I. Zlatkin, N. Ustiugov, "Poleznaia kniga po istorii Kazakhstana" (A Useful Book on the History of Kazakhstan), *Kommunist*, No. 16, 1957, pp. 86-95.

[33] E. B. Bekmakhanov, "Feodalno-monarkhicheskie dvizheniia v Kazakhstane," *Uchenye zapiski kazakhskii gosudarstvennoi universitet* (Scholarly Notes of the Kazakh State University), Vol. XX (1956), pp. 66-85.

[34] E. B. Bekmakhanov, *Prisoedinenie Kazakhstana k Rossii*, Moscow, 1957.

[35] *Voprosy istorii*, No. 9, 1966, p. 220.

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The Ukrainians

By Robert S. Sullivant

It is now fifteen years since the last of the Ukrainian nationalist guerrilla bands of World War II melted away into the Carpathian woods or were destroyed or resettled by Russian forces. In retrospect the struggle carried on by these small forces over a period of more than a dozen years seems to have left little legacy beyond its reminder that certain Ukrainian elements have found it difficult in the past to accept one or another aspect of Russian or Communist rule.

The problem posed by this kind of nationalist movement was extreme, and the Russian response was not surprisingly inflexible and harsh. Perhaps no Russian national leader could be expected to accept so radical a Ukrainian separatist movement as legitimate. Even Lenin, with his firm support for the principle of national self-determination and his liberal position on the Finnish question, regarded independence for the Ukraine in his time as no more than a short-run testimonial to Bolshevik weakness.[1]

Where national demands of a more limited sort have been involved—demands for language use and special educational programs, for economic development, for separate religions and forms of cultural expression—the Russian response has been more complex and varied.

In a recent issue of the journal *Kommunist* the Kazakh leader Nurymbek Dzhandildin has summarized the current Soviet position in a general way.[2] A socialist state, Dzhandildin suggests, has two principal concerns: (1) the building of productive forces; and (2) the development of free social and political relations. The first concern is primary, for it is only on the solid foundation of a sufficiently developed and properly organized economy that free social and political relations are conceivable. In exploring any problem such as the nationalities question, the relationship between these two social concerns has to be recognized.

Because each nationality group is concerned primarily with building its productive forces, Dzhandildin concludes that it finds a measure of natural unity with every other nationality. The unity may not be immediately apparent to all groups, many of which will find themselves separated from one another by traditional historic

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[1] V. I. Lenin, *Sochineniia*, 4th ed., Moscow, 1941-51. Vol. XXVII, pp. 90, 296.

[2] N. Dzhandildin, "Yedinaia mnogonatsionalnaia kultura," (A Single, Multinational Culture), *Kommunist*, No. 5, March 1966, pp. 62-71.

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differences of languages, customs, artistic forms and styles. These differences, Dzhandildin indicates, will not only remain for a time but may even grow, as each national culture flowers in the richer soil it finds at advancing stages in its economic development. In some instances—*e.g.*, where one nationality, particularly a dominant one, adopts a "vulgar," "nihilist" approach to the traditions of another—differences will be exaggerated. Nevertheless, as each nationality finds itself moving along the same path of economic development with others, it will come to accept a natural unity of ideology, of ethical principles and ideals, of "outlooks." Inevitably each culture is subjected to a growing measure of influence from other cultures. In a process referred to as "*sblizhenie*," there is a consolidation or coming together of separate nationalities on the basis of mutual economic development combined with a flowering of fraternal cooperation and friendly relationships in economic affairs, culture, and intellectual life.

The process Dzhandildin describes is an easy and natural one, developing spontaneously, it would appear, in any socialist multinational system where state policy avoids the pitfall of oppressive, imperialist chauvinism. The process is also a non-national one, leading ultimately to the creation of an international society representing an amalgam of the best of all cultures rather than the features of a single dominant culture.

In practice, Soviet leaders have shown little confidence that "*sblizhenie*" might develop as naturally and in as international a form as Dzhandildin suggests. Because of the considerable differences in national development among the Soviet Union's nationalities, different approaches have been applied at different times to one group or another. There has been little inclination to de-emphasize the dominant role of Russians in favor of a vague multinational culture. In short, the concept of *sblizhenie* has come to be interpreted as assimilation—the drawing of minority nationalities into the dominant culture in a manner not so different from the historic assimilation of diverse immigrant groups into American society.

Early Russification

How has this process of assimiliation developed in the Ukraine? We might expect that Ukrainians, as a nationality group, would be the most readily assimilated of the Soviet Union's minorities. Both their language and their traditional forms of worship have been similar to those of the Russians. The two peoples shared a common history in their beginnings and for many hundreds of years in their political organization. Large numbers of Russians have made their homes in the Ukraine, particularly in its eastern and southern sections, while Ukrainians on their part have settled in central Russia or have joined with Russians in colonizing Siberia and Central Asia.

In point of fact, however, relations between Russians and Ukrainians have frequently been troubled, and the process of assimilation in the Ukraine has been retarded by the differences between Ukrainian culture patterns, which have been predominantly rural, and Russian culture patterns, which have been predominantly urban. Census figures of the 1920's suggest the differences between the two ethnic groups. Of the Ukrainian population, 90 percent lived in rural areas while over half the Russians in the Ukraine lived in the cities. With some exceptions, the cities were in fact dominated by Russian and Jewish majorities, particularly the major centers of the Donbass, where 61 percent of the population was identified as Russian. In a few cities Russians comprised as much as 70 to 80 percent of the population.[3]

The problem was compounded because a large number of Ukrainians who had moved to the cities had lost their Ukrainian ties under Tsarist rule and had come to regard themselves for all practical purposes as Russians. There is no easy measure of the extent of this assimilation, but the census of 1926 reported that nearly a quarter of urban Ukrainians had come to regard Russian as their primary language. It was not simply that they spoke Russian but that they identified it as their first tongue. If we can regard these groups as assimilated, it appears that only 36 percent of the population of the Ukraine's cities remained primarily Ukrainian. On the other hand, the census indicated that in the countryside Russification had proceeded much more slowly: only 2 percent of rural Ukrainians had come to regard Russian as their primary tongue.

The contrast between the city and the village was one which many Ukrainians regarded in a painful way. For them the city was not Ukrainian and the city was not peasant. The city was alien and hostile.

[3] Tsentralnoe statisticheskoe upravlenie SSSR, otdel perepisi, *Vsesoiuznaia perepis naseleniia 1926 goda*, Moscow, 1927, Vol. XI, pp. 8-30; Tsentralnoe Statisticheskoe upravlenie SSSR, otdel demografii, *Trudy*, Moscow, 1924, Vol. XX, Part IV, pp. 40-51.

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The city rules the village and the city is "alien." The city draws to itself almost all the wealth and gives the village almost nothing in return. The city extracts taxes which never return to the Ukrainian village. In the city one must pay bribes to be freed from scorn and red tape. In the city are warm fires, schools, theaters, music and plays. The city is expensively dressed, as for a holiday; it eats and drinks well; many people promenade. In the village there is nothing besides hard work, impenetrable darkness, and misery. The city is aristocratic, it is alien. It is not ours, not Ukrainian.[4]

In the years immediately after the Revolution, Soviet leaders viewed these ethnic divisions as a part of the broad problem of winning control of the Ukraine. It is not surprising that they sought support chiefly in the largest urban areas in the east, for here were the bulk of the Ukraine's industrial workers—the logical allies of the Bolsheviks—and here too were the majority of the Ukraine's Russians, untroubled by national hostilities. Russian elements from the cities were drawn at once into dominant positions in the Ukrainian Soviet government, and they sought to maintain a privileged position for Russians and to preserve and expand Tsarist Russification. Throughout the first years, until April 1923, the government seemed determined to assimilate Ukrainians into Soviet Russian life with little regard for the local language, customs, or traditions.

Surprisingly, it was central officials who ordered a halt to Russification. Concerned, perhaps, that the program might alienate an important segment of the Soviet empire whose support was vital to Soviet success, they denounced the Russian leaders who governed the Ukraine. In an early party resolution, the Ukrainian government was charged with failure to conduct itself with the necessary "tolerance and prudence" toward the Ukrainian nationalist movement.[5] In 1921 Stalin issued a strong statement demanding that the local governments in the Ukraine and in other border regions accept the national peculiarities of their region, establish the local language as the official one, and emphasize the recruitment to party and state posts of leaders drawn from the local population.[6] In one of his last major statements Lenin attacked Russification in strongest terms, insisting that the problem had become the most serious one confronting Soviet leaders, and that it was better "to stretch too far in the direction of complacence and softness toward the national minorities, than too little." [7]

Ukrainization

Under central pressure a strong program was adopted early in 1923 to end Russification and to strengthen local Ukrainian institutions. Ukrainian was to be introduced as the official language in all party and government work; Russian chauvinists were to be removed from leadership posts and replaced with Ukrainians; a campaign was to be inaugurated to teach Ukrainian to those who did not know it, to extend its use in the schools, and to enlarge Ukrainian cultural facilities of every kind. The program was given the label "Ukrainization" and was to transform the Ukraine from a Russified and Russian-dominated republic into a distinctly Ukrainian one. The suggestion was strong that Russians living in the Ukraine would one day lose their national identification and become absorbed linguistically and culturally into a relatively homogeneous Ukrainian society.

For a short time the program was strenuously applied. Ukrainian language centers were established in party and government institutions, schools were shifted to the Ukrainian language, newspapers and publishing houses were prodded to publish in Ukrainian rather than Russian, and Ukrainians were encouraged to use their own language in the courts and in government and party work.

But almost at once powerful opposition developed, spearheaded by the Ukraine's entrenched Russian minority. The program, it was charged, was as discriminatory against Russians as the earlier Tsarist Russification program had been discriminatory against Ukrainians. Moreover, the argument ran, the program had fallen into the hands of Ukrainian nationalists who were working under its protection to spread counterrevolutionary and anti-Soviet separatist propaganda. A more balanced program was required if the revolution in the Ukraine was to be safeguarded and if Russian and Jewish minorities were to be protected against Ukrainian chauvinism.[8]

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[4] Peter Skoreventanski, *Revoliutsiia na Ukraine*, Saratov, 1919, pp. 7-8. Quoted in H. R. Weinstein, "Land Hunger in the Ukraine, 1905-1917," *Journal of Economic History* (New York), May 1942, p. 25.

[5] "O sovetskoi vlasti na Ukraine," (On Soviet Power in the Ukraine), *Vsesoiuznaia kommunisticheskaia partiia (bolshevikov) v rezoliutsiiakh sezdov, konferentsii i plenumov Ts. K., 1898-1935*, 5th ed., Moscow, 1935, Vol. I, pp. 324-26.

[6] J. V. Stalin, *Sochineniia*, Moscow, 1946-1951. Vol. V., pp. 24, 28, 49.

[7] *VKP (b) v rezoliutsiiakh*, I, pp. 391-397; and Richard Pipes, *The Formation of the Soviet Union*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1954, p. 276.

[8] N. N. Popov, *Narys istorii komunistychnoi partii (bolshivykiv) Ukrainy*, Kharkov, 1928, pp. 299-300; *Treti Sezd Sovetov SSR: Stenograficheskii otchet*, Moscow, 1925, 272-80.

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Early in 1926 the dispute over Ukrainization was taken directly to Moscow. Oleksandr Shumskyi, Ukrainian Commissar of Education and leader of the Ukrainian "nationalist" Bolsheviks, insisted in a personal interview with Stalin that despite party resolutions, assimilation pressures of the Tsarist era remained dominant in the Ukraine.[9] Powerful resistance, he argued, had developed within the Russian and Russified wing of the party to the Ukraine's distinctive culture and language. Many refused to support Ukrainian-language programs and showed an ongoing prejudice against native Ukrainians, denying them leadership posts in the government, party, and trade unions. Because these elements comprised the majority of party leaders and because they occupied controlling positions everywhere in the Ukraine, their resistance could not be overcome by Ukrainians alone. If the Ukrainization program was to be successfully carried out, direct intervention from Moscow was required. Republic officials would have to be replaced by local leaders committed to Ukrainian ways.

In his reply Stalin dismissed Shumskyi's complaint, calling instead for a decrease in the tempo of Ukrainization. He agreed that Russifying, assimilating tendencies were to be opposed and that leaders and cadres were to be removed when they would not accept the program. The pace of Ukrainization could not be hurried, however, and there had not yet emerged a sufficient body of Ukrainian workers capable of replacing Russian and Russified leaders. Moreover, the program required the most careful safeguards to ensure that it would not become oppressive of Russian and Jewish minorities or fall into the hands of anti-Russian, anti-Soviet nationalists. Differences between the Russian and Ukrainian cultures were negligible and were not to be emphasized or exaggerated. Russia, as the citadel of Leninism and the world revolutionary movement, provided the example to be emulated by other peoples. Russian cultural influences in the Ukraine were salutary and were not to be attacked.[10]

"Separate but Equal?"

Shumskyi was shortly relieved of his party and government posts and was denounced in the Ukraine by Russians and Ukrainians alike. Although the Ukrainization program was not abandoned, it was no longer vigorously stressed. In 1927 a new statute on languages was adopted, giving Russian virtually equal status with Ukrainian: both languages were to be taught in the schools, both were to be used by government agencies, and efforts to force Russians to use Ukrainian were to be abandoned.[11] In a party resolution it was announced that what was needed was a "battle on two fronts": against Russian chauvinism and assimilation practices on the one hand, and against counterrevolutionary Ukrainian nationalism on the other. Ukrainians were to be allowed to develop their language and culture without stigma or restraint, and Ukrainian institutions were to be accepted as republic institutions. Russians and Jews were to be equally free, however, and were not to be forced to adopt Ukrainian ways.[12]

If the "battle on two fronts" was an attempt at compromise between the Ukrainian and Russian factions of republic leadership, it soon failed. The main problem arose in the cities, which represented the center of Bolshevik power in the Ukraine since they contained the majority of party members, the trade unions, and the governmental, industrial, and educational leaders. Because the cities were more Russian than Ukrainian, pressures at the republic level were overwhelmingly weighted toward Russian rather than Ukrainian institutions. How, nationalist Ukrainians asked, was the republic to be distinctly Ukrainian, if leadership was to come from the cities, and if the cities were not to be forcibly Ukrainized?

The problem was further complicated by the profound changes in overall Soviet policy that occurred in the late 1920's and early 1930's. Under the industrialization and collectivization plans pressed in these years, the population of the Ukraine's urban and industrial areas began to swell. In part, the increase consisted of Russian technicians and industrial managers imported into the Ukraine from central Russia to implement the new programs. These groups enlarged the Russian segment of the urban population and considerably strengthened Russian influence. At the same time, Ukrainian peasants—uprooted by collectivization and left as surplus labor by the mechanization of agriculture—also flocked to the cities, probably in even greater numbers than the Russians. To Ukrainian nation-

[9] Stalin, *op. cit.*, Vol. VIII, pp. 149-50.
[10] *Ibid.*, pp. 149-54.

[11] "Zakon pro rivnopravnist mov na Ukraini," (Law on the Equality of Languages in the Ukraine), *Visti vseukrainskoho tsentralnoho vykonavchoho komitetu* (Kiev), July 8, 1927.
[12] "Zaiava TsK KP(b)U do vykonkomu kominterna," (Declaration of the Central Committee of the Communist Party [Bolshevik] of the Ukraine to the Executive Committee of the Comintern), in Mykola Skrypnyk. *Dzherela ta prychyny rozlamu v KPZU*, Kharkov, 1928, pp. 108-23.

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alist Bolsheviks—led now by the influential Nikolai Skrypnik—it was intolerable to confront these Ukrainians with the Russian culture dominant in the cities, subjecting them to the same assimilation pressures that Tsarist rule had applied. Again, it seemed essential that the cities be Ukrainized.

Despite Shumskyi's earlier failure, there was some reason for Skrypnik to expect the support of central leaders for his position. As early as 1921 Stalin had announced, "It is clear that although Russian elements still predominate in the cities of the Ukraine, in the course of time these cities will inevitably be Ukrainized." In 1926 Stalin had reaffirmed his view, modifying it only to suggest that the process would be a "long, spontaneous, natural" one that could not be forced.[13]

Stalin, however, refused to give Skrypnik any practical support, and Russian leaders in the Ukraine fastened upon Stalin's suggestion for slow and vol-

[13] Stalin, *op. cit.*, Vol. V, p. 49; Vol. VIII, pp. 149-54.

Voices from the Ukraine . . .

Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn's unprecedented letter to the Fourth Congress of Soviet Writers created a furor in Soviet literary circles, but perhaps nowhere was its impact more relevant and poignant than in the Ukraine. The letter vehemently assaulted "the oppression, no longer tolerable, that our literature has been enduring from censorship for decades," and spoke of "violence and personal persecution." [1] Oles Gonchar, Chairman of the Union of Writers of the Ukraine, addressing the Fourth Congress, echoed Solzhenitsyn's words:

The most severe and irascible of editors, as well as the inconspicuous person tightly clutching his colored pencil, should understand that restricting the thought of a Soviet artist, and confining the scope of his literary activity can only interest such people as the bureaucrat, living in constant fear for his position (unless he is handicapped by a totally primitive mind); the careerist; or the inflexible dogmatic. [2]

Both men were publicly voicing a feeling that was strong among numerous Soviet writers, and particularly strong among a group of Ukrainian writers, critics and poets known as the *shestydesyatnyky* ("Men of the Sixties") who appeared with the post-Stalinist thaw at the beginning of the 1960's. The best known of this group are Ivan Drach, Mykola Vinhranovskyy, Vitaliy Korotych, Mykola Synhayivskyy, and Robert Tretyakov. In addition, there are the poetess, Lina Kostenko, and the young literary critics, Ivan Dzyuba and Ivan Svitlychnyy. Naturally, there are great differences between these writers, and some are not too different in style or thought from other Soviet writers. But in general the "shestydesyatnyky" are distinguished by a more "western" and more outspoken approach than most Soviet writers. If any themes can be said to be dominant in their works, they are strong national pride, even patriotism; and a desire to transcend or attack the confines of dogma dictated by socialist realism.

The latter is surely the dominant factor in the following lines by Ivan Drach, probably written about Pavlo Tychyna, appointed in March 1962 by the Presidium of the Union of Writers of the Ukraine as a sort of watchdog over the works of the *shestydesyatnyky:*

You have so many sides that you are round like a snake,
You are a white-headed master with a black palate.
You always sing the same song,
That my generation is decadent. [3]

And national pride is surely evident in the following, by Mykola Vinhranovskyy:

You've brought my people to my heart,
You've lit my thoughts with time
And put them into the language of a Ukranian mother.
I look at you with my heart and mind,
I love you through the universe and through humanity. . .
And through the sunflower in its golden dream,
And through the grey hair of a wise thinker,
And through the wild sweetpeas on the stubble fields. . . .[4]

In prose, too, outspoken frankness is evident. Ivan Dzyuba, for example, wrote in *Literaturna Ukraina* of January 9, 1962:

When a writer turns to his reader solely for the purpose of presenting a belletristic work which illustrates the point of some administrative endeavor, or sings the praises of a government action—he mocks the writer's calling itself.

[1] *New York Times*, June 5 and 6, 1967.
[2] *Idem.*
[3] *Survey* (London), No. 59, April 1966, p. 105.
[4] *Ibid.*, p. 106.

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untary Ukrainization to plead their own case. Already, they argued, Ukrainization had moved too rapidly, to the disadvantage of the Russian workers in the cities: Russian films were no longer being shown; worse, workers could not participate in trade-union and party meetings, which were being conducted exclusively in Ukrainian.

In 1929 Skrypnik recognized these complaints, suggesting a compromise program which he called "voluntary Ukrainization." Russians in the cities would be allowed to use their language as widely as they saw fit but would be educated to the advantages of Ukrainian as the official language of the Republic and would be encouraged to learn it, initially as a secondary tongue, but ultimately as a primary tongue. For the moment the Skrypnik compromise was accepted despite the continued opposition of Russians in the Ukraine.[14]

[14] Nikolai Skrypnik, *Statti i promovy*, Kharkov, 1931, Vol. II, Pt. 2, pp. 113-17, 156-59.

The "Shestydesyatnyky"

And in Vasyl Symonenko's *Diary* which was recently issued abroad, we find the following entry for October 10, 1962:

In *Roses in Mourning* I had not intended to "topple gods." In it I take a stand against a new religion, against the hypocrites who, not unsuccessfully, are trying to transform Marxism into a religion, converting it into a Procrustean bed for science, the arts, love.[5]

Party leaders were quick to realize that works such as these were dangerous to the regime, and subjected their authors to severe criticism. The campaign against the *shestydesyatnyky* reached its climax at the 23rd Congress of the Ukrainian CP in March 1966, in a speech by the party-line playwright, O. Ye. Korneichuk:

To such young talents who lose their honor and conscience, who do not value the good fortune of membership in the great family of Soviet nations, only one thing can be said: "Come to your senses, because you will have to face the people. They might take away your Soviet passport and say: Get off our sacred land."[6]

A month later, two Ukrainian literary critics, Ivan Svitlychnyy and Ivan Dzyuba, were arrested for, according to the *New York Times*, "their spirited defense of young Ukrainian poets against attempts by the Soviet literary bureaucracy to impose conformism."[7] Dzyuba was released after the preliminary investigation because of ill health; Svitlychnyy, however, was kept in prison for eight months. Word also reached the West that during the summer of 1965 arrests of Ukrainian intellectuals had taken place in Kiev, Lvov, Ternopol, Lutsk, Zhytomyr, and Ivano-Frankivsk, and that at least 20 of them were tried in the spring of 1966 and sentenced to prison terms of one to six years.

This information was confirmed by Ivan Drach and Dmytro Pavlychko on November 11, 1966, in New York, when the two writers were there as members of the Soviet Ukrainian delegation to the UN General Assembly. "This question is very painful for us and for me personally," said Drach, speaking for himself and Pavlychko in answer to a query from the floor, "because among those arrested were my friends." According to Drach, the evidence against the defendents consisted of documents written by them criticizing the Soviet system of government, the hostile attitude of the system towards the Ukraine, and the "Red fascism" prevailing in the Ukraine. He did not confirm or deny these accusations, but did say that he felt there was no need to arrest the accused or bring them to trial.[8]

The defendants were sentenced under Article 62 of the Ukrainian Criminal Code. The charges were agitation and propaganda aimed at undermining the Soviet regime. The writers denied their guilt and testified that they had merely worked for the development of Ukrainian literature, language, culture, and economy, for cultural exchange with other nations, and for the implementation of the constitutional rights of the Ukrainian SSR. But the judges were unsympathetic to their defense. They remained indifferent even when, as reported by London's *New Statesman* of December 16, 1966, "about a dozen Ukrainian writers and scientists . . . interceded for the young men and asked for the sentences to be rescinded."

[5] *Suchasnist* (Munich) No. 1, January 1965.
[6] *Literaturna Ukraina*, March 18, 1966.
[7] *New York Times*, April 7 and 22, 1966.

[8] In a speech to the Overseas Press Club, Nov. 11, 1966, reported in *PROLOG*, Nov. 18, 1966.

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It was not long, however, before the central leaders, Stalin among them, found even this lower level of Ukrainization pressure unacceptable. The collectivization shock of the early 1930's, when Soviet efforts to transform the countryside met with grand-scale resistance from the Ukrainian peasantry, emphasized anew the critical importance for the Bolsheviks of the Ukraine's urban areas with their Russian elements. There is little evidence that Ukrainian nationalists played an important role in stimulating peasant unrest. But the identification of Ukrainians with rural areas was so close as to give pause to Soviet leaders. Here, they foresaw, were elements which might develop into a powerful peasant-nationalist rebellion. Ukrainians who pressed for decentralization, localism, and the Ukrainization program were therefore suspiciously close to treason. One after another, Ukrainian nationalist subversive organizations were "uncovered". In 1933-34 Stalin insisted that the Ukrainization program be dropped, and in short order its principal supporters were removed. In the future, it was announced, all support was to be given to "proletarian internationalism" and "Soviet solidarity" in preference to local Ukrainian themes, and leadership posts were to be filled with "tried and tested persons educated in the Bolshevik spirit" rather than with ethnic Ukrainians of uncertain political reliability.[15]

It soon became clear that the new approach represented a major reversal in policy. In the cities of the Ukraine, pressure on Russians and Jews to shift to Ukrainian ways was dropped, and leadership was left in the hands of Russians. Indeed, Russification pressures intensified, since Ukrainians were under a cloud of suspicion and an increasing premium was placed on familiarity with the Russian language and culture. The Ukrainization process, it was indicated, had come to an end.[16]

The return to Russification endured for the remainder of Stalin's rule. In 1938 a requirement was adopted that the Russian language be taught throughout the Ukrainian school system. All citizens, including those in the rural areas, were to be able to converse fluently in simple Russian and to read and write the language in an elementary way.[17] Increasingly, Russian was depicted as superior to Ukrainian, not only as the language Lenin had used and the language common to the whole Soviet Union, but as the bearer of an advanced, revolutionary, proletarian culture. The pressure exerted earlier to induce writers and artists to work with the Ukrainian language and with Ukrainian themes was replaced by pressure on Ukrainians to avoid nationalist tendencies and to increase their use of the Russian language and of Russian themes.

A final motive for Russification was provided by World War II. National unity and solidarity seemed essential in the face of the German advance. As the war progressed, Stalin became convinced that only the Russian people were wholly committed to the defense of the Soviet Union and that other nationalities, including the Ukrainians, were at best unenthusiastic and at worst treasonous. The problem was aggravated by absorption into the Ukraine of new districts in the west—districts which before the war had belonged to Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Rumania. The populations in these districts were more strongly nationalist and less willing to accept Soviet rule than the population in other parts of the Ukraine. The pressure to emphasize Russification grew correspondingly.

Gradually the Russification program centered on two traditional approaches. First, use of the Russian language was pressed even in areas such as the western Ukraine, where it had previously been of small or no importance; work in the higher schools was shifted from Ukrainian or Polish to Russian, and increasingly it became the common tongue for official meetings. Second, large numbers of Russians or Russified and urbanized Ukrainians were assigned to leadership posts in traditionally Ukrainian areas. Although there are no precise figures, it appears that many thousands of such workers were dispatched to the countryside in the years after World War II, chiefly from the great urban complexes in the east. The influence of these immigrants was felt most strongly in the western Ukraine, where native leaders found themselves denied the higher positions in the party, the government, industry and education. Understandably, this population shift also resulted in a dramatic strengthening of urban influences in the rural areas. Because urban attitudes were largely Russian, the shifts tended to increase the rate and extent of assimilation.

After Stalin

In the years following Stalin's death the pendulum swung back once more from the most extreme forms of Russification. Among the principal accusations leveled against Stalinism was the charge that it had

[15] *Visti* . . ., Jan. 17, 1933; P. P. Postyshev and S. V. Kossior, *Soviet Ukraine Today*, Moscow, 1934, pp. 95-96.
[16] Postyshev and Kossior, *op. cit.*, pp. 50-57.
[17] *Visti* . . ., April 24, and June 17, 1938.

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led to a distortion of the Leninist policy of friendship of all nationalities. The First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Ukraine, L. G. Melnikov, was removed from his post and denounced for engaging in the "vicious practice" of appointing party leaders drawn from eastern districts to high positions in the western Ukraine. In the future, it was urged, the party in the Ukraine was to emphasize the training and development of local leaders in all districts and was to give each area the opportunity to develop Soviet programs in ways which had special meaning for its own people.[18]

In a broader way, new importance was given the role Ukrainians might play in the Soviet Union as a whole. For the first time in the Soviet period Ukrainians were depicted as chief partners with Great Russians in building a new Soviet world. The partnership was not described as wholly equal, for the Russian nation was labeled the principal "bearer of the great revolutionary ideas of freedom and progress." Nevertheless, it was suggested, Ukrainians were a part of the same basic Slavic family as Russians and might be regarded as co-leaders set apart from other ethnic minorities.[19]

This partnership theme served as a powerful reassurance to the Ukraine, but it was also an implicit reminder that, as an equally responsible and privileged people with Russians, Ukrainians were obligated to provide dedicated support for Soviet programs. The theme reflected the considerable difference between Khrushchev's immediate practical political situation and that of Stalin before him. As a long-time party boss in the Ukraine—from 1938 to 1949—Khrushchev had constructed a powerful regional party organization, presumably identified closely with himself. It was natural for him to turn to this machine, first, for direct support in his struggle for the succession and, second, as a source of lieutenants to be assigned supporting positions throughout the Soviet Union. The impressive list of leaders thus promoted out of the Ukraine included Brezhnev, Podgorny, Kirilenko, Rudenko, Serdiuk, Korniets, Rudakov, Matskevich, and many others. Since Brezhnev in the past was as closely identified with the Ukraine as Khrushchev, he is likely to be influenced by the same considerations, though perhaps less directly. In any case, there has been no evidence since Khrushchev's removal of any intention to reduce the large role played by Ukrainians in Soviet affairs.

[18] *Pravda Ukrainy* (Kiev), June 13, 1953.
[19] *Pravda* (Moscow), May 30, 1954.

The Prospects Ahead

We have been following two threads in the development of the Ukraine under Soviet rule—first, the wide oscillations of official policy from period to period; and second, the shifts in population that have accompanied urbanization in the Ukraine and the impact of these shifts on relationships between Ukrainians and Russians. What conclusions can be drawn concerning the future course of development in this important Soviet republic?

First, it seems likely that Soviet leaders will continue to have a higher degree of confidence in the loyalty and reliability of Ukrainians than in the past. Stalin in his time seemed impelled to exaggerate Ukrainian hostility. He was excessively suspicious of all sub-centers of power outside Moscow, and Kiev was one of the most important of these centers. Apparently he misread the series of crises he had experienced involving the Ukraine—the nationalist movement at the time of the Revolution, the collectivization difficulties of the 1930's, the question of Ukrainian loyalty during World War II, and the difficult task of absorbing into the Ukraine the new western districts acquired before and after the war. Because of his suspicions, he drove into opposition Ukrainian leaders such as Petrovskyi, Chubar, Skrypnik, Liubchenko and others, whose loyalty initially was not seriously in question.

Khrushchev and Brezhnev both seem to have recognized that leaders have emerged in the Ukraine who are closely identified with the Soviet Union and the Soviet regime, and who form as reliable a group of adherents as might be found in party organizations in Russian centers. These Ukrainians are mainly from the cities of the eastern Ukraine, where they have been exposed to strong Russian and Soviet influence. They have been taught the Russian language, sent to Russian schools, and infused with attitudes which are more strongly Russian than Ukrainian. They have emphasized their complete opposition to Ukrainian separatists and to the nationalist movements developed by émigrés. Their acceptance by the central leaders, and the positions of influence they have been given, encourage them to identify more closely with the Soviet Union. As they do so, the confidence that central leaders have in them is also likely to increase.

Second, we can expect that the traditional division of the Ukraine into a predominantly Russian urban area and a predominantly Ukrainian rural area will remain. Moreover, as urban areas continue to grow, there will be a steady increase in the number of

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Ukrainians assimilated to one degree or another into Russian culture. Statistics on languages used in the school system indicate that ethnic cultural polarization follows substantially along urban-rural lines.[20] In recent years, approximately 86 percent of students enrolled in rural schools have been taught in the Ukrainian language as opposed to only 52 percent of students in urban schools.[21] The figures suggest that although Soviet language policy may have been successful at one time in prompting Russians and Jews to learn Ukrainian and at another time in prompting Ukrainians to learn Russian, it has not altered the basic pattern of language use in either the cities or rural areas.

In the early period, during the 1920's, the Ukrainization program led many to study and use Ukrainian, but it failed to convert the bulk of the urban population to Ukrainian as its primary tongue. It was this failure which aroused the ire first of Shumskyi and then of Skrypnik, prompting them to demand a more stringent language program aimed at transforming the Ukraine ultimately into an exclusively Ukrainian republic. The decision of central leaders to avoid pressing for such a transformation meant that the large cities would remain predominantly Russian centers.

With the new emphasis on the Russian language in the 1930's and 1940's, the situation was reversed. The new policy led to an increase in the number of Ukrainians moderately fluent in Russian but did not change the patterns of language use in the countryside. It is doubtful that the central leaders meant to produce a change, although the Russification measures adopted by Stalin after World War II suggested such an intent. In any case, Stalin's successors repudiated these measures, supporting the continued use of Ukrainian in the areas where it was the generally accepted tongue.

The most striking development in the Ukraine, therefore, has been its steady urbanization. In 1926 less than 20 percent of the population lived in cities. By 1965 the number had grown to 51 percent.[22] The urbanization process, involving Ukrainians and Russians alike, has reinforced not the Ukrainian culture—as Skrypnik had hoped would be the case—but the entrenched Russian culture. Regardless of official policies, migrants to the cities have been confronted with informal economic and social pressures which have led many of them—if not in the first generation, then in the second,—to accept Russian as their primary tongue. Moreover, inasmuch as Russian is the common tongue for the Soviet Union as a whole and the accepted language for official organizations and agencies, there has been an additional premium on its use, particularly for those hopeful of rising to high positions in the party, government, industry, or even the professions and arts. In certain traditional Ukrainian cities such as Poltava and Vinnitsa, as well as in the western Ukraine, the effect has been less marked. But in the major industrial and commercial centers, particularly in the Donbass, Russification has apparently proceeded apace.[23]

Finally, it seems likely that Ukrainians, particularly Ukrainian intellectuals, will be confronted in the future with a growing crisis of identification. In the past their concerns have been chiefly with nationalist, historical-traditional, and rural themes. Their nationalism has been powerfully conservative in its sentiment. As contemporary problems of economic development and modernization have intruded, Ukrainians have viewed them as essentially urban and non-traditional problems, and hence as non-Ukrainian in character. In the same way traditional themes have become to a degree inappropriate or irrelevant. Ukrainian intellectuals are therefore faced with the task of bridging the gap between the warm familiarities of a national, primarily rural past and the conditions of a contemporary Ukrainian society with all its complex problems and difficulties.

It may be that traditional-nationalist themes will continue to exert a powerful appeal despite the difficulties they are likely to create with central officials anxious to moderate feelings of regional distinctiveness. It may be that the tensions of urbanization and industrialization will lead to a renaissance of rural—and therefore Ukrainian—nostalgia, although much of the Ukraine has apparently completed the most difficult phases of urbanization. Perhaps the most likely development is the emergence of a new urbanized Ukrainian culture, centered in the old traditional cities of the Ukraine, but concerned with themes running parallel to those in other urban areas of the USSR.

[20] *Pravda Ukrainy*, Aug. 8, 1953; Dec. 25, 1956; K. Z. Litvin, *Rastsvet kultury sovetskoi Ukrainy*, Kiev, 1954, pp. 36, 38.

[21] Estimates based on 1959 census reports, 1965 population figures, and data on languages of instruction in the schools. *Pravda Ukrainy*, Dec. 25, 1965; and Tsentralnoe statisticheskoe upravlenie SSSR, *Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR v. 1964 g.*, Moscow, 1965.

[22] *Ibid.*

[23] A rough measure of the rate of assimilation is suggested by figures of the late 1950's indicating that although 76.8 percent of the population of the Ukraine was Ukrainian by background, only 69.1 percent of all students were enrolled in Ukrainian language schools.

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The Baltic Peoples

By V. Stanley Vardys

Travelers report that in Moscow the Baltic republics of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are known as *Sovetskaia zagranitsa," i.e.,* "The Soviet Abroad." The label is apt because the Baltic states indeed stand—culturally as well as geographically—on the edge of Soviet civilization. They are the most Western and the youngest of the Soviet republics, occupied in June of 1940 and incorporated in August of the same year. Though they now feel the entire weight of the Russian colossus, historically the Baltic states have functioned as a battleground and meeting place for Western and Russian influences. Finally, in the period 1918-1940, the Baltic nations were independent. Appreciation of these facts provides the perspective necessary for understanding their present situation. Therefore, at the risk of sounding too elementary, a brief historical sketch must precede the discussion of conditions in the Baltic republics today.

Although the fate of the three republics has been almost identical in the 20th century, the earlier historical development of Estonia and Latvia was different from that of Lithuania. While the Western influences in the first two republics were primarily of Germanic and Protestant origin, in Lithuania they were mainly Polish and Catholic. The early history of the three small nations was determined by the German missionary knights who in the 11th century conquered the Prussians, relatives of the Latvians and Lithuanians, and in the 12th century the Estonian and Latvian tribes. The knights colonized the northern Baltic region, and their descendents, popularly known as the Baltic barons, ruled the native population, establishing a Germanic feudal system, and building cities and trade. They suppressed the Baltic languages and limited economic opportunity for the native population. On the positive side, they introduced a more progressive social order than that found elsewhere in Russia. Courland, Livonia, and Estland—the precursors of today's republics—came under Swedish rule, and were finally annexed by Russia in the 18th century. But the German noblemen retained control of the local governments throughout this time and kept it until World War I, when their power was lost and its vestiges destroyed by the social measures of the independent Latvian and Estonian states. In 1939-40, the Germans were repatriated into the Reich.

In the 13th century, the medieval Lithuanian state, with the resources of the large Russian and

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Ukrainian areas that it ruled, was able to defend itself against the Teutonic Knights. At the end of the 14th century, Lithuania entered into a personal union with Poland, and together they were able to destroy the power of the Knights at the battle of Tannenberg in 1410. But pagan Lithuania, having just accepted Christianity from Poland, soon fell under Polish cultural and political influence, gradually lost its position as an equal partner in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, and in 1795 lost statehood altogether as a result of the final division of Poland by Russia and the Central German powers. Russian rule in Lithuania was more severe than in the northern provinces. Between 1863 and 1904, for example, Lithuania was even denied native language schools and publications. Russian industrial growth at the turn of the century, too, was barely reflected in Lithuania.

The fate of the region, however, was not always determined by outsiders. The national movements of the 19th century culminated in the establishment of independent states upon the downfall of the Tsarist Empire (Lithuania on February 16, 1918, Estonia on February 24th, and Latvia on November 18th of the same year).

The Period of Independence

Conditions for independence were favorable because both the giants, Russia and Germany, whose alliance usually spelled doom for the independence of the area, were defeated and disorganized. Native leaders and armies were able to assert themselves, with small help from the Allies, and to throw out the attacking Bolshevik armies which entered at the end of 1918 ready to set up Communist governments in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. In 1920, after failing to conquer the fledgling states, Soviet Russia signed peace treaties with them, "forever" renouncing all Russian claims to these territories. It was, as events proved within the same generation, a promise of expediency only.

The new nations established democratic governments on the French model, with omnipotent assemblies and weak executives, and with proportional representation which helped to produce multi-party systems. However, this democratic radicalism and the emaciation of the executive backfired, and in the 1930's all three republics found themselves ruled by strong men, Konstantin Päts in Estonia, Karlis Ulmanis in Latvia, and Antanas Smetona in Lithuania. There were differences between the three dictatorships, but generally the authoritarian regimes were similar to Pilsudski's rule in Poland, though they were not as strict and offered more protection for the rights of minorities. In fairness, it should be added that the pendulum was beginning to swing back toward democracy on the eve of World War II. In 1938, Lithuania, after some ten years of dictatorship, had a coalition government, while in Estonia, under reformed rules, a Communist could be elected to Parliament.

In the economic field, Estonia and Latvia were able to adjust their industries, both old and new, to serve non-Russian markets, since the Soviet Union conducted very little trade with these former provinces of Russia. Lithuania made modest progress in building new industry. All three were quite strong in agricultural production, especially dairy and meat products, and developed important food-processing industries. Their exports went primarily to England and Germany.

The social basis of agriculture was laid down in the early 1920's by rather radical land reforms; manors were broken up, their lands distributed to the peasants, and the size of landholdings limited. Private enterprise was the rule in industry and business, but the private sector was balanced by substantial cooperative and state ownership of industrial and marketing enterprises. At the outbreak of the war, the farmer's and the city consumer's standard of living was generally higher than that of the Soviet Union, especially in Estonia and Latvia.

In addition, during the independence period, educational facilities were expanded, and cultural activities flourished as never before in Baltic history. Seeking comparisons with Soviet development, it is possible to compare the period of Baltic independence to the NEP period in Soviet Russia, with the difference that in the Baltic states it was much longer, guaranteed more personal and organizational freedom, and facilitated the uninhibited development of national culture and, indeed, political nationalism.

Thus Baltic independence, though short-lived, was basically viable. The young republics did not collapse as a result of internal instability or incompetence, but became victims, like Poland, of a new Russian-German alliance brought into being by the Hitler-Stalin non-agression pact of August 1939. In October 1939, the Soviet Union demanded the establishment of Soviet military bases on Baltic territory in exchange for mutual assistance pacts to "guarantee" Baltic independence. Although the

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republics had declared their neutrality in the European conflict that had just begun, they felt very insecure. Still shocked by the Nazi destruction of Poland, they bowed to Soviet demands, hoping that "protection" by the Soviets would be easier to bear than domination by the Nazis.[1] They did not know, however, that in the secret protocol signed by Ribbentrop and Molotov on August 23, 1939, virtually the entire Baltic region was to be considered part of the Soviet sphere of influence. The introduction of Soviet air and ground bases signified the beginning of the end of Baltic independence. The end came soon after the USSR won its war against Finland—which had refused to accept Soviet garrisons. On fabricated charges, Moscow accused the Baltic states of failing to fulfill the terms of the mutual assistance pacts, and on June 15-17, beginning with Lithuania, the Red army moved in to occupy the three republics. The pretext for introducing more troops, estimated at some hundreds of thousands, was the need to "guarantee" the enforcement of treaty obligations.[2]

Under conditions of military occupation, the Kremlin's emissaries—Andrei Zhdanov in Estonia, Andrei Vishinski in Latvia and Vladimir Dekonozov in Lithuania—in actions foreshadowing the Soviet seizure of power in postwar Eastern Europe, organized the transfer of administration to "People's Governments" and the local Communist parties, which until then had been small underground organizations. Within six weeks, elections to People's Diets were held in the now familiar style. These diets then petitioned for the admission of their republics into the Soviet Union. On August 3, 5, and 6, this wish was granted by the Supreme Soviet in Moscow. Thus the USSR, anxious to legitimize and formalize the annexations, completed the process in less than two months. The Communists now call this period the "socialist revolution of 1940." There was no revolution, of course, and the Baltic states' entry into the Soviet Union was in no way voluntary. Soviet documents—though no longer editorials or speeches like Kosygin's in Riga in 1965—admit that Baltic independence was liquidated with the help of the Red Army, and Soviet power established "thanks to the Soviet Union." The United States at the time labeled the processes by which the Soviet Union attempted to legitimize its occupation "devious" and refused to recognize the annexations.[3]

The establishment of Baltic independence and the subsequent incorporation of the area into the Soviet Union are, on a practical as well theoretical level, sore points for Soviet historians and politicians. In their endeavors to win Baltic loyalties during the last twenty-seven years, they have been trying to convince the younger generation of the three countries that the independence period was a deviation from the historic Baltic destiny of union with Russia, and that in 1940 the Baltic workers brought the republics back into the path of historic righteousness.

Sovietization

The sovietization of the Baltic republics—that is, the introduction of an economic and administrative system conforming to the "socialist" constitution of Stalin—was accomplished in record time. While it took the Soviet Union almost twenty years to announce the establishment of socialism at home, in the Baltic countries seven years sufficed (1940-41 and 1945-51). The constitutions of the three republics were changed to eliminate socio-economic exceptions granted in 1940, and Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania were declared to be "socialist nations." Agriculture was completely collectivized, in Latvia first, in Estonia last, and the administrative systems,

[1] For Lithuania, the bitter pill was sugar-coated with the return of the city of Vilnius, the historical capital of Lithuania, and a part of the Vilnius region which the Lithuanians had claimed from Poland and which Soviet troops had occupied. The prewar conflict betweeen Poland and Lithuania over Vilnius was successfully used by Moscow's diplomats for Soviet purposes.

[2] The Soviet Union accused Lithuania of torturing and killing Red Army soldiers kidnapped from Soviet bases in Lithuania, of harassing Lithuanian civilians who worked for Soviet garrisons, and of "entering into a military alliance with Latvia and Estonia." Latvia and Estonia were charged with organizing this military alliance, to which, Moscow said, plans had been made to add not only Lithuania but also Finland. The existence of such an alliance, allegedly directed against the USSR, was considered to be proven by two conferences of Baltic foreign ministers (these, however, were held under provisions of the Baltic Entente agreement of 1934), visits by officers of the General Staff, and publication of a journal, *Revue Baltique*, in Tallinn. (For Soviet ultimatum texts, see Jane Degras (ed.), *Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy*, Vol. III, Oxford University Press, London, 1953, pp. 453-56.) Molotov refused to consider the findings of a Lithuanian investigation commission showing that the alleged kidnapping was in fact desertion and that the soldier who did not return to his army base actually committed suicide. German Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop had his people investigate whether the charges about the formation of a military alliance were true and found that they were not. (See Boris Meissner, *Die Sowjetunion, die baltischen Staaten und das Völkerrecht*, Verlag fur Politik und Wirtschaft, Köln, 1956, p. 77.) For the story of Baltic-Soviet relations, especially the events of 1939-40, see Albert N. Tarulis, *Soviet Policy Toward the Baltic States*, 1918-1940, University of Notre Dame Press, 1959.

[3] Statement by Under-Secretary Sumner Welles, US Department of State, *Bulletin*, III, No. 57, 1940, p. 48.

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inherited from independent times, were transformed along Soviet lines.

The creation of socialism took its usual toll—Stalin deported, in 1941 and 1945-51, over half a million people [4] as enemies of the regime and of collectivization—and exhibited characteristics of social change familiar from the experience of other European Soviet republics. These changes, in the main, included the neglect of collectivized agriculture; a rapid development of industries; urbanization; Russification of the population, education, the press, and the apparatus of power; suppression of religion and the establishment of the party's ideological monopoly.

Baltic agricultural production declined as in other Soviet regions and has only very recently recovered to levels equal to or higher than before the war. As in other parts of the Soviet Union, a large part (in Lithuania, one half [5]) of total farm production still comes from peasants' private plots. Soviet sources praise Latvian and Lithuanian farming, especially for dairy and cattle production, while Estonian agriculture has been declared the most efficient outside of the Soviet black-soil region. Socially, Estonian agriculture has also been the most progressive; it was among the very first to introduce a guaranteed wage and then to organize old-age pensions.

Industrialization of Latvia and Estonia began immediately after the war, although Lithuania had to wait almost until the death of Stalin. The probable reason for the difference in pace is that Estonia and Latvia already had a substantial industrial base and tradition, which Lithuania lacked. The pace of Baltic industrial development was higher than that of any of the other Soviet republics. The Baltic republics soon became industrial rather than agricultural states, deriving 60 to 75 percent of their total economic production from industry—just the inverse of the prewar ratio. By 1967, Lithuania's industrial production was reported to have increased 20 times over 1940,[6] and Estonia and Latvia had become the most industrialized republics of the Soviet Union, a position they had occupied in Tsarist Russia as well.

The development of heavy industry was stressed first, especially where historical precedent for it existed, as in Latvia. In the late 1950's Moscow allowed the buildup of mechanical industries that required no mass labor, but rather training and skills. Thus, Latvia has a heavy metallurgical industry, makes 130,000 tons of steel though it has neither ore nor coal, and produces 20 percent of all Soviet railroad passenger cars, 47 percent of all automatic telephone exchanges, and 20 percent of radios. Estonia mines 65 percent of all Soviet oil shale and produces over 30 percent of the Soviet Union's larger electric transformers. Lithuania contributes 33 percent of certain electric welding instruments and 10 percent of metal-cutting lathes.[7] The republics also make ships (Lithuania), fertilizer, artificial fibers, bicycles, buses, refrigerators, washing machines, textiles, cement, and so on.

The Stalinist type of industrialization, later corrected only in some aspects, has been very revealingly explained by Aleksei Muurisepp, in 1956 chairman of the Estonian Council of Ministers and now chairman of the Presidium of the Estonian Supreme Soviet.[8] In sentences that fit equally well the Latvian and only slightly less the Lithuanian situation, he wrote that Moscow's economic planners neglected his republic's "special economic needs," forced the export of Estonian raw materials while developing in Estonia industries for which materials had to be imported, and brought in Russians to work in new industries while assigning Estonian specialists to jobs outside of their republic. He also complained that Estonia had to export its products, especially those needed for industry, before the republic's own needs were met. Some leading Latvians in 1959 further amplified this explanation by proposing what seemed like two economic plans, one for industries that produce primarily for local republican needs, the other for those that work for outside demand.[9] They also opposed the further development of heavy industry, and the Balts are known to dislike such industry even now.

This intriguing opposition to the development of heavy industry can be explained by considering its demographic effects.

[4] Only estimates are available. They include figures compiled immediately following the mass deportations of June 1941 and estimates of people deported in subsequent deportation waves in 1945-51. Since definite figures for these latter years are not available, estimates vary. For example, figures compiled by Hellmuth Weiss (Die baltischen Staaten," in E. Birke, Rudolf Neumann (eds.), *Die Sowjetisierung Ost-Mitteleuropas*, Alfred Metzner Verlag, Frankfurt, 1959, p. 30) add up to 587,000, while those of Andrivs Namsons ("Die nationale Zusammensetzung der Einwohnerschaft der baltischen Staaten," *Acta Baltica*, Konigstein im Taunus, Vol. I, 1960/61, pp. 63, 67, 73) come to 831,000. Both authors, furthermore, include estimates of arrested and liquidated people. Generally, however, the figures of these and other authors do not fall below half a million when estimates for the individual countries are added up.

[5] *Kommunist*, No. 1, 1967, p. 10.

[6] *Pravda*, March 27, 1967.

[7] Data from *Kommunist Sovetskoi Latvii*, No. 4, 1963, p. 37, and *Liaudies Ukis* (Vilnius), No. 7-8, 1965, p. 195.

[8] *Izvestia*, September 22, 1956, p. 2.

[9] *Cf.* Dzerve's article in *Sovetskaia Latvia*, April 22, 1959, p. 2, and various articles, especially by A. Pelshe and V. Lacis, on events in Latvia in 1959, as cited below.

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Demographic Dislocations

In the 14 years 1945-1959, immigrant labor so increased the percentage of Russian and other Slavic groups that the percentage of Estonians decreased from the 87.7 percent to 72.9 percent, and the percentage of Latvians from 75 to 62 percent, within their own respective republics. The Lithuanian percentage remained approximately the same (an estimated 80 percent in 1945 and 79.3 percent in 1959), primarily because the slower rate and more technical type of industrialization, as well as the availability of an adequate supply of indigenous labor, required less labor immigration from outside republics. Over the same period, the number of Russians in Estonia climbed from 8 percent of the republic's population to 20.1 percent; in Latvia, from 10.6 to 26.6 percent; and in Lithuania from an estimated 2 percent to 8.5 percent. At this rate of change, some observers in the West fear that it may take no more than a decade or two for the Estonians and the Latvians to find themselves minorities in their own countries. Demographic factors are indeed especially unfavorable for these two nations, for unlike the Lithuanians, their birth rates are among the lowest in the world. In 1965, the Estonian birth rate was only 4.2 per thousand, and the Latvian, 3.8.[10]

What explains this continued immigation coming primarily from Russia and Belorussia and, to a lesser extent, from the Ukraine? There is, of course, the human motivation. The Baltic republics still retain their traditionally higher standards of living and their more European atmosphere and way of life. There are better opportunities and pleasant landscapes that attract visitors to return for permanent settlement and those seeking a better life to try their luck. The second reason is politico-economic. The Baltic republics were singled out for rapid economic development without having—except for Lithuania—a sufficient indigenous supply of labor. Baltic economists, it now appears, had been saying this ever since the early 1950's, but Moscow had not listened. Moreover, those Baltic leaders who sought changes that would restrain immigration were purged as "bourgeois nationalists" (in 1949-51) in Estonia, or as "national Communists" (in 1959-62) in Latvia. For Moscow, a large Russian settlement in the Baltic area was politically very convenient, since Soviet nationality policy was one of "internationalization" and assimilation.

Thus, immigration into the Baltic republics continued. In the years 1959-61, one hundred thousand immigrants entered.[11] In 1959-62, according to Latvian economist B. Mezhgailis, 40 percent of the required labor power had to be imported from other republics, mainly Russia and Belorussia.[12] An accounting of population growth by immigration, computed by comparing the total increase figures with the growth from the annual birth-rate, shows that average annual immigration into Latvia during 1959-65 was betweeen 12,000 and 13,000, into Estonia about 7,000, and into Lithuania 4,000-5,000. In Lithuania the figure seems to have been growing in recent years. In 1966, Estonia's total population was reported to be 1,285,000, Latvia's 2,262,000, and Lithuania's 2,986,000. The ethnic breakdown of these figures has not been revealed, but it would unquestionably show a steadily increasing Russian percentage in Estonia and Latvia. In Lithuania, lower immigration figures and a higher birth rate (10.2 in 1965, though declining) are helping to keep the existing balance between the Russian and Lithuanian groups.

Immigration remains an explosive political issue. Russian immigrants are generally not well liked, and relations with them are tense in Estonia, even more so in Lithuania, and somewhat less so in Latvia. In 1965, the then chairman of the Estonian *sovnarkhoz*, Arnold Veimer, assured a visiting American journalist that "no more Russians are being settled in Estonia under government plans."[13] As for voluntary immigration, he apparently put faith in restrictions for new residents that were introduced in Tallinn. The Balts, he explained, especially the Lithuanians who are learning from their neighbors' experience, want to avoid a further "mechanical" population increase by stopping the growth of large cities and by building new industries in small towns where much labor power now remains industrially unused. Neither of these measures has appreciably slowed down immigration.

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[10] Population percentages from the prewar Baltic censuses and from the Soviet census of 1959. Birth rate figures from *Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSR v 1965. Bolshaia sovetskaia entsiklopedia*, 1st ed., claimed that the percentage of Russians in prewar Latvia was 12 percent. For a comprehensive brief review of the very recent population trends in the Baltic republics, see "Population changes in the Baltic States, *East Europe*, New York, No. 4, 1965, pp. 19-20.

[11] G. S. Nevelshtein's article in E. N. Pavlovski (ed.), *Geografiia naseleniia v SSSR*, Moscow-Leningrad, 1964, p. 158.

[12] B. Mezgailis, "Problemy ispolzovaniia trudovykh resursov Pribaltiki v perspektive" (Problems of utilizing Baltic labor resources in perspective), *Latvijas PSR Zinatnu Akademijas Vestis*, No. 8, 1964, p. 16 ff.

[13] T. Shabad, "Estonia Reported Curbing Russian Immigration," *The New York Times*, July 20, 1965.

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The other important demographic change which intensifies the Balts' resentment of immigration is urbanization. In Estonia, city population grew from 36 percent before the war to 62 percent in 1965—the highest proportion anywhere in the Soviet Union. In Latvia it increased from 35 to 61 percent, and in Lithuania from 23 to 44 percent. Many of the added city-dwellers came from rural villages, but an equal number were immigrants.[14] Thus, in Tallinn Estonians barely have a majority; in Vilnius the Lithuanians constitute one third (this city, however, has been international throughout the centuries); and in Riga, which almost doubled its population from the prewar 355,000 to 656,000 in 1965, the Latvians are considered to be a minority. A current anecdote has two Russians in Riga asking each other what on earth the Latvians are doing in their city.

Cultural Melting Pot

This internationalization of the overall republican and especially the city populations has created the so-called "objective conditions" for a "melting-pot" culture. In such a situation, the Russian language is assumed to be a necessity to further voluntary assimilation. This theory was articulated and stressed under Khrushchev and was incorporated into the party's program of 1961. Thus, the greatly expanded institutions of education and communications which are urban attributes (and which statistically compare favorably with those of Western Europe) have been considerably Russianized.

To illustrate this, let us consider the lists of publications.[15] In Estonia, from 1950 to 1965, the number of Russian titles increased from 25 to 30 percent of the total for newspapers, from 14 to 25 percent for journals, and from 15 to 30 percent for books. In Latvia, this increase was much greater: from 25 to 35 percent for newspapers, from 24 to 43 percent for journals, and from 26 to 45 percent for books. In Lithuania, the situation in this field, as in industrialization and immigration, has been more stable. Besides publications in Lithuanian and Russian, there are some put out in Polish, which are not only for local use but also for distribution throughout the Soviet Union. Data for all three categories of publications are not available. The percentage of non-Russian journal titles has increased from 77 to 83 percent, but on the other hand non-Russian book titles have decreased from 85 to 73 percent. Complete statistics are available only for newspapers, showing that in 1950, 80 percent were published in Lithuanian, 13 percent in Russian, and 7 percent in Polish. In 1963, the corresponding figures were 81, 14, and 5 percent.

As in other "multinational" republics, a segment of Baltic education is also Russianized. All vestiges of autonomy in the school curricula disappeared in 1958, and the types of schools are now identical with those found elsewhere. One particular type, serving the "friendship of peoples" and especially prominent in Central Asia, has recently been promoted in Latvia. This is the bilingual school where classes are taught separately in the native and Russian languages, but under the same roof. The number of such schools is being increased and has now reached 240 out of a total of some 1500, these 240 educating one-third of all the country's schoolchildren.[16] The data for Estonia are not completely known, but in 1963 it was revealed that only 24 such schools were in existence there.[17] In Lithuania, there are separate schools teaching in Russian, Lithuanian, and Polish. Of the total of 4100 schools in 1963, 263 were instructing in Polish and 135 in Russian, but the number of students in the Russian-language schools was three times higher than in the Polish institutions. In addition, 115 schools were bilingual, and 22 were even trilingual.[18]

Bilingualism is also stressed outside the schools and seems to have made the greatest progress in Latvia. It remains, however, largely a one-way proposition. Thus, an opinion survey in the North Latvian Valmiera *raion* showed that two-thirds of the non-Russians questioned said they knew Russian, while less than half of the Russians questioned had learned Latvian.[19] This is understandable since Russian is the lingua franca of the USSR as a whole, but the fact is that most people in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia regard it as a policy aimed at the erosion of Baltic nationality and resent it bitterly.

In one important respect, the Baltic school systems differ from the standard pattern of the other

[14] See A. A. Mints and M. I. Rostovtsev, *Sovetskaia Pribaltika*, Moscow, 1966, p. 162.

[15] Percentages in round figures computed on data given in volumes of *Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR*. Percentage for newspaper publication in Russian, Polish, and Lithuanian given in Tsentralnoe statisticheskoe upravlenie pri Sovete Ministrov Litovskoi SSR, *Prosveshchenie i Kultura Litovskoi SSR* (Education and Culture of the Lithuanian SSR), Vilnius, 1964, p. 201.

[16] A. Voss, First Secretary of the Latvian Communist Party, in *Izvestia*, Jan. 5, 1967.

[17] V. Vjalas in *Kommunist Estonii*, No. 1, 1964, p. 16.

[18] Previously cited *Prosveshchenie i kultura Litovskoi SSR*, p. 44.

[19] *Sovetskaia Latviia*, September 13, 1966.

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republics: education through the secondary level takes eleven years, whereas elsewhere, including Russian schools in the Baltic republics, the rule is *desiatiletka* (ten-year schooling). This privilege was granted by the current Moscow leadership in response to Baltic demands, but it is not clear whether it will continue after the introduction of the newest all-Union reform of education. Its obvious effect so far has been to strengthen the teaching of the native language and literature, a privilege envied by the other Soviet republics.

Nationalism vs. Communism

In a recent article, a Lithuanian party ideologist noted with gratification that the present generation of the Lithuanian intelligentsia no longer "idealizes bourgeois Lithuania," but he also spoke out against nationalist tendencies and warned against thinking that Lithuania could prosper without Moscow's leadership and control.[20] Meanwhile, Estonian party leader Ivan (Johannes in Estonian) Käbin scolded the republic's youth for the rise of "individualism" and "nationalism," declaring that without the socialist order and the "friendship and mutual aid of the Soviet nations," Estonia could not make progress.[21] Chairman of the Latvian Council of Ministers Vitalijs Rubenis at the same time referred to the existence of "remnants of bourgeois nationalism" in Latvia.[22]

[20] V. Radaitis in *Kommunist* (Vilnius), No. 9 (1966), pp. 9 ff.
[21] *Kommunist Estonii*, No. 9, 1966, p. 22.
[22] *Pravda*, March 7, 1966, p. 2.

"There is No Third Road"

In the USSR, historiography fulfills primarily political purposes. Present interpretation of Baltic history, for instance, rests on two simple propositions: first, that Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia "joined" the Soviet Union voluntarily (in Premier Kosygin's words, as "a natural result of historic development" [1]); and second, that these countries have no other logical political alternative but to remain within the borders of the USSR. Since the period of Baltic independence has shown the viability of another alternative, Soviet leaders and historians have bent every effort to prove that this independence was bogus, imposed from abroad, and furthermore, that the Baltic people never desired it in the first place. In the words of Justas Paleckis, Chairman of the Council of Nationalities of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the Baltic countries were "torn away from brotherly Soviet republics as a result of intervention, organized in 1919-20 by the governments of the United States, England, France, and Germany." They maintained themselves, said Paleckis, on "foreign bayonets." [2] In addition they were exploited by foreign and domestic capitalists. "Twenty years (1920-40) of rule by the bourgeoisie and the tearing away of Latvia from Soviet Russia led the country to the brink of ruin," we read in the official *History of the Latvian SSR*.[3]

To explain Moscow's unprovoked occupation of the Baltic states in June of 1940, *Bolshaia sovetskaia entsiklopediia* (The Great Soviet Encyclopedia) resorts to another unlikely charge: that this was necessary because Latvia—with other Baltic nations—was made into a "springboard for an attack on the Soviet Union by the German-fascist army" (2nd ed., Vol. 24, pp. 327-28). According to *Istoriia Estonskoi SSR* (The History of the Estonian SSR), the installation of the Soviet regime under conditions of military occupation by the Red Army was a "socialist revolution, executed by the working class in alliance with working peasantry and under the leadership of the Communist Party [of Estonia]." [4] It was estimated in the West that Moscow introduced into the Baltic republics some 100-150 divisions, but Moscow admitted the presence of only 18-20 divisions.[5]

Since the Soviet-educated younger Balts, however, do not seem to be fully convinced that the incorporation in 1940 demonstrates inescapable historical necessity, they are told to be, if not believers, then at least realists. The dilemma has been best formulated by Antanas Snieckus, the first and perennial secretary of the Lithuanian Communist Party. In a speech at a party conference, he warned Lithuanian youth not to be led astray on "wrong roads of national communism" and then said:

It is very important that every working man should realize that the person who incites us against the Russian nation, who would like to tear the Lithuanian nation away from the Russian nation, is digging the grave for the Lithuanian nation. Either with the Russian nation, with all Soviet nations on the road of national progress —or imperialist slavery, the threat of destruction of the Lithuanian nation. There is no third road.[6]

—V.S.V.

[1] Speech in Riga, July 17, 1965; *Pravda*, July 18, 1965.
[2] *Sovetskaia Litva* (Vilnius), July 21, 1960.
[3] *Istoriia Latviiskoi SSR*, Vol. III, Riga, Izdatelstvo Akademii Nauk Latviiskoi SSR, 1958, p. 410.
[4] G. I. Naan (ed.), *Istoriia Estonskoi SSR*, Tallin, Estonskoe Gosudarstvennoe Izdatelstvo, 1958, pp. 597-98.
[5] *Izvestia*, June 23, 1940.
[6] *Tiesa* (Vilnius), Feb. 13, 1958, p. 4.

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There is no doubt that nationalism still persists in the Baltic states. The only question is: What type of nationalism is it, and how strong is it as a social force?

Baltic "bourgeois" nationalism—that is, nationalism that not only supports national independence but also seeks to abolish the Communist system—was inherited from the period of independence. Just twenty years ago nationalists were able to organize armed guerrilla resistance to the Baltic Communist regimes. Guerrilla groups fought in all three republics, but the Lithuanian effort is perhaps best known. There, it was at some points quite centrally organized and continued for almost eight years, 1944-52, but especially in 1944-48. The estimated losses of at least 40,000 active participants killed on both sides reflect the scope of the fighting.[23] The Soviets recognize that in large measure this type of opposition during and after the war was provoked by the cruelty of their 1940-41 occupation or, in the Soviet euphemism, Stalinist disregard for the norms of Soviet legality.[24] The repressive policies engendered fear and set in motion the mechanism of resistance instead of accomodation.

It is thus not surprising that "bourgeois" nationalist attitudes were still very strong in the 1950's and have survived, as Rubenis and others have said, until the present. Nationalist aggressiveness, however, has given way to acceptance of a *modus vivendi* with the system as hopes of escaping the Soviet embrace have disappeared. Crucial to this change of attitude were the crushing of the Hungarian revolt and, interestingly enough, the confrontation in Cuba betweeen Kennedy and Khrushchev. The latter was interpreted as proof of American unwillingness to push the Communists out of occupied positions.

A second variant of nationalism—"national communism"—first appeared on the Baltic scene in 1949, when the term itself was barely known. Essentially an attempt to build communism in an indigenous way and with as little control or interference from Moscow as possible, it first manifested itself in Estonia, where the reckless speed of industrialization, aggravated by the process of collectivization, led to a conflict between republic and Moscow loyalties. The exact issues have never been disclosed, but a number of Estonian Communists seem to have been accused of delaying collectivization (possibly, opposing deportations), resisting the employment of Russian cadres, and attempting to keep some "outlived" Estonian traditions. The result was a purge in 1949-51 of several high government officials (Professor Kruus, Johannes Semper) as "bourgeois" nationalists, the disappearance of several others, and the removal of party first secretary Nikolai Karotamm.[25] This Russian-educated Estonian was held to be too soft on the nationalists. Ivan Käbin then assumed the position of first secretary and has kept it to the present day.

An even stronger group of "national Communists" was eliminated in Latvia in 1959-62. The issues there were even more markedly economic and involved relations with the Russians.[26] The heretics were accused of localism in economic planning and of resisting the further development of heavy industry in favor of industries for which there existed local resources and local labor power. They apparently also opposed expansion of the teaching of Russian in the schools and demanded more place for the Latvian language. The Ministry of Culture was charged with "nationalist" mistakes, especially with failing to order theater managers to produce plays by Soviet authors. (It may be added that at the time the theaters were more interested in performing plays and music by emigrant Latvian writers and musicians than those of Russian writers.) The dissidents further committed the sin of demanding that Russian cadres learn Latvian, and that they be refused appointments if they did not. Khrushchev himself came to Riga to examine the situation, and after he left, Eduards Berklavs, Vice-Chairman of the Council of Ministers, was identified as one of the main culprits and was purged.

Within the next three years, a number of other

[23] Figures for losses in guerrilla fighting were given by R. Sharmaitis, director of the Lithuanian Communist Party's history institute, to George Weller, a correspondent of the *Chicago Daily News*. See this paper of August 17, 1961. For more information on the guerrilla war, see V. S. Vardys, "The Partisan Movement in Postwar Lithuania," *Slavic Review*, XXII, No. 3, 1963, pp. 499-522.

[24] See a page-long letter by Vilhelms Munters, the former minister of foreign affairs of independent Latvia, in *Izvestia*, April 8, 1962, p. 5. The question of Baltic nationalism vs. Russian communism was very involved, especially during the war, 1940-45, and not much researched. The Lithuanian situation is analysed by Professor Z. Ivinskis, "Lithuania During the War: Resistance Against the Soviet and the Nazi Occupants," in V. S. Vardys (ed.), *Lithuania Under the Soviets*, New York, 1965, pp. 61-84.

[25] *Cf.* Alexander Kaelas, "Schicksale estnischer Kommunisten und Mitlaufer," *Ostprobleme*, Stuttgart, No. 39 (1951).

[26] See Victor Zorza's comments in *Manchester Guardian*, Dec. 3, 1959, p. 5; also, articles by A. Pelshe in *Politicheskoe samoobrazovanie*, No. 1, 1960, pp. 28-37, and *Kommunist Sovetskoi Latvii*, No. 9, 1959, pp. 8-17; V. Latsis' article in *Partiinaia zhizn*, No. 16, 1959, pp. 14-21; reports in *Sovetskaia Latvia*, Oct. 13, 1959, p. 2; March 10, 1960, p. 2.

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functionaries such as the economist Pauls Dzerve, labor leader Indriks Pinksis, and government ministers Valdemars Kaplins and Viktors Krumins were removed. The scandal also brought down the chairman of the Council of Ministers, Stalin Prize-winning novelist Vilis Lacis, and the stalwart of the Latvian Communist Party, Janis Kalnberzins, then an alternate member of the CPSU Presidium in Moscow. He was dismissed as First Secretary of the Latvian Party and kicked upstairs to the chairmanship of the Presidium of the Latvian Supreme Soviet. Of course, he never returned to the Presidium in Moscow.

In Lithuania, "national communism" has also been known since the latter 1950's. Segments of the Lithuanian intelligentsia in 1957 apparently regarded the "satellite" status of the East European countries as a model for Lithuania's future. Party Secretary Antanas Snieckus had to warn that "there is no third road": Lithuania must either remain in union with Russia or it would fall prey to the imperialists.[27] Economic issues, however, played a smaller part in Lithuania. The purge of 1959 was not of an economic but of a cultural nature. The rector of Vilnius university, Juozas Bulavas, was replaced by a party faithful, Jonas Kubilius. Accused of dismissing Russian personnel from the university teaching staff and protecting nationalists in various departments, Bulavas was deprived of his party membership as well. The University's department of Lithuanian language and literature was purged, as were the faculties of other schools of higher education. Some members of the party's Central Committee suffered a similar fate.[28]

In Latvia, the lessons of 1959-62 and the strong hand of Arvids Pelshe, who replaced Janis Kalnberzins as the first secretary of the Latvian party, have since kept a damper on nationalism, and the Russianization of Latvia has proceeded relatively more successfully than in the other two republics. In Estonia and Lithuania, however, party leaders and the intelligentsia have not kept quiet. One example is their insistence that the Baltic schools keep eleven-year schooling even after Khrushchev's 1964 order to return to the *desiatiletka*. The Estonian Writers' Association adopted a resolution asking for retention of the eleven-year system, publishing the resolution in its organ *Sirp ja Vasar* in March 1954. On February 22, 1964, Lithuania's Minister of Education, Mecys Gedvilas, a Communist from the days of the underground, published a letter making the same demand in Moscow's *Izvestia*. Khrushchev disregarded these pleas, but his successors finally granted the wish in August 1965.

The persistence of the idea of "national communism" among Baltic youth promises a continuation and possibly even an intensification of such attitudes, particularly since there is now less fear of suppression than hitherto. Estonia's Käbin has warned against national conceit, narrow-mindedness, and national hostility, implying that these attitudes apparently not only still exist but have intensified in recent years.[29] In Lithuania, the young intelligentsia credits native diligence rather than Russian help for the republic's achievements, and it urges that the needs of the republic be provided for first, rather than those of the Union.[30] Thus, the time when the Balts will consider themselves to be living in a "lovely corner" (their home republic) of a very large apartment (Soviet Union) —in other words, the time when they will have shifted their loyalties—seems still far away.[31]

However, the effective strength of "national communism" should not be exaggerated. It creates tensions and problems, but it does not endanger the regime. Furthermore, we do not know how widespread these attitudes are. The frank public discussion of them indicates that they are of more than minor importance, yet not all Baltic youth appears to be conscious of or articulate about the issue of divided loyalties. Communist ideological propaganda, of course, has created some commitments, but for the most part it has succeeded merely in disabusing youth of ideology altogether and breeding moral and political cynicism. There is one type of Estonian, for example, who acts as if Soviet rule has not influenced him at all. But he is offset by a colleague who accepts the fact that it is not he, but the Russian deputy secretary, who is in actual command of the Komsomol; who sees that the Estonians are becoming submerged by the still rising wave of Russian settlers, yet tells himself that the Estonian workers do not want to mine oil-shale anyway and that Estonian women like comfort and therefore do

[27] *Tiesa* (Vilnius), February 13, 1958, p. 4.
[28] V. Vardys, "Recent Soviet Policy Towards Lithuanian Nationalism," *Journal of Central European Affairs*, No. 3, 1963, pp. 313-332.
[29] *Kommunist Sovetskoi Estonii*, No. 3, 1966, p. 22.
[30] *Kommunist* (Vilnius), No. 9, 1966, p. 18.
[31] This was how the proper relationship between national loyalty and loyalty to Moscow was explained in the Lithuanian Party organ *Tiesa*, Dec. 4, 1960, p. 2.

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not like having more children. The latter type accepts Russian leadership and the decline of his ethnic strength as part of a reality that cannot be changed, and he attempts to enjoy life without complaint until he is provided with reasonable prosperity. This prosperity is, in fact, evident in the Baltic republics, especially in comparison with many of the other Soviet republics.

Recent Tendencies and Prospects

The new Soviet five-year plan does not envisage radical changes in the development of the Baltic republics, and the economic and social problems of this region can therefore be expected to remain similar to those experienced so far. In recent years, however, the atmosphere has been somewhat more relaxed than in the other republics, and Russian pressure in the cultural field, especially since Khrushchev's removal, has eased. Furthermore, since the Vatican Ecumenical Council, the status of religion, both Catholic and Protestant, has somewhat improved. The Vatican was able to appoint a new bishop for Latvia, where none had remained, and another for Lithuania, so that now at least one of its seven dioceses is administered by a bishop. Some liturgical publication was allowed. Methods of atheist propanganda and pressure are also becoming somewhat more considerate of individual privacy and preference.

In the early 1960's, the Baltic republics were finally opened to foreign tourists, enabling at least partial fulfillment of the desire for cultural communication with the outside world. It is of considerable importance that this communication, at least in some cases, can now be developed directly, without first going to Moscow, though needless to say it still needs Moscow's tolerance. In the spring of 1964, Finland's President Kekonnen visited Estonia and greeted the Estonians as kinfolk (the Estonian-Finnish relationship is roughly comparable to that between the Latvians and Lithuanians). A year later, direct travel by boat between Helsinki and Tallinn was opened. In 1966, similar communication was established with Riga and with Kotka, another Estonian port.

The Estonians and Latvians are now seeking closer cultural ties with Sweden, where interestingly enough one finds many Estonian and Latvian émigrés. Estonia's Minister of Culture recently paid an official visit to Sweden. Swedish musicians have performed in Tallinn. Estonians, who can understand some Finnish, are able to receive Finnish TV programs on their sets, and the Russians do not seem to regard such Estonian-Finnish contacts as suspect. Lithuania attempts to foster relations with Poland, which now seems to be resuming its traditional role as mediator with the West. Direct air communication between Vilnius and Warsaw is supposed to be established before the end of 1967.

An attempt (no doubt politically inspired, but nevertheless providing important contacts with the West) has been made to establish communication with Baltic émigrés. Estonian and Lithuanian journals and publishing houses have reprinted works of émigré authors which were first published in the West. In 1966, a Lithuanian painter who has lived in the United States since the late 1940's visited an exhibition of his earlier paintings in Vilnius.

Discussion of issues of national culture and even economy have become surprisingly frank and matter-of-fact in the Baltic area. Republic leaders, especially the Estonians, were obviously dissatisfied with the abolition of *sovkhozes* and said so in public forums in Moscow. Genrikas Zimanas, editor of the Lithuanian party's daily, recently demanded that Khrushchev's policy of assimilation be reexamined, that republic organizations be given more autonomy, and that Russian cadres learn the language of the republics in which they work.[32] Efforts have also been made, it appears, to increase the proportion of native Balts in the republic parties. In the late 1950's party leaders were likely to lose their jobs for expressing such ideas.

This change in atmosphere is, on the one hand, a sign of the Soviet regime's confidence that no crisis situation exists, and on the other, a response to the underlying popular demand for more personal freedom and recognition of national values. Whether or not it will endure will depend in large measure on whether or not the current Moscow regime will be able again to tighten the reins of government. The party still pursues the objective of the ultimate merger of all the Soviet nations. This being the case, demographic changes and Moscow's economic policies will provide the real key to the future of the Baltic peoples.

[32] Article in *Voprosy filosofii*, No. 7, 1966, esp. pp. 7-9; also *Literaturnaia gazeta*, Moscow, September 27, 1966, p. 1.

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The Armenians

By Mary Matossian

The Armenian people have had a particularly painful history. Deprived of their independence countless times, persecuted and massacred by neighbors on all sides, scattered over much of the world, they have somehow endured. Today there is no Armenian state save that of the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic. Whatever shortcomings derive from this particular historical development, Soviet Armenia is the only available focus of Armenian nationalist pride and cultural creativity. The attitude of its native inhabitants may vary from enthusiasm to hostility, but few Armenians condemn all aspects of life there. It is, after all, Armenia.

The Armenians in Soviet Armenia, who constitute 88 percent of the population, are not being assimilated into Russian culture. They continue to use their language officially and have some degree of autonomy with regard to the production and consumption of material goods and in the arts. Compared to many other national minorities in the USSR, they have fared rather well. Under the circumstances, one may well ask why the Armenians have remained so nationalistic, and more important, how they have managed to keep their identity separate from other more dominating cultures that have surrounded them and often overpowered them over the centuries.

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The Origins of Armenian Nationalism

The peculiar character of Armenian nationalism is made up of two strong elements: the memory of cruel persecution and a sense of tenacious pride. It is an extremely potent combination.

Before the rise of modern nationalism in the 19th century, Armenians tended to regard themselves as belonging more to a particular locality than to a "nation." They had only one major bond in common: they were all Christians in a sea of Moslems, almost all of them belonging to the Armenian Church, founded in the fourth century. Within both the later Ottoman and Russian empires, the Church enjoyed autonomous functions—regulating marriage and divorce, recording vital statistics, and providing education for the Armenian community. In its archives were preserved the only records of Armenian history and culture that bound the faithful together.

Two major centers of secular Armenian thought developed during the 19th century to cement these

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bonds more forcefully: Constantinople in the Ottoman Empire and Tbilisi in the Russian Empire.[1] By 1914, Armenian intellectuals in these centers had succeeded in disseminating much information about peculiarly Armenian contributions to art, architecture, literature and politics. As a result, Armenians grew more and more conscious of their own community, both lay and clerical, as a focus of loyalty—a sentiment made stronger by the advent to power in the Middle East of those European states with whom the Armenians claimed to share a common Western heritage, as opposed to the Islamic civilization in the midst of which they lived. Thus, while their religion still provided them with a symbol of uniqueness, the Armenian intelligentsia helped to secularize this symbol.

When in 1828 the Russian armies defeated the Persians and annexed Eastern Armenia to the Tsar's empire, many Armenians regarded the Russians as deliverers. More numerous and certainly more powerful than the ensemble of Armenian communities, the Christian Russians appeared to many as the potential champions of Armenian claims. At the same time, the Armenians could look upon their benefactors with some condescension, pointing to their longer history as a cultured and civilized people. (Indeed, when the Russians had finally adopted Christianity in the 11th century from Byzantium, an Armenian peasant, Basil I, under whose dynasty the Eastern empire reached its apogee of power, sat on the throne in Constantinople.)

Armenian nationalism of the 19th century, however, was under pressure both from Alexander III's program of Russification and from the secular nationalist movement of the Turks in Anatolia and Transcaucasia. Of the two, the Turkish movement proved to be the most destructive to the Armenian "nation," which was the chief victim of the Russo-Turkish confrontation in World War I. Suspecting the Armenian population in Anatolia of treason, the "Young Turks" in Istanbul gave secret orders in April 1915 for the extermination of the entire Armenian community. In the months that followed, most of the Armenian population of the Ottoman Empire was rounded up, and about one and a half million men, women and children were butchered and mutilated.

Under Soviet Aegis

For a brief, unhappy period (May 1918 to November 1920) Armenia did once again belong to the Armenians, at least in that region known today as Eastern Armenia. A coalition of Armenian nationalist parties, led by the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (*Dashnaktsutiun*) governed the short-lived republic, which formally declared its independence on May 28, 1918. Russian authority in Transcaucasia had virtually disappeared at this time. The Georgians had declared their independence with German support, while the Azerbaijanis welcomed the advancing Turkish army. Left to fend for themselves, the Armenians proclaimed their own re-

[1] Tbilisi, the capital of Soviet Georgia, was—before 1917—the city in which many wealthy Armenians chose to live rather than in Yerevan.

АРАКЕЛЯН А. С.

По ту сторону Аракса. 1955 г.

"ACROSS THE ARAX RIVER"

An irredentist poster showing the Arax River, the boundary between Soviet Armenia and Turkey, across which lies Eastern Anatolia (Western Armenia). The older man is seated, brooding and discouraged, while the younger man stands unbowed and thoughtful. Reproduced from *Izobrazitelnoe Iskysstvo Sovetskoi Armenii* (Fine Arts of Soviet Armenia), Yerevan, 1956, p. 45.

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public out of self-defense, hoping that some sort of political unity would save them from disaster.

The internal situation in the new republic was wretched. An area that had imported one-third of its food before the war, it now had to support a 50-percent increase in population made up of Armenian refugees from Turkey. Only the efforts of the American Relief Mission in 1919-20 prevented a major famine. The new government managed to get some arms, ammunition and funds from General Denikin's White Russian Army. Soon, however, armed conflicts broke out over Armenian territorial claims in Georgia, Azerbaijan and Eastern Anatolia. In September 1920 Kemal Ataturk sent his armies to war with the new, virtually defenseless republic.

Not surprisingly, the Turks won an easy victory. However, in November 1920, while the defeated Dashnak government was negotiating with the Turks in Aleksandropol (now Leninakan), Red Army detachments began moving across the Armenian border toward Yerevan. These detachments had moved into Azerbaijan earlier that spring, and were now accompanied by Armenian Communist leaders who, with the Russian Bolsheviks, accused the Dashnaks of being a petty bourgeois group. At the same moment, the Russian representatives in Yerevan handed the Dashnaks an ultimatum to yield to the "Revolutionary Committee of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Armenia." As Richard Pipes has interpreted these events:

There are many indications that the Soviet entry was motivated by a desire to forestall the complete collapse of the Armenian Republic and to prevent a Turkish occupation of Yerevan. The Russian move was directed primarily against Kemal whose victories had threatened to bring Turkish troops into the heart of Transcaucasia. The readiness with which the Dashnaks consented to the Soviet ultimatum, the establishment of a joint Communist-Dashnak government in the newly-Sovietized Armenia, and the silence with which the Armenian diplomatic mission abroad treated the Soviet conquest while loudly protesting Turkish aggrandizement—all these facts indicate that the Armenian government did not consider the Soviet invasion as an unfriendly gesture.[2]

This was not, however, a "happy ending" to the affair. Once the Armenian Communists established themselves in Yerevan, they imprisoned and shot many Dashnak leaders. When remnants of the latter organized a rebellion in February 1921 which temporarily overthrew the Soviet regime in Yerevan,[3] the Red Army cruelly suppressed it. Ever since that time the Dashnaktsutiun has remained a focus of opposition to the Soviet regime, especially among the Armenians of the Diaspora. It is generally recognized, however, that the Soviet government rendered the Armenians a service by forcing the Turkish armies to withdraw almost to the 1914 Russo-Turkish frontier (the Turks kept Kars and Ardahan). If the Armenians were not actually liberated, at least the Russian presence permitted them to survive. Although the new Armenian Soviet Republic could not be described as independent, it was nevertheless a distinctively Armenian political unit, located on at least a major portion of the ancestral territory of the Armenians. The government of the new "Republic" was staffed almost wholly by Armenians; its population—totalling about 780,000 by 1926—was 82 percent Armenian.[4]

Over the years, the Armenians have both suffered and profited from their participation in Soviet society. Along with members of many other nationalities, thousands of Armenian peasants were shot or deported during the period of forced collectivization. Almost a whole generation of political leaders, such as Aghasi Khanchian and Sahak Ter Gabrielian, and intellectuals such as Yeghishe Charents and Aksel Bakounts, perished during the Great Purge. Rank-and-file party members and the intelligentsia were badly hit. Although we have no reliable statistics, it can be assumed that the purges were at least as traumatic for the Armenians as they were for the Russians themselves.[5]

On the other hand, the loyalty of the Armenian troops and population to the Soviet Union during World War II was beyond question. Moreover, Armenia emerged from the conflict relatively unscathed, since the Red Army was defending other frontiers. This, among other factors, helped launch the country on a significant course of progress in the postwar era.

Since the war, the Armenian population has grown to over two million. The country has become industrialized and can now produce manufactured goods for export. Armenian scholarship and the folk arts have flourished. Under the leadership of the astronomer Viktor Hampartsoumian, Armenia has also

[2] Richard Pipes, *The Formation of the Soviet Union*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1954, p. 232.
[3] M. T. Florinsky, ed., *Encylopedia of Russia and the Soviet Union*, New York, McGraw Hill, 1961, p. 44.
[4] According to the Yerevan party daily, *Kommunist*, Jan. 31, 1967.
[5] See Mary Matossian, *The Impact of Soviet Policies in Armenia*, Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1962, Chapters VI and VIII.

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become something of a scientific center. In many ways it would seem that Soviet rule has proved immensely successful.

Signs of Unrest

Armenian nationalism, however, has not disappeared. Recent signs indicate that, while not as virulent as in the past, national sentiment still runs deep. Old grievances are continually brought to Moscow's attention, such as the fate of the Armenian enclaves in Karabakh and Nakhichevan in neighboring Azerbaijan, and ancient Armenian territory in Anatolia. Reports in the Soviet Armenian press indicate that Armenians in Georgia and Azerbaijan, where over 30 percent of the total Armenian population of the Soviet Union live,[6] desire to be attached to Soviet Armenia.

The current phase of overt unrest began in April 1965, when the Communist Party of Armenia scheduled a series of meetings in Yerevan commemorating the 50th anniversary of the Turkish massacres of 1915. At all of these gatherings, Armenian speakers unleashed bitter attacks at their historic enemies and laid claims to "Western Armenia" in present-day Turkey, charges and claims that conflicted sharply with Moscow's determination to establish better relations with Istanbul. At one particular meeting on April 23 at the Yerevan State University, the chairman of the Academy, the aforementioned Viktor Hampartsoumian, accused the Turks of deliberately killing one and a half million Armenians and of devastating Western Armenia. Two other scholars presented papers on the falsifications of the "History of the Massacres in Turkish Historiography." [7] On April 24, another observance was held at the State Opera House, drawing an overflow crowd of thousands who demonstrated in the streets.

The violent demonstrations apparently went beyond the expectations of the party leaders in Armenia. They also represented to Moscow an alarming manifestation of the kind of nationalist fervor that could easily have developed anti-Russian overtones. More important, the violent tone of the demonstrations constituted a flagrant contradiction to the Soviet government's claims that all of the republics of the USSR were developing a new "socialist" consciousness which transcended age-old nationalist sentiment.

The sudden transfer of the Armenian Communist Party leader, Y. N. Zarobian, to a minor post in Moscow in February 1966 supports, in part, this hypothesis. His successor, A. E. Kochinian, later deplored the "unfortunate manifestations" of April 1965, which he said were prompted by a "misinterpretation" of the massacres. The young people who had participated in the demonstrations, he complained, were "moved more by passion than political sense." [8]

It is possible, however, that Zarobian's fall—he was accused only of unnamed "defects" in his work—was connected with certain Armenian economic demands being made in Moscow at the time. As opposed to central directives calling on Armenia to produce more copper, Armenian leaders were known to have prefered building a modern plastics industry. It was probably no coincidence that three weeks after Zarobian's ouster, a eulogy to Sahak Ter Gabrielian, the purged Chairman of the Armenian Council of Ministers, appeared in the Yerevan *Kommunist*.[9] Ter Gabrielian, who was liquidated in the mid-1930's in connection with his demands on behalf of the Armenian economy, was posthumously rehabilitated after Stalin's death. The timing of the publication of his eulogy suggests that the Armenians resent perhaps more than ever Moscow's arbitrary handling of Armenian affairs.

One year after the "unfortunate demonstrations," when a group of Armenian citizens requested permission to hold another assembly commemorating the massacres of 1915, the authorities refused. Despite the order, a demonstration took place in the main square, in full view of the Intourist Hotel of Yerevan. As a number of visitors reported, the police quickly broke up the meeting and arrested some of the participants. No mention of the disturbance was reported in the press, however.

Finally, in November 1966, three weeks before Premier Aleksei Kosygin's historic state visit to Turkey, the Fifth Congress of Armenian Writers in Yerevan carefully laid down the official party line on nationalism. The Secretary of the Governing Board, E. S. Topchian, praised the achievements of a num-

[6] The Soviet census of 1959 indicated that only 55.7 percent of all Armenians in the USSR lived in Soviet Armenia. Another 15.9 percent lived in Soviet Georgia and an equal percentage in Azerbaijan.

[7] *Kommunist* (Yerevan), April 22-25, 1965. One editorial compared the Armenian massacres with Nazi genocide and quoted Lenin as demanding complete freedom "for all Armenia." Moscow's *Pravda* on the same day condemned the events of 1915, but softened the charge of genocide with kind words for "the new Turkey."

[8] *Kommunist* (Yerevan), March 4, 1966.

[9] *Ibid.*, Feb. 27, 1966.

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ber of Armenian poets—among them N. Zarian, G. Sarian, S. Taronts, H. Shiraz, S. Bauni, S. Kaputikian and R. Bogosian—but made specific mention of their "well-known harmful tendencies," "national narrowmindedness and provincial thinking," which he labeled "expressions of literary backwardness" that did not conform to "our international world view." He did, however, tell the writers of Armenia that it was their "duty" to deal with the heroic struggle of those Armenians *abroad* who were in danger of being assimilated. The Armenian party chief A. E. Kochinian addressed the Congress a few days later in similar tones. Deploring the attention given by Armenian writers to "outworn national ethnographic categories and geographic expressions," he asserted that true patriotism involves not only a love of the progressive heritage of the past, but pride in the "socialist present." [10]

Armenians in Soviet Armenia have made many gains without losing their cultural identity. Their numbers have increased, and there is an awareness that their strength is appreciated in Moscow. According to fairly recent figures, the rate of natural population increase in Soviet Armenia is greater than that in the Soviet Union as a whole,[11] and in addition, more than 100,000 émigrés from abroad have taken up residence in Soviet Armenia since 1946.[12]

During the years of Soviet rule, the influence of the Armenian church has grown weaker. Family life and village life have also been transformed in various ways to accommodate the changes brought about by modernization, greater educational facilities and the spread of communications. In general, however, Russification has not taken hold, particularly in rural areas. Armenian is still the language of business, local government and education, and Armenian culture and traditions are kept alive by an energetic group of writers, artists and musicians.

A *modus vivendi* seems to have been reached between the Armenians and Moscow. Fearful of intensifying the Armenians' volatile nationalist sentiment, the Soviet government chooses not to risk any open attacks. Furthermore, any harsh suppression of the Armenian minority would have unpleasant reverberations abroad in the Armenian Diaspora. Over the years Moscow has shown itself eager to court the latter, encouraging scattered Armenians to visit their homeland and to study in the educational institutions of Yerevan.[13]

Like all national groups with a long history and clearly defined traditions that distinguish them from their neighbors, the Armenians of the Soviet Union manifest a stubborn will to survive. Whatever the eventual outcome of their irredentist claims on Turkey, it is safe to predict that the Armenians will never forget them, and that they will serve as a constant reminder to Moscow, a warning that Armenian nationalism has not yet disappeared into the sea of "socialist brotherhood."



ШАВЕРДЯН Р. И. Портрет В. И. Ленина. 1949 г.

"PORTRAIT OF V. I. LENIN"

This Armenian rug, woven in 1949, incorporates folk motifs and a portrait of Lenin. Reproduced from *Izobrazitelnoe Iskusstvo Sovetskoi Armenii* (Fine Arts of Soviet Armenia), Yerevan, 1956, p. 55.

[10] *Ibid.*, Nov. 18, 19, and Dec. 1, 1966.

[11] Population statistics for Soviet Armenia for 1959 per 1000 population show births 41.0, deaths 7.9 or a net gain of 33.1. Comparable statistics for the entire Soviet Union show births 23.8, deaths 7.2, or a net gain of 16.6 See *Itogi Vsesoiuznoi perepisi naseleniia 1959 goda SSSR*, Moscow, 1962, p. 280; and *Itogi Vsesoiuznoi perepisi naseleniia 1959 goda: Armianskaia SSR*, (Moscow 1963), p. 110.

[12] The repatriation of Armenians to Soviet Armenia has not, however, been a complete success from the Soviet point of view. Many of these "returnees" found no warm welcome and have been the most vocal critics of living conditions and of Armenia's isolation from the outside world. Quite a number have since left Soviet Armenia.

[13] In the 1966-67 academic year at least 274 "foreign born" Armenians are enrolled in the higher educational institutions of Soviet Armenia. *Kommunist* (Yerevan), Jan. 3, 1967.

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Despite Soviet Armenia's impressive gains in terms of education, industrialization and productivity, the local Armenians tend to regard their successes as a reward earned by their own labor, their own creativity and their cultural separateness. They do not deny that they have profited to some degree from their relationship with the Russians, but neither do they hide their resentment over what they consider to be perfidious betrayals of their interests. Their complaints cover the entire history of Soviet Armenia, although many have only been given verbal expression since the death of Stalin.

Armenia Irridenta

Armenian claims to territory in neighboring Soviet republics as well as in Turkey constitute the most serious issue between the Armenians and the central authorities in Moscow. The Armenian position, as it emerges from the writings of scholars both abroad and in the USSR, is that the Russians forced the Armenians to give up their eastern provinces to Turkey in treaties of 1921, and that subsequent promises to restore to Armenia two regions of Transcaucasia—Karabagh and Nakhitchevan, now under Azerbaijan administration—have never been honored. The issue was supposedly "settled" in 1927, when a Commission to Resolve Conflicts Between the Transcaucasian Republics denied all of the Armenian claims and even made further modifications in certain frontiers in favor of Armenia's neighbors. But the Armenian people remained unreconciled to this settlement.

At the end of World War II, the issue was raised again —this time by the Supreme Patriarch of the Armenian Church. On November 27, 1945, the Patriarch took the step of issuing direct appeals to the governments of the United States and Great Britain, as well as to the Soviet central authorities, with respect to the situation of Armenians. His plea for a reconsideration of territorial claims was based in part on the Armenians' contribution to the Allied victory. (Some 300,000 Armenians had taken part in the conflict, including—among senior officers —58 generals, two marshals and one admiral; years later, in 1961, the then Premier Nikita Khrushchev publicly noted that some 106 Armenian soldiers had been awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union and another 70,000 had won medals for bravery.[1]) The Patriarch's appeal was to no avail, however; the official record of subsequent diplomatic exchanges indicates that the Soviet government omitted any reference to the territorial claims in question.

In the postwar era sentiment on this issue has remained strong, finding its main expression as a direct and indirect theme of Armenian literature, poetry, and painting.

Another serious problem has its roots in the rivalry that has for centuries marked relations between the Armenian and Georgian peoples. This mutual antagonism has not diminished since the two peoples became part of the Soviet Union. Indeed, in Stalin's time, their relations became even more strained, for, in the view of the Armenians, Georgia—the birthplace of both Stalin and Beria—was the only part of Transcaucasia to which the Soviet dictator paid any attention. Even loyal Armenian Communists complained of the preferential treatment given to the Georgians, as borne out by reports of the Ninth Congress of the Armenian Communist Party, held in Yerevan in January 1934.[2]

That Armenian resentment continues to this day has been confirmed by countless Western tourists who have visited Soviet Armenia over the past decade or so. Understandably, official sources are reticent on this highly sensitive issue. However, an interesting clue to Soviet policy with regard to Armenia and Georgia, and to the feelings it engenders among the Armenians, was provided at the Eighth Congress of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, when an Armenian deputy pointed out that in budget allocations, 638,825,000 rubles went to Armenia as compared to 979,910,000 for Georgia and 1,007,580,000 for Azerbaijan. As reported in *Sovetakan Hayastan*, the party daily published in Yerevan, on December 20, 1966, the Armenian deputy claimed that the Union Ministries "abrogated basic principles in the preparation of the budget for 1967, over which they had not even consulted the Government of Soviet Armenia."

As for Stalin's Great Purge of the middle 1930's it affected Armenia as much as any other area of the USSR. Yet if Armenians single out—as they did, say, in *Sovetakan Hayastan* on November 15, 1961—the thousands of their compatriots "shot, without trial or investigation," they do so out of a knowledge that many of these victims were accused not merely of "oppositionism," but also of "bourgeois nationalism"—in other words, not only of a general, but of a specifically "Armenian" crime. Their bitterness is further compounded by the punishment that was meted out to such Armenian leaders as Stepan Shaumian and Al Miassnigian.[3] They cannot easily forget that the last two had been chosen by Lenin himself to lead the Transcaucasian Federation, only to be subsequently denigrated by Stalin, who appointed one of "his" Georgians—Lavrenti Beria—in their stead. It was Beria who,

[1] Speech published in the *Moscow News Supplement*, May 13, 1961.

[2] *H.K.K. Kentkomee Hashwedvoutioone Ennerort Hamakoumaroum* (Report of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Armenia), Yerevan, Jan. 10-14, 1934, pp. 168-69.

[3] Stepan Shaumian was a Marxist theoretician and an old confidant of Lenin, with whom he corresponded continuously before the Bolshevik Revolution. He was also the principal organizer of the armed contingents that fiercely defended Baku against the Turks. By thus denying access to the strategic Baku oil fields, he helped accelerate the German surrender of 1918, as Ludendorf's memoirs indicate. Shaumian subsequently fell into the hands of anti-Bolshevik forces near the Caspian Sea and was executed there in the autumn of 1918. Al Miassnigian was the commandant of the Red Army in the Ukraine during the Civil War. Like Shaumian, he wrote prolifically on Marxist theory. In 1926, while First Secretary of the Transcaucasian Federation, he was killed in a plane crash near Tbilisi. The cause of the accident was never properly determined or publicly revealed, and most Armenians suspect sabotage by the Georgians.

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during an official meeting in Tbilisi in 1936, personally shot to death Aghassi Khandjian, then First Secretary of the Armenian Communist Party and one of the most popular leaders of Armenia; and it was Beria who was personally responsible for rewriting the history of the Bolshevik movement in Transcaucasia, giving Stalin almost exclusive credit for all its successes from 1900 onwards.[4] Beria has now, of course, been roundly condemned by Soviet spokesmen, and Shaumian has been officially rehabilitated, most notably in an October 13, 1963 editorial in *Pravda*. But the memory of the wounds inflicted by Stalin's and Beria's policies lingers on in the national consciousness of the Armenians, and no doubt contributes to the recurrent manifestations of anti-Soviet ferment in that part of the country.

Recent Cultural Pressures

The most recent manifestations of this unrest occurred in 1965 and 1966, on the anniversary of the Turkish genocide of April 24, 1915, to which approximately 1.5 million Armenians fell victim. Following mass demonstrations held on that date in Yerevan both in 1965 and 1966, Moscow let it be known that it would hold Armenian intellectuals responsible for containing local nationalism within reasonable limits. Instead of accepting the challenge, however, the Armenian intelligentsia, even those that consider themselves loyal Marxists, have scored the Russian complaints and issued warnings that the nationality question, particularly regarding Armenia, is a complex problem that is far from solved.

At the Fifth Congress of the Union of Soviet Armenian Writers, held at Yerevan in November 1966, two prominent Armenian writers lashed out against the prevalence of attitudes which distorted legitimate national sentiments, and complained of "informers" within their midst who sought to bring ruin on the Armenian intellectual community. As reported in *Kuragan Tert* (Literary Journal), Yerevan, on December 16 and December 23, 1966, both Barouyr Sevag and Kevork Emin asserted the right to national self-respect and pride. Emin denounced in particular those who "by attaching political stigma to our national sentiments are in vain trying to restore the grim era of the cult of personality."

Probably the most resolute complaints against Moscow's interference with and failure to satisfy the demands of the Armenian people came from Sylva Kapoutikian, Armenia's best-known poet, an ardent Communist and one of the most celebrated writers in the Soviet Union. In a speech delivered on March 2, 1966, on the eve of the 24th Congress of the Armenian Communist Party in Yerevan, Miss Kapoutikian answered Soviet critics in Moscow who had labeled the recent manifestations of Armenian nationalism as "secessionist and anti-state." Although the speech has not appeared in any Soviet publication, the full text was published in Armenian exile publications in Beirut (*Aztag* and *Spiurk*) and Boston (*Hairenik*). Its authenticity has also been confirmed by the pro-Soviet-Armenian daily *Baikar*, published in Boston. Here are some of her remarks:

It would be naive to assume that the patriotic and vehement pathos of more than 100,000 Armenians, who on the noon of April 24th (1965) jammed the streets of Yerevan, and the inflamed mood of our people on the eve and the wake of that day, were the result of incitement by Armenian intellectuals. . . . We are Marxists, and we know that it is the existing situation that determines one's consciousness. No idea or thought can take root in the heart of the masses without the presence of a corresponding fertile soil in which these ideas and thoughts are born and nurtured. . . .

And further:

The fidelity of the Armenians vis-à-vis Russia is conditioned not only by geography and history, but also by an affinity of soul and mind. . . . However, with great chagrin we must observe that instead of realizing and appreciating this devotion, occasionally the leaders of the Soviet Union exhibit disconcerting carelessness regarding some of the problems that deeply touch people.

Perhaps the most crucial point of the speech was its implied suggestion that Soviet industrialization and the cultural emphasis of Soviet nationality policy have combined to foster a new brand of nationalism which has Soviet overtones, but which is quite ethnocentric in its roots and aspirations. There is, according to Miss Kapoutikian, a "renaissance" of nationalities in the Soviet Union, which—contrary to Soviet suppositions—has been brought about by overall Soviet progress in education, economy, industry and science. Soviet nationalities, she asserted, "are all resolved to preserve and to develop their national existence and culture, and they are entitled to assert fully their unique individuality." There is nothing incompatible between national pride and the building of communism, she said, for the latter cannot take place without the former.

Referring to the pressures on national groups from the Kremlin, the poetess attacked the "sense of almightiness" emanating from the Kremlin and the predominance of one nation (the Russians) over all others. She further warned that such conditions might have dire consequences:

Comrades, the nationality question is a complex one. History is replete with examples where, having failed to solve the nationality problem, multinational states disintegrated.

—V. N. Dadrian

(Mr. Dadrian is Associate Professor of Sociology at the Florida Atlantic University.)

[4] See Beria's *On the History of the Bolshevik Organizations in Transcaucasia* (Moscow, Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1949), based on a lecture delivered by Beria at a party meeting in Tbilisi on July 21-22, 1935.

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The Muslims of Central Asia

By Geoffrey Wheeler

At the 1959 Soviet census, the Muslims of the USSR numbered some 25 million,[1] or 13 percent of the total population. They live in three main areas: the Central Asian and Kazakh republics (55 percent), the Caucasus (25 percent), and the Volga and Ural regions (20 percent). Although the Muslims are classified as belonging to 38 different nationalities, 84 percent of them are of Turkic stock, speaking closely interrelated languages. Of the remainder, 8 percent are of Iranian and 7 percent of Ibero-Caucasian stock. (See accompanying table.)

During the 19th century, Russian rule expanded southwards through the Caucasus and Central Asia to the frontiers of Iran, Afghanistan and China. This brought into the Tsarist Empire a number of Muslim lands, possession of which presented the Imperial government with a number of political, economic and cultural problems. Unlike the Muslim lands forming part of the British and French colonial empires, the new provinces of the Caucasus, the Steppe Region and Turkestan were territorially contiguous with the metropolitan country and, except for the vassal states of Bukhara and Khiva, were regarded as integral parts of Russia.[2] This meant that the southern fringe of the Empire was now peopled by Muslims and bordered directly on Muslim Iran, Afghanistan, and the largely Muslim Chinese province of Sinkiang. Separated from Russia only by a narrow strip of Afghan territory was Muslim northern India. Economically, the newly-acquired Muslim territories quickly became important not only as a vital source of oil and cotton but also as an area for Russian colonization.

Culturally, the Muslims confronted the Russians with a far greater problem than did the other non-Russian peoples of the Empire, the vast majority of whom were Christian and followed a way of life not greatly different from that of the Russians themselves. Although there were ethnic and linguistic

[1] Assuming a rate of natural increase of 3 percent per annum, this total must have risen over 30 million by the end of 1966.

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[2] V. V. Barthold, *Four Studies on the History of Central Asia,* Leiden, 1956, Vol. I, p. 1.

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differences among the various Muslim communities, Islam constituted a greater bond of union than did basic Christianity among adherents of the Orthodox, Gregorian, Catholic and other Christian communities. The attitude of the Russians towards Islam as a creed was tolerant—perhaps even more tolerant than towards non-Orthodox Christian sects, and certainly more so than towards Jewry—but they regarded Islamic culture in general with a mixture of contempt and suspicion, the latter deriving partly from the memory of the 250 years of Islamized Mongol domination of Muscovy and partly from the universal character of Islam and the spiritual allegiance paid to the Caliph of Islam, the Sultan of Turkey.

The means by which the Tsarist government attempted to cope with the problems presented in the major areas of Muslim habitation—Turkestan, the Steppe Region, and the Caucasus—included military control, stabilization of the nomads, assimilation and colonization. All these measures were resented by the Muslims, and in the absence of a consistent government policy, particularly as regards education, they failed to produce the desired result of superimposing Russian on Muslim civilization. Excessive and badly managed colonization was the underlying cause of the great revolt of 1916, which temporarily disposed the Muslims of Central Asia in favor of the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917. This Muslim revolt, however, was in no sense a nationalist upheaval. Before the Revolution, indeed, there had been no demands for self-government on the part of the Muslims, nor had the Tsarist government ever formulated any plans for the eventual grant of any degree of self-determination.

After the short-lived nationalist movements which accompanied the Revolution and the ensuing Civil War, and which were soon suppressed by force, the new Soviet rulers found that the Muslims confronted them with much the same problem that had faced their predecessors. The Asian frontiers of the new state were identical with those of the Tsarist Empire, and the vulnerable southern fringe of the Soviet Union was inhabited by peoples whose lands had been annexed to Russia but who had preserved a traditional culture and a way of life which were thought to militate against modern progress on European lines. These Muslim lands contained vital natural resources and adjoined countries which were not only Muslim but were aligned with the Western powers, whose attitude was regarded by the new regime as fundamentally hostile.

Tsarist aims with respect to the Muslim borderlands had in effect been confined to security and economic considerations: the Muslims had to be kept quiet and reasonably content because of their location on a strategic frontier and to enable maximum advantage to be derived from the natural resources situated in their territory. Soviet aims were, and still are, broadly the same, but the means by which the new regime proposed to achieve them went much further than those adopted by the Tsarist government. In addition to applying the methods of assimilation, stabilization of the nomads, and colonization with an energy, consistency and determination that had been lacking in the previous regime, the Communists instituted many others designed to eradicate what they regarded as the outworn Islamic way of life and to establish in its place the modern, "progressive" Soviet way of life which they advocated for all the peoples of the Union. These new methods included: a new administrative division of the Muslim peoples; social and agrarian reforms; collectivization and mechanization of agriculture; industrialization; rigid segregation from the adjoining Muslim countries; and a far-reaching policy of cultural regimentation. In order to understand the present position of the Muslims of the USSR, it is necessary to consider how these measures have differed from those applied to other nationalities and religious groups in the Soviet Union, and what effects they have produced. It will be convenient to group the various measures under the headings of Political, Social and Demographic, Economic, Cultural, and Ideological.

Political

The political and administrative structure of the Muslim Soviet Socialist Republics (SSRs) and of the Muslim Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics (ASSRs) within the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic (RSFSR) is uniform with that of all the other republics. No account is taken of traditional Muslim methods of government in the republican constitutions, and unlike all but one of the constitutions of the nineteen independent Muslim states outside the USSR, those of the Soviet Muslim republics contain no mention of the need to safeguard the basic principles of Islam. The last mention of such a need occurred in the short-lived 1921 constitution of the People's Republic of Bukhara.

Whereas the administrative division of the Tsarist Empire ignored nationality, this was theoretically the guiding principle in the creation of the present six Muslim union republics, which contain over three-fifths of the Muslim population. Owing partly,

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MUSLIMS OF THE USSR

Nationality	Number (1959 census)	Main Location
Turkic peoples		
Uzbeks	6,004,000	Uzbek SSR
Tatars	4,969,000	Tatar ASSR
Kazakhs	3,581,000	Kazakh SSR
Azerbaijanis	2,929,000	Azerbaijan SSR
Turkmens	1,004,000	Turkmen SSR
Bashkirs	983,000	Bashkir ASSR
Kirghiz	974,000	Kirkhiz SSR
Kara-kalpaks	173,000	Kara-kalpak ASSR
Kumyks	135,000	Daghestan ASSR
Uigurs	95,000	Kazakh & Kirghiz SSRs
Karachais	81,000	Karachai-Cherkess AO*
Balkars	42,000	Kabarda-Balkar ASSR
Nogais	41,000	Karachai-Cherkess AO
Iranian peoples		
Tadjiks	1,397,000	Tadjik SSR
Ossetians **	410,000	North-Ossetian ASSR
Kurds	59,000	Armenian SSR
Iranians	21,000	Soviet Central Asia
Tats	1,000	Azerbaijan SSR
Baluchis	7,800	Turkmen SSR
Ibero-Caucasian peoples		
Chechens	418,000	Chechen-Ingush ASSR
Kabardians	204,000	Kabarda-Balkar ASSR
Ingushi	104,000	Chechen-Ingush ASSR
Adyges	80,000	Karachai-Cherkess AO
Cherkess	30,000	
Abkhaz **	74,000	Abkhaz ASSR
Abaza	20,000	Karachai-Cherkess AO
Avars	268,000	Daghestan ASSR
Lezgins	223,000	
Dargins	158,000	
Laks	64,000	
Tabasarans	35,000	
Aguls	8,000	
Rutuls	7,000	
Tsakhurs	6,000	
Miscellaneous		
Dungans	21,000	Kazakh & Kirghiz SSRs
Arab	8,000	Soviet Central Asia
Albanians **	5,000	Ukrainian SSR

* Autonomous Oblast
** Partly Muslim

however, to the intermingling of the different Muslim nationalities and partly to the fact that the structure of Muslim society is tribal rather than national, the creation of linguistically and ethnically compact political units would have required some exchange of populations, and this is an instrument to which the Soviet regime has never been willing to resort.

Apart from subsequent minor modifications, the boundaries of the Muslim republics were decided upon between 1922 and 1925, that is, while literacy still stood at under five percent and a majority of the people were uncertain what their "nationality" was. In Central Asia the creation of six republics out of peoples who could ethnically and culturally have been grouped into three resulted in much less national as well as cultural homogeneity than exists in the non-Muslim republics. In the individual Muslim republics, the proportion of people of the "titular" Muslim nationality (*i.e.*, Kazakhs in Kazakhstan, Uzbeks in Uzbekistan, etc.) ranges from 29 percent (Kazakh SSR) to 62 percent (Uzbek SSR), while in the non-Muslim republics the corresponding figure ranges from 62 percent (Latvian SSR) to 83 percent (RSFSR). The proportion of Muslims of all races in the Muslim republics ranges from 34 percent (Kazakh SSR) to 81 percent Tadzhik SSR), an overall average of 64 percent. By contrast, in seven of the remaining nine union republics, people of Slav or other non-Asian cultures predominate to the extent of over 86 percent, while the Armenian Republic contains 80 percent of Armenians and the Georgian Republic has 63 percent of Georgians and 12 percent of Slavs, the remainder being Asians, including about 7 percent of Muslims.

Except for the nominal representation of the Ukrainian and Belorussian SSRs in the United Nations, the political status of the Muslim republics is the same as that of the rest. "Full sovereignty" is officially claimed for them, but they have no diplomatic or commercial representation abroad and thus no concern with foreign policy or trade. There are also no locally-recruited military formations, the considerable armed forces maintained in each republic for defense and security being predominantly Russian.

It is too early to assess the long-term effect of these political measures. The introduction of the national principle into the political organization of the Muslim peoples has been described as an attempt to treat the incipient disease of nationalism by homeopathic methods. If it had been allowed full rein after the Revolution, nationalism could have fatally impaired the integrity of the new Soviet state.

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A broader and more natural division of the Muslims into four political units—a greater Azerbaijan, a Tatar-Bashkir, a Kazakh-Karakalpak-Kirghiz, and a Turkmen-Uzbek-Tadjik republic—seemed potentially more dangerous than their final parcelling out into six union republics and the various ASSRs incorporated into the RSFSR. From the Soviet point of view, this creation of a number of synthetic nation-states facilitated the largely artificial development of separate national cultures, societies and economies, all of which until recently gave the outside world, and to some extent even the Soviet Muslim peoples themselves, the illusion that their national aspirations had been satisfied.

During the past few years, however, it has become clear that particularist consciousness among the Muslims, far from dying out, is actually increasing. This phenomenon is not, of course, confined to the Muslim republics, but elsewhere its scope is limited to single nationalities that have no positive bond of union with one another. Islam, on the other hand, is a potential connecting link not only among the Muslim peoples living along 3,000 miles of the Soviet Union's vulnerable southern frontier, but also between them and the peoples of the adjoining Muslim countries. Opinions differ on whether particularist consciousness is developing along all-Muslim, regional, racial (Turkic and Iranian), or republican lines. The Soviet authorities, judging from official writings, seem to think that the danger lies in the reality which the artificially-formed "national republics" are rapidly acquiring. Hence their growing doubts whether the national principle should continue to guide the administration of the Soviet state.

Social and Demographic

At the time of the Russian conquest of the Caucasus and Central Asia, the tribe and clan had already ceased to have any significance as political or economic units. The patriarchal joint family possessing its lands and herds in common, which had been the economic unit up to about the sixth century, had also disappeared. It had gradually been replaced by two-generation conjugal families, which often formed family unions with strong economic and ideological ties and well-established rules of conduct. This social structure persisted under the Tsarist regime with only a minimum of official interference.

The Soviet regime, however, aimed at destroying the existing structure for three reasons: it was thought—often quite wrongly—to be inseparably associated with Islam; it was believed to militate against socialist economic progress; and it fostered particularism and nepotism. Accordingly, ever since the Revolution, the Soviet authorities have waged relentless war against all aspects of Muslim society that were deemed objectionable, taking care to stigmatize them as essentially Islamic. The exercise of parental authority over marriage, the seclusion of women, polygamy, and child-marriage are among the so-called "Islamic" practices which have been and still are regularly attacked in the Soviet press and other propaganda media, and the last two have been made illegal. Particularism is combatted through what is called "international education," and higher party officials are often removed from their posts for practicing nepotism.

It is difficult to assess the effectiveness of these measures. Many of the practices objected to have little to recommend them and are tending to die out elsewhere in the Muslim world simply under the pressure of enlightened Muslim opinion. The much stronger pressures brought to bear on the Soviet Muslims by their alien and atheist rulers, together with other circumstances such as the mingling of Muslims and non-Muslims in higher educational establishments and the armed forces, have undoubtedly had an effect on Muslim society, particularly in the towns. There has, indeed, been no organized opposition to Soviet social reforms; European skills, work methods and, to some extent, living habits are being rapidly adopted; and full advantage is being taken of the educational opportunities offered.

On the other hand, the Soviet dream of the social and biological fusion of the Muslim and non-Muslim peoples shows no signs of being realized. Socially, the Muslims remain aloof: although they rub shoulders with Russians in the factories, the army and the universities, their family and sex relationships, their behavior and moral standards (particularly of women), and their leisure habits are still markedly different from those of non-Muslims. Particularly significant is the low incidence of intermarriage: Muslim men occasionally marry non-Muslim girls, but the converse is extremely rare since no respectable Muslim would allow his daughter to marry a non-Muslim. Some curious circumstances should be noted. The seclusion of women, although officially frowned upon, has become a status symbol as an indication of affluence, that is, of official position; and polygamy, though illegal, is still practiced through the device of registering children of illegal marriages solemnized be-

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fore a mulla as the offspring of the first legal marriage.[3]

Thus, efforts to assimilate the Muslims have made no more progress under the Soviet regime than they did under the Tsars. The breakup of the joint family and family union as a system of social grouping and their replacement by the synthetically formed nation have not helped matters. Contrary to Soviet wishes and expectation, the nation composed of small families on the Western model is now fast becoming an accepted form of grouping which has nothing to gain by fusion with the Russians.

By far the most drastic reform applied by the Soviet regime to the Muslims was the stabilization of the nomads, the vast majority of whom were Kazakhs. During the Tsarist regime there had been much confiscation of pastoral land for the use of Russian settlers, but attempts to cure the Kazakhs of their nomadic way of life had been halfhearted and largely unsuccessful. During the first years of the Soviet regime, plans to achieve stabilization by voluntary means also proved a signal failure, and there was a switch to forceful measures during the collectivization period (1928-32). These not only were equally unsuccessful but resulted in the wholesale slaughter of livestock and a drop in the Kazakh population of some 800,000. Finally, in 1933, a new policy was inaugurated: the official doctrine that land cultivation was necessarily a higher form of agriculture than pastoral nomadism was dropped, and a compromise was introduced in the form of the system known as *Otgon* (*otgonnoie zhivotnovodstvo*) or "roving cattle economy." [4] This meant that the seasonal movement of flocks and herds from pasture to pasture was permitted, but the herds were accompanied by "brigades" and not by the whole population, the bulk of whom remained settled in villages. It is this system which prevails today, with reasonably good results.

In the nature of things, however, ties of kinship are stronger in nomadic than in settled societies, and attempts to destroy them in the pastoral regions of the Muslim lands have been correspondingly less successful. The inmates of Kazakh collective farms, for instance, still tend to consist of members of the same clan or family union.

Although the desire to combat Islam—and eventually to overwhelm the Muslim peoples—was not the primary reason for the vast colonization schemes undertaken during the Tsarist and Soviet regimes, colonization was certainly expected to be an important aid to assimilation by demonstrating the superiority of Russian culture and work habits. But in spite of its extent (the Muslim regions of the USSR as a whole have been more heavily colonized by non-Muslims than any other Muslim country in the world), colonization does not seem to have produced any higher degree of westernization than exists in many non-Soviet Muslim countries where there is no European colonization at all—for example, in Syria, Lebanon and Iran. Perhaps one explanation, as Richard Pipes has aptly pointed out,[5] is that in the USSR Russian and other non-Muslim settlers tend to live side by side with, rather than among, the Muslims.

It is sometimes said that the Soviet government still aims at eventually swamping the Muslim population with white settlers. Indeed, great emphasis is laid by Soviet propagandists on the need for further internationalization and on the large number of nationalities working on various enterprises in the Muslim regions. There is, however, no evidence of any clear-cut demographic policy involving a sub-

[3] A. Bennigsen, *Islam in the Soviet Union*, London, 1966, p. 191.

[4] I. Winner, "Nomadism and Social Organization among the Recently Settled Kazakhs," *Central Asian Review* (London: henceforth cited as CAR), Vol. XI, 1963, pp. 234-45 and 353-73.

[5] R. Pipes, *Moslems of Soviet Central Asia*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1954.

Survivals of the Past

Nationalist remnants at times are manifested in an endeavor to emphasize national exclusiveness, to idealize the past, to exaggerate the role of one people and denigrate the role of other peoples in the achievement of common victory, and to perpetuate old, harmful customs and morals under the guise of national traditions. There are also still such abnormal phenomena, inherited from the past, as a feudal-bey attitude toward women and the observance of religious ceremonies. Instances are observed when someone tries to exaggerate the significance of the national cultures, and thus to create artificial barriers to their rapprochement.

—Sh. R. Rashidov, First Secretary of the Uzbek CP, in Kommunist, No .18, 1965.

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stantial and steady increase of immigration from the western parts of the USSR such as would be necessary to keep pace with the exceptionally high rate of natural increase (considerably over 30 per thousand per annum) among the Muslims.[6] The present high level of European settlement is perforce tolerated by the Muslims, but as the Soviet authorities are well aware, they resent it, and any significant increase could have consequences of which Muslim unemployment might not be the most serious.

Economic

"Islam," writes Professor Klimovich, its foremost Soviet detractor, "is an anti-scientific, reactionary world concept, alien and inimical to the scientific Marxist-Leninist world concept. Islam is in opposition to optimistic and stimulating materialistic teaching; it is incompatible with the fundamental interest of the Soviet peoples: it prevents believers from being active and conscientious builders of Communist society." [7]

When considered in relation to the state economy and productivity, this stigmatization of Islam has much more force than similar attacks on other religions. It is not simply that Muslim belief runs counter to Communist ideology; the whole Muslim way of life is seen as militating against the development of a modern economy. This latter view, indeed, has in the past not been confined solely to the Soviet regime; in the West, the theory has often been advanced that the relative economic backwardness of the Muslim world as compared with the non-Muslim West could be attributed to the static and conservative nature of Islam. Nowadays, however, this backwardness seems more attributable to two interconnected facts of history, neither of which was necessarily due to any inherent quality of Islam: (1) the domination of state affairs by the Church began to diminish in Christendom several centuries before a similar phenomenon took place in the Muslim world; and (2) this head start enabled the non-Muslim West to dominate the majority of the world's Muslim peoples either directly or indirectly until only two decades ago. At present, the only considerable Muslim community whose economy and finance are still modeled and directed by a dominant Western power is that living within the USSR.

The all-Union application of centrally-controlled Soviet economic planning and development has had a far greater effect on the Muslims than on any other considerable element in the USSR. Before the 1917 Revolution, the integration of the economy of the Muslim regions into that of Russia as a whole had proceeded on very unequal lines. It was virtually confined to the Baku oil industry and a few industrial and agricultural enterprises, all of which, though encouraged by the Tsarist government, were in private hands. Modern irrigation works, on which large-scale development of the cotton industry depended, were state-controlled, but efforts to replace the primitive but efficient native irrigation system by new methods had not made great progress. Moreover, the economies of the vassal states of Khiva and Bukhara, which contained some of the most valuable agricultural land, were largely independent: that is to say, they were developed along lines chosen by their rulers.

The economic development of the Muslim lands—particularly of Central Asia—that has taken place since the Revolution was in no sense initiated by the Muslims themselves, who probably would have followed a very different course if left to their own devices. The sweeping measures taken over their heads by the central Soviet authorities ran in almost every instance directly counter to Muslim tradition. To begin with, the notion of landed property was much more firmly established in the Muslim lands than in European Russia, where the Revolution had taken the form of a peasant war against the landowners. Collectivization, the destruction of the age-old irrigation system, and the diversion of pastoral lands to grain cultivation and of grain-producing lands to cotton all struck at the very roots of established Muslim usage.

The long-term economic soundness of these measures, and particularly of collectivization, is not yet proven,[8] but it can hardly be doubted that, taken as a whole, they have substantially increased the agricultural productivity of the Muslim lands and have also contributed to the material well-being of the Muslims. Industrialization has also progressed at a pace unknown in any other Asian country except Japan. It may have resulted in some material advantages for the Muslims, but it is not of their creation and has so far depended on the presence of large numbers of non-Muslim technicians.

In any event, it must be acknowledged that the

[6] A. Sheehy, "Population Trends in Central Asia and Kazakhstan," *CAR*, Vol. XIV, 1966, p. 317.
[7] *Zaria vostoka*, Oct. 10, 1954.
[8] "The Collectivization Campaign in Uzbekistan, 1927-33," *CAR*, Vol. XII, 1964, pp. 40-52.

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presence of non-Muslims—mainly Russians and Ukrainians—has been a decisive factor in the economic development of the Muslim lands. Without Russian organizing ability, ruthlessly applied control, technical skill, and manpower, the economy of the Muslim peoples could not have reached its present level in so short a time. The result is a standard of living higher than that enjoyed by most, if not all, the non-Soviet Muslim states—although it is steadily rising in the latter without (except in some of the Muslim countries of North Africa) the presence of any settlers and with only a handful of foreign technicians. Left to themselves, the Muslims of the USSR would no doubt have developed their economy along different and, by Western standards, probably less efficient lines, and their sparse population would quite likely have prevented them from exploiting their natural resources to the full. There is no reason to suppose, however, that by adopting Western techniques to the same extent as the Muslim countries of the Middle East and South Asia, they could not have created at least one economically viable Muslim state.

Cultural

Russian and Soviet objections to Islamic culture have always been much more deep-rooted than their objections to cultures associated with other religions, with the possible exception of Judaism. Islam is seen not only as a brake on economic development, as unhygienic and possessing dangerous international links, but also as positively inimical to Russian culture, as a snake in the grass and an enemy within the gates. The Orthodox Church has always been considered an integral part of Russian culture, and the Muslims are by far the largest non-Orthodox community in Russia. To the Soviet reformers Islam simply bristled with peculiar obstacles to the building of a uniform Soviet culture: it preached, or was thought to preach, predestination and fatalism; it denied women their rightful place in society and the arts; it exercised a stranglehold on education; its languages used the exotic Arabic character, borrowed extensively from Arabic and Persian, and preferred "oriental" literary genres. Therefore, while the Soviet assault on Christian cultures was directed mainly against the influence of the churches and against uneducated superstition, the assault on Islam was directed against all aspects of Muslim life and all strata of society, particularly against the intellectuals. Soviet hostility to Islamic practices was in no sense mitigated by the fact that a purely Muslim reformist movement, that of the Jadids,[9] had been aiming since the beginning of the century at the removal of many of those aspects of Islam to which the Soviet reformers most objected. After a halfhearted attempt at collaboration, the authorities decided that the Jadids wanted to purify Islam, not to destroy it, that they were interested in nationalism rather than in the class war, and that they might in fact steal the Soviet cultural thunder. The regime therefore eliminated them and thus ensured that any reforms of Islamic culture would be associated solely with Marxist-Leninist socialism.

It is clear from Soviet writings on the subject that fifty years of sustained pressure against Muslim beliefs and observances, against the customs and traditions that permeate Muslim life from the cradle to the grave, and fifty years of effort to remold the Muslim languages, literature and arts along Soviet lines, have had far less effect than was at one time anticipated. Nine-tenths of the mosques, all the religious primary schools (*maktabs*), and all but one of the seminaries (*madrasahs*) have been closed;[10] the number of officially recognized Islamic clergymen has been drastically reduced; pilgrimages are confined to a few carefully selected persons; and a steady stream of propaganda is directed at Muslim beliefs and practices. Yet, while these steps have undoubtedly had a considerable superficial effect on the Soviet Islamic community—as, indeed, modernization has had a considerable effect on Muslim peoples outside the Soviet Union—they are still far from having erased the imprint left by a thousand years of Muslim culture. The vast majority of the indigenous inhabitants of the Muslim republics still readily admit to being Muslims, and as recently as 1966 a Soviet writer could state that the proportion of religious believers in these republics was higher than in any of the others.[11]

No intelligent person would wish to belittle Soviet achievement in the field of general, higher and technical education of the Muslims. Here the regime has unquestionably outstripped many earlier colonial powers, and the Muslims themselves have taken fullest advantage of the educational opportunities offered.[12] Whether the total exclusion of religious

[9] "Jaddism: A Current Soviet Assessment," *CAR*, Vol. XII, 1964, pp. 30-39.
[10] H. Carrère d'Encausse, "Islam in the USSR," *CAR*, Vol. IX, 1961, p. 335.
[11] M. V. Vagabov, "Bolshe vnimaniia sovetskomu Islamovedeniiu" (For Greater Attention to Soviet Islamic Studies), *Voprosy filosofii* (Moscow), No. 12, 1966, pp. 172-175.
[12] G. Wheeler, *The Modern History of Soviet Central Asia*, London, 1964, pp. 198-208.

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instruction from state education has accomplished as much as was intended towards undermining Islamic culture may be doubted. There is, indeed, good ground for presuming that education on modern lines has increased rather than diminished Muslim particularism. In the words of Alexandre Bennigsen, "the modern Muslim intellectual . . . may be indifferent to Muslim dogma and practice, but he remains attached to the whole body of customs and traditions which make up the special character of the Muslim way of life." [13] At the same time, education has brought the Muslim intellectuals to regard themselves as equals of their Russian counterparts and hence to aspire to the leadership of their own peoples. On this point, Bennigsen writes:

The present-day Muslim intelligentsia seems to have all the necessary political and ideological qualifications, and its claims cannot therefore be brushed aside by the government as could those of the intelligentsia of the 'twenties and 'thirties.[14]

The aims of Soviet linguistic reform for the Muslim republics [15] have been far-reaching but not entirely consistent. Officially these reforms have been described as aimed, on the one hand, at the transformation of tribal and community languages into developed national languages, and on the other, at the establishment of Russian as "a second native language." The reforms were also designed to eliminate outside, particularly Arabic and Persian, influences, and ostensibly to promote cultural uniformity, but at the same time the Soviet authorities, by emphasizing rather than reducing phonetic and orthographic differences between the strongly interresemblant Turkic languages, evidently intended the reforms to serve a policy of "divide and rule." Success in the achievement of these aims has only been partial, and the last has recently been abandoned.[16] In some languages, notably Azerbaijani and Uzbek, the Arabic and Persian element remains surprisingly high.

The development of Muslim national languages has helped bring into being national literatures which, though large, are artificial and carefully controlled, excluding all but derogatory references to Islam. In style and construction, these Soviet Muslim literatures may be equal to or even ahead of those of independent Muslim countries, but as a genuine reflection of current thought, or even of modern living conditions, they are very far behind. Moreover, unlike the modern Arabic, Persian and Turkish literatures, they provide no insight into the progress of ideas in the outside world. Nor have Soviet Muslim writers so far dared to express ideological skepticism to the same extent as Russian writers.

The waning of traditional artistic expression in the arts and crafts under the impact of westernization is observable all over the Muslim East, but it is particularly marked among the Soviet Muslims. In music, however, tastes remain conservative, and traditional themes, though officially discouraged, are still persistent in the newly-developed drama and opera. Not surprisingly, Islamic influence is entirely absent from the officially encouraged but un-Muslim media of painting and sculpture.

Soviet sociologists do not as a rule distinguish between culture and civilization, and they would hardly accept Professor MacIver's statement that "our culture is what we are, our civilization is what we use." [17] But on the basis of such a distinction, it

On Religion and Research

Research on the population's religious affiliations has shown that the percentage of believers in the republics of the Soviet East is substantially higher than in the other union republics. This can be explained by a number of historical factors that conditioned the specific nature of the transition of the peoples of the Soviet East to socialism and also by specific features of the ideology of Islam itself. . . . But, unfortunately, the real state of affairs is inadequately taken into account both in theoretical research and in the elaboration of scientific-atheist measures. No concrete social and social-psychology research has been conducted as yet (except for a few timid attempts) on religious affiliations in areas where Islam is widespread, and this is why we know so little, to our shame, of the present-day Muslim believer, his spiritual world, psychology, etc.

—M. V. Vagabov, Voprosy filosofii, No. 12, 1966.

[13] Bennigsen, *op. cit.*, p. 213.
[14] *Ibid.*, p. 214.
[15] Wheeler, *op. cit.*, p. 192.
[16] F. P. Filin, "Some questions of the development of the languages of the peoples of the USR," *Vestnik AN SSSR* (Moscow), No. 11, 1966, p. 30.
[17] R. M. MacIver, *The Modern State*, London, 1926, p. 321.

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can perhaps be said that whereas Soviet *civilization* has made great progress in the Muslim lands of the USSR, the adoption of Soviet *culture* is still limited and superficial.

Ideological

The extent to which an alien ideology can be imposed on a subject people depends on a number of factors, such as time, the staying-power of the native ideology, the degree of insistence and pressure on on the part of the alien rulers, and the material advantages to be gained by compliance on the part of the ruled. The history of imperialism shows considerable variations in the degree of coercion used in attempting to impose one ideology on another. Such attempts have usually accompanied or closely followed conquest and annexation. The Soviet attempt to impose "the scientific Marxist-Leninist world concept" on the "anti-scientific and reactionary world concept" of Islam has had some features in common with the earlier attempts—largely successful—of Islam to impose itself on Zoroastrian Iran and Hindu India. The novelty of the Soviet experiment lies in the fact that the preparatory work of physical conquest had been accomplished for the Soviet regime by its Tsarist predecessors. The present Soviet Union is the first instance in history of a multiracial empire remaining (with one or two temporary lapses) in the hands of a power which had undergone a complete change of ideology and world outlook.

The effects on the Soviet Muslims of the changed ideology of their rulers have been complex. Owing to the low rate of literacy and the absence of official propaganda prior to the Revolution, they had only dimly apprehended the nature of the driving force behind Tsarist rule, which did not seriously interfere with their way of life. They were soon to learn that the force behind the new regime, while still unmistakably Russian, drove very much harder, and that the new rulers proposed to draw them into the general stream of Russian life as never before. The adjustments which the new ideology demanded of them were much greater than those demanded of the non-Muslim majority. Many of these adjustments have been painful—for example, compulsory military service, from which most Muslims were exempt before 1917—but there have been some compensating advantages, such as greater education, more equality of opportunity, and a higher standard of living. These, it can be argued, could have been achieved without communism, but fifty years of intensive indoctrination appear to have been successful in bringing Muslim intellectuals to believe the contrary and to regard communism as a superior, if not the ideal, form of government. This does not mean that they are unable to visualize communism without the Russians, any more than the Indian Congress Party was unable to visualize the continuance of British-style parliamentary democracy, in which it firmly believed, after the end of British rule.

There is little doubt, however, that communism, *as imported from Europe*, is much more acceptable, on a permanent basis, to non-Muslim than to Muslim peoples. As long ago as 1923, a movement led by a Muslim Communist, Sultan Galiev (Sultan Ali Oglu) sought to remodel communism on lines more suitable to the Muslim East.[18] It was suppressed, but there can be no doubt that it voiced deep-seated aspirations which may have intensified with the spread of education and consequently of Muslim self-confidence. The roots of Communist principles may have penetrated as deep among the Soviet Muslim intellectuals as did the roots of the parliamentary democratic principle in India. But while the semblance of British parliamentary democracy still persists in India, and may continue to persist there for a long time, it is nevertheless being steadily affected by the reemergence of old institutions. In certain circumstances, events could follow the same pattern in the Soviet Muslim republics. For the foreseeable future, however, Muslim national aspirations, insofar as they can be said to exist, appear to be concerned primarily with gaining political, cultural and economic self-determination, and Muslim intellectuals seem more likely to press their claims in these areas as Communists than as reactionaries.

Conclusion

As regards their political and economic status and standard of living, then, the position of the Muslim nationalities in the USSR is much the same as that of other ethnic groups. By reason mainly of the sparseness of their indigenous population, the Muslim lands have been far more heavily colonized by other nationalities, mainly by Russians. This has meant that things are done much more in the Russian way, particularly in the largely Russianized cities, than for example in the Armenian Republic.

[18] Bennigsen, *op. cit.*, p. 110.

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The task of getting the Muslims to conform to standard Soviet culture has been much greater and has involved much more drastic methods than similar efforts with respect to other nationalities whose culture was either European or near-European, or so primitive as to offer no serious resistance. The effects on the Soviet Muslims of cultural regimentation and their segregation from their fellow Muslims outside the USSR have undoubtedly been considerable, but they are still very far from being decisive. Islam has certainly not been superseded by communism as an ideological concept, but there are signs of a fusion of the two in the minds of Muslim intellectuals—a development which is not likely to be welcomed by the Communist authorities.

Muslim cultural particularism in relation to other groups, and most of all in relation to the Russians, undoubtedly exists. Whether in a political sense this particularism can be said to amount to nationalism is doubtful. Many factors militate against this—geographical separation, racial and linguistic differences, and most of all the uncompromising attitude of the Soviet regime. This last, however, may eventually be affected by the emergence of a powerful China abutting on three of the Soviet Muslim republics over a boundary of 1,800 miles.

The Yakuts

By Violet Conolly

The Sino-Soviet conflict, Chinese territorial claims against the Soviet Union, and the Red Guards' frenzied anti-Soviet agitation in Heilungkiang Province of Manchuria, often within earshot of the Soviet border city of Blagoveshchensk, have inevitably quickened interest in the state of affairs in the vast lands of the Soviet Far Eastern Region, stretching from the southern Amur River frontier far northward to the Arctic Ocean. Until the most recent period, this huge territory of over six million square kilometers had been virtually closed to Western visitors, and the very restricted facilities now granted to selected travellers to visit such places as Yakutsk or Khabarovsk still leave most of the area within the banned travel zone. Thus, almost the only available sources of information about this region and its peoples are Soviet ones, which are exceptionally difficult to check under the circumstances.

The Soviet Far Eastern Region is now divided into seven large administrative-territorial divisions: the Yakut Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (YASSR), Khabarovsk krai, the Maritime krai,

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Amur oblast (province), Kamchatka oblast, Magadan oblast, and Sakhalin oblast. The region contains the homelands of many small indigenous peoples of Tungus-Manchu, Paleosiberian (Paleoasiatic) or Mongol origin, who before the coming of the Russians in the 17th century roamed the tundra and the taiga, undisturbed by Western penetration. Many of these small peoples have already lost their identity and become assimilated to the Russian or other more numerous nationalities surrounding them. Where they survive, their rate of growth is very slow, and in all cases it is exceeded by the influx of Russian immigrants, so that it seems only a question of time before they will be completely submerged.[1] This would be in line with the aims of the current CPSU Program (1961), which welcomes the trend towards assimilation of non-Russian peoples and looks forward to the time when "complete unity" will be achieved on the basis of a culture common to all the Soviet peoples.[2] In view of the numerical and cultural predominance of the Russians in the multinational Soviet state, this process can only result in a devious form of Russification, however strongly the party ideologues may protest their interest in the "free development" of the national cultures and languages of the peoples of the USSR.

This study is specifically concerned with the Yakuts of the Soviet Far East, who are relative newcomers to the region and are not regarded by the Soviets as belonging to any of the above-mentioned indigenous Tungus or Paleosiberian groups of "small peoples of the North." They are in many ways a more distinctive group than any of their neighbors. For more than a millenium, they have been settled in a compact mass in the enormous area known as Yakutia, which is about six times the size of France and the largest unit in the Soviet Far East. They are more advanced than the reindeer-breeding Tungus, the Yukagirs, or the Chukchi, their neighbors. The distinguished anthropologist M. A. Czaplicka, who spent a year among the natives of northern Siberia, described the Yakuts as "the aristocrats of the tundra . . . they are at a much higher stage of culture, both material and intellectual, than their neighbors."[3]

Historically, racially, and linguistically, the Yakuts differ significantly from the rest of the mosaic of peoples in the Soviet Far East. Their origin and the origins of their language were long enveloped in mystery, and indeed are still somewhat of an enigma to Soviet scholars. It is now generally agreed that the Yakuts are a Turkish people—though they never have been Muslims—and that their language is based on a mixture of Turkish with strong elements of Mongolian and Tungus, plus some hitherto undefined pre-Turkish elements that puzzle philologists. How this islet of Turkish people found its way to the land of the reindeer Tungus and other completely non-Turkish peoples of the middle Lena basin is still the subject of controversy among Soviet historians and anthropologists. From their study of Yakut folklore and archeology, Soviet scholars are now mostly of the opinion that the Yakuts, during the 10th-13th centuries, migrated in several waves from the Baikal region and further south from the fringes of the Kazakh-Kirghiz lands, up along the Lena and its tributaries, pushing the former tribal occupants of the taiga northward and eastward before them. The name Yakut is in fact a Russian adaptation of the Tungus name for these people. In their own tongue, the Yakuts call themselves Sakha, a name deriving from their Baikal ancestors.[4]

In recent years, Yakutia has become extremely important to the Soviet Union economically owing to its rich deposits of such valuable minerals as gold, diamonds, tin, mica (phlogopite), wolfram, and mercury, in addition to large reserves of coal and iron, oil and gas. The development and exploitation of these resources as a result of Russian geological research is only one facet of the history of Russian influence in Yakutia. This influence has been at work now for over three hundred years and has transformed the face of the country and its people.

The Russian Conquest

Little is known about the Yakuts before the Russian conquest of the Far Eastern region in the early 17th century. They were then settled in the

[1] Yuri Mironenko, "Population and Territorial Division," *Studies on the Soviet Union*, No. 4, 1962, p. 62; A. A. Isupov, *Natsionalnyi sostav naseleniia SSSR* (*National Composition of the Population of the USSR*), Moscow, 1964, pp. 39-42.

[2] Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1961.

[3] M. A. Czaplicka, *My Siberian Year*, London, 1916, p. 99.

[4] M. G. Levin, A. P. Potapov (Eds.), *Narody Sibirii* (Peoples of Siberia), Moscow, 1956, pp. 269-70.

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lands between the Lena, Amga, and Aldan rivers. The Cossacks, the spearhead of the Russian advance, reached Yakutia via the river Lena and established a fortified post (*ostrog*) at Yakutsk, the site of the present capital, in 1632. A Russian military governor was appointed in 1640. In keeping with their usual practice in the conquered Siberian lands, the Russians immediately exacted a fur tribute (Yasak) from the Yakuts, and the severity of this forced levy, as well as the attempt to carry out a local census in 1649, caused many risings against Russian rule before the end of the century. These risings were harshly suppressed, and the Yakuts eventually learned the hard way that resistance to the Russians was futile. They either settled down to live with them peacefully or fled beyond the Russian strong arm to remote parts of the tundra and taiga. An important element in the Russians' subjection of the Yakut people was their success in winning over the tribal aristocracy, or *toiony*, to their side and using them as agents to run the country.[5]

The Yakut population in the mid-17th century, soon after the Russian conquest, has been estimated at about 26,000. Russian colonization remained small until political deportees began to arrive in the 19th century. The Yakuts at this time were semi-settled folk. They had large herds of cattle and horses but did not keep reindeer like their nomadic neighbors. They knew the use of iron and were skilled craftsmen in wood and metal. The Russians introduced them to bread, which they had not known before as they did not grow grain, and in spite of the extremely harsh Yakutian climate and the permafrost terrain, they soon learned to grow a little grain and potatoes. The Russian presence exercised a favorable influence on the local economy and culture—a fact which Soviet sources do not fail to point out. The Soviet ethnographer O. V. Yonova, for example, expresses the view that "the union of the Yakut krai to Russia had great progressive significance for Russia and Yakutia": for Russia it was primarily of economic significance, while for the Yakuts it helped, through Russian elimination of intertribal feuding, to consolidate them into "a united people," expedited the development of their productive forces, and gave them membership in a powerful, centralized state with an incomparably higher technique of production.[6] The Yakuts were quick to learn new domestic arts from the Russians,

Якутки в старинных сангыяхах и меховых шапках (рис. худ. М. М. Носова)

Yakuts in traditional fur coats and hats. Reproduced from S. A. *Tokarev Etnografiia Narodov SSSR* (Ethnography of the People of the USSR), Moscow University Publishing House, 1958, p. 465.

to imitate their dress, and to adopt from them tools and implements that were better than the primitive ones they had been accustomed to using.

There was also a certain amount of "Yakutization" of the Russians. Yakuts taught the Russians their hunting and trapping skills, how to live in their extremely severe climate, and also their language, which some Russians—we are told—gradually adopted instead of their own. Intermarriage was not uncommon, and there was no "color barrier" although the superior status of the Russians was certainly taken for granted here, as elsewhere in the Russian Empire. Indeed, Dr. Terence Armstrong goes so far as to maintain that probably nowhere else in the Russian dominions was the culture of the conquerors so strongly influenced, and even submerged, by that of a conquered ethnic group as in Yakutia.[7]

The darker side of Russian relations with the indigenous peoples of the Far Eastern region was

[5] *Ibid.*, pp. 270-71.

[6] In S. A. Tokarev (Ed.), *Istoriia Yakutskoi ASSR* (History of the Yakutian ASSR), Vol. II, Moscow, 1957, pp. 40-42.

[7] *Russian Settlement in the North*, London, Cambridge University Press, 1965, pp. 96-97.

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described by a Russian "merchant and owner of gold mines," N. L. Latkin, in a late 19th-century account of conditions in the *Yeniseiskaia guberniia*, which could also apply to Yakutia:

The history of Siberia shows clearly the merciless exploitation of natives by all who are in a position to do so, from the bread shop managers, rich peasants, Cossacks, traders and local clergy to the duly-constituted authorities.[8]

Latkin was writing in the 1880's, but his words give a general picture of Russian behavior in Yakutia from the 17th century to the end of the Tsarist regime.[9] There were exceptions to this sort of conduct, of course—most notable of all, the religious and political deportees who began to arrive in considerable numbers in the middle of the 19th century.

The Role of Political Exiles

Yakutia was chosen as a place of exile because of its remoteness, harsh climate, and difficult living conditions. Highly educated Russians and Poles deported by the Tsarist regime for political reasons were dumped in obscure corners of Yakutia along with simple peasant exiles like the fanatical *Skoptsy* (an Orthodox sect which practiced self-castration). They made up an odd company, but in their several ways they rendered great services to the Yakut people. In particular, the scholars and scientists devoted their energies to studying the language, customs, and archeology of the country, and to exploring the physical geography of many of its lesser known areas. E. K. Pekarski compiled the first dictionary of the Yakut language between 1899 and 1930, completing this monumental work more than a decade after the Bolshevik Revolution. The Yakut Museum was founded in Yakutsk by exiles in 1891, and E. M. Yaroslavski, later a famous Bolshevik party historian, was its curator. The Polish exile V. Seroshevski made an intensive 12-year study (1880-1892) of the north Yakutian districts of Verkhoian and Kolyma, the Russian Geographical Society recognizing the value of his ethnographical research by publishing his work, *Yakuty*, in 1896.

Though subject to certain official restrictions, Russian exiles also participated in the so-called Siberian (*i.e.*, Yakutian) Expedition of 1894-96, organized and financed by the rich mine owner I. M. Sibiriakov, which produced important scientific results in the fields of Yakut customary law, economics, and primitive religions, thanks largely to the contributions of Pekarski, the distinguished anthropologist V. G. Bogoraz-Tan, and Vladimir Yokhelson (all political exiles). In this and other scientific expeditions, the Yakuts cooperated very usefully with the Russians, guiding them through difficult and unknown areas and elucidating local myths and legends. One of the most interesting of these early study projects was the Russian-American Ethnographical Expedition through Chukotka (1900-02), organized by the American Museum of Natural Sciences, in which both Bogoraz and Yokhelson again took part.[10] These two political exiles also were instrumental in stimulating the emerging young Yakut intelligentsia and encouraging the stirrings of national consciousness.

The industrious *Skoptsy* and other sectarian peasant exiles made their contribution in the field of agriculture, particularly in the development of grain and vegetable production. The best results were obtained in the Olekminsk and Viliui districts, where the methods introduced by the exiles were quickly imitated by the Yakuts and applied elsewhere. The Yakuts learned how to use new implements and to clear woodlands, and large numbers who had previously grown only hay for their animals now took up arable farming on a broader scale.[11] The development of the gold-mining industry in Yakutia and the neighboring Irkutsk *guberniia* created a growing market for dairy and grain products from the Lena-Viliui districts, benefiting both Yakut and Russian farmers. There were also skilled Yakut joiners and carpenters who helped to adjust construction to the peculiar permafrost soil.

Cultural and Economic Progress

During the last century of Tsarist rule, the cultural horizons of the Yakuts were considerably enlarged. The people were now converted, at least formally, to Orthodox Catholicism, although the old Shamanistic rites were often still practiced in the home. Church services in Yakut were started in

[8] N. L. Latkin, *Yeniseiskaia guberniia, yeio proshloe i nastoiashchee* (Yeniseiskaia Province, Its Past and Present), St. Petersburg, 1892, quoted in Armstrong, *op. cit.*, pp. 118-19.

[9] Tsarist laws governing relations with the native populations were on the whole liberal. They forbade the sale of alcohol to the natives and made other provisions to protect the latter from the rapacity and brutality of officials and private traders. But the laws were easy to evade in view of the remoteness of the region and the laxity and venality of many officials.

[10] Tokarev, *op. cit.*, pp. 362-63.

[11] *Ibid.*, pp. 272-74.

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Yakutsk in 1859 and extended later to many country districts. Some religious books were published in the Yakut language, but Russian was as a rule the language of instruction in Church schools for Russians and Yakuts alike. In spite of the lethargy and inferior educational and moral quality of many teachers and local officials, the network of schools for Yakut and Russian peasants grew slowly but steadily throughout the country. In remote places, schools were often started by devoted Russian exiles with no assistance from the government. Native literacy rose from 0.7 percent according to the 1897 census to 2 percent in 1917, but it should be noted that these figures included the Chukchi and Tungus, Yukagirs and Lamuts, among whom literacy scarcely existed. The literacy figure for the entire Russian Empire in 1917 was only 21 percent.

Commercially, the country was also developing. The Yakuts were proving themselves keen traders even in competition with the Russians. The lucrative carrying trade by pack-horse across the Yakutian tracks linking Siberia with the Pacific via Yakutsk was largely in their hands, and we hear of Yakut merchants sending representatives to China to buy tea, which was imported via the ports of Ayan and Okhotsk. They also imported goods from America and elsewhere via Ayan and Nelkan in the 1880's—because it was cheaper to import by these sea routes than overland from Russia—and in spite of the miserable state of the roads leading from these ports to the interior of the country, trade with China and America was brisk.[12] Thus, Yakutia at the end of the 19th century was less isolated from the outside world than it is today.

From the early years of the 20th century, there was evidence among the young Yakut intelligentsia of a growth of national consciousness, which expressed itself in native literature and poetry and in widespread hostility to the iniquities of Russian taxation, land tenure, and undemocratically elected institutions. The establishment in 1905 of the "Union of Yakuts" embracing many different indigenous groups—princelings (*toyony*), merchants, intelligentsia, and businessmen—was a sign of the times. Its aims were to establish the civil and economic rights of its members; to obtain recognition of all native lands occupied by the state, monasteries, churches, and deportees without the agreement of the indigenous owners as being native property; and to secure separate Yakut representation in the State Duma, the removal of police control over native social institutions, and the urgent enforcement of the statute on local self-government.[13] The Tsarist government arrested the leaders of the Union but were unable to stifle nationalist sentiment in Yakutsk and the chief Yakut settlements. This was a genuine native movement, not influenced to any significant extent by Bolshevik émigrés. Contemporary Soviet historians are inclined to dismiss the Yakut Union as a "bourgeois-liberal" movement which did not have the "support of the broad national masses." The charge has little substance. It is like accusing Ireland's Charles Parnell, John Dillon or John Redmond of not having been "national leaders" because they did not belong to the working class.

Yakutia Under Soviet Rule

The Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 found Yakutia advancing socially, culturally and economically in spite of immense problems still awaiting solution. Four years of bitter civil war had to be fought out before Soviet power was firmly established and the remnants of the White (Kolchak) forces routed in 1922-23. A Yakut Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (YASSR) was then set up within roughly the same frontiers as the old Tsarist Yakutsk oblast, and its constitution was approved by the Supreme Soviet in 1923.

The new governmental setup in Yakutia was based on soviets and local party organs and was thus a simulacrum of government administration throughout the Soviet Union, taking no account of peculiar local conditions. This remains the form of government obtaining in Yakutia today. The YASSR is a constituent part of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic (RSFSR), and according to the hierarachical principle of Soviet government, all Yakut laws and regulations are subject to the control of both the governing bodies of the RSFSR and the highest all-Union state organs. Thus, the term "autonomous," in the Soviet usage, is not to be identified with the Oxford Dictionary definition of "self-governing," with which it has little in common. The Soviet "autonomous republics" represent, in effect, a second-class type of political unit devised by the Bolsheviks to compensate the smaller national groups, such as the Tatars, Bashkirs, and Karelians (there are now 16 such groups in all), which were not raised to full republican status on a

[12] *Ibid.*, pp. 278-79.

[13] *Ibid.*, pp. 380-83.

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par with the Russians or the Ukrainians. Professor Leonard Schapiro has defined the constitutional status of the autonomous republics as follows:

> **Within the Union republics there is a further division, that of the Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, which is subordinated to the Union republic of the territory of which it forms part. . . . Autonomous republics are not awarded the "right" of secession by the Constitution. Nor do autonomous republics enjoy, even on paper, the right to conduct their own foreign relations or to maintain their own armed forces. Each autonomous republic has its own Constitution which requires approval by the Union republic to which it is subordinated.**[14]

Accordingly, the YASSR must submit all its legislation, including budget and taxation arrangements, to the RSFSR for approval. Economically, it is dependent on Moscow for capital to develop its resources, and decisions regarding specific capital allocations for one project or another are also highly centralized. Development of Yakutia's major natural resources under the Soviet regime has always been directed from "without"—first, by the notorious Dalstroi of NKVD (Moscow's concentration camp system in the Far East), and latterly by the all-Union or RSFSR economic ministries in Moscow.

The inhabitants of the YASSR, as Soviet citizens, are represented in the bicameral Supreme Soviet of the USSR, electing one deputy for every 300,000 of the population to the Council of the Union, and as one of the Soviet autonomous republics they also send eleven deputies to the Soviet of Nationalities. Owing to the fact that many Yakuts have adopted Russian family names, it is usually impossible to distinguish Russians from Yakuts in the lists of members of these delegations. However, a recently published list of the YASSR delegation to the all-Union Council of Nationalities in 1966 specifies the nationalities of the delegates, showing that five were Russians, four were Yakuts, and two were Evenkis (Tungus).[15] At the local government level, according to visitors to Yakutsk during 1965-67, Yakuts were in charge of many important posts. Thus, the mayor of Yakutsk was a Yakut in 1965, as were the President of the Republic (a woman), the Rector of the University, and some of the chief soviet officials.

Most important of all the instruments of ruling power is the highly centralized apparatus of the CPSU, represented in the YASSR by the Yakut Obkom or Provincial Committee. The national (or autonomous) republics do not have their own national party organizations, but only branches of the all-Union party; thus, officials of any nationality chosen by the party can be switched from one republic to another. In fact, many of the most important posts in republican party organs are frequently occupied by Great Russians from Moscow with little or no local connections. All this indicates that the degree of self-government allowed to the YASSR is extremely limited.

The Population

The Yakuts form the largest and most compact native ethnic group in the Soviet Far East today, though their number is relatively minute compared to the Russians. They are still the only northern people not outnumbered by the Russians on their own home ground; however, at the present rate of Russian immigration, they also should soon be overtaken, as so many of the other small national minorities in the USSR have been. This trend is clearly shown in the accompanying table of population changes between the 1926 and 1959 censuses.

In 1926, the Yakuts constituted 82.3 percent of the population of the republic; the Russians, 10.43 percent; the Evenki and Eveni, 4.08 percent; and the remaining 3 percent consisted of scattered groups of nomadic Yukagirs, Chukchi, and small pockets of Chinese and Koreans. By the time of the last census in 1959, however, the situation had

Population of the YASSR

	1926	1959
Total	289,000	487,343
Yakuts	235,926[a]	226,053[a]
Russians	30,000[b]	215,328
Peoples of the North:		13,691
Evenki (Tungus)	13,000	9,505
Eveni		3,537
Ukrainians	—	12,182
Tatars	—	5,172
Belorussians	—	2,548

[a] The 1926 and 1959 figures for the Yakuts are not entirely comparable owing to minor changes in the YASSR boundaries during this period. In the northwest some territory was transferred to the Irkutsk oblast, while the YASSR gained other territory in the Olekminsk area.

[b] This figure includes Ukrainians and Belorussians.

[14] Leonard Schapiro, *Government and Politics of the Soviet Union*, London, 1965, p. 104.

[15] *Deputaty Verkhovnovo Soveta SSSR. Sedmoi Sozyv. Deputaty Soveta Soiuza i Soveta Natsionalostei*, Moscow, 1966.

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radically changed. As a result of the immigration of large numbers of Russians to man the new mining settlements and other enterprises, the Yakut proportion had fallen to 46.4 percent, while that of the Russians had risen to 44.2 percent. Official statistics no longer mention Chinese or Koreans in Yakutia. They have most likely been deported or, if not Soviet citizens, were expelled during the transfer of both groups from the southern areas of the Soviet Far East before and during the last war.

The Yakuts are very unevenly distributed throughout the territory of the republic. About nine-tenths of them are concentrated in the central areas, chiefly in the Yakutsk and Viliui districts, while the population is very thinly spread in the north.[16] The growth of the urban population has been considerable in the last forty years: official Soviet statistics show a rise from two percent in 1926 to 17 percent in 1959, and this trend continues. It is most strikingly reflected in the population of Yakutsk, which grew from 11,000 in 1926 to 74,000 in 1959 and 100,000 in 1966, and which now represents about one-seventh of the total population of the republic. The former tiny hamlet of Nezametnyi (now Aldan), which is the center of the southern Yakut gold-mining industry, is also growing rapidly (the population had reached 12,000 by the 1959 census and has probably risen since by several thousand).

Education and Culture

The Soviet period in Yakutia has seen a big leap forward in literacy, the spread of schools, and the establishment of many new cultural-scientific bodies. There has also been a considerable development of Yakut art and literature, albeit within the restrictions imposed by Marxist ideology and the rules of "socialist realism." Soviet sources dealing with these developments tend to obscure the national-cultural level already reached by the Yakuts prior to the Bolshevik Revolution and to depict them as having been wholly illiterate—a picture which, as indicated earlier, misrepresents the actual situation. Though literacy was indeed very low and concentrated among the higher social classes, the development of Yakut culture certainly antedates the Soviet period.

The Yakut language is now written in Cyrillic letters. Soviet scholars originally devised a special form of writing for it in 1923, but this was arbitrarily replaced by the Latin alphabet for both Yakut and the other Turkish languages of the Soviet Union in 1929, and an equally arbitrary switch was made to Cyrillic in 1937. The Yakuts in 1959 were 96.3 percent literate, and a creditable percentage of the population—164 per 1,000—could boast secondary or higher education. Boarding schools or "internats" have been established to meet the needs of the nomadic reindeer-breeding and trapping people of the northern areas (some 412 were reported to exist in 1954[17]) and no doubt serve a useful purpose in providing education where this would otherwise be very difficult. In the beginning, however, parents strongly objected to parting with their children, feeling that they would thus lose touch with their traditional way of life and skills and be brought up in an alien ideological atmosphere.

Primary education is now given entirely in Yakut and secondary education in Yakut and Russian. There is an increasing trend among the smaller nationalities of the Soviet Union to regard Russian as their mother tongue, and this trend is apparent among the Yakuts, though it is still relatively slight. Thus, only 0.5 percent of the Yakuts had adopted Russian instead of Yakut by 1939, whereas the proportion rose to 2.4 percent by 1959. The trend is more marked among Yakuts living outside their homeland in other areas of the RSFSR where Russian influence is paramount.[18]

Although only a rudimentary Yakut written language and literature existed before 1917, there is now a growing volume of creative literary work in the native tongue. Two daily newspapers are published in Yakut, and a literary magazine, *Poliarnaia zvezda*, appears every two months in both Yakut and Russian. The Russian edition, which is available in the West, contrives to express, in poetry and literary articles, a genuine feeling of Yakut national pride in the country's legends and natural beauty, though its pages are also well filled with "party line" pieces and obsequious tributes to Lenin.

In Yakutia, as in other national minority areas of the Soviet Union, nationalist ideas and sentiments can be given expression only at the risk of harsh political reprisal. After a period of relative toler-

[16] *Narody Sibirii, op. cit.*, pp. 267-68.

[17] V. V. Pokshishevski, *Yakutiia, priroda-liudi-khoziaistvo* (Yakutia, Nature-People-Economy), Moscow, 1957, pp. 91-92.

[18] Isupov. *op. cit.*, pp. 33-34.

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ance towards nationalism during the early and middle 1920's, the Bolshevik regime drove this lesson home to the Yakuts by purging various local party and literary figures between 1928 and 1938. In 1928 the members of the Yakut Obkom were deposed and replaced by more amenable men, and there was a concurrent purge of native writers, its more notable victims including the poet and ethnographer, A. Kulakovski, who used his poetry as a vehicle for warning against Russian domination, and Altan Saryn, an advocate of pan-Turkism among the Yakuts. The new Obkom subsequently disbanded the Sakha Omuk, a Yakut cultural organization, and imposed curbs on the country's only nationalist literary journal. What were officially described as "the most fanatical representatives" of the Yakut national intelligentsia were deported, and it is probable that some of them wound up in the "national minority brigades" which built the White Sea Canal in the appalling conditions of the 1930's. These reprisals against the native intelligentsia further weakened the natural leadership of the country —a process which had started with the destruction of the Yakut aristocracy in the immediate aftermath of the Revolution.[19]

The tendency to introduce Russian words into the Yakut vocabulary to convey ideas outside its range of expression, especially terms related to technical-industrial administration, is increasing. This is a trend found in many "developing countries" where new terms are borrowed from more advanced societies to meet the needs of modernization. The official Soviet line is that the "Russian language does not drive out the national languages and does not diminish their roles. The Russian language spreads with the flowering of the national languages." [20] But this reassurance must be weighed against the fact that an increasing number of people of the small nationalities gave Russian as their chosen language in the 1959 census, and that one of the aims of the Communist Party Program is "the fusion of cultures" and "the formation of a single universal culture of Communist society." If such a "fusion" is realized, it is obvious from the present trend that the Russian language and culture will inevitably dominate and the minority national cultures eventually be driven to the wall.

Many higher educational, technical and research institutions are now established in Yakutsk, and a special mining institute in Aldan works in connection with the gold industry. Yakutia's first university, which grew out of the old teachers' training college, was established in 1956. Earlier, in 1947, the Yakutsk branch of the all-Union Academy of Sciences was founded and attached to the Siberian Division of the Academy at Novosibirsk. It embraces a number of research institutes for geology, biology, etc. The important Permafrost Institute, which is attached directly to the Academy at Novosibirsk, has a staff of over 250 persons and maintains out-stations at Igarka and Chulman. It is engaged in both purely scientific work and the solution of practical problems of mining, construction, etc., in the permafrost areas of the country. Visiting experts have reported the scientific staff of the Institute to be of high quality. Soviet ethnographers, geologists and other scientists have done a great deal of work on Yakut problems, and some extremely interesting and original research studies have been published.

The Institute of Language, Literature and History is mainly concerned with research into the Yakut and other languages of the republic and is directed by a Yakut woman. However, the treatment given in 1951 to the distinguished Yakut literary historian and member of the Institute, G. P. Basharin, stands as a warning to all Yakut scholars to watch their step even today. In a book published in 1944, Basharin had dared to defend some of the pioneers of Yakut literature, Kulakovski in particular, who had been purged for their nationalist views. For this, he was violently denounced by *Pravda*, in an article published on December 10, 1951, and written by Aleksei Surkhov and L. I. Klimovich, for harboring "erroneous and anti-Marxist" ideas and seeking to justify the reactionary, "bourgeois-nationalist" character of Kulakovski.[21] Although Basharin has since been able to publish several important works during the Khrushchev period (including a history of agrarian relations in Yakutia), he still does not appear to have a position at the Institute commensurate with his scholarship.

Yakutia's pool of trained professional personnel is growing rapidly as a result of the increased facilities for higher and especially technical training in Yakutsk. The number of doctors, for example, almost tripled between 1939 and 1959, while that of electricians and grid supervisers grew 12 times.[22]

[19] Walter Kolarz, *The Peoples of the Soviet Far East*, London, 1954, pp. 106-8.
[20] Isupov, *op. cit.*, p. 36.
[21] For details of the "Basharin incident," see Kolarz, *op. cit.*, pp. 109-10.
[22] Isupov, *op. cit.*, p. 49.

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Despite this, the great majority of managerial and technical personnel in Yakutia are still Slav and primarily Russian immigrants, and there is a continuing and acute lack of qualified people to meet the growing demands of the new mining and other industries of the country.

Economic Development

Over the last five decades, Yakutia has been economically transformed by geological prospecting which has led to the development of valuable new mining sites, many in remote, roadless and inhospitable areas. These natural obstacles greatly increased the cost and difficulty of exploiting the country's mineral resources. Soviet capital investment in Yakutia, which has shown a sharp upward curve during this period, has been primarily concentrated in branches of heavy industry designed to strengthen the economic might of the USSR, and in the mining of gold, mica (phlogopite), diamonds and tin.

A Yakut prospector discovered the large Aldan goldfields in southern Yakutia in 1922-23 (in an area of small older workings of a primitive nature), and extraction operations here and in the adjacent mica mines have been greatly expanded since the war through mechanization. The supply situation has also been improved by the construction of the Amur-Yakutsk main motor road, which links the Aldan mining district with Bolshoi Never on the trans-Siberian railway to the south and also serves as a winter road connection between Aldan and Yakutsk.

Aldan, now the administrative center of the gold mining industry, is reported by travellers to be a relatively well-appointed town with good public buildings. It lies in a valley in the permafrost area and has an airport. Some processing of the ore is done in two local refineries, but final processing is carried on outside the republic. The majority of the local inhabitants are Russians, but Yakuts are also being drawn into the mining industry.

Gold is also found in northern Yakutia, in the Indigirka, Yana and Kolyma river basins, but the Aldan gold mines remain the most important producer. A new gold processing plant is believed to have been completed recently at Nizhnii Kuranakh and should increase output. No precise figures of current gold production are published in the Soviet Union. In the 1930's Yakut gold output was stated by several Soviet sources to be 20-25 percent of total Soviet gold production.[23] There is no doubt that output from the Aldan and other Yakutian gold mines is much higher now as a result of increased mechanization, the opening of new deposits, and the liquidation of the former concentration camp labor force with the abolition of Dalstroi in 1957.

The diamond resources of the Soviet Union were sharply increased by the discovery in the 1950's of three rich kimberlite pipes in the wilds of northwest Yakutia at Mirnii and Aikhal, and further north at Udachnaia-Vostochnaia, following earlier finds of alluvial diamonds in the Viliui basin. These deposits are regarded by geologists as among the richest (if not the richest) in the world, comparable to those in South Africa. They are difficult and expensive to work owing to labor and supply problems caused by their remoteness from inhabited centers and the harsh climate. Their importance to the Soviet economy is indicated by the fact that they now account for about 90 percent of annual Soviet diamond production, estimated in international trade journals at between 3 and 6 million carats. Some natural diamonds still have to be imported for special purposes, but Yakutian output is thought to be sufficient for normal Soviet requirements. A diamond institute has been established at Mirnii, and an interesting experiment is in progress looking toward the building of a completely enclosed town at Aikhal, with a micro-climate to shield the workers from the extremes of the local weather (plans for this project were to be shown at the Soviet pavillion during Expo 67 at Montreal).[24]

The tin mines at Ese-Khaiia and Bagatai and the more recently opened Deputatski mine in northern Yakutia, together with the piesoquartz and phlogopite mica workings at Aldan, are other Yakut resources of all-Union importance. The tin deposits are especially valuable because of the scarcity of this mineral in the Soviet Union, which has necessitated large imports from Malaya to make good the deficit.

A sharp criticism of the central government's failure to act more energetically to develop the natural resources of Yakutia was voiced in 1965 by the then party First Secretary of the YASSR, S. Z.

[23] V. V. Pokshishevski, *op. cit.*, p. 105; S. S. Korshuev (Ed.), *Yakutiia*, Moscow, 1965, p. 396.

[24] *Soviet Life*, June 1965, reported these and other developments in the Soviet diamond industry.

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Borisov, himself a Yakut in spite of his Russian-sounding name. Complaining of the underdevelopment of gold, diamond, tin and mica resources, Borisov declared:

The annual output of minerals in proportion to prospected reserves is less than one percent for diamonds, just over one percent for tin, about two percent for mica, and five percent for gold. The rich deposits of high-grade coking coal and iron ore in southern Yakutia, other deposits of non-ferrous and rare metals, and the salt deposits are not being worked at all and represent so much frozen capital, in spite of the fact that the appropriate research for getting the most out of these deposits has already been carried out and has proven the great profits which can be expected from their exploitation.[25]

Borisov went on to hint that there was opposition in influential quarters to sinking "much capital in a sparsely-populated region." He pointed out, however, that the diamond industry in Yakutia had already more than paid for itself, and that capital investments in the Deputatski tin mining enterprise, producing the cheapest tin concentrate in the USSR, were "15-16 times less than comparable capital investments in tin mining elsewhere in the Soviet Union."

It is impossible for an outsider to judge the validity of this possibly exaggerated special pleading. There is, however, plenty of evidence in Soviet sources as to the existence in Yakutia of a serious labor problem (to which Borisov also referred) which is greatly hampering mining and industrial development. Owing to poor living conditions, unreliable food supplies, and inadequate social amenities such as hospitals and crèches, it has hitherto been impossible to attract adequate numbers of immigrants to settle permanently in Yakutia. Higher wages and bonuses are indeed paid to workers in the more inhospitable areas of the country, but they are not enough to compensate for the greatly increased cost of living, the irregular supplies of fresh food, and the lack of good housing.[26]

The Labor Problem

As a consequence of these conditions, labor turnover is exceptionally high in the most important Yakut mining areas. Soviet sources in 1961 gave the following statistics (which are not regularly published) for migrants leaving their jobs in these areas: 51 percent in the Indigirka mining region; 51.3 percent in the Yakut diamond trust; 65.1 percent in the Aldan mica mines; and 93 percent in the Deputatski tin mines. The main cause given for this heavy efflux of mineworkers was the inadequate or non-existent supply of potatoes, vegetables and eggs available at government stores, while these food items on the free market were 4-5 times higher in price.[27]

Notwithstanding the special difficulties of supply, housing and communications throughout these northern territories, it is suprising that the Soviet government has not made more headway in solving the labor-turnover problem there after its long experience in the area. Its record is immeasurably less successful than that of capitalist countries like Canada or the United States in overcoming similar difficulties in their Arctic regions. Now that Stalinist restrictions on the free movement of workers have been abolished, Moscow is learning at great cost that free labor will not remain on the job in bad conditions any longer than is necessary to accummulate a little capital before seeking more attractive conditions elsewhere. Certainly, the Soviet authorities will have to devote much more serious thought to Yakutia's labor problems if the provisions in the new draft Five-Year Plan (1966-70) for building up the economic potential of the Soviet Far East and further increasing the output of gold, tin, wolfram, mercury, diamonds and mica—all found in Yakutia—are to be implemented. Moreover, when the new metallurgical plant now planned for the Far East gets off the ground, the coking-coal deposits at Chulman in southern Yakutia will probably be chosen as its fuel base, further heightening the urgency of solving the labor problem.

In view of the vast distances and the largely roadless state of much of the country, air transport is the most convenient means of moving light freight and passenger traffic. Aeroflot runs scheduled flights to over thirty small towns within Yakutia, as well as farther east, and through Siberia to Moscow and Central Russia. The Lena River system is also important for heavy freight, and supplies reach northeastern districts *via* the North Sea route and the port of Tiksi on the Arctic Ocean.

There are as yet no railways in Yakutia for transporting heavy freight, but this situation may eventually be improved by the projected construction of

[25] *Ekonomicheskaia gazeta*, No. 35, 1965.
[26] *Planovoe khoziaistvo*, No. 4, 1966, p. 48.
[27] "Labor Turnover in the Yakutskaia ASSR," *Polar Record*, May 1966. Data based on papers published in *Voprosy geografii Yakutii*, No. 1, 1961.

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a great new rail line (Sevsib) traversing Northern Siberia and Yakutia and terminating at a Pacific port. This will be a major project comparable in magnitude to the old Trans-Siberian railway and will take at least twenty years to complete.

Agriculture

The ill-conceived Soviet attempts in the 1930's to collectivize the Yakut herds of cattle, horses and reindeer and to settle the nomadic reindeer-herding peoples caused much confusion and distress among the rural population of Yakutia. The folly of trying to change the traditional methods of reindeer herding was eventually recognized, and now the reindeer peoples are classified as "semi-nomadic." Their reindeer meat and other products find good markets in the new mining settlements of northeastern Yakutia, and their animals are indispensable for transport in the tundra. There are now some prosperous mixed reindeer collectives in the Kolyma depression, with Chukchi, Evenki, Yakut and Russian members.[28]

Large areas of Yakutia are unsuitable for arable farming owing to the harsh climate and the permafrost soil. The best lands for wheat and vegetables are in central Yakutia and the Olekminsk district. There are large herds of cattle and horses, and Yakutsk is now supplied with meat and dairy products from the surrounding farms. As a result of intensive experimental work in plant breeding, the boundaries of agriculture in Yakutia have been moved substantially farther north than was formerly believed possible, although the practical results of these experiments are still not very substantial.[29] In the more inclement areas, some vegetables are grown in large glass-enclosed nurseries to supply local workers, but in far from sufficient quantities.

Conclusion

That a considerable degree of social and economic progress has been realized in Yakutia under Soviet rule cannot be denied. On the other hand, the severely limited measure of self-government allowed to the Yakuts and other native peoples of the area stands out in sharp contrast to the USSR's constant agitation in the United Nations on behalf of full independence for all colonial peoples, however ill-prepared they may be, politically and economically, for self-rule. The Yakuts are now nearly 100 percent literate and are making an appreciable contribution to local government administration, scientific research, and other sophisticated activities in their republic. They thus are much more entitled to genuine self-government than are some of the more primitive peoples from Oceania to Africa for whom the Soviets demand independence.

Lined up against the Slav millions, a people so numerically small as the Yakuts seems insignificant. Yet, even numerically, they appear in a different light within their own homeland. There they are the largest and the dominant group of native peoples and have given their name to a country almost six times the size of France, with great natural resources. These are the significant facts locally.

Notwithstanding the imposition of collectivization, the destruction of the young Yakut national intelligentsia under Stalin, and the continued subjection of the YASSR to Moscow's overriding political control, Soviet writers blandly tout the myth of Yakut "autonomy" and "independence." Even a work of the caliber of *The Peoples of Siberia*, produced by the Soviet Academy of Sciences, can affirm: "The Yakut people received its national independence from the hands of the Russian proletariat directed by the Communist Party." [30] But, as pointed out earlier, the terms "national independence" and "autonomy" in the Soviet context are a far cry from genuine independence and autonomy in the accepted Western sense. The Soviet "autonomous republics" do not represent an intermediate stage in the preparation of a primitive people for self-government; by definition, they are a fixed and permanent form of political tutelage imposed on the national minorities of the Soviet Union.

It would, of course, be unrealistic to demand that the Russians grant independence to a tiny minority people like the Yakuts occupying a vast rich area of Siberia. But if the Yakuts were located in some equally rich Western colonial territory in the heart of Africa or Asia, one can imagine the clamor that would be heard from Moscow demanding the liberation of this small people and its natural resources from colonial exploitation.

[28] Pokshishevski, *op. cit.*, pp. 185-86.
[29] Armstrong, *op. cit.*, 141-43, 161.
[30] *Narody Sibirii, op. cit.*, p. 307.

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The Jews

By Zvi Gitelman

Soviet policy toward the Jews can best be understood when viewed not simply in terms of specifically "Jewish policies" but rather in the wider context of general policies that have peculiar effects on Soviet Jewry—a group whose religion is tribal rather than ecumenical, whose culture presents unique difficulties for Soviet ideology, and whose extraterritoriality poses problems different from those posed by any other ethnic groups in the USSR. This is not to say that there are no policies specifically aimed at the Jews; indeed, there is striking evidence that in some key areas of Soviet life—notably, politics, culture and education—Jews are denied the rights or opportunities enjoyed by citizens of other nationalities.

This article will examine the three principal aspects of the Jewish problem in the USSR: religion, antisemitism, and assimilation as a key to the future of the Soviet Jewish community. This approach, it is hoped, will serve to bring into sharper focus both the similarities and the significant differences between the status and treatment of the Jews on the one hand, and of other ethnic and religious minorities on the other.

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To begin with, there is little question that the Jewish religion is on the decline in the USSR, perhaps more rapidly than other religions. While it is difficult to estimate the number of believing Jews (some Soviet sources have put it as high as 500,000), it is a fact that only about 60 synagogues remain open in the entire Soviet Union whereas the Belorussian Republic alone had some 500 synagogues or houses of study in the late 1920's.[1] The overwhelming majority or worshippers are in their sixties and seventies. There is a lack of religious articles and, just as importantly, of religious functionaries. There is no Yeshiva (religious seminary) in Moscow—or anywhere else in the Soviet Union.

To some extent, the decline of the Jewish faith is part of a general decline of religion in the USSR. A poll conducted by *Komsomolskaia pravda's* Institute of Public Opinion in 1961 revealed that the majority of Soviet youth considered adherence

[1] This figure is cited in the Minsk Yiddish daily *Oktiabr*, February 1, 1929. Despite the extremely militant anti-religious campaign of the 1920's conducted by the *Yevsektsiia*, or Jewish Section of the Communist Party, the number of synagogues had declined only from 1,034 in 1917 to 934 in 1929-30. The number of rabbis in the Ukraine had fallen from 1,049 in 1914 to 830 in 1929-30. All in all, 646 synagogues had been seized since the Revolution. *American Jewish Yearbook 5690*, Philadelphia, 1930, p. 68-9, and *AJYB 5691*, p. 118. In contrast, 354 of 450 remaining synagogues were seized between 1956 and 1963.

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to a religious faith among the lesser "social evils." [2] Workers and members of the intelligentsia have manifested a similar indifference, although there have recently been signs that some among the intelligentsia and youth have begun exploring Russian religious tradition and more exotic religious and metaphysical doctrines in what may be described as "a search for the meaning of life."

This general decline of religious belief in the Soviet Union has of course been largely a product of the anti-religious policies of the Communist regime, but in part it also reflects a widespread trend toward secularization that was already becoming noticeable in Russia—among Jews as well as others—even before the Revolution, and that has been evident still longer in most other European societies. In England, for example, 152 out of every thousand persons were enrolled in the Anglican Church forty years ago, whereas in 1964 the number had dropped to 81.[3] In Denmark today, only two percent of the population attend church with some regularity; and in Sweden, about four percent. But in the Soviet Union, the process of secularization was sharply accelerated by the anti-religious campaigns of the 1920's and, to an equal if not greater extent, by the industrialization and urbanization of the 1930's.

Secularization has perhaps affected the Jews more than it has other religious groups because of the fact that they are very highly urbanized and tend to concentrate in the larger cities, precisely where it is most difficult to practice religion and where religion tends to be weakest. A recent survey taken in Belorussia showed that, of eleven population samples in various cities and towns, the Jewish sample (taken in the town of Bobruisk) revealed 98.5 percent of the respondents declaring themselves atheists, whereas the average for the other ten samples was only 65.1 percent.[4] Even allowing for the methodological shortcomings of the survey and the probability that Jews were more reluctant than others to declare themselves believers, this finding seems a significant indication of the declining religiousness of the Soviet Jewish community. It should be noted here that certain Jewish religious forms and festivals retain a special meaning for nationally-conscious Jewish youth, even though atheist, since they have a national historical significance independent of theor theological content; thus, Passover is observed in some form by many non-believers, who celebrate it rather as a holiday of national liberation.

Official persecution has also been an important factor in the decline of the Jewish religion, and while it has extended to other religions as well, the evidence seems to indicate that the Jewish religion has been harassed with greater zeal and subjected to greater deprivations than other faiths. The officially-tolerated Orthodox Church has about 8,000 places of worship open; it is allowed to print Bibles and prayer books, to manufacture candles, crucifixes and icons, and to publish a monthly religious journal and an annual yearbook; it has five seminaries and two academies for higher theological education.[5] For some 540,000 Soviet Baptists, there are 5,500 Baptist churches; there is an All-Union Council of Evangelical Christian Baptists, which functions as a central administration coordinating church activities and publishes a magazine, *Bratskii vestnik;* and the Baptists are also printing a Bible for their adherents.[6] By contrast, the 2,268,000 Soviet Jews have only 60 synagogues; they have no central religious organization and no magazine or journal; they have been permitted to publish only 3,000 copies of a prayer book (and that in 1958), and none of the Bible. Soviet rabbis have consistently been denied permission to attend European rabbinical conferences, and no Soviet Jews have been allowed to train abroad for the rabbinate, whereas Soviet Moslems have occasionally been permitted to make pilgrimages to Mecca and Medina, and gifted Soviet Moslem students to receive training in the seminaries of Cairo, Damascus and Morocco.[7]

The patently harsher restrictions imposed on the Jewish religion may well be due as much to the fact that it is a weaker and easier target than the other religions as to antisemitism *per se* in the

[2] Cited in Bohdan Bociurkiw, "Religion and Soviet Society," *Survey* (London), July, 1966.
[3] *New York Times*, Dec. 14 and 18, 1966.
[4] *Prichiny sushchestvovaniia i puti preodoleniia religioznykh perezhitkov, Minsk*, 1965, p. 40.
[5] Moscow Radio Broadcast, March 27, 1964, quoted in *Jews in Eastern Europe*, (London), November 1964, p. 28.
[6] *Morning Star*, July 13, 1966, quoted in *Jews in Eastern Europe, loc. cit.*
[7] Mufti Babakhanov, "USSR Moslems Expand Ties," *Soviet Information Service*, November 10, 1966 and TASS radio broadcast, April 17, 1966.

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field of religion. The Orthodox Church itself is constantly under fire but seems better able to survive. This is explained by the paradox that the Church is both more trusted and more feared than the synagogue. It is the largest and politically best adapted religious group in the country. Its ties with churches abroad are above suspicion and, indeed, are manipulated by the Soviet regime for its own ends. For many years now, Church leaders have successfully collaborated with the regime. In contrast, in the eyes of the Soviets, the synagogue has its main centers abroad, and in unfriendly countries at that. The Soviets see the synagogue as promoting extra-Soviet loyalties centered in Israel and the United States. Since the Jewish religion is essentially identified with a particular nationality rather than being ecumenical, and since its content is judged to promote national sentiments which focus on Israel, the Jewish religion cannot be *trusted* as much as the Orthodox faith.

On the other hand, the Jewish religious community is not *feared* as much as the Orthodox congregation of the faithful. The sheer number of adherents to the Orthodox faith makes that church a far more powerful social force—a potential pressure group—than religious Jewry. It has to be handled more gingerly, and it is. Because Soviet Jews generally are less secure and more fearful than most non-Jews, it is easier to dissuade them from adhering to and maintaining religious practices and affiliations. A few visits by the local party propagandist are enough to persuade a Jewish worker that his chances for promotion are seriously harmed by synagogue attendance.

Antisemitism and Jewish Culture

The question of antisemitism is a more complex and difficult one. Ethnic identification is important in the Soviet Union not only in official transactions but also in social intercourse. An application for admission to a university must indicate both the applicant's citizenship and his nationality. Internal passports—carried by all Soviet citizens and produced in most official transactions—have the nationality of their owners clearly stamped on them. Traditional national rivalries have survived all the propaganda about *druzhba narodov*, or friendship of peoples. But most of the nationalities, even those less numerous than the Jews, have their own territories, where the official language is their own and where most officials are of their nationality. The Soviet Jewish citizen has no such home, Birobidzhan notwithstanding.[8] Thus, as so often in the past, the Jew is once again the eternal stranger, subject to sundry disabilities. Many an Ukrainian resents the Jewish official in "his" republic. Since Jews tend to assimilate most often into the Russian culture, rather than into the native culture of a non-Russian area, they are further suspect as agents of Russification. In areas such as the Ukraine and Moldavia, where there is a long tradition of antisemitism, Jews are damned both for being ethnically Jewish and for being culturally Russian.

Many Jews, particularly the very old and the young, unhesitatingly acknowledge the existence of societal antisemitism. Just as Negro slaves once saw themselves as akin to persecuted Children of Israel, so now do some Soviet Jews see their situation as analogous to that of the Negroes in America. And, indeed, the parallels are striking: American Negroes and Soviet Jews are highly represented in the art and entertainment fields, but are virtually excluded from the political elite. American Negroes and Soviet Jews are faced with the problem of acceptance by and integration into the surrounding societies, while trying to maintain a distinct identity whose content and essence are as yet undefined. American Negro and Soviet Jewish youth are both in rebellion against what they see as the timidity and subservience of their elders.

Yet there are important differences in the situations of these two ethnic minorities. Perhaps the most crucial difference is the official attitude displayed toward these groups by the governments of the countries in which they reside. While both anti-Negro prejudice in the United States and antisemitic prejudice in the Soviet Union are most virulent at the local level, the American federal government has unequivocally pursued a policy designed to lessen and eventually abolish altogether both official and social prejudice against Negroes. Unfortunately, the same cannot be said for the attitude of the Soviet central government toward the Jews.

[8] The remote region of Birobidzhan, in eastern Siberia, was designated for Jewish settlement in 1928 and in 1934 was officially declared a Jewish Autonomous Oblast. In 1936, the total Jewish population, including some Jewish Communists from abroad, was 14,000. But the purges of 1937 and 1948 destroyed first the intellectual leadership of the community, then every organ of Jewish culture and education. By 1959 the Jews represented 8.8 percent of the population, or 14,269 out of 162,856 inhabitants. Though the official language of the oblast is Yiddish, there have been no Jewish schools, or Yiddish classes, since 1948. The thrice-a-week newspaper and the broadcasting of a few Yiddish songs by the radio are all that remain.

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The central government may not actively pursue a deliberate, high-level policy which singles Jews out for discrimination in all areas of Soviet life. But it is pursuing a policy of repressing the potential development, or resuscitation, of Jewish culture. And it does tolerate, and thus tacitly approve, antisemitism among middle and lower-level officials and in society as a whole. What is the rationale for this policy?

Soviet nationality policy is dualistic: it seeks to promote the culture of backward nationalities and, at the same time, to push many national cultures toward a merger with the Great Russian. This Stalinist dialectic posits as its final synthesis the "drawing together" and even the "merging" of all the cultures into one supranational culture. Since the Jewish people are politically and culturally weak, and geographically dispersed, the repressive arm of nationality policy can be raised against them. They feel only one of the two contradictory thrusts of Soviet policy. Furthermore, individual members of the Soviet apparatus, especially at the lower and middle levels, are often antisemitically inclined, especially in regions where antisemitism has strong native roots.

It is entirely possible, indeed probable, judging by statements made by Khrushchev,[9] that these inclinations exist also among high-level Soviet leaders, since their backgrounds and sociological characteristics are not very different from those of lower-level functionaries. However, because top leaders must have the broadest perspectives and must strive for objective evaluations and judgments, they must try not to let irrational considerations govern their decisions and actions. At the same time, official attitudes and policies have once again made antisemitism *acceptable* in the USSR, and the regime is doing little to combat it. Each of these assertions requires close examination.

The destruction of Jewish cultural institutions began in the 1930's and was completed by 1952. Practically all Jewish schools were closed by 1938. Only one Yiddish daily survived the war and it was closed down in 1948, as were all Yiddish publications and publishing houses. The Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee, the sole remaining central organization of Soviet Jews, was also dissolved in 1948. Most of the leading Yiddish writers were arrested. In August 1952, nearly thirty of them were shot in Moscow. Thus, the cultural situation today is not the creation of the post-Stalin leadership. But the maintenance of that situation is their responsibility. There is not a single Yiddish or Hebrew school anywhere in the USSR for two and a half million Jews, although there are schools in their native languages for the 6,300 Koriaks—who form 0.005 percent of the population of the USSR—for the 12,000 Chukchi, for the 19,000 Khant, etc.[10] In the Ukraine, there are 99 Hungarian-language schools for the 149,000 Hungarians who form 0.4 percent of the population of the Ukraine; yet for the one million Jews forming two percent of the population, there is not a single Yiddish school.[11] While 33 books, three periodicals and 13 newspapers were published in Udmurt in 1964, only two books, one periodical and one newspaper—the two-page, thrice-a-week *birobidzhaner shtern*—appeared in Yiddish.[12] The 1,619,000 Germans in the USSR have two daily newspapers, a weekly and a literary journal, in addition to radio and television programs in German and German schools serving at least 33,000 pupils.[13]

The appearance of the journal *sovetish heimland* in 1961 (after 13 years of total suppression of Yiddish culture) and the publication of a few Yiddish books represent concessions to public opinion abroad and do not signify a reversal of basic policy. The argument that the Jews themselves have no interest in a revival of Jewish culture is a specious one, and the Soviets themselves have been soft-pedaling this claim of late. Soviet writers have consistently stressed the policy of striving for "*sblizhenie*"—drawing together—or even "*sliianie*"—merging of national cultures. (See article by Mr. Hodnett elsewhere in this issue-*Ed.*) Seen as two phases of an historically inevitable

[9] Khrushchev told a group of French socialists that "in all ages, the Jews have preferred the artisan trades. . . But if you take the building trades or metallurgy, you can't find a single Jew to my knowledge. They don't like collective work, group discipline, they have always preferred to be dispersed." *Le Figaro* (Paris), April 9, 1958. J. B. Salsberg, a former Canadian Communist leader, was told by Khrushchev that "after the liberation of Czernowitz the streets were dirty. When the Jews were asked why the strets were not being cleaned, they replied that the non-Jewish population which used to do this work had fled the city. Of the thousands of Soviet citizens who have toured abroad only three failed to return. All of them were Jews. Wherever a Jew settles, the first thing he does is build a synagogue." J. B. Salsberg, "Talks with Soviet leaders on the Jewish Question," *Jewish Life* (Toronto), February 1957.

[10] See *Kulturnoe stroitelstvo RSFSR*, Moscow, 1958, pp. 206-209.

[11] *Pedagogicheskii slovar*, Moscow, 1960, V. II, p. 509.

[12] *Pechat v SSSR v 1964 godu*, Moscow, 1964.

[13] *Jews in Eastern Europe*, Vol. III, No. 5, (October 1966), pp. 10-15.

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Judaism, Israel, and Genocide

. . . Indeed, the very invasion of Palestine is described in the Bible as a direct order of Yahve . . . God orders the annihilation of the indigenous population of the country without mercy. . . . Bloodthirstiness also characterized the subsequent wars of the Jews in which, as expressed in the Bible, they "put to death all that breathed" . . . God only forbade the annihilation of a few of the neighboring peoples, and this was not at all from a feeling of pity, but in accordance with a sly calculation. They were left to serve as an instrument for testing the Israelites in the future, as a sort of training material on which Israel could practice the art of war. . . . It must be said that the Israelites exploited this living material left in reserve for them: later, after they occupied the whole land, they continued their unbelievably cruel raids and the slaughter of peaceful inhabitants. Yahve incited them to this and punished any softening of the heart. . . . King David, the favorite of the God, did not simply kill off all the inhabitants of the lands and the cities he conquered, he did this with a special sadism.

—From ***Religion in the History of the Peoples of the World***, by Sergei Aleksandrovich Tokarev, Moscow, 1965.

[Judaism sows] mistrust and enmity towards other people. . . . Jewish nationalism has exploited this idea . . . arguing that . . . while the others are doomed to perish . . . Yahve has predestined the Jewish people to rule the world.

[In Israel] the clerical parties, which lean on Judaism, support the chauvinist policy of the government of Israel, are hostile to the progressive movements in the countries of the Middle East, and play into the hands of the imperialist powers.

—From ***Fundamental Questions of Scientific Atheism***, edited by Professor I. D. Pantskhava, Moscow, 1966.

process, assimilation is eventually to affect all national cultures in the USSR. In the case of the Jews, however, assimilation has been actively—and even ruthlessly—encouraged from above. As a "religious civilization," as Jewish culture has aptly been characterized, it had to be purged of all its religious and even Hebrew or vaguely pro-Zionist elements.[14] As an expression of a mode of life considered to be antithetical to communism, even secular Yiddish culture had to be denuded of any nostalgic references to the customs, institutions and traditions of Jewish life prior to the Revolution. The result of the policy—even at the height of Jewish activity in the late 1920's and early 1930's—was a progressively more barren, more artificial, and more meaningless culture, only partially "national in form," and almost entirely "socialist [*i.e.*, Soviet] in content," to use Stalin's famous dictum.[15]

As a consequence, religious parents took to sending their children to Russian schools, where religion in general and Christianity in particular were the targets of atheistic education, rather than to Jewish schools, where the Jewish religion was singled out for attack. And nationally-conscious secular Jews did the same, finding nothing in the "proletarianized" Yiddish schools to attract them. The ravages and dislocations caused by World War II and Stalin's explicitly anti-Jewish policies of the late 1940's accomplished the rest.

When the subject of the revival of Jewish cultural institutions is raised with Soviet officials today, the reaction is almost invariably hostile. In part, this is no doubt due to deeply-ingrained antisemitic prejudices, but not always. Communist ideology and policies over the past few decades have predisposed Soviet officials, among them many who would be genuinely shocked to hear themselves labeled as antisemites, to view any manifestation of Jewish identity as highly undesirable—indeed, as promoting antisemitism. The more invisible the Jew is, they reason, the fewer his problems; there-

[14] In the 1920's and 1930's the very orthography of the Yiddish language was radically altered in order to obsure the Hebraic origin of many Yiddish words.

[15] In a 1925 report to students at the University of the Peoples of the East, Stalin expressed the formula that became the crux of official policy toward minority cultures: ". . . Proletarian culture does not eliminate national culture but lends it content. Conversely, national culture does not eliminate proletarian culture but lends it form. . . . Proletarian culture, common to all mankind, does not exclude but rather advocates and nurtures the national culture of peoples, just as the national culture does not abolish but supplements and enriches the proletarian culture. . ." (Stalin, *Sochineniia*, Moscow, Vol. VII, pp. 138, 140.)

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fore, the suppression of a distinctively Jewish culture ultimately redounds to the benefit of the Jew. Of course, this implicitly argues that the Soviet Union is unable to accommodate Jewish culture and that the Jew can solve his problem only by disappearing.

The Soviet Jew most often encounters what may be called official antisemitism when dealing with members of the various *apparats*. Jobs, housing and schooling come under the purview of local and sometimes middle-level officials. Studies of these groups indicate that they are, for the most part, first-generation urban dwellers, with no humanistic education, with a narrow range of interest, and with a general attitude and bearing best described by the Russian "*nekulturnyi*" ("uncultured"). Both personality factors and party training tend to develop in them the rigidity of outlook, intolerance of ambiguity, and other characteristics that sociologists and psychologists have associated with the "authoritarian personality." [16] Especially in regions infused with a culture of prejudice, these types are almost "naturally" antisemitic. In some ways their antisemitism is unconscious: it is part of their "normal" attitudinal and behavioral pattern. The Soviet Jew does not deal with Brezhnev or Kosygin when he looks for a job promotion, a new apartment, or admission to a university. But since the top echelon leaders never actively curb or even criticize the attitudes, policies and decisions of officials on lower levels, Soviet Jews cannot but conclude that antisemitism is officially tolerated, and hence acceptable to the government and party. In this sense it is "official policy."

At an earlier though still fairly recent period, the central government did pursue a very active antisemitic policy. Begun on the eve of World War II, this policy reached the peak of its intensity in 1948-52, the "Black Years" for Soviet Jewry. After the "discovery" of the "Doctors' Plot," Soviet patients refused to see Jewish physicians, some because they literally believed that the doctors would poison them, the more sophisticated because they regarded it as politically unwise. There were numerous instances of physical clashes between Jews and non-Jews. Jews were purged from all politically sensitive posts, and the central government and diplomatic corps were virtually "cleansed" of Jewish elements. The effects of this era still linger on, especially since there has been no explicit condemnation of the antisemitic "errors" of the late Stalin period. There is today only a single Jewish member of the party Central Committee, and but five Jewish deputies in the USSR Supreme Soviet. (For a detailed discussion of Jewish political representation, see Mr. Bilinsky's article elsewhere in this issue.-*Ed.*).

In the post-Stalin period there has been at least one governmental campaign with explicitly antisemitic overtones: the anti-speculation campaign of the early 1960's. The large proportion of Jews engaged in trade makes it reasonable to expect that Jews would be "overrepresented" in commercial "crimes." But the deliberate identification by nationality of Jewish offenders, in contrast to the absence of such identification in referring to positive achievements by Jews, was a clear instance of antisemitism. The Soviet press further played up the fact that some Jews convicted of economic crimes had relatives in the United States and Israel, pointed to the synagogues as "nests of speculators," and consistently portrayed Jews as anti-Soviet, antisocial and anti-socialist. After surveying Soviet press reports of sentences handed down for economic crimes from July 1961 to August 1963, an International Socialist Study Group found that at least 55 percent of those sentenced to death were Jews. In the RSFSR, where Jews constitute 0.7 percent of the population, 64 percent of those executed were Jews; for Belorussia, the corresponding figures were 1.9 and 57 percent; for Moldavia, 3.3 and 83 percent; and for the Ukraine, 2 and 90 percent! [17] No wonder that the International Commission of Jurists, which also studied the Soviet campaign against economic crimes, concluded:

There has been an insidious and sometimes subtle propaganda campaign directed against the Jewish people of the Soviet Union. . . If the reports of trials for economic crimes are even reasonably complete, the number of Jews receiving death sentences and severe terms of imprisonment is greatly disproportionate to their number as a minority group.[18]

[16] T. W. Adorno, Else Frenkel-Brunswik, D. J. Levinson and R. N. Sanford, *The Authoritian Personality*, New York, 1950, p. 461.

[17] See the table prepared by Alec Nove on the proportion in supreme and local soviets, in *Jews in Eastern Europe*, Vol. II, No. 1 (December 1962), p. 8; See also Vol. III, No. 1 (November 1964) p. 37.

[18] "Economic Crimes in the Soviet Union," *Journal of the International Commission of Jurists* (The Hague), Vol. V, No. 1 (Summer, 1964).

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The campaign against economic crimes was not a cover for a general antisemitic campaign but was an end in itself. Nevertheless, the Soviet leadership deliberately used antisemitism in the campaign as a weapon to make certain economic practices unpopular, and it continued to do so until protests from abroad made it inconvenient to go on emphasizing the supposed Jewish role. The faucet of antisemitism was thus turned on and off without regard for moral considerations, let alone Bolshevik ideological principles.

A Virus Unchecked

If the antisemitic overtones of the economic crimes campaign could be quickly toned down, why has there been no reversal of the policy of almost complete exclusion of Jews from posts of political importance? Why has the Soviet government not attempted to deal seriously, as it did in the 1920's and 1930's, with the problem of antisemitism in society? Why has the percentage of Jews in higher educational institutions declined so sharply? Are all these things the result of a single coordinated policy, or does each have its own rationale?

The answer to the first question probably lies in the mental attitudes of a generation of Soviet leaders and officials trained in the incredible atmosphere of paranoia and suspicion of the Stalinist era. The Jews are suspected of harboring dual political and psychological loyalties, and the continued discrimination against them in the political field can be explained as designed to protect against the possibility that Soviet Jews in political office might act upon a loyalty to a homeland other than the USSR. The insistence of the Soviet press, during the recent war in the Middle East, that Soviet Jews violently condemned Israel's policies and actions was meant more as a warning than as a statement of fact. Indeed, the suspicion openly expressed by Polish party First Secretary Gomulka that the Jews are a potential fifth column which, if forced to choose between Israeli policies and those of the socialist countries, would support the former —this suspicion is probably a *conviction* in the minds of most Soviet leaders. Of course, the problem of dual loyalties does not arise as sharply in the less sensitive artistic, literary and scientific areas, where the prominence of Jews makes it possible for Soviet spokesmen to recite statistics on Jewish overrepresentation. But politically the Jews remain suspect, as is anyone who has any emotional or psychological ties to a political entity or even to an ethnic community outside the boundaries of the USSR.

The second question requires a different answer. Even in the unlikely event that severe pangs of conscience or a sudden concern for fundamental Bolshevik principles condemning racial prejudice might incline the Soviet leaders to mount a campaign against antisemitism similar to those of the 1920's, they would probably calculate that the risks would not justify the possible gains. The Jewish population is so atomized that it presents no potential threat, and its desires and feelings can be ignored. On the other hand, the Ukrainians, for example, inhabit one of the most economically and strategically vital areas of the USSR. So why risk antagonizing even a minority of Ukrainians —or Moldavians or Lithuanians, for that matter— by renewing a long and costly struggle against antisemitism, when the only possible benefit that might accrue from it would be not a major change in

Вашингтон, откровенно покровительствующий агрессивным действиям Израиля, пытается обеспечить ему условия для захвата все новых территорий.

КОМУ ВЫГОДНА ТАКТИКА ПРОВОЛОЧЕК?

Рисунок Мих. Кузнецова.

A Familiar Caricature

Caption above: "Washington, openly covering up for Israel's aggressive activities, is trying to assure the conditions for it to seize all the new territories." *Below:* "Who stands to gain from delaying tactics?" This is one of numerous anti-Israeli cartoons published during the Middle East crisis, all utilizing traditional antisemitic stereotypes to make their point.

From *Sovetskaia Rossiia* (Moscow), June 14, 1967.

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Soviet relations with the West, but merely a somewhat better image abroad?

The drastic decline in the proportion of Jews in higher education requires still a third kind of explanation. The Soviet government has stated its aim of bringing nationality representation in higher education into line with the proportion of each nationality in the total Soviet population. In contrast to the policy of exclusion from important political posts, this policy is not applied only to the Jews, but to all nationalities. Peoples such as the Uzbeks and Tadjiks are gainers from this policy, whereas the Armenians, Georgians and Jews are losers. The Jews are particularly hard hit not merely because they are a small extraterritorial minority suffering from the special social and political disabilities already discussed, but because they have always had a special tradition of education and learning.

Thus, the Jews have always been overrepresented in Soviet universities and institutes strictly on the basis of their number in the overall population. Indeed, they still are, but recent evidence indicates that application of the quota principle is gradually restricting their access to higher education. This is clear from the fact that in 1927, when Jews were 1.8 percent of the population, they made up 13.5 percent of students, whereas today, when they are 1.1 percent of the population, they constitute about 4 percent of student enrollment.[19] While the quota principle itself thus operates to the disadvantage of the Jews without any need for discriminatory application, there is no doubt that in individual instances the antisemitism of some admissions officials comes into play. There have been, for example, numerous reports of prize-winning Jewish graduates of secondary schools being denied admission to universities.

Two other areas where Soviet policies have antisemitic overtones are worthy of mention. Since the Jewish religion is associated exclusively with Jews, attacks on it can be easily generalized into attacks on Jews as a *people*. The average Soviet reader of atheistic articles and pamphlets directed against the Jewish religion would have to make a constant, conscious effort to discriminate between *anti-Judaism* and *antisemitism*. The same can be said for the anti-Israel policy of the USSR. Soviet Jews clearly identify the government's attitude towards the State of Israel with the government's attitude toward themselves. There is every reason to believe that the non-Jewish Soviet citizen tends to make the same identification.

Assimilation or Survival?

The future of Soviet Jewry depends not only on governmental attitudes but on social trends within the Jewish population, which in turn are, of course, affected by official policies. The early hope that the Jews would achieve the status of a nation, with all the cultural and political rights that this term implies, has been abandoned. A leading Soviet authority on nationality problems has recently written that "by virtue of its historically established dispersal and social composition, the Jewish nationality cannot develop into a nation."[20] The Soviet government seems to foresee the gradual disappearance by assimilation of its Jewish citizens, and this prognosis is shared by many outside the Soviet Union. A closer look at the process of assimilation among Soviet Jews raises the distinct possibility that this may not be so.

As noted earlier in this article, before World War II the overwhelming majority of Soviet Jews were indeed well on the way to assimilation. Soviet Jewish culture failed to retain them, and Russian culture strongly attracted them. Jewish workers saw Russian as the key to advancement. The rate of intermarriage rose steadily. In the Ukraine, 8.5 per cent of Jewish marriages in 1924 were mixed. In 1925 the figure rose to 9.5 per cent; in 1926 it was 10.6 per cent, and in 1927 11.1 per cent. In the Russian republic in 1926, 21 per cent of Jewish marriages were mixed.[21] As industrialization and urbanization proceeded rapidly in the 1930's, Jews streamed into the cities from the small towns and intermarriage became more frequent still.

However, the searing experience of the war and the trauma of Stalinist antisemitism increased national consciousness, sharpened ethnic tensions, and brought this process to a virtual halt. Thus, in the Ukraine, 10.3 per cent of the present Jewish urban population and 9.8 percent of the rural Jewish population are in "mixed families." (This category applies to families composed of several

[19] See Nicholas De Witt, *Education and Professional Employment in the USSR*, Washington, D.C., 1961, pp. 358-360.

[20] M.S. Dzhunusov, "Natsiia kak sotsialno-etnicheskaia obshchnost liudei," *Voprosy istorii* (Moscow), April 1966, p. 28.

[21] These statistics are taken from I. I. Veitzbilt, *di dinamik fun der yidisher befelkerung in ukraine*, Kharkov, 1930, p. 50.

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generations, including those in which only one member is married to a non-Jew; the number of mixed marriages, therefore, is almost certainly lower than the number of "mixed" families.) [22] While the data are too fragmentary to draw any hard conclusions, there seems to be little doubt that assimilation in this sense is no longer characteristic of the Soviet Jewish community as a whole.

The decline in the rate of intermarriage has been accompanied by another significant development—namely, the resurgence of national identity among a large number of Soviet Jewish youth. To an extent this is due, as mentioned before, to the shattering experience of World War II, as well as to the antisemitic policies followed by Stalin and continued, albeit on a far lesser scale, by his successors. Yet there is another reason, too. Soviet Jewish youth have largely lost the "immigrant mentality" of their elders. Many of their parents were immigrants, uprooted from their homes in the small towns of the Ukraine and Belorussia, and consequently physically and ethnically disoriented. The children have firmer roots. Together with millions of other young Soviet citizens, they had been spared the crippling effects of Stalinist totalitarianism. Together with their coevals, too, they are subject to the forces of nationalism which since the war have swept over all areas of the USSR. They are more secure, more hopeful about their future, and more courageous in demonstrating their ethnic belonging.

The forms in which this assertiveness expresses itself are often quixotic. Soviet policies have raised Jewish culture to the status of "forbidden fruit," which only excites the appetite of the youth. Many young men and women, without any background of religious upbringing or affiliation, crowd the synagogues during the joyous holiday of *Simchat Torah* (festival of the Torah) noisily affirming their bonds with the Jewish people.[23] Others wear the star of David, learn Hebrew in secret, or listen to the Israeli radio. They are not an "oppositionist" element. If offered an opportunity, the majority of them would surely decline to emigrate to the Jewish state. But they refuse to accept the proposition that any fervent manifestation of Jewishness—including sympathy for Israel—is in conflict with their loyalties as citizens of the USSR.

That this group is a minority is perhaps not as important as the fact that such a minority exists. If, after all these years of forced and voluntary acculturation, of antisemitism and cultural deprivation, the interest in things Jewish not only remains but grows, then the prospect of the eventual disappearance of Soviet Jewry is hardly tenable. It might be that a basic error has been made in failing to differentiate between acculturation and assimilation. Acculturation can be defined as "the adoption by a person or group of the culture of another social group, or the process leading to this adoption." Assimilation, on the other hand, is "the adoption of a culture of another social group to such an extent that the person or group no longer has any characteristics identifying him with his former culture and no longer has any particular loyalties to his former culture." All Soviet Jews are acculturated, but large numbers of them are not assimilated. The internal passport, the social significance of ethnic identity, antisemitism and the persistence of distinct social mores prevent the Jews from assimilating completely, from becoming objectively and psychologically Russian. The Jew is Russianized, but not Russified.

What of the Future?

Ideologically and historically committed to promoting assimilation, yet faced with a mounting resistance to it on the part of a large sector of the Jewish community, what is the future attitude of the Soviet government going to be? If the leadership is influenced by an irrational and virulent antisemitism, then there is no doubt that repression of Jewish culture will continue, and perhaps new antisemitic policies will be pursued. On the other hand, if the Soviet leaders can approach the problem in a more rational way, they are confronted by a fundamental policy choice: either to treat the Jews as other non-territorial national minorities such as the Germans, for example; or to continue treating them as a special case. There are costs and benefits accruing to each of these courses.

Abolishing discriminatory practices against the Jews—that is, allowing them the same cultural facilities as other nationalities and discouraging social antisemitism—would, first of all, ease external pressures from abroad, including the embarassing pressures of foreign Communist parties

[22] V.I. Naulko, *Etnicheskii sostav naseleniia SSSR: Ukrainskoi SSR*, Kiev, 1965, p. 109.

[23] For a perceptive eye-witness report, see Elie Wiesel, "Will Soviet Jewry Survive?" *Commentary* (New York), February 1967.

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and of sympathetic intellectuals and world figures. Secondly, it would assuage the discontent of a significant segment of Soviet Jewry—a discontent which might otherwise assume a genuinely anti-Soviet and perhaps even pro-Zionist form. In other words, it would reinforce the loyalties of a group which the Soviets seem to feel is at least potentially disloyal. Granting the Jews the cultural facilities available to other minorities would bring out into the open the desires and activities that exist anyway and would thus remove from them any taint of subversion.

Finally, such measures would probably be applauded by the liberal intelligentsia, who have made the Jewish issue almost a symbol of their own struggle for decency and freedom, and who view it as a barometer of the regime's attitudes and and intentions. Undoubtedly, the intelligentsia of other minority nationalities would also support the revival of Jewish culture since it would buttress their own claims to cultural facilities and opportunities.

On the other hand, the Soviet government could —for reasons elucidated earlier—continue to treat Jews and Jewish culture differently from all other peoples and cultures, both because of their links to Jews in other (mostly hostile) countries and because—in the Soviet view—any encouragement of Jewish culture must inevitably lead to "the detachment of the Jewish workers from the international labor movement," or, to put it less obscurely, to increased Jewish consciousness, to nationalism, and perhaps ultimately, to Zionism. Such a policy would obviously be supported by those who are pressing for a more rapid "fusion" of Soviet nationalities into one supranational culture. It would please the many Russian *apparatchiki* in the various Soviet republics who are just barely tolerant of native cultural institutions and national feelings. And it would also play into the hands of those elements in the elite who are in favor of an unqualified pro-Arab policy in the Middle East: any internal tolerance, let alone active approval, of even vaguely Zionist expressions in the USSR, they might well argue, would be sure to awaken distrust among the Arab states and among their many sympathizers in the "Third World."

This second policy—obviously the one the Soviets are presently pursuing, however inconsistently—may or may not be labelled "antisemitic." It certainly affects the status of the Soviet Jews adversely. To what extent it is influenced by an ingrained antipathy for the Jews and to what extent by "practical" considerations cannot, of course, be determined with certainty. Whatever the case may be, there is a fundamental internal contradiction in the Soviet attitude. If Jewish culture is to be repressed to the point of disappearance, and if the Jews have no other special characteristics, such as their own territory, then why continue to insist on the maintenance of Jewish identity by categorizing Jews as a nationality and by indicating the ethnic affiliation of every Jew on his internal passport? Why single out Jews and point to their Jewishness in connection with a campaign against economic speculators? This only stimulates Jewish self-recognition, which, at least among many of the youth, is no longer regarded as a cause for embarrassment, or as something to be denied and suppressed. As long as consciousness and identity are maintained officially, there will be a search for the content of that identity. Soviet policy tries to have its cake and eat it too: it wants the Jews to become acculturated and assimilated, but while it forces acculturation, it makes assimilation difficult by its official maintenance of Jewish identity. This may possibly indicate either that the Soviet leaders cannot bring themselves to deny the objective fact of a Jewish identity and nationality, however devoid of content they may want it to be, or that they have not yet made a thoroughgoing choice between the two basic alternatives open to them.

When and if this choice is made, it will undoubtedly be determined—or strongly influenced—by a far more fundamental issue: the nature and direction of the political evolution of the USSR. At present, when the fundamental decisions as to the future of the system are being postponed, the party is pursuing the same kind of temporizing policy in regard to Jewish culture and the Jewish people as it is in other areas. It has deferred seminal decisions in nationality policy in general, and it has given no sign that major changes in policies affecting the Jews are at hand. For the time being, both the Soviet regime and the Soviet Jews are "muddling through." This may be inconvenient for the regime; it is tragic for the nearly three million Jewish citizens of the USSR.

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The Deported Nationalities...

An Unsavory Story

The deportation of seven nationality groups during World War II is a somber chapter in the history of Soviet nationality policy. The Soviet regime maintained a strict silence about every aspect of the deportations; indeed, for ten years virtually all information about the past and current status of the deported peoples was successfully suppressed. The floodgates of revelation were opened by Khrushchev in his secret speech to the 20th Party Congress in 1956, and since then, it has been possible to reconstruct—at least to some extent—the undoing of these nations.

The very first clue came with the publication in *Izvestia* on June 26, 1946, of "The Law Concerning the Abolition of the Checheno-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic and the Changing of the Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic into the Crimean Oblast." A simple explanation of the decreed territorial changes was proffered:

During the Great Patriotic War, when the peoples of the USSR were heroically defending the honor and independence of the Fatherland in the struggle against the German-Fascist invaders, many Chechens and Crimean Tatars, at the instigation of German agents, joined volunteer units organized by the Germans and, together with German troops, engaged in armed struggle against units of the Red Army . . . meanwhile, the main mass of the population of the Checheno-Ingush and Crimean ASSR's took no counteraction against these betrayers of the Fatherland.

In connection with this, the Chechens and the Crimean Tatars were resettled in other regions of the USSR. . . .

The admission of active disloyalty on the part of the Chechens and Tatars was politically difficult, for it discredited two decades of declarations about the freedom and contentment of these peoples under the Soviet wing. But five years earlier, Soviet officials had been realistic about the potential disloyalty of Soviet Germans and had arranged to remove them from their Volga Republic and scattered "national areas" in the Ukraine in August 1941 before the Nazis had penetrated that far. The deportation of the Karachai, Kalmyks, Chechens and Ingushi, Balkars and Crimean Tatars followed, after a two year interval, in the winter of 1943 and the spring of 1944.

During the German occupation of 1942-43, the subject Caucasian peoples' behavior toward Russia ranged from defiance to indifference. The Chechen and Ingushi, both Moslem peoples of the Northern Caucasus, had opposed the new Bolshevik regime after the Revolution with legendary fierceness that included terrorist raids on Russians living within the area. Their nationalism was combined with extraordinary attachment to their Moslem religion, and to the mores inspired by it. They were first denied any chance at autonomy because their capital, Groznyi, became a major oil center, wholly controlled by the Russians.

The Karachai and the Balkars are both Turkic-speaking Moslem nations, who inhabited areas that were geographically contiguous but separated by mountains. The Karachai had their own autonomous Republic, while the Balkars were joined with the Kabardines in the Kabardine-Balkar Autonomous Republic, in which they were a minority. Like the Chechen-Ingushi, they had resisted the incursions of the Tsars and the Soviets, and their native Communist parties had been severely purged in the late 1930's.

The Kalmyks were the only Mongol and Buddhist people in Europe until their evacuation from the steppes of the lower Volga. During the 19th century the Tsars had ousted the Kalmyks, whom they considered an alien and unreliable element, from the valuable fishing waters of the Volga and Caspian, and the Kalmyks grew increasingly poor. After the Revolution, the Soviets broke up and forcibly expelled the "feudal aristocrats" who were also the hereditary heads of local Kalmyk self-government organs. When the Nazis retreated from Kalmyk lands after their occupation, a number of Kalymks went with them.

The Tatars of the Crimea once formed an empire, and their prestige in the Turkic and Moslem worlds continued after their subjugation by the Bolsheviks after the Civil

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War. During the 1920's and 1930's the Soviet government enforced agricultural colonization of the Crimea by Ukrainians and Russians, until in 1936 more than half of the population was Slav. Official Soviet statements (above) of the grounds for the deportation are difficult to verify; the Russians claimed that a great many Crimean Tatars joined German volunteer detachments and dogged the Soviet army at the rear by means of saboteur gangs while the rest of the Tatars stood by. Crimean lands were resettled so thoroughly afterwards that a return by the Tatars would hardly be feasible today.

The Germans were the largest single group to be deported; they numbered 400,000 in the Volga Republic and over 1 million in 17 national districts in the Ukraine and RSFSR. The Nazis later evacuated many Germans from the Black Sea area. While Soviet concern about possible collaboration with the advancing Nazis may be understandable, no proof has thus far been offered of any more enthusiasm for the Nazis among the Volga Germans than among any other Soviet nationality. Indeed, there is considerable evidence of loyalty to the Soviet regime among people who, after all, were the descendents of settlers under Catherine the Great and who had flourished in the intervening century and a half.

The actual rounding up of the citizens in each village was handled by regiments of NKVD troops. The troops were generally brought into the area several weeks before to familiarize themselves with plans and positioning. The villagers were called out to rallies or compulsory meetings celebrating Soviet military successes; a decree of deportation was read, a baggage allowance announced, and then families were assembled immediately. The procedure varied according to the group, as did the kilogram allowance for baggage and food. Some of the boldest resisted, often without arms, and were caught and shot or fled to the mountains to live as outlaws.

Exact figures for the victimized nations are not available. The following estimates for 1941 were arrived at by applying the percentages of native nationalities as given in the 1926 census (which was based on *nationality*) to the total population figures in given areas taken from the 1939 census (which in turn was based exclusively on *regions*):

Chechen-Ingush ASSR	524,577
Crimean ASSR	200,000
Kabardine-Balkar ASSR (⅓ Balkars)	217,235
Kalmyk ASSR	141,150
Karachai AO	79,583
Volga German ASSR	380,000
Total Germans in USSR	1,495,894

(Based on Corliss Lamont: *The Peoples of the Soviet Union*, New York, 1946, pp. 212-13.)

Altogether nearly one and a half million people were dispatched into exile, and an area of 60,000 square miles —about the size of Czechoslovakia and Albania—was depopulated, later to be settled by Russians and Ukrainians. The journey in cattle trucks took a toll of casualties that may have ranged as high as 40 percent, particularly old people and children who died of starvation, exposure and typhus en route. The surviving deportees were put to work, mainly in agriculture, but also in mines and railway construction. Many were sent to the Siberian settlements near Karaganda, where deported kulaks had been literally dumped with no shelter in the early 1930's. The bulk of the Chechens and Ingushi were sent to Kazakhstan and Kirghizia, but the Tatars and Germans were scattered over an even wider area. Information about the whereabouts of the Karachai, Balkars and Kalmyks has been incomplete, with settlements noted near Krasnoiarsk for the Kalmyks, and near Issyk-Kul and between Dzhambul and the Kirghiz border for the others.

Administrative rearrangement of the former "autonomous" regions and republics took place along with the deportation. The Volga German ASSR went over to Saratov oblast, with a southern strip being added to Stalingrad (now Volograd) oblast. The Kalmyk ASSR was largely incorporated into a new Astrakhan oblast. The Karachai Autonomous Oblast was taken over by the Georgian SSR along with the Upper Baksan Valley, where most Balkars resided. The rest of Balkaria was left in the renamed Kabardine ASSR. The bulk of the Checheno-Ingush ASSR was included in a new Groznyi oblast, except for a Western strip that went to the North Ossetian ASSR, an eastern strip to the Daghestan ASSR, and the southern mountain area to the Georgian SSR. City and place names in the languages of the former peoples were changed to Russian. Interestingly enough, outside observers were able to deduce from this reorganization that the Kalmyks, the Karachai and the Balkars had also been subject to deportation, a fact which was not confirmed until 1957.

Just as the map of the Crimea and Northern Caucasus was redrawn, the history of these German, Moslem, Turkic and Buddhist Mongol minorities was either rewritten so as to establish "precedents" for their disloyalty to the Soviet regime or obliterated from textbooks and encyclopedias altogether. The Chechens and Ingushi, for example, were denied the label "revolutionary" in a history of the revolution in North Caucasus; and in 1948 the Central Committee of the Soviet CP issued a resolution condemning the opera, "The Great Friendship," by the Georgian, V. Muradeli, for, among other reasons, giving the impression that the Georgians and Ossetians—rather than the Ingushi and Chechens—were "in enmity with the Russian people" (*Pravda*, Moscow, February 11, 1948).

With a few exceptions—such as the publication of the 1946 law—the ten-year silence about the deportations was carefully maintained. It was not until 1956 when the truth—or more accurately the *partial* truth—was officially disclosed. In his "secret speech" to the 20th CPSU Congress in February of that year, Khrushchev openly denounced the "monstrous acts whose initiator was Stalin and which are crude violations of the basic Leninist principles of the nationality policy of the Soviet state." He mentioned the deportations of the Karachai and Kalmyks in December 1943, the March 1944 liquidation of the Chechen-Ingush ASSR and the de-

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portation of the Balkars one month later. Without referring either to the Volga Germans or the Crimean Tatars, he told his listeners that "the Ukrainians avoided meeting this fate only because there were too many of them and there was no place to which to deport them." And he concluded:

Not only no Marxist-Leninist but also no man of common sense can grasp how it is possible to make whole nations responsible for inimical activity, including women, children, old people, Communists and Komsomols, to use mass repression against them, and to expose them to misery and suffering for the hostile acts of individual persons or groups of persons.

(See *The Anti-Stalin Campaign and International Communism*, edited by the Russian Institute, Columbia University, New York, Columbia University Press, 1956, pp. 57-58.)

At a meeting of the Supreme Soviet in February 1957, the rehabilitations directly inspired by Khrushchev's statement were proposed and passed. As a result the Kabardine-Balkar ASSR and the Chechen-Ingush ASSR were reconstituted; and a Kalmyk Autonomous Oblast and a Karachai-Cherkess Autonomous Oblast were formed.

In December 1964, the post-Khrushchev leadership took up the matter of the Volga Germans. A decree dated August 29, 1964, repealed the 1941 deportation order. The former accusations against the Germans were described as groundless and as a manifestation of the Stalinist "cult of personality." However, a return to the Volga territory—which was resettled soon after their exodus—was ruled out. At their present locations in Central Asia, they do have their own German-language schools, radio programs and newspapers, including a new publication, *Freundschaft*, which made its first appearance in January 1966 and has been coming out five times a week since then.

Eleven years after the Caucasian nations were rehabilitated, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR has seen fit to exonerate the last of the exiled groups, the Crimean Tatars. The decree, adopted this September 5 and announced in the Central Asian republics where the survivors reside, describes the original accusation against all Crimean Tatars as "indiscriminate" and "unjust"; only a "certain segment" were guilty of collaboration with the Germans. Yet as in the case of the Volga Germans, the decree makes it clear that the Tatars must stay in their present locations, for it orders the republican governments to "offer assistance and cooperation to the Tatar nationality in developing economic and cultural life in accordance with national interests and traits."

In assessing the motives for the expulsion of the Caucasian peoples, their determined opposition to the penetration of Soviet communism must certainly be taken into account. As Moslems, as mountaineers, with comparatively recent traditions of clan rule, they possessed a strong sense of their historical and cultural unity, which neither the Tsars nor Soviets had been able to shatter in less than a century of rule. Moreover, the strategic importance of the Ukraine, the Crimea and the Caucasus for military and industrial purposes may have forced Soviet thinking on this point. That Stalin was pro-Georgian and pro-Ossetian in his choice of exiles and of beneficiaries for the redivided areas can be explained by his parentage. But there is also an element of arbitrariness in his leaving 50 or 60 potentially subversive nationalities untouched.

If the Soviets intended the early expulsion of the Volga Germans as a warning, and the later deportations as punishment for collaboration, they failed to publicize these acts and thus limited their effectiveness for those purposes. Obviously they were aware of how shameful it was to uproot non-Slavic minorities, to give their land away to Slavs, and to give undeniable evidence to the world of the absence of unity and loyalty among the constituent nations of the USSR. The fact that the Crimean Tatars had to wait over twenty years for their partial rehabilitation, and that until the publication of the decree their fate had not been as much as alluded to in the Soviet press, only helps to underline the iniquity of Stalin's nationality policy and the reluctance of his successors to break decisively with it.*

* This account is based largely on *The Soviet Deportation of Nationalities*, by Robert Conquest (London, Macmillan & Co. Ltd., and New York, St. Martin's Press, 1960).

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The "Friendship of Peoples"...

Pages from a Notebook

I

TIGRAN PETROSIAN, the world chess champion, is an Armenian who was born and brought up in Tbilisi, Georgia. He won his first match in that city, and a few years ago he won the USSR championship in the Tbilisi tournament. In the Soviet Union, this is a big event, with pictures in *Pravda* and interviews on Soviet television.

I was in Tbilisi at that time for Petrosian's "coronation." After the ceremony I went to lunch with Georgian friends. About fifteen of us were gathered around a television set. When the interview with Petrosian began, one of my Georgian friends switched it off. I could not help asking why. Smiling, my host answered:

"What's the use of looking at him? Petrosian is the king of the nobodies. He didn't win; he sat out his championship. All he knows is how to avoid a fight. The likes of him we don't like."

I asked why they were not proud of Petrosian, since he was a native of Tbilisi. "My dear man," said my host, "there are many types of Tbilisians. Shaumian Avenue is full of people like him." (Shaumian Avenue is the Armenian district of Tbilisi.) I changed the subject.

The same evening, 300 miles away, a national celebration took place in Yerevan, the capital of Soviet Armenia. People kissed one another on the streets and shouted for joy, even though Petrosian had never lived in Yerevan.

Dislike of Armenians among Georgians is widespread, and *vice versa*. Georgians also dislike Russians, but the reasons for this are somewhat more obvious.

Recently a popular Georgian writer, Konstantin Gamsakhurdiia, staged an odd demonstration in Tbilisi. Dressed in national costume, he rode his white horse up the steps of the large and tasteless building of the Central Committee of the Georgian Communist Party and knocked on one of the windows with his whip.

Gamsakhurdiia demanded to speak with the Second Secretary of the Central Committee, whose name—he thought—was Ivanov. Ivanov, a Russian, was summoned; and Gamsakhurdiia greeted him politely in Georgian, before a growing crowd of interested spectators. Ivanov smiled, waved his hands, and said that unfortunately he did not understand Georgian.

At this, Gamaskhurdiia shouted (in Georgian): "How can you rule Georgia if you cannot even say 'good morning' in Georgian? What do we need with people like you? Get out of our country at once!" And he galloped away.

II

INCIDENTS SUCH AS THESE are typical not only of Georgia and Armenia but of all the other outlying areas of the Soviet Union as well. Anti-Russian and, with the exception of the Baltic States, a general "anti-neighbor" sentiment is the rule. The attitude of the Soviet officials, of course, is another matter again. In Georgia, for example, if you publicly express your dislike for Armenians, you may be mildly criticized; but if you make anti-Russian statements, far more serious consequences will ensue.

The expression of national sentiments within the Soviet Union is categorized as "bourgeois nationalism." At the same time, the Communist Party recognizes the existence of "progressive nationalistic movements" abroad—in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Thus we have the paradox that in the Soviet Union, where for forty years there has officially been no bourgeoisie, nationalism is a "bourgeois" current, while nationalism abroad, which is usually under bourgeois leadership, is a "progressive" movement.

Recently, however, nationalism has become fashionable among the intelligentsia in Russia proper as well as in the non-Russian republics. My discussion about Petrosian with the group of intellectuals in Tbilisi is a case in point. This may in part be influenced by the overall upsurge of nationalism throughout the world, but I believe that the principal cause is what might be described as a *new* populism (*narodnichestvo*) which has appeared, and is growing, in the Soviet Union.

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III

OLD RUSSIAN CUSTOMS are very much in vogue. One is invited for the evening and offered nothing but vodka, boiled potatoes and salt. Intellectuals profess an enthusiasm for ancient temples and icons and talk of their moral responsibility for the difficult life of the "little man," the peasant or worker. Works like Solzhenitsyn's "Matriona's House," Siomin's "Seven in a House," Koniushev's "Twelve Sticks on the Green Grass," and Aimatov's "Goodbye, Tiulsary!" are popular examples of this trend.[1] They express sympathy for the hard life of the little people, and the intellectuals feel called upon to come to their assistance, rather than pass the time in talk and high living.

This is what I would term the new populism. It takes the form not of organized philanthropy, which is not feasible in the USSR, but of an attraction for the simple life. Instead of visiting resorts in the Caucasus, the new populists spend their holidays somewhere in Suzdal, Uglich, or ancient Novgorod, admiring the churches and living in peasant huts.

In the outlying areas, a similar process is taking place. Central Asian professors appear at meetings in colorful oriental robes. Scholarly research is exploiting the documentary collections of the smaller nationalities.

This new populism is in a sense a form of protest against the dead hand of central bureaucratic control. However, provided nationalistic expressions are not specifically anti-Russian, the authorities do not appear to be alarmed. In fact, they even exploit them for their own purposes. For example, during the recent Arab-Israeli war, *Pravda* openly appealed to latent antisemitic sentiments among the population. Nor are the authorities alarmed by what could be called a Great Russian backlash, or a hostile reaction toward the nationalities in the outlying areas. These feelings are shown in a number of ways and are worthy of some attention.

IV

IF YOU LISTEN to a conversation between two ordinary Russians about other nationalities of the Soviet Union, you will notice that they will usually refer to these people by pejorative nicknames, such as "*Khokhol*" for a Ukrainian, "*Katso*" for a Georgian, "*Armiashka*" for an Armenian, "*Yoldash*" for a Kazakh, "*Chernozadyi*" for an Azerbaijani, or "*Chuchmek*" for an Uzbek, Turkman or Tadjik.

These terms, to an outsider, may denote contempt and superciliousness, but while this is true to some extent, the basic explanation lies elsewhere. The Russians approach the outlying nationalities more with a feeling of suspicion than one of natural superiority. They have a vague realization that their country's annexationist policies—both Tsarist and Soviet—have brought very little good to the people of the Caucasus or Central Asia, and least of all to the Baltic nationalities. Anticipating anti-Russian sentiment, they are on their guard. To be sure, they may tend to look down upon certain nationalities—*e.g.*, in Central Asia—as "primitive" and "uncultured." But often— paradoxically enough—their antagonism also disguises envy of and admiration for nationalities they consider even more advanced than their own. This is certainly true for the Baltic states, which had enjoyed an incomparably higher standard of living than the Soviet Union at the time of their forcible annexation in 1941. Many Russians flock to the Baltic sea resorts in the summer and openly admire the amenities of life in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia.

The reverse is often true, too. The anti-Russian hostility of many nationalities in the USSR is rooted more in the natural resentment of conquered peoples than in irrational hatred for everything Russian. In Lithuania, for instance, I met many people who bitterly resented the influx of Russian settlers and their preponderant positions in the party and local government bodies, but I hardly ever encountered anyone who thought that the Russians *as a people* were bad or unpleasant. The Ukraine is another case in point. Despite the growth of nationalism in this largest of all Soviet republics (after the RSFSR), the local population does not reject Russian culture or the Russian language. Except in the formerly Polish territories (annexed in 1939), Russian is recognized as the *lingua franca* and is spoken almost exclusively in all public enterprises and institutions—even though all official correspondence must be in Ukrainian. Even the fiercest Ukrainian nationalist would no doubt be horrified at the suggestion that he abandon the use or study of Russian.

V

DESPITE 50 YEARS of appeals for friendship among the peoples of the Soviet Union, national origin is still one of the fundamental facts of life in the USSR. All official documents, including personal identity papers, state the bearer's nationality, based on that of his parents. Since there is no possibility or procedure for changing one's nationality, this presents problems for children of mixed parentage.

At the age of 16, these children must choose the nationality of one of their parents. This is a very serious choice, which is exercised with solemnity and after consultation with the child's parents and the authorities. Nationality, as given in the identity papers, also appears on the Soviet citizen's military service card; and *raion* military commissariats, which are responsible for Soviet draft calls, keep their lists according to nationality. In applying for any job, school, university, or training program, the citizen's nationality must be specified.

Regardless of whether there is any discrimination in fact on the basis of nationality—and in some cases there is[2]—the Soviet citizen is continuously made conscious of

[1] Solzhenitsyn's tale appeared in *Novyi mir* (Moscow), No. 1, 1963, and in an English translation by Harry Willetts in Max Hayward and Patricia Blake (Ed.), *Half-way to the Moon*, Garden City, N. Y., Anchor Books, 1965. Koniushev's story also appeared in *Novyi mir* (May and June, 1966), as did Siomin's "Seven in a House" and Aimatov's "Good-bye, Tiulsary!" (June 1965 and March 1966, respectively).

[2] For some examples of how different nationalities are subjected to official or quasi-official discrimination, see articles by Yaroslav Bilinsky and Zvi Gitelman in this issue. See also "The Deported Nationalities," p. 102.

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the fact of nationality; and he is aware that there are "principal" and "secondary" nationalities.

A Jewish friend of mine had a Russian wife. When their son was 16, he went to the militia and applied for a passport. He opted for Jewish nationality. The official was surprised and first thought he had misunderstood, then asked him if this decision had been cleared with the boy's parents. This was indeed the case.

The officer then very carefully pointed out that the boy, since his mother was Russian, had the full right to register as a Russian. It was apparently difficult for him to comprehend that anyone would voluntarily forego the privilege of being of Russian nationality when this once-in-a-lifetime possibility was offered.

Recently there have twice been widepsread rumors in the Soviet Union that the nationality entry in personal documents would be deleted. When Aleksei Adzuhbei was still editor of *Izvestia,* he launched a campaign to introduce a "labor passport," which would include details of the citizen's job history but nothing about his nationality. More recently, after Khrushchev's fall, the rumor spread again, to the accompaniment of heated private discussions, not all of which were in favor of the proposal. However, in neither case was any governmental action taken.

The fact of national differences is deeply rooted in Russian history; and distinctions based on nationality could not easily be set aside, even if the will to do so existed. In this context, the official propaganda of "friendship among peoples" has little meaningfulness or credibility. Essentially, the situation has not changed. National antagonisms and suspicions lie just below the surface and are given at least formal recognition in the continuation of the classification of Soviet citizens on the basis of nationality.

IF I WERE ASKED what is the most striking aspect of Soviet nationality policy and of relations between nationalities in the USSR, I would say that it is the duplicity that prevails in this as in any other area of Soviet life—the contrast between the official "line" and reality. The Soviet leaders never tire of proclaiming that national antagonisms have been eliminated in the Soviet Union, but everyone knows that this is untrue—that in fact Soviet policies have, if anything, exacerbated national tensions. Even in 1949-53, at the height of the officially sponsored wave of Russian chauvinism, Soviet newspapers were full of articles about the "brotherly friendship among the peoples," and Tadjik, Yakut and Armenian poets published turgid verses voicing their "unbounded love" for their "elder brother," the Russian. This hypocrisy continues to this day, giving rise to more and more cynicism among Soviet citizens and feeding the tensions and antagonisms among the hundred-odd nationalities of the USSR.

—I. M. Volgin

(Mr. Volgin is the pseudonym of a Soviet journalist who considers it preferable politically to remain unidentified.)

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Reform and Schism

By Michael Bourdeaux

Since 1917, Soviet state policy has consistently reflected the profound abhorrence for religion expressed in Communist doctrine. Official hostility has been directed at all religions in the territory of the USSR—Islam, Buddhism, Judaism, as well as the traditionally predominant Russian Orthodox Church and a wide variety of smaller Christian sects.[1] There have been periods of greater and lesser anti-religious pressure from the regime, but the general aims and trends of official policy have not changed. Nonetheless, religion has survived in the land of "scientific atheism"—indeed, in the face of a renewed onslaught during the years of Khrushchev's reign, it has demonstrated some highly interesting signs of vitality and ferment.

The purpose of the present article is to describe a reform movement which originated in the Russian Baptist and Evangelical Christian Church as a specific reaction to the anti-religious policy of the Khrushchev regime, and which has since sparked a similar demand for reform in the much more influential Russian Orthodox Church. The precise significance of these reformist trends is impossible to gauge, in part because many of the issues that have been raised have not as yet been resolved, and in part because detailed information on the developments that have been reported is so hard to come by. Still, enough evidence has come to light to warrant careful perusal by students of Russia and religious bodies alike.

It should be pointed out at the start that much of this evidence is necessarily second-hand, filtering to the West through the reports of foreign correspondents in the Soviet Union or through émigré publications. Thus the information cannot be authenticated in every detail. Yet like pieces of a puzzle, the reports that have been made fit together to establish a clear pattern of events, which at many points can be confirmed in official Soviet sources. The writer feels that there is therefore a case for accepting the reportage as valid until

[1] See Walter Kolarz, *Religion in the Soviet Union*, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1962, for a wide survey of the effect of communism on religions and sects in the USSR.

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or unless it is refuted by superior evidence. It might be added that no single document or report quoted in this text has ever been challenged by Soviet secular or religious officials, either in print or—so far as is known—verbally.

Repression under Khrushchev

The sharp intensification of Soviet anti-religious activity in the years 1959 to 1964 has already been described and documented in an earlier issue of this journal.[2] A brief review of some of the highlights of the campaign will serve to recall that it was endorsed in the highest councils of the leadership and took many forms of attack, ranging from intensive propaganda in the press to acts of severe repression.

That the new crackdown on religion was pursued—if not initiated—on orders from the top became clear in 1960. In January of that year, the Society for the Dissemination of Political and Scientific Knowledge (later contracted to the "Knowledge" Society)—the central organ in control of Soviet anti-religious propaganda—held a congress attended by a number of important leaders, including Brezhnev, Kosygin, Mikoyan, Suslov, Ignatiev, and Polianski.[3] Immediately after the congress, and almost certainly as a result of the discussions that took place, regional party organizations were issued instructions to stress strict enforcement of the existing laws relevant to religious organizations.[4] Then, at the 22nd CPSU Congress in October 1961, Khrushchev personally demanded that the anti-religious struggle be given greater emphasis.[5] In subsequent years this demand was reiterated at least twice by Leonid Ilichev, then Chairman of the Ideological Commission of the Central Committee—once at a closed session of party leaders in 1963,[6] and again in early 1964 in a speech that called for a stepping-up of the anti-religious campaign on all fronts.[7]

The policy of the regime was ominously reflected in the revised Penal Code of the Russian Republic published in 1963 (which served as a model for codes in the other Soviet republics). Article 227 of the Code, introduced in 1962, prescribed a penalty of up to five years' imprisonment or exile for persons engaging in religious activity which "is harmful to health," which "prompts citizens to refuse to participate in social activity or to carry out their civil duties, or which entices young people to join religious groups."[8] This ill-defined article provided blanket cover for numerous arrests and incarcerations, as we shall see.

While it is clear that all religious groups suffered abuse to one degree or another during the course of the campaign, its impact on the Orthodox Church can serve as an example of the intensity and scope of anti-religious activity. Prior to the drive, relations between the Orthodox Church and the government appeared to rest on a kind of "live and let live" understanding established between Metropolitan Nikolai of the Moscow Patriarchate and G. G. Karpov, head of the government's Council for Russian Orthodox Church Affairs. Shortly after the resurgence of official hostility, however, both these men—and a number of lesser colleagues—were stripped of their authority.[9] In 1961, the centralized, hierarchical organization of the Church was drastically weakened, when much of the control over church affairs passed into the hands of lay councils at the parish level.[10] Thenceforth priests were regarded as employees of the local *dvadsatka* (church council of 20 members) and deprived of any official voice in the running of their parishes.

Meanwhile, to the tune of a continuing barrage of vilification of the Church in the Soviet press, there began a massive closing down of Russian Orthodox monasteries, cathedrals, and church buildings. Press accounts gave the impression that local party organizations were in a race with one another to chalk up the largest number of such closures, and often did not even bother to mention the tenuous legal bases used to justify the shutdowns.[11] In 1961 it was reported that 500 churches had been closed in two provinces alone;[12] a more recent report has estimated that, in all, 10,000 churches (about half of the total open in 1960) were put out of operation during the latter part of Khrushchev's reign.[13]

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[2] Harry Willetts, "De-opiating the Masses," and Jacques Fernier, "Judaism with Embellishment," *Problems of Communism*, No. 6, November-December 1964, pp. 32-47.

[3] *Pravda* (Moscow), Jan. 27, 1960.

[4] Reported in *Sovetskaia Moldaviia* (Kishinev), Jan. 29, 1960, and *Sovetskaia Belorussiia* (Minsk), Feb. 18, 1960.

[5] *Pravda*, Oct. 18, 1961.

[6] Reported in *Bakinskii rabochii* (Baku), June 19, 1963.

[7] Full text in *Partiinaia zhizn* (Moscow), February 1964.

[8] See discussion of this legislation in *Nauka i religiia* (Moscow), No. 3, March 1963, pp. 35-48.

[9] Well-documented accounts of these developments are to be found in the following articles: I. Swan, "The Disappearance of Metropolitan Nikolai," *Bulletin of the Institute for the Study of the USSR* (Munich), No. 5, May 1961, pp. 46-47; N. Teodorovich, "*Increasing Pressure on the Moscow Patriarchate*," *ibid.*, No. 10, October 1962, pp. 46-47; T. E. Bird, "The Party, the Patriarch, and the World Council," *Commonweal*, April 13, 1962, p. 56.

[10] See *Zhurnal Moskovskoi Patriarkhii* (the official organ of the Moscow Patriarchate), No. 8, August 1961, p. 6.

[11] On this subject see Nikita Struve, *Christians in Contemporary Russia*, London, Harvill Press, 1967, pp. 296 ff.

[12] *Komsomolskaia pravda* (Moscow), June 14, 1961.

[13] *St. Vladimir's Seminary Quarterly* (New York), Vol. 10, Nos. 1-2, 1966, p. 70.

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In the case of Orthodox seminaries, an attempt was made to give a semblance of legality to closures and expropriations by first emptying the schools, through the drafting of students to do national service or through the withdrawal of residence permits.[14] Church authorities could not of course report the exact means by which the state expropriated the seminary buildings, but a comparison of Church statements on the availability of theological training before, during, and after the period of crackdown reveals that the eight seminaries operative in 1958 had dwindled to three by 1965 (two additional academies run by the Church apparently escaped closure).[15]

There is finally evidence that many monks and at least three bishops of the Orthodox faith were arrested and imprisoned in the course of the anti-religious campaign.[16] More often, however, the authorities tried to avoid inflaming popular sentiment by confining religious "dissidents" to hospitals or mental institutions without ever bringing them to trial.[17]

Such acts of intimidation made it clear that a number of ordained churchmen had reacted in open opposition to the renewed onslaught on the Orthodox Church. Some lay members also made efforts to influence public opinion at home and abroad by writing letters of protest to senior government officials and to foreign church dignitaries.[18] However, the leaders of the Church seemingly remained passive, conducting themselves in public as if nothing were amiss. That there was internal dissension within the Church over this attitude of the leadership seems likely, but it did not come to the surface until 1965.

The Baptist Reform Movement

By contrast, the new wave of repression produced a rather dramatic and immediate reaction within the ranks of the smaller Baptist-Evangelical following.

In brief, 1961 saw the emergence of a protest movement within this group of several million adherents[19] that has since pressed its cause on two levels—first, by attempting to spark an internal regeneration among believers in affirmation of religious doctrine and in opposition to the compliance of the leadership with the secular authorities; and second, by challenging the state's anti-religious statutes on the grounds that they contravene Soviet legal and constitutional tradition.

To clarify further references in this paper, it should be noted that since 1944, the official structures of the main Protestant churches in the USSR—the Baptist, the Evangelical Christian, and the Pentecostal—have been united under a central body called the All-Union Council of Baptists and Evangelical Christians, with headquarters in Moscow. In 1963 Mennonite congregations also joined the Council.[20] We shall use the abbreviation "AUCBEC" to designate this body; where an adjective is necessary, "Baptist" will be used but should be understood to refer to the brotherhood in general. The opposition movement that developed to the AUCBEC was originally known as the "Action Group for the Convocation of an Extraordinary All-Union Congress of the Baptist and Evangelical Christian Church"—contracted in the Soviet press to the term, "Initsiativniki." As the movement spread, the Action Group became an enlarged "Organizing Committee," which in turn formed the "Council of the Baptist and Evangelical Christian Churches" in 1965. The adoption of the latter title marked the final schism of the reformist group from the AUCBEC.[21]

The evidence indicates that the opposition emerged in specific protest against a governmental directive issued to Baptist congregations in 1960 in the early stages of the anti-religious campaign. A verbatim excerpt from this document—a "Letter of Instructions" circulated by the state's Council for Religious Cults, concerning the conduct of senior presbyters (congregational leaders)—was first made public by an American correspondent, George Bailey, who claims to have been shown a copy of it in a Baptist church in Moscow. While Soviet sources have never quoted the document, neither have they denied its existence. The text read in part:

The Senior Presbyter must remember that at present the main task of divine services is *not* the enlistment of new members; the duty of the Senior Presbyter is to check unhealthy missionary tendencies; . . . neither should he become too involved in preaching; . . . the tendency

[14] Struve, *op. cit.*, p. 310.

[15] See *Russkaia Pravoslavnaia Tserkov* (official publication of the Moscow Patriarchate), Moscow, 1958, pp. 109-10; and *Zhurnal Moskovskoi Patriarkhii*, No. 4, April 1965, p. 47. In the latter journal, see also issues No. 4, April 1960, p. 41, and No. 5, May 1961, p. 38.

[16] See *Uspekhi sovremennoi nauki i religii* (Successes of Contemporary Science and Religion), Moscow, USSR Academy of Sciences, 1961, pp. 20-21; *Sovetskaia Rossiia* (Moscow), June 21, 1960; *Literaturnaia gazeta* (Moscow), April 10, 1962.

[17] Discussed in Struve, *op. cit.*, pp. 304-10.

[18] *Ibid.*, pp. 303 and 323.

[19] *Bratskii vestnik* (official organ of the AUCBEC), No. 3-4, p. 91, reports 512,000 baptized adult members and three million non-adult or non-baptized adherents. Subsequent official figures have been unreliable because of the confusions introduced both by the non-registration of many congregations and by the schism of 1965—on which see further.

[20] *Ibid.*, No. 6, 1963, pp. 40-42.

[21] See, for example, comments in "Neskolko voprosov o religii i tserkvi" (A Few Questions on Religion and the Church), *Izvestia* (Moscow), Aug. 30, 1966, p. 4.

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to swell the membership in our communities is definitely to be discontinued . . .; in an effort to reduce the baptisms of young people between the ages of 18 and 30 to a minimum, children of preschool and school age, as a rule, should not be admitted to public worship meetings.[22]

As anyone familiar with the Baptist and Evangelical faiths will recognize, these instructions demanded so radical a departure from established traditions that they left little room for a compromise course between compliance and conscience, and leaders who attempted to pursue such a course could not help but be vulnerable to attack from the ranks of the faithful. Perhaps it is not surprising, then, that internal opposition crystallized rather quickly. The prime movers in forming the Action Group were two Baptist presbyters named Aleksei Prokofiev and Gennadi Kriuchkov. The Soviet press has recently given some precise details about this early stage:

The official date of the emergence of the Prokofiev group was, by its own account, August 13, 1961, which marked the beginning of an "internal church movement demanding a congress, a regeneration and consecration of our Evangelical Baptist brotherhood." On that day the so-called "Action Group" released its first appeal signed by Prokofiev and Kriuchkov.[23]

According to the source, the statement of the two men declared in part:

In our days, Satan dictates through the servants of the AUCBEC, while the church accepts all sorts of decrees which openly contradict the commandments of God. . . . Because of the subservience of the AUCBEC leadership to human directives, the church has deviated from the Lord's teaching and is cluttered with unworthy people; this is the reason for the schisms which have occurred in our congregation.[24]

In the course of events since, most Soviet accusations against the reformers have tended to stress what one spokesman has called their "path of organized struggle against Soviet legislation on religious worship" (these are the words of V. A. Kuroedov, President of the Council for Religious Affairs).[25] Yet as the above statement suggests, the initial thrust of the reform was directed mainly against the alleged collaboration of AUCBEC leaders with the secular authorities. To what extent these charges against the leaders were justified is not a question that can be answered with over-great confidence. Church-state relations in the USSR are a matter of extreme delicacy, involving compromise on both sides, and outsiders cannot sit in moral judgment over Russian religious authorities, deeming that such-and-such a compromise was or was not acceptable according to the tenets of Christian integrity.[26] On the issue of whether the AUCBEC leaders actually connived in the anti-religious campaign of 1959-64, all that can legitimately be stated is that the Action Group said they did, and the only evidence that can be adduced is the support the reformers managed to win in the face of continuing repressive acts on the part of the regime. As for the reformers' attack on the direct source of their troubles—the anti-religious laws—the definitive statement of their position was not to be issued until the post-Khrushchev period.

Meanwhile, the authorities used various means of intimidation and terror in their assault on the reformers. Prokofiev was arrested some time in 1962, and a later report in the Soviet press revealed his fate:

At the end of last year [1962] in Zhdanov, the adventurer A. F. Prokofiev was condemned to five years' imprisonment, to be followed by a further five years' exile. The obscurantist has got his deserts.[27]

The author of this report devoted hundreds of words to blackening Prokofiev's character, describing his clandestine missionary activity, his influence over children, and his attempts to set up a bible school—yet was wholly silent on the precise legal specifications of the charges brought against him.

Many of Prokofiev's sympathizers suffered a similar fate. The facts pertaining to their treatment was documented through a procedure that was probably unique in Soviet history. In 1964 the reformers established a "Temporary Council of the Relatives of Prisoners," which managed to continue in operation at least into 1965. Its members collected the names of 197 men and women who had supported the demands of the reform leaders and who had been imprisoned on various

[22] G. Bailey, "Religion in the Soviet Union," *The Reporter* (New York), July 16, 1964, p. 28.

[23] F. Garkavenko, "Baptizm: vnutrennye techeniia i borba" (The Baptist Church: Internal Tendencies and Conflict), *Nauka i religiia*, No. 9, September 1966, pp. 23-24.

[24] *Ibid.*, p. 19.

[25] *Izvestia*, Aug. 30, 1966. The Council for Religious Affairs is now the top governmental agency charged with implementing regime policy on religion. Prior to 1966, its functions were divided between a Council for Russian Orthodox Church Affairs and a Council for Religious Cults—both mentioned in this paper.

[26] A concurring opinion comes from Dr. William C. Fletcher, author of a recent full-length work on Metropolitan Sergei and his relations with the state between 1927 and 1943 (*A Study in Survival*, London, S.P.C.K., 1965). Even in so detailed a study, the author felt constrained not to draw conclusions concerning the Metropolitan's policies.

[27] N. Chernous, "Novoiavlennye 'apostoly'" (Latter-day "Apostles"), *Sovetskaia Moldaviia*, Jan. 27, 1963, p. 4.

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charges between 1961 and 1964. A collection of documents from the Council eventually reached the West and was published by the United States Government Printing Office.[28] The documents list the names of all the prisoners and give substantial details on the length and place of sentence and the next of kin of 150 of them. Five are said to have died during pre-trial investigations or while serving their sentences. Several of the names can be cross-checked from accounts of arrests which appeared in the Soviet press during these years. To cite an example, three of the victims listed were V. K. and N. K. Khmara and F. I. Subbotin,[29] whose case occasioned some comment in the legal journal, *Sovetskaia yustitsiia*.[30] The latter account confirms that the accused refused to admit they had broken the Soviet law by holding religious meetings at night and training young people in their faith. A letter subsequently sent out of the Soviet Union and published in the United States gave the following account of the fate of one of the victims, N. K. Khmara:

At the court relatives and friends had seen him in completely good health and courage. But what did we see now when we received him dead? On his hands was the evidence of handcuffs; the palms of his hands were burned, as were his toes and the soles of his feet. The lower part of his abdomen had the marks of deep wounds made by the insertion of a sharp jagged object; his right leg was swollen; both ankles seemed to have been beaten and there were black and blue bruises on his body.[31]

It is curious—but not untypical of Soviet methods—that in the midst of this resort to terroristic intimidation, the state authorities acceded, at least formally, to one of the major demands of the reformist forces by allowing the convocation of a church congress in October 1963. In the course of this meeting, proposals for reform were discussed in the context of how unity could be reestablished in the church, and the AUCBEC made limited concessions to the Organizing Committee, New statutes were promulgated, the most important of which was an article stating that leaders of the AUCBEC would henceforward be elected by representatives of local congregations.[32] However, since many congregations in sympathy with the reform movement were not officially registered (a problem which we shall examine shortly), the leaders who won "election" under the new rule were substantially the same group as before. Thus the reformers were effectively stymied in their effort to promote internal change through a turnover in the leadership. In retrospect, it is highly doubtful that anything of much consequence was accomplished by the congress.

The Post-Khrushchev Period

In the aftermath of Khrushchev's downfall, the state's anti-religious campaign temporarily abated, encouraging the Baptist reformers to press forward their cause with renewed vigor. This period marks the issuance of the first definitive statement—so far as is known in the West—of the reformers' stance on Soviet anti-religious legislation. On April 14, 1965, the aforementioned Kriuchkov and a colleague named Georg Vins, lately in the fore of the reform movement, wrote to Leonid Brezhnev—in his capacity as chairman of a commission appointed to draft a new Soviet constitution—to propose and defend significant changes in the Soviet laws pertaining to religion. This document, since published in the West, was an impressive exercise in Soviet constitutional history; compiled with considerable legal expertise, it demonstrated that the basic guarantees of freedom of conscience embedded in the original Soviet Constitution had been whittled away by later legislation.[33]

Kriuchkov and Vins set forth three basic demands. First, they said, the meaning of the original Soviet decree on "The Separation of Church and State," issued January 23, 1918, ought to be more accurately defined. Second, a decree of April 8, 1929, "On Religious Associations," requiring that all congregations be officially registered, ought to be repealed as a fundamental contradiction of the precept of separation of church and state. Thirdly, the original guarantee of "freedom for religious propaganda" ought to be reinstated; this right had been set forth in Article 13 of the first Soviet Constitution (1918), which guaranteed freedom of both religious and anti-religious propaganda, but an amendment of May 18, 1929, still in force, had modified the language to read: "freedom for practicing religious worship and freedom of anti-religious propaganda are acknowledged for all citizens."

The two authors charged that these obscurities and modifications of the law had served to introduce an element of chaos and even stark contradiction into

[28] *Communist Exploitation of Religion*, Washington, D. C., U. S. Government Printing Office, 1966, pp. 30-42.
[29] *Ibid.*, p. 35.
[30] V. Tonkikh, "S krestom na sheie, s rozgoi v ruke" (With a Cross on the Neck and a Birchrod in the Hand), *Sovetskaia yustitsiia* (Moscow), No. 9, May 1964, pp. 26-27.
[31] "A Letter from Siberia," *Religion in Communist-Dominated Area* (published in New York by the National Council of Churches), Vol. III, No. 16, Sept. 30, 1964, pp. 122-25.
[32] *Bratskii vestnik*, No. 6, 1963, pp. 43-47.
[33] Complete text in Possev (Frankfurt), No. 32, Aug. 5, 1966, pp. 4-5.

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Soviet legal practice, providing a cover for all sorts of persecutions against Baptists and Evangelicals. Yet while leveling these quite justified accusations, the writers stressed that believers supported the Soviet system, seeking only to be allowed to live peacefully as loyal citizens. The appeal ended on the note:

A new constitution must show whether the government of our country will follow a policy of freedom, equality, and brotherhood towards believers and the church, or whether it will continue its former policy of arbitrariness and force. . . .

A few months after the issuance of this document, *Nauka i religiia*, the chief atheist publication in the Soviet Union, reported that in the course of 1965 the Organizing Committee had considerably stepped up its activities. According to the journal,

[The reformist leaders] started to assemble large gatherings of believers and send them to Moscow. This was to put pressure on government organs for the satisfaction of their illegal demands. The last instance of such an organized invasion of Moscow by supporters of the "Council of Churches" Organizing Committee led to a gross violation of public order right at the entrance to a government building. The arm of the law had to take appropriate measures to re-establish order.[34]

Typically, the language of this account was excessive, judging by the testimony of a number of Western correspondents who observed the incidents involved and reported that they were peaceful demonstrations.[35]

Apparently, however, this growing public activity caused a considerable degree of apprehension in the state establishment. In September 1965, according to an editorial published several months later in *Nauka i religiia*, a delegation of the Organizing Committee was allowed to air its grievances to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet—a significant indication of official concern even though the delegation got nowhere with its appeals. While the editorial does not clarify whether the reformers' position on Soviet religious laws was discussed, it reveals considerable sophistry on the part of the state spokesmen with respect to the Organizing Committee's complaints against the AUCBEC and appeals for another church congress:

It was explained to the leaders of the Organizing Committee that decisions on the question of the BEC union leadership and on a church congress were matters for believers themselves [to decide], and if the government were to satisfy their demands, this would entail interference by the state in internal church affairs. Such was the answer given to Organizing Committee representatives when they were received in September 1965 by the highest organ of the state, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.[36]

In the course of 1966, continuing ferment over the issue of Baptist reform was dramatically confirmed by the state's recourse to past tactics, both in the form of repression (albeit on a modified scale) and in the form of conciliation.

During the year, a whole spate of anti-religious articles appeared in the Soviet press,[37] accusing sympathizers of the Organizing Committee of singing hymns on public transport; forming processions to rivers for public performance of the sacrament of baptism; publishing clandestine literature; and organizing religious education for children, through Bible instruction and through the teaching of hymns to the accompaniment of guitars and balalaikas. Most significant, the articles listed a total of 21 people arrested and imprisoned for terms up to five years for participating in these activities. The cause of arrest most frequently cited was the religious indoctrination of children, suggesting that this area of activity is the most offensive and worrisome to the Soviet authorities.

While public affirmations of faith have clearly increased, it should be pointed out that the large amount of open-air activity in which Baptists have been indulging is due in part to the existing law governing registration of congregations, one of the targets of Kriuchkov's and Vins' attack. According to a recent Soviet source, the "only" basis on which a congregation can be refused registration is "if the members of the religious union do not acknowledge Soviet legislation on the cults, and [if] their rituals and teaching on the faith incite believers to break state laws and the established order of the country."[38] (This and other statements in the article make it clear that state organs, rather than the central ecclesiastical authority, control the registration of local congregations.) The conditions cited are of course at the heart of the Baptist pro-

[34] *Nauka i religiia*, No. 7, July 1966, p. 25.
[35] See, for example, *The Times* (London), May 23, 1966.
[36] "Kto takie 'initsiativniki' v yevangelskikh khristian-baptistov?" (What is the 'Initiative Group' in the Evangelical Christian and Baptist Church?), *Nauka i religiia*, No. 7, July 1966, p. 25.
[37] See the following (all 1966): *Pravda*, Feb. 19, p. 2; *Sovetskaia Kirgiziia* (Frunze), March 18, p. 4; *Komsomolskoe znamia* (Kiev), July 16; *Uchitelskaia gazeta* (Moscow), Aug. 23, p. 4; *Sovetskaia Moldaviia*, Sept. 15, p. 4; *Pravda Ukrainy* (Kiev), Oct. 4, p. 4; *Pravda Vostoka* (Tashkent), Oct. 22, p. 4; *Sovetskaia Rossiia*, Nov. 22, p. 2.
[38] Yu. Alexandrov, "Mestnye sovety i zakonodatelstvo o kultakh" (Local Soviets and Legislation on the Cults) *Agitator* (Moscow), No. 13, July 1966, pp. 57-59.

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test, and through the years have prevented many Baptist and Evangelical congregations from gaining official recognition. As a result they have not been able to hire premises from the state where they could meet legally, and they have turned increasingly to worship out-of-doors.

Meantime, in March 1966, the regime promulgated new laws on religion. Additions to Article 142 of the Penal Code of the Russian Republic specified that it was henceforth illegal to circulate any sort of religious literature or to organize any type of gathering or procession which "disturbs public order." [39] At the same time, a liberalizing clause was adopted making it illegal to discriminate against Soviet citizens for religious reasons either in jobs or in educational institutions. There was an immediate public debate in the West as to whether the laws would lead on balance to a worsening or an easing of the religious situation. In this author's view, the ensuing arrests—as reported above—speak for themselves, strongly suggesting that the March laws were passed with the express intention of buttressing the legal justification for a crackdown on the reformers. (A sidelight on Soviet sensitivity to the ripple of Western protest over these arrests was provided by an exchange of comments printed in the London *Times*, with the present author participating. A statement by Professor Leonard Schapiro questioning the legality of one of the verdicts prompted an indignant letter to the *Times* from a Moscow lawyer, Yuri Aleksandrov, who put forward the defense that religious bodies which break the law are punished anywhere.[40] This writer then challenged Aleksandrov to explain why the Organizing Committee was not allowed to have registered and legal congregations under its aegis.[41] The reply—some two months forthcoming—evaded the question posed and simply elaborated on Aleksandrov's earlier defense.[42] Mr. Aleksandrov was in no position, of course, to debate the most crucial issue at stake—which was not whether the Baptists had broken the laws on religion, but whether the laws themselves were constitutional.)

In another echo of earlier years, the regime mingled the tactics of broadside propaganda and specific intimidation with eventual permission for the convening of a congress of the AUCBEC, which took place in Moscow from October 4 to 8, just three years after the previous congress. Two significant concessions appear to have been made, according to an October 11 release of the Soviet press agency *Novosti:* first, senior presbyters were no longer to be appointed by the AUCBEC leaders, but rather by the local congregations; second, control over local church affairs was to pass from three-man executive committees to the congregations at large, who were to make decisions "collectively."

While it is too early to discern how these concessions have worked out in practice, it would appear that state policy has moved in the direction of granting some of the reformist demands with respect to the internal organization of the church union, while remaining firmly opposed to any fundamental change in Soviet anti-religious legislation. Seemingly the aim of the secular authorities is to reunite as many moderates as possible under the AUCBEC umbrella, while using the full force of the law to liquidate the more determined opposition. The fact that at least two trials of religious offenders were reported after the October assembly might bear this out.[43]

A final word remains to be said concerning the sentiment within the Baptist and Evangelical Christian community toward the Organizing Committee and its activities. It is virtually impossible to judge how many believers have actively supported the reform group in open or clandestine activity, and how many more are in sympathy with its aims. The regime has claimed that the dissenters constitute only a small minority of the brotherhood, asserting—in Kuroedov's words—that "less than one-twentieth of all Baptists followed them"; [44] but the dissenters' own materials give a very different impression. In the last analysis, the strength of the movement can only be judged by the amount of attention it has been given in the Soviet press and by the actions of the regime—and these confirm that the reformist fervor has been a source of considerable and continuing concern to the authorities.

Parallels in the Orthodox Church

Meantime, however, the authorities had another problem to worry about. While pressures for reform were confined to a minority church, the regime was confronted with a situation that it could hope to control. The spread of disaffection to the Orthodox Church—which not only has a much larger following

[39] *Vedomosti Verkhovnovo Soveta RSFSR* (Moscow), No. 12, 1966, pp. 219-20, decrees dated March 18; see also *ibid.*, No. 38, 1966, p. 819, decree dated Sept. 16, for further restrictions on the right of assembly.
[40] Sept. 22, 1966.
[41] Sept. 27, 1966.
[42] Dec. 2, 1966.
[43] See footnote 36.
[44] *Izvestia*, Aug. 30, 1966.

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but enjoys a certain degree of sympathy among elements of the Russian intelligentsia—was another and potentially more serious matter. What has happened since the latter months of 1965 can be described as the emergence of a reform effort within the Russian Orthodox Church that has been remarkably similar in several respects to the Baptist attempt at reform.

The first cryptic hint of a stirring within the Church came from the *Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate*, in December 1965:

It has been decided . . . to release His Grace Archbishop Yermogen of Kaluga and Borovsk from his authority over the Kaluga diocese, in accordance with his own request. In view of the fact that at present there is no suitable vacant see, he may retire. The Uspenski Monastery at Zhirovitsy is designated as his residence.[45]

The eye practiced at catching a glimmer of human interest beneath the opaque surface of the *Journal* registered something of more than usual significance behind this announcement, but the most experienced analyst of Patriarchate affairs would have had difficulty in guessing its full import.

Enlightenment was not long in coming, however. In April 1966 three documents reached the West explaining what lay behind the Archbishop's dismissal.[46] These documents, written and signed by two priests of the Moscow Diocese, Nikolai Eshliman and Gleb Yakunin, and dated November and December 1965, are undoubtedly the most significant texts on church-state relations to come out of the Soviet Union since the Revolution. They were in the form of open letters, and copies had been sent to all bishops of the Moscow jurisdiction of the Russian Orthodox Church.

The briefest of the documents, addressed directly to the bishops, was in the form of a covering letter to the other two. It stated that in the summer of 1965 Archbishop Yermogen had taken the initiative of gathering together a delegation of eight bishops, who went to the Patriarchate to present a petition criticizing a 1961 decision of the Council of Bishops (as explained elsewhere, this was the decision to transfer control over parish affairs to local lay councils). The anger caused by this petition was left to inference; the two priests simply revealed that pressure was afterwards brought to bear on Archbishop Yermogen—through the person of Archbishop Aleksis of Tallin, an official of the Patriarchate—to give up his diocese; while he asked for a transfer, the writers assert he was forced into retirement "to please atheist bureaucrats."[47]

Of the two main documents, one was an appeal addressed to the secular authorities—specifically to Nikolai Podgorny, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. Its main premise was that:

During the period 1957-64, under personal pressure from Khrushchev . . . the Council for Russian Orthodox Church Affairs radically changed its function, becoming, instead of a department for arbitration, an organ of unofficial and illegal control over the Moscow Patriarchate.[48]

The authors went on to list eight specific categories of state interference in Church affairs, giving full legal references to show exactly in what way Soviet law had been contravened. They appealed for an end of the Council's control over the church, making it possible for Christians to remain loyal Soviet citizens; and they pleaded for the reopening of the many monasteries, seminaries and churches that had been forcibly closed under Khrushchev.

The longest of the three documents was addressed to the Patriarch himself. Declaring that they spoke in a spirit of loyal humility and with inexpressible grief, Fathers Eshliman and Yakunin in effect accused the Moscow Patriarchate of complicity in the degeneration of church life. The essence of their message was contained in the passage:

The submission of the Moscow Patriarchate to the secret oral dictates of atheist officials and the affirmation (by the 1961 Council of Bishops) of the Synodal decree which placed the pastor in a position of a hireling, was an assault on the life of the Russian Church. . . .[49]

The specific stress on the latter decree indicates that Eshliman and Yakunin, along with Archbishop Yermogen, believed the introduction of the *dvadsatka* had done more than anything else to undermine the position of the Orthodox Church. More generally, though their language was respectful in the extreme, the two priests clearly charged that the Church authorities had been too submissive in their relations with the state. They called for an end to state interference in Church affairs and begged the Patriarch to be more rigorous in preventing such encroachment. At the same time, they deliberately avoided making rash accusations, confining themselves to a documentation of objective facts couched in strict legal terminology. They also stressed that their views were based entirely on estab-

[45] "Opredeleniia Sviashchennovo Sinoda" (Resolutions of the Holy Synod), *Zhurnal Moskovskoi Patriarkhii*, No. 12, December 1965, p. 3.

[46] Published in full in an English translation in *St. Vladimir's Seminary Quarterly*, Vol. 10, Nos. 1-2, December 1965, p. 3.

[47] *Ibid.*, pp. 110-11.

[48] *Ibid.*, p. 68.

[49] *Ibid.*, p. 103.

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lished Christian doctrines, that they had no wish to break away from tradition as enshrined in the Orthodox Church, and above all that they wished there to be no schism within the official church.

Was there a cross-fertilization of ideas between the relatively small Russian Baptist and Evangelical Christian Church and the 40-50 million-strong Orthodox Church? Several points suggest the possibility. The Kriuchkov-Vins document (discussed above) was dated April 14, 1965; the Eshliman-Yakunin papers were issued just eight months later. Allowing for the basic differences in the two faiths, the tenor of the documents is strikingly similar. Both sets of authors took a broad intellectual approach to the problem of church-state relations, reflecting the fact that Russian Christians now dared to express their arguments more logically than in earlier phases of repression. Both stressed legal argumentation and showed an impressive legal grasp—in short, the authors were at pains to avoid the charge of anti-Soviet activity, setting their demands firmly within the framework of the Soviet Constitution. In both treaties, the charge was brought that the state had forced the Church to accept legislation which could not be reconciled with basic guarantees of freedom contained in the constitution. In other activity the Baptist reformers had made clear that they remained loyal to the basic tenets of their faith and that questions of doctrine were not at issue; similarly, the Orthodox priests emphasized their absolute loyalty to canon law and to the specific beliefs of their Church. The one major difference between these reform efforts was that the Baptists actively sought a change in the state-condoned leadership of the AUCBEC, whereas the would-be reformers in the more hierarchical Orthodox order merely sought a more independent stance on the part of the Church's leaders.

A Black View of Religion

Caption: **"Through the help of old women like this, the priests try under the incense to hang a millstone on tiny souls, *but we will not give up these souls to them!*"**

—Soviet propaganda poster.

It might be added that the "underground" circulation of unpublishable manuscripts has become a common phenomenon of the post-Stalin era in the Soviet Union, and one may certainly assume that copies of the Kriuchkov-Vins document—and later of the Eshliman-Yakunin documents—reached well beyond the circle of their immediate supporters, as well as finding their way to the West. That the state suspected some cross-influence between the two reform efforts—and certainly feared the further spread of disaffection—seems indicated by the aforementioned law of March 1966 specifically proscribing the circulation of religious propaganda. It is also interesting that early in 1966 the Council for Russian Orthodox Church Affairs was amalgamated with the Council for Religious Cults to form a single state Council for Religious Affairs.[50]

Understandably, the Eshliman-Yakunin documents produced sharp repercussions within the Church itself. Despite the relatively moderate tone of their appeal, the two fathers were asked by the Patriarch to retract what they had said. When they refused, the Patriarch took the following disciplinary action, announced May 13, 1966:

[50] Reported in *Izvestia*, Aug. 30, 1966.

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With the aim of shielding the Mother-Church from this disruption of its internal peace, we consider it essential to relieve them from their duties and ban them from priestly activities until their full repentance; moreover, we warn them that if they continue their sinful action, we will be compelled to resort to sterner measures against them in accordance with the demands of canon law.[51]

In the months since this action was taken, there has been no further word on the situation of the two priests and therefore no way to tell how they reacted to the Patriarch's ban. Yet evidence has been accumulating that the issues they raised continued to "disrupt the peace" of the Church to a serious degree.

The most outspoken support for the two priests came from a man with an interesting and well-known history in Orthodox Church affairs, Anatoli Levitin. In July and again in October 1966, two letters appeared in the Russian émigré press which, although written under the pseudonym A. Krasnov, were attributed to Levitin.[52] While some people were at first disposed to consider the letters forgeries, there was later clear proof that Levitin was deeply committed to the cause of reform and was circulating literature on its behalf.

A brief word about Levitin's background is in order. In the early Soviet era he was an ordained member of the "Living Church," a body that tried to introduce reforms into the Orthodox Church in the 1920's and for a time enjoyed state support; later he joined the Orthodox Church as a layman. In the latter part of Stalin's reign, he spent seven years in concentration camps. After being amnestied in 1956, he became a frequent contributor to the *Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate*.[53] During the period of Khrushchev's anti-religious drive, he was one of the more vociferous opponents of the campaign against the Church,[54] but the new controversy turned his wrath toward the Patriarchate.

In the first of his letters, entitled "With Love and Anger," Levitin repudiated a fulsome encomium which he had written on the occasion of the Patriarch's 80th birthday in 1957 and which had appeared in the Journal of the *Moscow Patriarchate*.[55] In words less moderate than those of Fathers Eshliman and Yakunin, Levitin accused the Patriarch of disastrous failure at the most critical point in his ministry and demanded that he should rescind his decision suspending their service as priests.

His second letter, entitled "Listening to the Radio," was occasioned by a BBC broadcast from London summarizing Western press reactions to the Eshliman-Yakunin affair. In it Levitin gave some incisive details of how the Church had acquiesced in allowing the state to control parochial and episcopal appointments. One of several examples he cited was the case of Bishop Antoni Vikarik, appointed to the see of Smolensk in 1965. Finding the diocese in a chaotic state, Bishop Vikarik had set about restoring order—with notable success until he took the step of dismissing A. P. Zhirov, who in Levitin's words was "a notoriously ill-living archdeacon," but who apparently had influence in high places. The upshot was that Bishop Antoni was summoned to the Moscow Patriarchate, forced to reinstate Zhirov, and thereafter deprived of effective authority in his diocese.

During most of 1966 the Soviet press maintained silence about the situation in the Orthodox Church, while saying a great deal about the punitive steps being taken against the Baptist reformers. This silence was finally broken in October, with the publication of a severe attack against Levitin in *Nauka i religiia*.[56] Though the attack did not refer directly to the two letters published in the West, it dispelled any doubt concerning their authenticity by quoting extensively from a third letter by Levitin entitled "The Ailing Church," which presumably had been circulating illegally in the Soviet Union.

When the vituperative commentary is eliminated from this attack, a catena of quotations remains from the letter, indicating the gist of Levitin's argument. Here, according to *Nauka i religiia*, is what he wrote:

[In the Church there are bishops who] are branches of a dead, sterile and useless fig tree. . . . There are many gangrened church members who are playing a pernicious role in its most secret depths. Therefore the Russian Church is ill—seriously ill. . . . The most serious ailment is the age-old one of Caesaro-Papism [subjugation of the Church to the narrow nationalistic interest of the secular state—M. B.]. . . . Is it not reprehensible that these lines are being written not by one of the hierarchy or by a member of the Holy Synod,

[51] Full Russian text released by A.C.E.R., 91 Rue Olivier de Serres, Paris 15; French translation in *Le Messager Orthodoxe*, No. 35, 1966, p. 57.

[52] "Liuboviu i gnevom" (With Love and Anger), *Russkaia mysl* (Paris), July 7, 1966, pp. 4-5; and "Slushaia radio" (Listening to the Radio), *Possev* (Frankfurt), No. 39, Sept. 23, 1966, pp. 3-4, and No. 40, Oct. 1, 1966, pp. 3-4.

[53] For further biographical details, see A. Krasnov, "Gospod—moia nesokrushimaia krepost" (The Lord is My Indestructible Refuge), *Possev*, Jan. 7, 1967, pp. 5-7.

[54] See *Zashchita very v SSSR* (Defense of the Faith in the USSR), Paris, Ikhthus, and Munich, Possev-Verlag, 1966.

[55] *Zhurnal Moskovskoi Patriarkhii*, No. 11, November 1957.

[56] G. Vasiliev, "Bogoslov-podstrekatel" (Rebellious Theologian), *Nauka i religiia*, No. 10, October 1966, pp. 25-26. Also see commentary in *The Observer* (London), Nov. 27, 1966.

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but by me, a simple layman and schoolmaster? . . . I am writing because you are silent; I am defending the Church because you are failing in your duty. You should be ashamed! . . .

According to the article, Levitin went on to warn the Church leaders "that the patience of Orthodox believers is not unlimited, and that their unworthy conduct can easily lead to schism."

The article in turn issued its own warning: that there are laws which defend the interests of all Soviet citizens and that they apply as much to Levitin as to anyone else. The author did not state whether he had in mind the March 1966 law forbidding the circulation of religious manuscripts. But he did charge Levitin with "trying to provoke the hierarchy of the Russian Orthodox Church to protest against repressions which are a figment of imagination."

While in the past threats of this sort have often presaged the arrest of the persons under attack, there is no indication as of this writing that the authorities have taken any action against Levitin. In view of other developments that have come to light, it seems possible that with respect to the Orthodox Church, the regime sought to avoid the repressive tactics of the past for fear of throwing fuel on the fire, leaving it to the Church authorities to deal with internal dissension.

As in the case of the Baptist reform movement, there is no real way to judge the extent of reaction within the Church to the Eshliman-Yakunin controversy or the degree of support which their appeals may have evoked. Indeed, we do not even know how widely the documents themselves may have circulated in the lower levels of the hierarchy or among Orthodox laymen.

It seems highly significant, however, that in July 1966—some six months after Eshliman and Yakunin issued their eloquent statements—the Patriarch deemed it necessary to issue a proscription against reformist sentiment. In a circular letter dated July 6, the Patriarch wrote to all Bishops of the Russian Orthodox Church, forbidding them to allow anyone in their dioceses to follow the initiative of Eshliman and Yakunin, asserting that such activity gave foreign enemies of the Russian Church ammunition to slander it, and stating that the expression of such views could lead to schism. Interestingly, the text of this circular letter was later printed with the express permission of the Patriarchate in the journal, *Religion in Communist-Dominated Areas* (published by the National Council of Churches in New York), in answer to a request from its editor for authoritative confirmation of reports of the Eshliman-Yakunin controversy.[57]

The Patriarch's action seems to indicate clearly that the effects of the controversy were felt well beyond the Moscow center where it originated. In support of this conclusion, a document recently reached the West indicating that the diocese of Kirov was in sympathy with the two priests' position almost *en masse*.[58]

It is curious that while Eshliman and Yakunin passionately protested the thought of a division within the Church, both the Patriarch—at one end of the controversy—and the hard-speaking Levitin—at the other—mentioned schism as a distinct possibility and palpable threat. While the outward signs of dissension in the Church have died down in recent months, it is wholly logical to assume that the fervor for reform continues beneath the surface and will not easily be suppressed. Whether it will erupt again—pushing the Orthodox Church further toward a division which all involved, including the secular authorities, seem to deplore—is a question that only the future can answer.

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[57] *Religion in Communist-Dominated Areas*, Vol. V, No. 15-16, Aug. 15-31, 1966, pp. 126-28.

[58] See *Vestnik Russkovo Studencheskovo Khristianskovo Dvizheniia* (Paris), No. 4, 1966, pp. 3-20; also *Possev*, No. 51, Dec. 16, 1966, pp. 4-5. Compare with *Vestnik Russkovo Studencheskovo Khristianskovo Dvizheniia*, No. 1, 1967, pp. 29-64.

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The Status of Cults

By Joshua Rothenberg

Few aspects of Soviet life are as hard to assess as the status of religion. In this area, nothing is more uncertain and ambiguous than the legislation on religious matters. Moreover, study of the application of this legislation creates the impression that the obscurity is deliberate. The following examples are illustrative.

Two Russian Orthodox priests, in a letter submitted December 15, 1965, to the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, accused the Soviet authorities of seeking to keep religious leaders in ignorance about the exact meaning of the religious law and its implications. The authors cite the fact that "*at the wish of the Council on the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church*, there is no teaching in the theological schools . . . of the law which is of such daily importance for the priests." [1]

The bizarre tactics of the Soviet government are further exemplified by the following fact: In the 1959 edition of *Kommunistischeskaia partiia i sovetskoe pravitelstvo o religii i tserkvi* (The Communist Party and the Soviet Government on Religion and Church), published in Moscow by Gosizpolit, the basic Law on Religious Associations of April 8, 1929, is reprinted in full with a statement by the editors that this law is "*the most important document* presently regulating the relations between the Soviet government and religious associations in the territory of the USSR" (p. 116). Such a statement was also made in the information submitted by the Soviet Union to the United Nations in 1956.[2] The above law was *not* revoked. Nevertheless the text of the law was entirely omitted in the subsequent edition of the book in 1961, and also in the book *On Religion and Church*, a collection of documents published in Moscow in 1965. There is but one possible explanation of the omission of the "most important law": a deliberate effort to withhold information about the law from those who might use it in defense of their rights.

There is evidence that in many parts of the Soviet Union the local deputies of the Councils for the Affairs of Religious Cults tend to override existing statutes by oral directives. These they refuse to confirm in writing, knowing full well that their orders do not conform to the laws in force. In addition, the cam-

[1] See preceding article by M. Bourdeaux.

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[2] Conference Room Paper, No. 35, United Nations Commission on Human Rights, "Study of Discrimination in the Matter of Religious Rights and Practices," January 30, 1959.

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paign against religion and religious institutions has gained force since 1959. According to assessments by students of the Russian Orthodox Church, the number of churches in the Soviet Union was reduced from 22,000 to 11,500 between 1959 and 1962.[3]

In view of all this, any new legal enactment of the Soviet government on religious matters deserves close attention.

On March 24, 1966, the Soviet government enacted and published three legislative acts pertaining to religious matters. We must assume that these acts were considered necessary either because the Soviet authorities realized that deficiencies existed in the present laws, or because new developments called for changes. A short discussion of the legal situation of religious sects in the Soviet Union will help to place the newly promulgated legislative acts in proper perspective.

Basic Legislation

Legal provisions concerning religion are derived from three principal sources: 1) rights to religious freedom provided for by the Constitution of the USSR and those of the individual Soviet republics; 2) articles in the Criminal Codes of the Soviet Union; 3) legal enactments pertaining specifically to religious sects and observances.

Considerable confusion exists as to which laws on "the separation of church and state and school and church" are still in operation. Undoubtedly, the Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of January 23, 1918, "Ob otdelenii tserkvi ot gosudarstva i shkoly ot tserkvii" (On the separation of church from state and school from church) is in force.[4] An ordinance "For Carrying out the Decree of Separation of Church from State and School from Church (Instruction)" was subsequently issued by the People's Commissariat of Justice on August 24, 1918. This ordinance, together with subsequent interpretive "circulars" and "instructions," formed the main body of legislation on religious matters until 1929.

In 1929, two important new acts were promulgated. The first of these was the law "On Religious Associations" (Ob religioznykh obedineniiakh), adopted by the All-Russian Central Committee and the Council of People's Commissars on April 6, 1929. A detailed and systematic interpretation of this law, "Instructions on Rights and Obligations of Religious Associations" (O pravakh i obiazannostiakh religioznykh obedinenii) was issued by the People's Commissariat of the Interior on October 1, 1929.[5]

As these two enactments changed and even reversed provisions of the Ordinance of August 24, 1918 (for instance, on the number of members required to organize a "religious association"), it is clear that they supersede that ordinance. However, the decree of January 23, 1918, remains the basic law, the Soviet "Magna Carta," with regard to the rights of citizens to be members of religious sects and the rights of religious associations and groups to function. The enactments of 1929 supply the detailed rules and regulations based on that decree. They are now the principal law of the land concerning religious matters.

The RSFSR Criminal Code of 1960 (with corresponding articles in the Codes of all other Soviet republics) includes three articles pertaining directly to religious activities, and one article applicable at times to religious activities considered punishable.[6] *Article 142* makes the violation of laws on the separation of church and state and of school and church punishable by correctional work for a term not exceeding one year, or by a fine not exceeding fifty rubles. *Article 143* makes punishable "obstructing the performance of religious rites, insofar as they do not violate public order and are not accompanied by infringement of the rights of citizens, by correctional work for a term not exceeding six months or by social censure." *Article 227* deals with "the infringement of persons and rights of citizens under the guise of per-

[3] See: Nikita Struve, *Les Chrétiens en URSS*, Paris, 1963, p. 259 *et al.*; also *The New York Times*, May 7, 1966.

[4] It is interesting to note that the decree prepared by a special Commission of the Council of Commissars which had a priest among its members, had proposed a different heading: "On Freedom of Conscience, Church and Religious Associations" ("O svobode sovesti tserkovnykh i religioznykh obshchestvakh") and a decree with that title had already been published in the *Izvestia*, January 21, 1918. It was an indignant Lenin who changed the title of the decree, throwing out the "idealistic" phrase "freedom of conscience" and inserting instead the term "separation of church and state" which he evidently considered to be the crux of the decree. Lenin also made other important changes in the decree, which was published two days later in the official organ *Gazety rabochevo i krestianskovo pravitelstva.* Both the original and the final wordings of the decree are included in some Soviet publications on religious matters (see: *O religii i tserkvii*, Sbornik dokumentov, Politizdat, Moscow, 1965, pp. 95-99, 119-120; also *O religii, khrestomatiia*, Gos. Izd. Polit. Literatury, Moscow, 1963, pp. 502-505).

[5] *Sobranie uzakonenii i rasporiazhenii rabochekrestianskovo pravitelstva RSFSR*, No. 35, text no. 353; amendments *Sobranie uzakonenii*, etc., No. 8, 1932, text no. 41, II, 6; published also in N. Orleanski, *Zakon o religioznykh obedineniakh RSFSR*, Moscow, 1930. English translation in *The Church and State Under Communism*, special study prepared for the US Senate by the Library of Congress, Washington, 1964, pp. 12-17, 18-24.

[6] *Ugolovnoe zakonodatelstvo Soiuza SSR i Soiuznikh Respublik*, Gos. Izd. Yuridicheskoi Literatury, Moscow, 1963, T. 1, pp. 108, 123, 142; for English translation see: Harold J. Berman, *Soviet Criminal Law and Procedure*, Cambridge, Mass., 1966.

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forming religious ceremonies," naming a number of activities punishable under this article. *Article 70* concerns "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda." This article—like its predecessor, the notorious article 56 of the former Criminal Code—may be applied to various activities of religious believers and organizations considered at a given moment to be anti-Soviet.

Prior to 1936, only the constitutions of the individual Soviet republics had included provisions on religious freedom; the Federal Constitution had not incorporated them. The Constitution of the RSFSR had contained the provision on the separation of church and state and school and state and a provision that "freedom of religious and anti-religious *propaganda* is recognized for all citizens" (Article 4, emphasis added). The wording of the provision was later changed by the 14th Congress of Soviets in 1929, and was subsequently incorporated into Article 124 of the "Stalin Constitution" of 1936, according to which "freedom of religious worship [not propaganda] and freedom of anti-religious propaganda are recognized for all citizens."

Recent Laws

Let us now examine the legislative acts of 1966 and try to find possible motives for their adoption.

One of the three acts is an "ordinance" (*postanovlenie*) of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR on activities that constitute violations of the laws on the separation of church and state and school and church according to Article 142 of the Criminal Code.[7] (RSFSR acts of this kind are later followed by similar enactments in all other Soviet republics).

The ordinance enumerates six kinds of offenses *without making it clear whether this is an exhaustive list* of offenses under Article 142, or an enumeration of *some* punishable activities to which Article 142 will apply. Some of the offenses specified were already prohibited under the law on religious associations of April 8, 1929, and the decree of January 23, 1918.

The first of these punishable offenses is compulsory collections and taxation for the benefit of religious organizations or clergy. However, the new ordinance fails to provide a much-needed interpretation of the term "compulsory collections." It is difficult to understand how religious associations can use compulsion under conditions prevailing in the Soviet Union, and how "compulsion" in collecting funds should be interpreted. Since the provision on compulsory donations is just a reiteration of the existing law, a plausible explanation for its inclusion in the ordinance is that the "collections" (i.e., the funds of religious associations) have now assumed larger proportions than the authorities wish, possibly in consequence of the greater prosperity in the country, and it seems desirable to limit their scope.

Other prohibitions in the present ordinance forbidding the "preparation for purposes of mass dissemination, or the mass dissemination, of written or printed material calling for nonobservance of the legislation on religious cults," and the "organization and systematic conduct of studies" for teaching religion to minors in violation of established legislative rules, are a reiteration of old provisions of law.

Some other provisions of the act are, however, new. For example, the ordinance states that "the commission of fraudulent actions for purposes of inciting religious superstition among the masses of the population is punishable"—a vague wording that can be variously interpreted. It does not specify what kind of action is to be judged "fraudulent," or the meaning of "inciting religious superstition" in a regime which considers *all* religious beliefs superstition. Significantly, the term "masses of the population" recalls a bygone era and uses faded political terminology. Soviet legislative acts generally use the term "citizens," and not "masses." Is this provision just an echo of old slogans, or is it a response to a situation existing among certain religious sects that worries the Soviet rulers? Probably the last is true.

Another provision of the new ordinance cites as punishable offenses conducting religious meetings, processions and other cult ceremonies "disturbing public order" (*narushaiushchykh obshchestvennyi poriadok*). Whereas previous legal provisions *withdrew protection of the law* for religious rites only if their performance violated public order, and guaranteed free performance of religious observances otherwise,[8] the *new ordinance makes such performance in itself a criminal offense.* "Religious meetings, processions and ceremonies of the cult" that now come under this clause are almost the sum total of religious life. Making the legality of all religious observances subject to the vague and undefined clause "disturbing public order" creates a situation where the observances are now, by law, fully dependent on the interpretation

[7] "O primenenii stati 142 Ugolovnovo Kodeksa RSFSR" (On the application of Article 142 of RSFSR Criminal Code), *Vedomosti Verkhovnovo Soveta RSFSR*, No. 12, March 24, 1966, pos. 21.

[8] The USSR Constitution guarantees (in Article 124) freedom of religious worship, without any qualifications.

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of the local Soviet authorities, who by their own admission are opposed to the very existence of these observances.

Under this provision of the new ordinance, the Soviet authorities, if they so desire, can prevent and make punishable almost any religious activity by applying the clause. Not only can "religious rites disturbing public order" be prohibited or stopped, but they become now a distinct criminal offense, punishable *after* they have taken place.

Perhaps partly to offset the restrictive (and poorly defined) provisions of the ordinance, one stipulation of the law has strong "liberal" overtones and might be of great importance to religious believers—although it, too, is essentially a repetition of a legal right granted by the Soviet Constitution and by previous legislation. Since the formulation is important, we will quote it verbatim: "The refusal to hire citizens for work, or to admit them to educational institutions, dismissal from work or expulsion from educational institutions, the deprivation of citizens' privileges and benefits that have been established by law, as well as other substantial limitations of the rights of citizens because of their attitude toward religion"—these acts are designated as unlawful and punishable under Article 142 of the Criminal Code. Cases of expulsion of religious-minded young people from educational institutions have often been reported. The explicit legal prohibition of such practices is, therefore, of great importance.

A "Scientific" Outlook

Caption: **"The Soviet girl has a bright path—to the library, the club, the factory, and the fields. We will not allow churchgoers or sectarians to snatch her off that path!"**

—Soviet propaganda poster.

The second legislative act issued in March 1966 relates, too, to Article 142 of the Criminal Code, but its scope and significance are relatively minor. This document is an edict (*ukaz*) of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR amending (or more literally "introducing supplements to" —*o vnesenii dopolnenii*) Article 142.[9] It concerns cases of recidivism; persons who have been previously convicted under this article will be punished for a similar new offense by "deprivation of freedom for a term of up to three years." This makes the punishment of recidivists harsher not only by lengthening the term of punishment, *i.e.*, a maximum of three years instead of one, but also by calling for "deprivation of freedom" (*lishenie svobody*) instead of "correctional work" (*ispravitelnye raboty*). "Deprivation of freedom" covers a wider range of punitive forms and institutions than "correctional work" (or "correctional tasks"), which in some cases is applied in the form of administrative fines, in other cases by deprivation of freedom in a correctional labor colony.[10]

The third act of March 1966 determines administrative responsibility for punishment of violations of various established rules concerning religious cults.[11] Apparently, the offenses enumerated in this act were

[9] "Ukaz Prezidiuma Verkhovnovo Soveta RSFSR o vnesenii dopolnenii v statiu 142 Ugolovnovo Kodeksa RSFSR;" *Vedomosti Verkhovnovo Soveta*, No. 12 (390) March 24, 1966. The term "ukaz" is being translated here by "edict" and not "decree" (which is the equivalent for the Russian word "*dekret.*")

[10] See Leon Lipson, "The Criminal Reconsidered," *Problems of Communism*, July-August 1961, pp. 58-60.

[11] Ukaz Prezidiuma Verkhovnovo Soveta RSFSR 'Ob administrativnoi otvetstvennosti za narushenie zakonodatelstva o religioznykh kultakh" ("Edict of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet 'On administrative liability for violation of legislation on religious cults'"); *Vedemosti Verkhovnovo Soveta, op. cit.*, pos. 219.

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not considered important enough to warrant prosecution before the courts under the Criminal Law.

The offenses to be punished *administratively* are: 1) failure to register associations with the proper authorities; 2) violation of the rules established by legislation on organizing and conducting religious meetings, processions, and ceremonies of the cult; 3) the organization and holding of special meetings of children and youth, the organizaiton of work, literary and other circles and groups "having no relation to the observance of the cult." The punishment for all these offenses is a fine of up to 50 rubles imposed by administrative commissions of the district (*raion*) or city soviets.[12]

It is puzzling that failure to register religious associations (par. 1.) is thus treated as a relatively minor offense incurring only a fine. Unofficially (but in fact), religious organizations are divided into three categories: 1) Registered—legal, 2) unregistered—illegal, 3) not allowed to register—tolerated. In line with this division, Soviet practice has been to prosecute and punish with maximum severity in the case of illegal organizations, often applying not only Article 142 of the Criminal Code but also the ominous article 70 (on anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda);[13] to dissolve the organization with a warning of sanctions when it has been appraised as insignificant and the danger is considered minor; or sometimes to tolerate its existence when the organization is restricted in size and is considered harmless in the fostering of religious beliefs. Evidently another "middle of the road" alternative was required and the new provision answers the need.

Concerning the sanction for violation of the rules in organizing and conducting religious meetings, processions and ceremonies (par. 2 above), according to the legislative acts of 1929, prayer meetings of believers who have formed a religious society or religious group may be held *without* notification or permission of the authorities.

There are no specific rules in the law of April 8, 1929, on organizing and conducting routine religious meetings or ceremonies of the sect, except a provision requiring permission of the authorities for calling a general assembly of the religious association (par. 23 of the "Instructions") and the calling of religious conferences and conventions of more than one religious association (pars. 21-24 of the "Law" and pars. 28-32 of the "Instructions"). It is not clear which religious meetings and ceremonies are meant by the new law.[14]

The other activities enumerated above (in par. 3) and many more were prohibited by the "Instructions" of 1929. In paragraph 2 alone, in points "a" to "h," eight prohibitions are specified. Out of the score of prohibitions in the "Instructions," the new ordinance has selected but a few. For instance, the "Instructions" included in the same sentence literary, sewing and other "circles," whereas the new ordinance omits "sewing" and singles out "literary" circles—a good indication of the kind of activities the authorities are now especially concerned with.

Both the ordinance covering activities punishable administratively and the edict on the application of Article 142 of the Criminal Code to certain other activities *do not begin to exhaust* all the "do's" and "don't's" that were included in the two acts of 1929. Some examples of these others are: the manifold regulations concerning prayer houses and religious objects, which are by law the property of the state, used and administered by religious associations, and the regulations on the rights and duties of the clergy, on religious teaching, on closing a house of prayer and disposing of the religious objects.

Are these activities not to be punished henceforth as "violations of the law on separation of church and state and of church and school"? The new laws do not provide an answer.

Conclusions

1) At a time when a powerful anti-religious campaign has greatly weakened the churches in the Soviet

[12] The Administrative Commissions of the local soviets were established in 1962 with the authority to impose administrative penalties and to review penalties imposed by administrative officials. (Edict of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR, March 30, 1962, in *Vedomosti RSFSR*, No. 13, 1962, pos. 162) See also: Harold J. Berman, *Soviet Criminal Law and Procedure*, p. 7.

[13] See the relevant article of Yu. T. Milko, "Nauchno-ateisticheskaia propaganda i ugolovno-pravovaia borba s prestupleniami tserkovnikov i sektantov" (Scientific-atheist propaganda and criminal-legal fight against crimes of churchmen and sectarians) in *Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo*, Moscow, v. 7, 1964.

[14] One wonders whether the new edict will also apply in the case of *obstructing* or *interfering* with a religious procession around a house of prayer, or with religious ceremonies performed without notification in a private apartment, or in the case of conducting religious rites for dying or "dangerously ill persons" in hospitals and prisons. All of these are religious activities permitted by law (Par. 33, 34, 35 (a) of the "Instructions" of October 1, 1929) but are often not allowed by local Soviet authorities to be performed. Article 143 which has made such actions punishable ("obstructing the performance of religious rites") with the qualification "if they do not violate public order and are not accompanied by infringement of the rights of citizens" has been rarely applied.

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Union, the enactments of March 1966 are particularly puzzling. Much of what they comprise is but a re-enactment of old laws. Some of the provisions that are novel seem vague and arbitrary. While precision and clarity are not cultivated as assiduously by Soviet lawmakers as by their Western counterparts, it is odd that the relationship between the new legislative acts and the existing laws on religious matters as expressed in the decree of January 1918 and in the laws of 1929 is not even mentioned.

2) Appraisal of the new acts depends on how they will be interpreted, especially on whether they will be construed as defining *all* religious activities and observances that are henceforth punishabe or only selected offenses that the Soviet authorities deemed it necessary to reemphasize. The wording of the acts might be interpreted either way. If the acts do cover all activities that are henceforth punishable, the new legislation is a rather "liberal" development. It would circumscribe the area of illegal activities, prescribe punishment for each offense—light punishment for some—and remove from the sphere of punishable acts a number of other prohibitions included in the 1929 legislative acts.[15] If, on the other hand, the recent acts are not an exhaustive list of all punishable activities, but represent only a selected few, then the reverse would be true, and the recent legislation will serve as an additional means of restricting religious activities.

3) Whatever the interpretation, the edict and the ordinance give us clues to the activities of religious associations that are now of particular concern to the Soviet authorities.

4) The new legislative acts have "put teeth" into some of the provisions of existing legislation on religious matters, but have reduced others to milder administrative treatment. The division of punishable activities into more serious offenses, subject to prosecution under the Criminal Code, and less serious transgressions, subject to administrative action, seems to be arbitrary, *dictated by actual contingencies*. Otherwise, it is difficult to explain why some apparently serious offenses (such as failure to register a "religious associaton") are punishable in the administrative order, and some obviously less serious transgressions (such as "compulsory" collection of funds, or holding religious meetings that "disturb public order") qualify for criminal prosecution.

5) Many provisions of the ordinance on the application of Article 142 of the Criminal Code will work to the disadvantage of religious believers. The provisions concerning "the commission of fraudulent actions for purposes of inciting religious superstition" and the provision on the "organization and conduct of religious meetings and other cult ceremonies disturbing public order" are particularly dangerous for religious believers. On the other hand, the provision which brings the act of depriving citizens of benefits on the grounds of their religious beliefs under the Criminal Code is obviously advantageous for religious believers and their families. Its significance becomes greater when one realizes that the persons answerable on this kind of criminal charge are, under Soviet conditions, individuals holding official executive positions as managers and heads of offices and educational institutions. It remains to be seen whether this new provision has been added merely to placate public opinion, and how and when this provision of the law will be applied.

6) A codification of the laws on religious matters, a clear establishment of the duties and responsibilities of religious organizations and religious believers in the observance of their cult, and finally steps to make the actual laws easily available to all Soviet citizens—these are urgently needed measures, and measures to be expected from a state governed by law. Raising Soviet legislation on religious matters and its application at least to the level of other legislation would certainly satisfy one of the basic demands of religious believers in the Soviet Union and of public opinion abroad.

[15] For instance, par. 19 of the law of 1929 includes the very important restriction limiting the activities of the clergyman to the area where the prayer building he officiates in is located. This prohibition is not included in the new legislative acts; do we have to understand that it has not lost its validity?

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"Solving" the Nationality Problem

By Richard Pipes

Nationalism is a natural ally and concomitant of democracy.* This connection is often lost sight of in the West where nationalism, once it matured, shed its democratic affiliations and became increasingly identified with conservative and reactionary causes. But this had not been the case in Europe originally, and it is still not the case in those areas of the world which have only recently experienced the first stirrings of national sentiment. Here, nationalism and democracy are closely linked.

There are good reasons for this close affinity between the two. Democracy, by the mere fact of asserting the principle of popular sovereignty, raises the question: Who are the "people"? How many and what kind of "people" rule the given state? These questions are most readily answered by reference to nationality. The "people" are the "nation"—that is, those who share a common language and secular culture. Indeed, in most European constitutions of the late 18th and early 19th centuries, the terms "people" and "nation" are used interchangeably. Now, in multinational empires where one nation rules many, this identification of democracy with nationalism is inherently an explosive force. Here the "sovereignty of the people" means not only the introduction of democratic institutions, but the overthrow of foreign rule. This is the reason why, under the impact of democracy, imperial structures previously considered viable, like the Austrian and British, came under severe internal stress in the past century.

Until the end of the 19th century, the Russian Empire was generally regarded as a viable poli-

* Prof. Pipes' study is a revised version of a paper presented to the conference on "The October Revolution: Promise and Realization," conducted by the Institute for the Study of the USSR in Munich, Germany, October 24-28, 1966. It will be published together with other papers from the conference in three special issues of *Studies on the Soviet Union*, subsequently to be reprinted in book form by F. A. Praeger, New York.

Professor of History at Harvard University, Mr. Pipes has written widely on Russian intellectual history, as well as on nationalism and nationalities in the Soviet Union. Among his works are The Formation of the Soviet Union *(Harvard University Press, 1954), and* Social Democracy and the St. Petersburg Labor Movement, 1885-1897 *(Harvard, 1963).*

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tical organism—except by the Poles, who had been acquired late and refused to assimilate. One can dismiss accusations that Russian imperialism was more brutal than its Western counterparts, exactly as one can disregard the claims of Stalinist and post-Stalinist Soviet historians that it was somehow more "progressive." The Russian Empire was an empire like the others, perhaps less efficiently administered, especially in the remote provinces where lack of supervision by the center permitted serious abuses. Its political inefficiency, however, did have its good side, for it also allowed a great deal of diversity. Until the 1860's, vast areas of Russia were allowed to escape the authority of the central bureaucratic apparatus and to rule themselves (e.g., Livonia, Finland, and the Kazakh steppe).

A complicating feature of the history of Russian imperialism is the fact that the Great Russians developed a sense of national consciousness more or less concurrently with their subject peoples (the Poles again excepted). In other words, at the very time when they acquired an awareness of their own national identity, they were forced to contend with nationalist movements directed against themselves. I believe that this coincidence had much bearing on the whole development of Russian nationalism and, in particular, on Russian imperial practices. The French in North Africa, the Germans in the Cameroons, or the Japanese in Korea had no doubt about their own identity. They crossed bodies of water, put down local resistance by force, and incorporated the conquered areas. But the Russians were never fully conscious of being strangers in their vast and amorphous land. The absence of any sharp land or water frontiers between Russia proper—the upper Volga and Oka region—and the Pacific, the Himalayas, or the Black Sea, permitted Russian colonists to move steadily outwards, engulfing or bypassing other ethnic groups, often without realizing that they were engaged in an imperial venture. The historical fusion of nationalism and imperialism, as well as the geographic contiguity of national state and empire, helps explain why the Russians never developed either an imperial mentality or an imperial constitution. They created and ruled an empire as if they were creating and ruling a national state.

The first stirrings of national sentiment among the subjugated peoples toward the end of the 19th century produced a distinct shock in Russian public opinion, well reflected in the programs of political parties. The parties of the right, of course, rejected out of hand any idea of autonomy for the various ethnic groups, being committed to uphold the supremacy of the Great Russian nationality and its Orthodox religion. But even those of the center and the left—parties which would have no truck with racial or religious discrimination—were strangely embarrassed whenever the "national problem" reared its head. They were all for abolishing disabilities imposed by the Imperial government on minorities, such as the Jews; they were even prepared to concede independence to Poland. But beyond this they hesitated to go. Russian liberals and socialists, in their desperate fight against Tsarism, feared nationalism as a divisive force and preferred to ignore it.

Though by the time World War I broke out most political parties had formulated programmatic solutions of the nationality problem, they did so in an unmistakably halfhearted manner. Deep inside, the liberals believed that the national problem would solve itself with the introduction of political democracy, while the socialists were equally certain it would vanish with the expropriation of private property. That the desires of the minorities not only stemmed from political or economic dissatisfaction but also expressed positive aspirations of a democratic nature was not seriously entertained by any prominent opposition group in Russia, despite ample evidence to that effect from neighboring Austro-Hungary.

Lenin and the National Question

Fundamentally, Lenin had a similar attitude toward the national question, notwithstanding the boldness of his nationality program. Like his socialist colleagues, he viewed nationalism as a by-product of the capitalist mode of production, doomed to disappear with the introduction of socialism. More than any socialist leader, however, he took seriously the possibility of exploiting the frustrations of the national minorities for revolutionary purposes. Lenin always looked for allies, no matter how distasteful they or their ideals may have been to him. It was while living in Austria on the eve of World War I that he became aware of the explosive force of nationalism and formulated a radical programmatic "solution." This solution was political self-determination, defined to mean that every national minority had the right to separate and form an independent state; if it did not wish to avail itself of this right, it had to acquiesce to assimi-

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lation. Lenin rejected any middle way, such as federalism or cultural autonomy, because he felt they institutionalized and therefore perpetuated national distinctions. His thesis on national self-determination was criticized at the time of its formulation (1913) by fellow-Bolsheviks on the ground that it would split Russia into many small states and thereby hamper the development of capitalism and socialism. Lenin, however, had no such fears. He felt certain that capitalism would inexorably fuse the national minorities with the Russians and create out of the Empire an indissoluble whole, so that in practice no minority peoples would or could take advantage of the right to independent statehood. His solution, therefore, was also essentially declarative. It was so bold because he did not expect it to be exercised.

Within a few years, however, events made a mockery of Lenin's calculations.

Once the revolution got under way, the nationalist movement among the non-Russian peoples matured with great rapidity. The phenomenon had no single cause. In some areas, separatism was due to a desire of local groups to escape the bloodshed of the civil war. In others, it was the result of intervention by Germans, Austrians and Turks. In others yet, it came into being because of pent-up hatred between the native population and Russian settlers. Whatever the reason, however, once launched, separatism gained great impetus. The local governments which came into being in the years 1918-1920 may have been as ephemeral as the money or postage stamps they issued, but the independence which they proclaimed and in some way embodied struck root in popular consciousness. The native intelligentsias in particular developed a strong appetite for authority during those years. The history of the formation of the Soviet Union offers many striking examples of individuals who as late as 1916 had pledged loyalty to Russia, yet fought for separation from it two or three years later.

The unexpected disintegration of the Russian Empire confronted Lenin with a dilemma: either to acquiesce in it and reduce the domain of the Bolshevik regime to the size of Muscovy in the reign of Basil II; or to seize the separatist areas by force of arms and thereby abandon the entire Bolshevik nationality program. As we know, Lenin chose the second alternative. Wherever possible, he ordered the separated borderlands to be reconquered and reincorporated into the Russian state. At the same time, as a sop to their nationalist feelings, he granted the so-called Soviet republics pseudo-federal status and a considerable measure of cultural autonomy—the very devices which he had condemned before the Revolution as nationalistic and reactionary.

The foundations of Soviet nationality policy thus were laid not in Lenin's pre-1917 writings, but in the practical directives issued in the midst of the Civil War. At that time the Communists did not think about the long-term effects of any policy, for they were fighting for survival. They needed Ukrainian wheat, coal, and iron, Caucasian oil, and Turkestani cotton. They had to prevent the borderlands from turning into White outposts. It must also be kept in mind that in 1918-19 the Communists believed in the imminence of world revolution. In subjugating the breakaway borderland republics, they were motivated not so much by a desire to reestablish the frontiers of the old Russian Empire as by a wish to "liberate" as many countries as possible from the "capitalist-imperialist yoke." Their attack on the government of the Ukrainian Directory in early 1919 basically had much the same purpose as the support which they extended that year to Bela Kun's government in Hungary, a country which had never formed part of Russia. The fact that Soviet nationality policy was devised as an emergency measure in the Civil War, that it was not thought out but improvised as a makeshift arrangement to tide the new regime over until the outbreak of world revolution, is essential to an understanding of both its philosophy and its operation.

By 1920 it became clear that the world revolution would not come, at least in the foreseeable future. It was necessary, therefore, to bring order to the helterskelter arrangement which had come into being in the preceding three years. The constitution of the Soviet Union, promulgated in 1923-24, froze the system of administration evolved in the course of the Civil War. It is testimony to the fundamental conservatism of all Russian politics, whether imperial or Soviet, that this system has remained virtually intact to this day. This fact permits us to review the successes and failures of Soviet nationality policy over the past fifty years as a whole. Let us carry out the survey under the rubrics of political, economic, and cultural policies.

Politics

The Soviet Union has been from the beginning a strictly centralized state, ruled both horizontally and vertically by the Communist Party. The party does

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not recognize national divisions. Its structure is homogeneous, cutting across ethnic lines. This much can hardly be disputed.

Despite its own centralization, the party recognizes constitutionally the existence of national republics, some of which—the so-called union republics—are in theory able to separate and form independent, sovereign states. In reality unitary, the Soviet Union is in form federal. The fiction of federalism is a legacy of the Civil War, when it was found expedient, for both domestic and foreign reasons, to leave the conquered borderlands a semblance of sovereignty. In 1922, when the new constitution was being drafted, Stalin urged that this fiction be abandoned and the national republics incorporated into the Russian Soviet Republic. But Lenin refused because he foresaw the necessity of formally dissociating the new Soviet state from the name "Russia" in order to permit the absorption into it of future communized countries. (Lenin originally even proposed to call the new state "Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of Europe and Asia"). Lenin also attached importance to the federal fiction as a psychological asset in overcoming the suspicion of the national minorities toward the Russians. For these reasons the pseudo-federal system remained on the books.

Now it is needless to elaborate that the republics do not—and, given the Communist Party's view of itself, cannot—enjoy anything resembling genuine authority, and that their "right to separation" is meaningless. Historically viewed, the functions of the so-called republican governments resemble not those of bona fide federal states but those assigned before the Revolution to the provincial *zemstva*. Nevertheless, the Soviet national republics with their token governments must not be written off. The *zemstva*, too, lacked legislative authority, yet they became with time important foci of political resistance. The same may well happen with the administrations of the Soviet republics.

In the first place, national governments, even when impotent, are known from historical experience to arouse strong feelings of loyalty among both their officials and subjects. Napoleon had this disagreable experience with the satellite governments he had set up over Europe. Even some of his own brothers identified themselves so closely with their domains that they resisted him and had to be removed. The puppet Napoleonic Kingdom of Italy and the Confederation of the Rhine became the nuclei, respectively, of the united Italian and German states. We can observe the same phenomenon in 20th-century Africa. The African states which came into existence after World War II follow the frontiers carved out in the 19th century by their imperial masters. They are legacies of conquests accomplished by Western armies and legalized by Western diplomats without regard either to the wishes of the native population or to its ethnic composition. Yet the "imperialist" origin of their states has not inhibited the Ghanaians or the Congolese from developing a genuine sense of patriotism. Undoubtedly this is also true of the Soviet national minorities. The fact that the Uzbek Republic is a Soviet creation, and that its government enjoys no meaningful authority, probably does not make it any less real for the Uzbeks, and especially for the Uzbek intelligentsia.

In the second place, the bureaucratization of Soviet life and the spread of education have markedly increased the number of intellectuals with administrative experience. In 1917-20, the nationalist movement in the borderlands of Russia had been led by a handful of lawyers, teachers, and journalists, few of whom had had any practice in statecraft. By contrast, there are today in every minority republic thousands of persons employed in the party and state apparatus who could, if permitted, assume full responsibility for local administration. The hunger for power among the intelligentsia in so-called underdeveloped countries is well known. They tend to consider a secondary school diploma a ticket to political office, and they chafe when positions to which they feel entitled are occupied by civil officials from another region or of another nationality. There is little doubt that the native intelligentsia in the Soviet borderlands have similar ambitions and experience similar frustrations. To enjoy the appearance of power without its substance is not something which they like or will acquiesce in forever.

These two considerations—the psychological reality of statehood and the discontent of the native intelligentsia, especially those serving in the bureaucracy—endow Soviet federalism with a significance which it lacks when viewed purely from the point of view of power distribution. Devised to mollify nationalism, it in effect intensifies it and provides it with institutional outlets.

Economics

The economic benefits of imperialism are familiar. Imperialist rule brings with it capital and technical skills, opens up markets for local produce, and thereby contributes to "economic develop-

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ment." Thanks to these benefits, areas which once were colonial possessions are today at a higher economic level than those which were not. On the debit side, however, imperialism entails regional specialization, which results in unbalanced economies overdependent on one or two basic commodities.

Broadly speaking, Soviet imperialism has brought with it the same advantages and disadvantages as did so-called "capitalist" imperialism.[1] Russian investments have stimulated and continue to stimulate economic activities which would have been beyond the capacity of the borderlands were they independent. The construction of railroad lines alone (many of them, to be sure, laid before the Revolution) has linked the borderlands with markets that would not have been otherwise available to them, thereby substantially enhancing the value of their produce. At the same time, however, the borderlands have not been permitted to develop rounded economies. Soviet planning offices treat the entire Soviet Union as an economic entity, placing industries and assigning crops where they are most profitable or strategically useful, without regard to local desires. As Miss Conolly and Prof. Vardys indicate, this policy of regional specialization and dependence on the all-Union economy arouses considerable resentment in the national republics.

Setting aside the question of how well the borderlands would have fared economically had they not been subjected to Communist economic regulation, it seems fairly certain that by being part of a large economic entity they do enjoy distinct benefits.[2] Statistical computations purporting to show that Russia withdraws more wealth from the national republics than it puts into them are not convincing because they usually do not take into account the costs of administration and defense which these republics would have to bear if they were independent. They are indeed no more realistic than Marxist statistics adduced to show imperialistic exploitation of colonies by the "capitalist" countries. Nevertheless, many intellectuals in the borderlands passionately believe that they *are* being exploited by Russia, and this belief is politically significant.

Confined for half a century within a closed economy and unable to reach foreign markets directly, the national republics have become, for better or worse, welded economically to the other regions of the Soviet Union. It would be dangerous, however, to draw from this economic fact conclusions about their political future. We know, for example, how closely Algeria was formerly integrated into the French economy, and how much its own economy has declined since independence. Yet this predictable fact did not prevent Algerian nationalists from waging a determined struggle for independence. Nor would they now trade their independence for the economic advantages of reunification. If economic considerations were the determining factor in such matters, nationalism would not exist, because it is inherently an economic absurdity. The integration of the various regions of the USSR into an economic whole, therefore, is not likely of itself to retard the development of national sentiments or movements. The mere fact that many intellectuals in the national republics believe they would be better off without Russian tutelage may have more bearing on their political actions than the objective realities of the situation.

There is another aspect to this matter. Even if separation from the imperial metropolis usually brings with it an economic decline of the ex-colony taken as a whole, it does improve the economic status of some of the native social groups. How many clerks in French Algerian enterprises have become executives since Algeria gained independence! How many sergeants have been promoted to colonels, how many teachers have become school inspectors, how many reporters have secured editorial desks! The general deterioration of the Algerian economy has not adversely affected *their* climb up the social and economic ladder. And after all, it is just these groups—resentful intellectuals and white-collar workers—who everywhere furnish the leading cadres of nationalist movements. It would be difficult to dissuade them from engaging in separatist activities by the force of general economic arguments. No matter what would happen to their particular country as a whole, their personal position would be likely to improve under independent statehood.

The Algerian example provides a further corollary for Russia. After the protracted and vicious war waged between the French and Algerians, one might have expected that relations between them would remain permanently poisoned. Yet as soon as France had granted Algeria independence, the

[1] This statement is meant to apply only to areas within the USSR, and not to the so-called satellite states of Eastern Europe.

[2] There is little doubt in the author's mind that Russia and its empire would have been very much better off economically had the Revolution not occurred, but this is irrelevant to the present discussion.

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two countries reestablished normal economic ties. The point is that Algeria and France, having become economically interdependent over a long period of common statehood, need each other. France requires Algerian labor (and, more recently, oil); Algeria requires French markets. It is likely that future relations between the national republics and Russia will develop along similar lines. Even if some day the Ukraine, the Caucasus, and Central Asia should secure independence, they would probably want to continue close economic relations with Russia proper, to which they are linked by transport and a long tradition of trade. Russia thus seems likely to remain the hub of a large economic community, regardless of political vicissitudes.

Culture

In the borderlands which they reconquered during the Civil War, the Communists at first granted the minorities a considerable measure of linguistic and cultural autonomy in addition to pseudo-federal institutions. In particular, they permitted the native intellectuals great latitude in matters of historical and political thought. This policy was abandoned in the early 1930's, when Stalin, for reasons of political expediency, found it necessary to appeal to Great Russian nationalism; however, it left lasting traces. For many of the nationalities, the 1920's were a decade of unprecedented cultural activity, in the course of which they laid the foundations of a national ideology. Indeed, some of the smaller, more primitive ethnic groups became aware only then of their national identity. If for the Russians the Revolution marked the beginning of a tragic cultural decline, for some of the minorities it meant the very opposite: the birth of a national culture.

Much of the "instant culture" that sprang up in non-Russian republics during the 1920's is comical, but it is nevertheless taken very seriously by the population concerned. For example, I recall once being told by an Azerbaijani refugee that the Russians must have no culture of their own, otherwise they would not translate into Russian so many works by non-Russian authors of the Soviet Union. Even so civilized and ancient a nation as the Armenians can get carried away and—as Mr. Volgin's essay illustrates—make claim to having invented cybernetics a thousand years ago.

No single aspect of the nationality question evokes more passion than the matter of assimilation. And rightly so, for this issue is indeed critical. If in fact the minorities are gradually losing their ethnic identity and fusing with the dominant Great Russian population, then the Bolsheviks may be said to have successfully "solved" the nationality problem. To answer this question with any degree of assurance, we would have to have access to a great deal of statistical and ethnographic information—such, for example, as data on intermarriage or domestic habits. We do not, however, possess such information, and all we can go by is the census figures on linguistic habits—data which are at best of limited significance, and at worst of dubious reliability. Without going into the detailed results of the linguistic censuses, suffice it to say that while they indicate rapid linguistic assimilation of smaller and territorially scattered ethnic groups, they also reveal a remarkable persistence of linguistic loyalty among the larger, more compact minorities with their own republics. There has been no significant Russification of the Ukrainians, Georgians, Uzbeks, or other major borderland peoples. The fact that in these republics much of the administration and education is in the hands of native intellectuals makes it possible to resist efforts at Russification emanating from the center and from the local Russian population.

The prevalence of bilingualism among intellectuals in the borderlands need not, of itself, be taken as a symptom of denationalization. The phenomenon has parallels in other colonial areas. The most rabid Indian nationalists, for example, spoke English as their second language, and even today English continues to serve as the official language in the parliament of independent India. Similarly, in Algeria, the war for independence was led by French-educated Arab nationalists, to whom French was a second language. English was for the Indians, and French for the Algerians, not a substitute for their local, native languages, but a link with the Western world. Russian performs the same function for Azerbaijani or Tadjik intellectuals.

The linguistic data are thus not enough to permit any firm opinion on the question of ethnic assimilation. It can be said, however, that neither the scanty information coming from the USSR nor the lessons taught by the experience of other empires would suggest that such assimilation is taking place. The onus of proof in this matter rests with those who argue the opposite hypothesis. The intense debate carried on in Soviet journals (as reported by Mr. Hodnett) on the subject of the "merging" of nationalities in the Communist state of the future is indicative of the concern this

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question causes the Soviet authorities and shows they are far from convinced that the issue of assimilation has been solved in a positive sense.

In addition to politics, economics, and culture, there is one more aspect of Soviet nationality policy that should be mentioned, one that cuts across all three: the relationship between ethnic groups. Official Soviet propaganda sidestepped this question for a long time on the ground that there can be no national antagonism in the Soviet Union, either because it has been constitutionally outlawed, or because the Russians are immune to it by virtue of their peculiar "all-human" ethos. It is perfectly clear however, that the Soviet constitution, of itself, can no more eliminate national or racial tensions in the USSR than the US Bill of Rights can assure the civil equality of American Negroes. More is needed than laws. The belief that the Soviet constitution has "solved" the relations between ethnic groups is a widespread Russian self-delusion. Much the same holds true of Russian "pan-humanity." It may have carried the day for Dostoevski in his Pushkin Speech of 1880, but as a serious contention it will not hold water. The Russians are as susceptible to anti-semitism, anti-Negroism, and every form of xenophobia as are members of other nations.

It is difficult to speak with any assurance on ethnic relations in the Soviet Union because the material is even scantier than on the question of assimilation. There is much evidence that friction exists not only between the Russians and the other nationalities, but also among the different national minorities themselves, as observed from personal experience by Mr. Volgin and Mr. Gitelman. Many of the minority intellectuals blame the Russians for the poverty and lack of freedom in their regions; others, not without justice, accuse them of discrimination in higher schooling and career advancement. In areas where the Russian have penetrated and settled *en masse* in this century (*e.g.*, the Baltic areas and Kazakhstan) there is deep resentment against the newcomers and acute racial tension. (As Mr. Wheeler points out, the Muslim regions of the USSR have been more heavily colonized by non-Muslims than any other Muslim area in the world.) But there does not seem to be widespread hatred of Russians, even among ethnic groups which have suffered most from communism. For although the Russians rule, they are not a "Herrenvolk" as were the Germans in their short-lived empire. A Russian *qua* Russian does enjoy certain advantages, but he does not automatically have a privileged status. Indeed, some Russian settlers in the non-Russian republics believe that they are worse off than the native citizens, and they grumble about having to toil for the indolent Caucasians or Turkestanis. There are also local tensions among different national groups. The Armenians and Azeri Turks, for example, seem to have developed a healthy dislike for the neighboring Georgians, whom they accuse of having lorded it in the days of Stalin and Beria. In the Ukraine, the traditional antisemitism has not subsided.

All these antagonisms are undoubtedly exacerbated by that intense Russian nationalism which has since the 1930's penetrated the whole Soviet apparatus, but they cannot be entirely ascribed to it. In recent times we have seen similar ethnic conflicts arising in democratic states (*e.g.*, Canada and Belgium) where the minorities are given very wide latitude. As pointed out at the beginning of this essay, nationalism is an intrinsic aspect of the democratization of modern life which goes on relentlessly everywhere, even in countries with a political system that is the very antithesis of democracy.

To summarize: The national problem in the Soviet Union surely has not been "solved." On the contrary, if by a "solution" we mean the disappearance of national frustrations and animosities, the problem is in many ways more acute than it was when the Communists seized power fifty years ago. True, the Soviet regime is in theory an international government, the bastion of "world socialism," and it cannot afford to tolerate, let alone excite, national animosities as the Imperial government was wont to do in its final decades. For this reason, although antisemitism, for example, seems to have greatly intensified in the past fifty years, it is not allowed to take violent outlets. On the other hand, all the evidence available both from within the Soviet Union itself and from historic parallels with other countries indicates that the nationalism of the minority peoples of the USSR (like that of the Russians themselves) has grown and intensified since 1917. There is a great deal of nationalist frustration in the Soviet Union. Unless the Soviet rulers face up to it and begin the process of decentralization voluntarily, it is likely someday to explode in a most destructive manner.

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Reviews in Brief

Soviet Central Asia

OLAF CAROE: *Soviet Empire, The Turks of Central Asia and Stalinism* (2nd ed.), New York, St. Martin's Press, 1967.

ALEC NOVE AND J. A. NEWTH: *The Soviet Middle East, A Communist Model for Development,* New York, Praeger, 1967.

ALEXANDRE BENNIGSEN AND CHANTAL LEMERCIER-QUELQUEJAY: *Islam in the Soviet Union,* New York, Praeger, 1967.

THE THREE BOOKS under review are welcome additions to the growing literature on Russian Turkestan and Soviet Central Asia, meriting a place on the bookshelf beside the studies of Pierce, Parks, Allworth, Carrère d'Encausse, Bacon and Wheeler.[1] While there are few disagreements among them on factual matters, the authors differ in their viewpoints and areas of emphasis, with the result that they adopt divergent, if not actually conflicting, attitudes on the issue of Soviet imperialism in Central Asia.

To begin with, one might juxtapose the studies of Olaf Caroe and Alec Nove -J. A. Newth since they are at opposite poles in their evaluation of the impact of communism and the Russian presence in the Moslem regions. Caroe's study is a new edition of his 1953 classic. In a lengthy introduction commenting on developments since 1953, he writes that the passage of the years and a "rereading of the book do not incline me to alter or amend anything that is said in it":

On the main fact sought to be established by these pages, I see no grounds for reviewing the conclusion that the Russian presence in Central Asia remains today, more than ever, the primary example of imperial colonization of an Asian or African territory by a European power. . . . It is true to say that this area has become a field for Russian colonization on a scale never attempted since Europeans ventured into the largely empty spaces of North America. Imperialism does not only come over the sea in ships.[2]

Caroe returns repeatedly to this theme and to the key question that disturbs him: Why should a landward imperialism be so hard to recognize? Thus, he seems to set himself the task of presenting the facts so as to make this recognition easier.

Caroe's style often verges on the poetic. His treatment of Turkestan's history prior to the Russian conquest is almost romantic, but while he is seldom less than eloquent, he is also given to linguistic extravagance, for example in his description of a certain Khakimov as a "Mulla turned stooge" (p. xviii). The Caroe edition benefits greatly from the use of Zeki Validi Togan's (Validov's) major work, *Turkestan Today* (still not translated into English from the Turkish). Validov's involvement in the struggle against Soviet power in Turkestan provided a wealth of material that Caroe unveils in his chronicle of the *Basmachi* movement and the role of Enver Pasha in Bukhara. These sections are perhaps the most valuable parts of the book, for they provide the Western reader with information that has hitherto been available only to those who read Turkish.

In both the introduction and the text of the new edition, Caroe turns up intriguing lines of analysis, then disappoints us by not pursuing them. He merely mentions, for example, the limited extent of Russian colonization in Uzbekistan and Tadjikistan as compared to the substantial influx of Slavs into the Kazakh and Kirghiz Republics. He also initiates a discussion of the importance of water control as the starting point for the imposition of Communist power—a concept that brings to mind Karl Wittfogel's hypotheses regarding the "hydraulic society" [3]—but he does not apply this line of thought to the contrasting experiences of collectivization in the Kazakh nomadic regions and the Uzbek settled territory. Caroe is drawn to the traumatic upheaval of the Kazakhs, rather than to the less familiar adjustment of the Uzbeks. Finally, one wonders why Mr. Caroe did not probe his own find-

[1] Richard A. Pierce, *Russian Central Asia 1867-1917,* 1960; Alexander G. Park, *Bolshevism in Turkestan, 1917-1927,* 1957; Edward Allworth, *Uzbek Literary Politics,* 1964; Edward Allworth, ed., *Central Asia,* 1967; H. Carrère d'Encausse, *Réforme et Révolution chez les Musulmans de l'Empire Russe: Bukhara 1867-1924,* 1966; Elizabeth E. Bacon, *Central Asians under Russian Rule,* 1966; Geoffrey Wheeler, *The Modern History of Soviet Central Asia,* 1964.

[2] Olaf Caroe, *Soviet Empire,* p. viii.

[3] Karl A. Wittfogel, *Oriental Despotism,* New Haven, Yale University Press, 1957.

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ing that there is a large contingent of Uzbeks in the Tadjik Republic, for this discovery points to the possibility that the Uzbeks played the role of "elder brother" in the Tadjiks' development—as the Russians had done for the Uzbeks. A detailed study of the 1920's and 1930's suggests that an Uzbek hegemony did exist, yet Caroe chooses not to treat this or other evidence of tensions and rivalries among the various Central Asian peoples.

Alec Nove and J. A. Newth take a quite different approach from that of Mr. Caroe. They seem to consider it more productive to evaluate the modernization of the "Soviet Middle East" while purposely avoiding preoccupation with the theme of Russian imperialism.

In the course of their appraisal, the two authors make a strong case for the argument that there were fewer political and more economic motives behind Soviet policy than is often granted. First of all, they dispense with the notion of "cotton colony" as a comprehensive framework or a very useful insight. After explaining that political attitudes in the Soviet Union are difficult to measure, they assert that there is little evidence of the sort of anti-Russian sentiment that would undoubtedly characterize a "cotton colony." They argue, further, that the Uzbek *dekkhan* suffered less than the Russian or Ukrainian peasant, and in fact gained a great deal from the Russian presence and from integration into the all-Union economic network. The data gathered for this volume present a vivid contrast between the economic progress of the Soviet Republics of Georgia and Uzbekistan and the lack of such progress in Turkey and Iran.

Islam in the Soviet Union, by Mr. Bennigsen and Miss Lemercier-Quelquejay, is an assessment of the Soviet impact on Central Asia from the historian's viewpoint. In this brilliant study the reader is not only treated to a stimulating analysis of the present state of Islam, but is also given a valuable reconstruction of the past, drawing upon the authors' earlier studies of Islam in the pre-Soviet and Soviet periods.[4] This is a book of fundamental importance. The authors' discussion of the interaction between communism and Moslem nationalism, of the hopes, frustrations and ultimate fate of those Moslems who took the Leninist theory of self-determination seriously is first-rate, indeed probably the best available in Western literature. In addition, there is an authoritative analysis of the Sultan Galiev episode, including a perceptive evaluation of the motives of those Moslem Communists who rallied to the Soviet banner, and a sympathetic but realistic appraisal of the failures of the non-Communist nationalists.

Turkic émigrés may simply consider Moslem Communists such as Sultan Galiev and the Uzbek leaders, Akmal Ikramov and Faizulla Khodzhaev, to be traitors to their peoples. But the student of the Soviet Union must consider why such talented men found communism relevant to their problems. Benningsen and Quelquejay settle on the appeal of the ideology as a doctrine for modernization. According to the authors, the fate of these leaders under Stalin should not obscure the fact that they were seeking a synthesis of Marxism and Islam, of modernization and traditionalism, and that this search underlay their espousal of a form of Bolshevism which they hoped to adapt to the native environment. Both Ikramov and Khodzhaev shared the dock with Bukharin and the others in the 1938 Moscow show trial;[5] and their recent rehabilitation has arisen from the attempt of the present Moslem intelligentsia to correct the historical record and perhaps to strive once again for greater local autonomy. The unexpected, difficult, but long overdue rehabilitation of the "bourgeois nationalist" Faizulla Khodzhaev[6] is especially pertinent to current controversies. Bennigsen and Quelquejay are convinced that the "Soviet" Moslem intelligentsia that has emerged since the purges will be the source of even more innovation in the future.

[4] See by the same authors, *La Presse et le Mouvement National chez les Musulmans de Russie avant 1920*, and *Les Mouvements Nationaux chez les Musulmans de Russie, Le "Sultangalievisme" au Tatarstan.*

[5] While the authors make an error on p. 108, stating that Khodzhaev "was condemned to death in 1937," on p. 160 they correctly note that he and Ikramov were sentenced at the 1938 Moscow trial. He was, however, arrested in 1937, at or just after the Uzbek party congress.

[6] Compare the two articles making Khodzhaev's rehabilitation: *Izvestia*, May 25, 1966; and *Pravda Vostoka*, May 27, 1966.

Reviewers in This Issue

DONALD S. CARLISLE—Associate Professor of Political Economy, University of Toronto. Formerly Research Fellow at the Russian Research Center, Harvard University. Now completing a study of Soviet Central Asia.

GEOFFREY WHEELER—Director of the Central Asian Research Center in London (also see his article on p. 72).

STANLEY W. PAGE—Professor of History at the City College of New York.

ROSALIND VEE AVNET—American student of Soviet affairs, now on the staff of this journal.

ROBERT A. FELDMESSER—Associate Professor of Sociology at Dartmouth College, Hanover, New Hampshire.

JEREMY R. AZRAEL—Associate Professor of Sociology at the University of Chicago. Author of *Managerial Power and Soviet Politics* (Harvard University Press, 1966).

JOHN W. LAWRENCE—Editor of *Frontier* (London), and noted authority on religion in the Soviet Union.

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The analysis of social class and population data applied by Bennigsen and Lemercier-Quelquejay verifies the structural integration of the Moslem intelligentsia within the broad framework of Soviet society (whereas language data raise some questions regarding the integration of the native masses). But it may be a deceptive guide to attitudes and may lead us to underestimate the existence of national and ethnic loyalities in a new guise. The Moslem elite's search for native roots may, for example, take the form of "local patriotism." Having forced the creation of a "Soviet-Moslem intelligentsia" in order to bypass nationalism and to assure all-Soviet integration, Moscow may yet find that it has provoked a series of new problems. The observations of Geoffrey Wheeler strike to the heart of Moscow's dilemma:

The days of the Jihad, of the Holy War against the unbelievers, may be over, but in the Soviet Muslim intellectual of today—an intellectual largely of communism's own creation —the Russians are encountering a resistance more subtle, elusive and more determined than they bargained for. This Muslim intellectual may be and often is a person of high scientific attainments, he may even be a convinced Communist; but he may yet remain a Muslim at heart, a Muslim, moreover, technically, mentally and spiritually far better fitted to undertake the independent government of his own people than the rulers of many former colonial Muslim countries of whose independence the Soviet government is such an eager advocate. This silent but persistent struggle is sensed, if not thoroughly comprehended, by the Soviet authorities, and observation of its progress constitutes an enthralling study.[7]

This phenomenon may reflect differences between the generations. As the second generation of the native elite emerges, less beholden to Moscow and more confident of its local status, it begins to question the "colonial" tie as it seeks out its own cultural past.[8] Already one finds evidence of the search for symbols linking the intelligentsia with the Moslem masses and separating it from the rest of the Soviet intelligentsia. Industrialization by itself may bring the engineers and technicians to accept integration within a multinational Soviet society; but it will also breed its own problems. For instance, what ethnic and political tensions will ensue when Uzbek, Tadjik and Kirghiz emerge from school armed with new skills only to find Russians and Ukrainians blocking mobility and occupying key positions? Just as Western colonialism had the "white man's burden," Moscow's colonial rationale has involved a sort of "Russian-Bolshevik burden." In the past the Russian presence could be justified in part on a technical—as opposed to a political—basis, since the native Asians lacked the sophistication to manage a complex, developing society. But skills and education are no longer the monopoly of the Russians, and it is easy for the natives to see "colonialism" in the continued Russian dominance. The "revolution of rising expectations" was never simply an economic phenomenon; the mounting challenge to political power forced Western Europe to divest itself of its colonial possessions. Moscow may yet be confronted with the dilemma of either granting full power to the native elite or risking alienation, as the visible Russian presence becomes increasingly a focus of local unrest.

But despite these suggestive parallels, it would be foolhardy to expect in Soviet Central Asia a repetition of the disintegration of Western colonialism. Moscow displays its power by making and breaking political cadres at will, and it is alert to the least manifestation of independence. One cannot forget that the Soviets have fought to create a loyal, responsive native elite; it is hardly likely that the upper echelons of the Central Asian parties are sorely disaffected. Yet the dynamics of ethnic allegiance are far from charted. Strong national ties often disappear only to reappear unexpectedly. The Chinese, Polish and Rumanian developments should remind us that, contrary to Soviet claims, the "socialist transformation" does not eliminate national loyalty but instead may well revitalize it. In the Central Asian case, it is possible that advancing socialism may even create a new stimulus for the emergence of nationalist sentiment.

Donald S. Carlisle

[7] Bennigsen & Lemercier-Quelquejay, Forward, p. xi.

[8] The difficult problem of re-evaluating "Jadidism" reflects this dilemma; see M. G. Vakhabov, "O sotsialnoi prirode srednеaziatskovo jadidizma i evo evoliutsii v period velikoi oktiabrskoi revoliutsii," *Istoriia SSSR*, No. 2, 1963.

EDWARD ALLWORTH, Ed.: *Central Asia: A Century of Russian Rule*, New York and London, Columbia University Press, 1967.

THE AIM OF this handsome volume is evidently to present a comprehensive picture of how the Muslim peoples of the four present-day Central Asian and Kazakh republics of the Soviet Union have fared under Russian rule during the past century. The contributors are six highly qualified specialists: the editor, Edward Allworth, writes on literature, the intelligentsia and history; Hélène Carrère d'Encausse on history; Karl Menges on people and languages; I. M. Matley on population, the land and the economy; Johanna Spector on music; and Arthur Sprague on architecture and art. The result is a wealth of carefully documented information. Understandably, much of this material is not original, having been drawn from earlier works by the contributors. The chapters on music and architecture, however, break new ground.

Professor Allworth's exceptional knowledge of Central Asian languages and literature have enabled him to impart a unique flavor and sympathy to his own contribution, and the attempt made throughout the book to see the problem from the native rather than from the Russian or Western viewpoint is wholly laudable. However, the unfamiliar and inconsistent systems of transliteration from Central Asian languages require explanation, particularly for geographical names. Not everyone will identify Jambil and Qazali with the spellings Dzhambul and Kazalinsk found on all American and British maps.

The lack of an introduction explaining the plan of the book, and of a final chapter setting forth some of the conclusions to be derived from the rich store of factual, objective material which it contains, is somewhat unusual. It may be that the editor wanted readers to draw their own conclusions. He may have kept in mind the Soviet complaint that so-called objective Western writing on Central Asia is more often than not anti-Soviet.

Assuming that the book is primarily directed at readers seeking a general assessment of the effects of Russian rule, an introduction and a conclusion could have explained the reason for certain unexpected omissions from the otherwise comprehensive material. For

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example, the historical section does not go beyond 1938, thus neglecting important events during and after World War II; treatment of Soviet linguistic policy is confined to a mere two pages in Professor Menges' scholarly section on peoples, languages and migrations; the nature of the nationalities policy and the Soviet administrative system are hardly touched upon; there is no mention of the great advance in public health and in the standard of living; and perhaps most surprising of all, there is no section devoted to the Russian and Soviet attitudes towards Islam as a religion. Still, the relative importance of various aspects and results of colonial rule is surely a matter of opinion, and these omissions may well be deliberate.

ELIZABETH E. BACON: *Central Asians under Russian Rule: A Study in Culture Change.* Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1966.

THE FIRST CHAPTERS of *Central Asians under Russian Rule* describe the land, history and traditional culture of the nomad and oasis peoples of the two geographical areas now constituting the Kazakh SSR and the four SSR's of Soviet Central Asia. In the remainder of the study, Professor Bacon examines in depth the effect of Tsarist and Soviet cultural policies on the peoples in these areas.

Early in her academic career Professor Bacon did specialized study on the nomadic culture of the Kazakhs, visiting Leningrad and Alma-Ata for this purpose in 1934. She has since been a student of Asian cultures in general, but only recently did she return to the subject of Central Asia. On her own admission she has had to rely on the research of other Western scholars for her examination of current conditions. Nevertheless, she has succeeded in producing a volume which is at once informative and lively, and likely to be of value to students embarking on a study of the region. The bibliography is useful although several important Soviet works on ethnography are missing.

It is too early to predict success or failure for the Soviet cultural experiment among the Muslim peoples of the USSR. Soviet assertions—now shrill, now wistful—about the love which the Muslims have conceived for socialism and for the Russians, and about the extent to which they have adopted new work and living habits, are at least partially contradicted by evidence adduced from Soviet writing. One reason that achievement has not come up to Soviet expectation lies in the Muslims' passive resistance to what they recognize as a continuation of alien rule. Another reason, not mentioned by Professor Bacon, is that the national republics—which the Soviet regime intended to remain synthetic—are now acquiring a certain independent reality. So long as the states bordering on the Muslim republics were all militarily weak and unaggressive, this problem was not serious; but the emergence along an 1800-mile frontier of a strong and hostile China has forced the Soviet government to exercise much more caution in its attitude towards national consciousness, which is still very much alive among the Muslim minorities.

Since 1960, when Sino-Soviet differences first became acute, there has been renewed emphasis on the processes of *sblizhenie* (drawing closer) and *sliianie* (blending), which are eventually to lead to the creation of a unitary multinational state and thus to the abolition of nations within the USSR. Such a prospect can have little appeal for the Muslim minorities, and the Soviet authorities may be wondering whether by too much insistence on cultural regimentation they may well forfeit the Muslims' somewhat precarious loyalty. It would perhaps be unfair to expect such political considerations to be treated in a book of this kind; but the use in the final paragraph of the nonexistent Russian word *sblizhnost* suggests that the author may not be familiar with much of recent Soviet writing on the subject of the liquidation of national distinctions, including those of frontier and language.

HÉLÈNE CARRÈRE D'ENCAUSSE: *Réforme et Révolution chez les Musulmans de l'Empire Russe: Bukhara 1867-1924.* Preface by Maxime Rodinson. Paris, Armand Colin, 1966.

THE CONTINUED VITALITY of Islam is one of the most difficult problems which Soviet communism has had to face, and one which is still far from solution. Lenin realized better than most the strength of traditional sentiment, but even he underestimated the passive resistance presented by an ideology so closely bound up, in Maxime Rodinson's words, "with life's daily round, the warmth of the paternal hearth, the emotions of childhood, the triumphs, the pain and the bitterness of maturity." During the years of Soviet rule there has been much resignation and bowing to the inevitable on the part of the Muslims, but little acquiescence or renunciation.

Madame Carrère d'Encausse has focussed her attention on the principality of Bukhara. After describing conditions there prior to the establishment of Russian power in 1868 and the first gropings towards reform, she examines the growth of the Jadid movement under the Tsars, and its subsequent suppression by the Soviet regime. The movement originated among the Tatars of European Russia, then spread to Russian Turkestan and the still quasi-independent state of Bukhara. The Jadids stood primarily for social and cultural reform; and at first their aims seemed identical with those of the Bolsheviks. Two or three years of initial cooperation with the Soviet regime resulted in the overthrow of the ruling dynasty and the creation in 1921 of the People's Republic of Bukhara, under what amounted to a Jadid government. It soon became evident, however, that from the Soviet point of view the Jadids were *"mauvais coucheurs:"* they were interested neither in the class war nor in Soviet culture; moreover, as Madame Carrère d'Encausse emphasizes, the Jadid movement, in spite of its iconoclastic and modernist tendencies, was essentially Muslim in both origin and outlook. For example, the constitution of the Bukhara republic, like that of many modern Muslim states, scrupulously avoided anything which ran counter to the fundamental ideology of Islam. It was this more than anything else which resulted in the liquidation of the People's Republic and its absorption in 1924 into the newly formed Uzbek and Tadjik Soviet Socialist Republics. In due course all the Jadid leaders were repudiated, and many executed. The fact that in recent years some of them have been posthumously rehabilitated is a clear indication that the Soviet regime recognizes the need to assuage remaining Muslim resentment. It is noteworthy, however, that rehabilitation has not so far been extended to such avowedly anti-Russian Muslim patriots as 'Abdur-Rauf Fitrat and Mustafa Chokay.

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This is an important book and a welcome contribution to our understanding of the problems posed by the continued presence of 25 million Muslims within the Soviet Union. The author has made use of a wide range of source material—Tsarist, Soviet and Western—and has carefully analyzed the little-known works of such reformist writers as Ahmad Danish and Fitrat. Her use of the great mass of Soviet historical writing is in general discriminating.

Geoffrey Wheeler

Lithuania

V. STANLEY VARDYS, Ed.: *Lithuania Under the Soviets: Portrait of a Nation, 1940-65.* New York, Praeger, 1965.

THIS COMPILATION of chapter-articles, however uneven in quality, constitutes a significant contribution to the study of Baltic history. The editor has written four of the eleven entries. His "Independent Lithuania: A Profile" is certainly the best brief account in English of the period in question, and his style and scholarly balance would be difficult to improve upon.

Vardys' concluding chapter, "Soviet Social Engineering in Lithuania." is equally impressive. In it the editor dispassionately evaluates Soviet efforts to establish Communist social mores and institutions and to bring about the evolution of a "new Soviet man" in Lithuania. Lithuanians have so far had little difficulty resisting the most stultifying aspects of the Sovietization process, but that fact alone, Vardys warns, does not preclude the eventual destruction of the "conditions under which it is still possible to resist indoctrination and Russification." "This could happen if Lithuanians were reduced to a minority in their own country . . . [which] is within the realm of possibility," says Vardys, pointing to the major depletions that the Lithuanian populace has already endured, as Russians have displaced ousted Lithuanians in large numbers and have occupied the commanding posts in the republic's economic and political administration.

There are several other outstanding chapters in this collection: Thomas Remeikis' "The Administration of Power: The Communist Party and the Soviet Government," for one, and Pranas Zunde's "Lithuania's Economy: Introduction of the Soviet Pattern." Remeikis provides a penetrating analysis of the dynamics of Communist power in a Russian-dominated nation, lucidly depicting the complex relationship of older to younger Lithuanian Communists, on the one hand, and of the Lithuanian party members as a group to the Russians in the Lithuanian party, on the other. The Russians evidently serve as watchdogs against the possible revival of nationalist tendencies. Remeikis calls the post-Stalin group of Communists the "new class." Essentially technocrats, they have been favored by the Soviet regime, and by 1960 they made up over 40 percent of the party. "Mostly under forty," they matured "in somewhat stabilized political circumstances and never had to fight for communism. They grew up in a climate of resurging cultural nationalism and normalization of party and government activity. Most importantly, they did not have to be anti-Lithuanian," as did the youth of the postwar years, "who grew up during an intense struggle between communism and nationalism, and for whom communism and nationalism were mutually exclusive."

In his article Zunde recounts the widespread peasant resistance to forcible collectivization. He also depicts most vividly the manner in which Moscow has integrated the economy of Lithuania with that of the Soviet Union, thus distorting that small country's course of economic development and, in effect, manipulating Lithuania like a colonial possession.

Simas Suziedelis' introductory chapter, "Lithuania from Medieval to Modern Times," is too sketchy and too nationally biased to be included in this otherwise excellent collection.

Stanley W. Page

The Soviet Jews

BEN AMI: *Between Hammer and Sickle.* Philadelphia, The Jewish Publication Society of America, 1967.

AS THE SITUATION of the Jews in the Soviet Union has excited the interest and indignation of outsiders, a number of "personal reports" on Soviet Jewry have appeared. Based like most of these on a sampling of the author's experiences in the USSR, *Between Hammer and Sickle* is an example of how much solid material can be fitted into the best of this genre.

Mr. Ben Ami (a pseudonym chosen by the Israeli author) begins with the Soviet image of the Jew, for this is the basis of the Soviet policy towards them. The Soviet authorities, says the author, view the Jews as both *different* from other ethnic groups in the USSR (almost entirely urbanized, and not identified with a specific territory) and essentially *alien* (with an emotional interest in values that are foreign to Soviet ideology and, because of their many relatives outside the country, mostly in America and Israel, potentially disloyal). This perception of the Jew as alien is mainly a hangover from bouts of virulent antisemitism, which has grown almost unchecked in the Soviet Union since the 1920's, after a brief period when the government tried to combat it. As recently as 1963, it manifested itself in the campaign against economic crimes (see article by Z. Gitelman elsewhere in this issue). The familiar hallucinations of a Jewish world government have not been challenged, and new myths have supplemented the old images—in Ben Ami's words—of the "crafty-and-fraudulent-Jew" and the "Jew-as-Satanic-genius." (Mr. Ben Ami recounts, for example, the widespread rumor that the Jews of Israel have discovered a cure for cancer. Despite his denial, some insisted that the Israelis had cured the now deceased Soviet party leader, N.M Shvernik, for $50,000!)

With this sort of nonsense in mind, Soviet officials dare not allow the Jews to assimilate because a Jew, even with a different name and nationality, would remain "Jewish at heart" and at the same time would be more difficult to control by administrative means. The author adds that most Soviet Jews have accepted the view that a mere change in nationality would not eradicate their Jewishness. Their acceptance reflects the extent to which the Soviet Jews' self-image has been conditioned by their isolation within the Soviet Union, and the fact that they also are realistic about the depth of the moat that has been dug around them. In this way Mr. Ben Ami illustrates the frightening thoroughness of the Soviet identification of any Jew with all Jews, and of all Jews with

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Zionism and imperialism—that is, with "the enemy."

In local Soviet policy toward the Jews, the *attitude* of the central authority, not its supposed monolithic power, is decisive. Despite Khrushchev's repudiation of Stalinist practices, he continued to tolerate repression of Jewish cultural and religious organs and thus set the tone for the local administrations with whom the Jews must deal. Ben Ami describes the Soviet town officials as poorly-educated, eager to prove their zeal and to follow the party line without sensing any individual responsibility, their consciences dulled by traditional native antisemitism.

Ben Ami later applies this appreciation of the role of local officials to explain the tolerance that surrounds the Georgian, Mountain (Daghestani) and Bukharan Jews, who number nearly a quarter of a million. Descendants of tribes that fled Palestine after the destructions of the first and second Temples, these Jews were dispersed through the Caucasus and Central Asia. According to the author, they were thus more influenced by the local cultures, until in dress and customs they became almost indistinguishable. Two millenia of residence and their acceptance by the native populations and by the dominant churches of these areas have also contributed to their present status. Contrasting their history with that of Western Russian Jews, the author argues that the Oriental Jews "performed normal and basic functions" in their societies and in addition, because of their small numbers, they were "less conspicuous than their Ashkenazi [East European] brothers."

But the missing half of Ben Ami's explanation rests on the relative backwardness of the areas where the Oriental Jews reside. For it is within the extended family unit, still a patriarchy, that the Jewish heritage is transmitted. Mr. Ben Ami does not relate the fact that ten to twenty members of a family ordinarily dine together to the existence of individual homes in which this is possible. The crowded housing and lack of privacy common to large Western Soviet cities are not yet true of the areas inhabited by the Oriental Jews. Nor has the traditional family unit been broken up by the same crowding and by the need for mobility to secure higher education and better jobs as it has been in the urban centers of Western Russian Jewry.

In the three large Central Asian Republics, Ashkenazi Jews, having fled the Nazis, have mixed with the native Bukharan Jews, who now blame them for having infected the Uzbeks with antisemitism. Ben Ami links this new bigotry to the racial tension and rivalry between the Uzbek half of the population and the Russian-Ukrainian half. Both halves, he says, regard the Jews as competitors. "The Bukharan Jews thus find themselves, for the first time, placed in the 'classical' position of the rest of Soviet Jewry"—between the Russian authorities and the "national majority of the Republic."

Although Mr. Ben Ami is modest about the "collective and cumulative nature" of the book, his ability to apply restraint and reason to a sensitive subject, and spirit to a broad range of inquiry, makes this a fine study of Soviet Jewry.

Rosalind Vee Avnet

Christians in Russia

MICHAEL BOURDEAUX: *Opium of the People: The Christian Religion in the USSR.* Indianapolis, Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1966.

MICHAEL BOURDEAUX, an Anglican priest, spent a year in the Soviet Union as a British exchange scholar and made several visits there afterward. What he presents here is a series of vignettes on the history and contemporary position of religion in the USSR, organized chiefly around his observations of people and places, and supplemented by a few lengthy extracts from published sources. This is not a systematic survey, and it does not pretend to be; the author does not treat Judaism or Islam, and he found it difficult to locate, let alone to hold extended conversations with, members of the Russian Orthodox clergy or seminary students. Nevertheless, his book is informative and often highly revealing.

Though writing on a topic where luridness and hysteria are commonplace, Mr. Bourdeaux keeps his head. His main message is that there exists within the Soviet Union a wide spectrum of religious outlooks. He encountered aged women who devoted their lives to the church, giving so generously of their miserable incomes as to embarrass the church with "too much money"—*i.e.*, more than it could usefully spend within the restrictions of Soviet law. (The regime is, of course, quite ready to turn this fact to its own purposes.) But not all of the believers are old women. He saw many young people in the churches: indeed, one of the most interesting chapters in the book deals with the range of religious attitudes among university students and recent graduates.

At one extreme was the young man who said he had been "converted to Christianity" in 1953, during his last year at Leningrad University, and was married to a woman, a graduate of the same institution, who shared his convictions. Other professionals and students also found Soviet life spiritually unsatisfying but had no access, physical or psychological, to anything which could make up for the lack they felt. "No, I don't believe in God," a teacher told him, "but I often wish I could." Others enjoyed religious ceremonials without feeling any need for the doctrines, provoking the regime to try to provide substitute secular ceremonies. Still others displayed a "condescending tolerance—'You can't help being a Christian,'" they would say, "'because it's part of your capitalist heritage.'" And finally, there were those who had only "aggressive scorn" for religious beliefs, who simply seemed unable to believe that an educated person might actually want to be a priest. With respect to some of these, Mr. Bourdeaux says it was "impossible to judge how far their attitude was a piece of play-acting . . . an exaggerted pose adopted to cover inner unresolved doubts, or how far it was a genuine characteristic of the ideal Communist man."

The range of outlooks is hardly narrower among church officials themselves. Some priests, monks, and nuns had remained stubbornly devout in the face of great suffering. On the other hand, Father Mikhail of Moscow (later Archbishop Kiprian) spoke with casual pride of his car, his dacha, and his salary of 700 rubles a month (and also of his "mistrust" toward the Baptists), and made such remarkable statements as these: ". . . with the world triumph of communism, a united Christian Church will automatically come into being . . . the Communist Party does what [the monks] were quite unable to do. . . . It does it more effectively, too, because the sincerity of its members is obvious to everyone."

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Mr. Bourdeaux is convinced that there is the possibility of a religious renascence in Soviet society, particularly in the realm of ethical doctrine. Whether this possibility is realized depends above all on whether the church can make contact with Soviet life, with the real concerns of contemporary Soviet men and women. Yet he also reports the new pressures which have been exerted aginst the church since 1960, including some repetitions of the worst excesses of the early postrevolutionary period, and he does not explain how the church can make effective contact with the population under such circumstances.

Robert A. Feldmesser

WILLIAM C. FLETCHER: *A Study in Survival.* New York, Macmillan, 1965.

IN WRITING this book Dr. Fletcher has made an eminently worthwhile contribution to the political history of the Russian Orthodox Church. After briefly reviewing church-state relations during the first decade of Bolshevik rule, he presents a balanced account of the efforts of Metropolitan Sergei (later Patriarch from September 1943 until his death in May 1944) to find a *modus vivendi* with the Soviet state. Based on what the author terms the strategy of the "outstretched hand," these efforts were motivated by the conviction that the Church's sole hope of survival lay in loyal support of the Communist regime. In his famous proclamation of August 18, 1927, Sergei made such support a vital test of faith, and he thereafter sponsored an increasingly vigorous search for ways and means to serve the regime and to play a "useful" political role. He believed that if he could convince the regime of the Church's loyalty and show it that the Church's support could yield significant political advantages, then—and only then—the Church might attain a measure of security and even a certain freedom of maneuver.

During World War II, the Church finally did win significant concessions in return for its active participation in the regime's effort to rally popular support. The "outstretched hand" was accepted, in fact frantically clutched, and at the time of his death Sergei undoubtedly believed that his controversial and much-maligned strategy had been vindicated by events. The Church had indeed been in imminent danger of complete institutional annihilation on the eve of the war. That it had managed to survive was certainly due in part to Sergei's stewardship, and it is also possible that a different orientation of Church policy would have precluded the wartime concordat. It is nevertheless clear that other factors, including the courage and tenacity of local church congregations, had also been instrumental in keeping the Church alive during the prewar period, and it is equally clear that Hitler's aggression, rather than the Church's "Soviet patriotism" *per se*, was the prime factor that led the regime to accept a temporary détente in 1941.

Many of the regime's wartime concessions to the Church proved illusory, and others proved short-lived. While the postwar years did not bring a complete return to the *status quo ante*, they saw a definite resurgence of "militant atheism," and the early 1960's witnessed a massive new campaign against religion and the Church. Throughout this period, the Church still had services to render—for example, in the propagation of Slavic solidarity, participation in the peace movement, *etc.*—and the regime for its part exercised a certain modicum of restraint. It nevertheless became increasingly clear that what the Church had won in 1941 was less a stable *modus vivendi* with the state than a temporary respite from persecution. The regime remained committed to the eradication of all institutional "islands of separateness" and all retrograde "survivals of the past," and this commitment became the more compelling as the legitimacy of the regime became progressively more dependent on the achievement of full-fledged communism.

It is to Dr. Fletcher's credit that he recognizes these limitations on Sergei's success—this despite his obvious sympathy for the Patriarch and his impatience with the latter's critics and detractors. Indeed, in his last chapter, he is at some pains to stress the tenuous character of the regime's concessions and the ambiguous quality of Sergei's victory. This makes it the more unfortunate that he does not go a step further and attempt to relate his conclusions to a broader analysis of the basic calculus of political collaboration in a totalitarian setting. Had he done so, he would have been forced to pose important normative questions of the sort so forcefully dramatized by Rolf Hochhuth in the case of the Catholic Church under Nazism. If anything, these questions might assume an even more acute form in the Russian case, for here we are dealing with active support by the Church, rather than with non-opposition or passive collaboration. In terms of a refined *realpolitik*, the distinction may be largely irrelevant, especially in a totalitarian system where mere collaboration is likely to entail behavior that in other systems could only derive from positive commitment, if at all. However, *raison d'église* presumably entails the defense of values that transcend institutional survival, and positive support of a totalitarian regime may compromise these values in a far more radical way than mere compliance. Even though he does not venture into this realm of inquiry, Dr. Fletcher has nevertheless done a commendable piece of work that will be of interest and value to all scholars in the field.

Jeremy R. Azrael

WILLIAM C. FLETCHER AND ANTHONY J. STOVER (EDS.): *Religion and the Search for New Ideals in the USSR,* New York, Praeger, 1967.

THIS SYMPOSIUM grew out of papers presented at a gathering organized in Munich in April 1966 by the Institute for the Study of the USSR. Like most symposia, it is a mixed bag. It testifies to much searching for ideals, but in spite of its title there is nothing very new in them. It is the persistence of old ideals and their rejuvenation that is impressive.

These ideals are mostly though not entirely religious in the broad sense, if not in the conventional sense of worshipping in church, mosque or synagogue. Peter Reddaway writes that judging from his observations of Moscow students, searchers are "rather more concerned with Orthodox *values* than with the presently constituted Orthodox Church. Many regard the latter as in certain respects, especially that of its leadership, unjustifiably compromised." George van Stackelberg builds up an impressive picture of the tenacity of Islam in Central Asia. It is a pity that the weakest contribution to the book is Hans Lamm's essay on Judaism: so far as it goes, it gives the im-

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pression that religious Judaism in the USSR has become anemic, but that can hardly be the whole story. In the secular field, Heinrich Schultz gives interesting evidence suggesting a steady return to traditional values in medical ethics. But the book is chiefly concerned with various aspects of Christianity as the background religion of most Soviet citizens.

None of the contributors takes Marxism seriously as a para-religion that now has any appeal to the Soviet peoples. Max Hayward calls it a dinosaur that died: "A dinosaur, just as any other animal, needs air, and Marxism died of suffocation in Russia." Stalin choked it, and in consequence "a terrible vacuum was formed." Western Marxists, however, were only indirectly affected by this, and consequently their approach can be altogether more sophisticated. For example, Gustav Wetter describes a conversation he had with an Italian Communist intellectual, Professor Geymonat, in 1946. The professor termed it a gross misconception to think that communism necessarily involves atheism. In his view, Marxism was merely "a positive science, like medicine, biology or mathematics, but dealing with the transformation of society. . . . Just as a man could be a good doctor and hold any one of a variety of philosophies of life, so it was possible to be a Marxist and subscribe to any philosophy, any religion, or to none at all." This may perhaps be the wave of the future, but the future has not yet come.

Soviet ideologists are surprisingly easily put off their balance by any intellectual challenge. Max Hayward writes that "the editors of *Voprosy filosofii* were evidently horrified (when the *Zhurnal Moskovskoi Patriarkhii* quoted Berdiaev) because they had always counted on a low level of philosophical thinking in the Russian Orthodox Church." It should be added that one such reference in the Church organ might have passed unnoticed, but the background to this is a revival of interest in Berdiaev and other religious writers of his generation among the non-churchgoing intelligentsia.

Dmitri Konstantinov quotes, from the atheist journal *Nauka i religii*, a description of young boys and girls making their first acquaintance with the Orthodox faith and being "kindly instructed by old women, but not by those backward grandmothers whom the atheists gave up as hopeless a long time ago." Also from *Nauka i religiia* comes the classical story of the head of the atheist department at Volzhsk, in the Mari ASSR, who could not be found because he was studying for his exams. "What exams?" "For admission to a seminary." The Mari ASSR is, of course, the sort of country area where going to church is felt to be the necessary corollary of religious belief, just as Peter Reddaway's friends in Moscow come from circles where one would expect to find a less churchy interest in religious ideas.

Perhaps the most interesting contribution is that of William C. Fletcher on the Russian Baptists. They are evidently increasing in strength, but any discontent there may be among adherents of the Orthodox Church with their own leadership is nothing by comparison with the revolt that has developed against the Baptist leaders. Evidence that has accumulated since this symposium was written indicates that the majority of Baptists, perhaps the overwhelming majority, are in schism from the All-Union Council of Evangelical Christians-Baptists. Already in 1966, the dissident group, the *Initsiativniki*, was getting far more than its share of attacks in the Soviet press. Evidently it has gotten under the skin of the party. Why? Dr. Fletcher makes the interesting suggestion that "the segment of society most likely to be attracted to the (Baptist) movement is not the Russian Orthodox, but people of the sort who would be attracted to the Communist Party itself."

John Lawrence

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1917-1967: The Victors and the Victims

(A Note on Our Next Issue)

This year the Soviet Union is celebrating the 50th anniversary of the "Great October Socialist Revolution." Various events, such as festive meetings, academic gatherings, and special books, articles, plays and songs written for the occasion, are already in full swing, and will culminate on November 7, a half century after the Bolsheviks overthrew the Provisional Government of Russia and established themselves in power.

To define the contents and set the tone for the celebrations, the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party published a 20,000-word document (*Pravda* and *Izvestia*, June 25, reprinted in *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, New York, July 12 and 19, 1967), called "Fiftieth Anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution: Theses of the CC of the CPSU." The "Theses" are essentially an elaboration of a shorter Central Committee "Resolution" on the same subject, published on January 4. It is a curious document. In tracing the history of the USSR and the significance of the anniversary, it manages to avoid mentioning almost altogether the name of the person who ruled the Soviet Union for nearly half of its 50-year span. Of the two references to Stalin, one is "neutral" (his chairmanship of the State Defense Committee during World War II), and one decidedly pejorative ("at the 20th Congress the party firmly condemned Stalin's personality cult"). Stalin's successors—Malenkov, Bulganin and even Khrushchev—are passed over in silence. Nor do the "Theses" contain any references (except for an elliptical mention of the "political rout of Trotskyism") to the many Bolsheviks who with Lenin led the party both before and after the Revolution and who later fell victim to Stalin's purges—such as Leon Trotsky, Grigori Zinoviev, Lev Kamenev, Nikolai Bukharin, Karl Radek, and countless others. It would seem, indeed, as if for half a century the people of Russia had labored, suffered, fought and achieved its great victories and successes without any leaders whatever, save for Lenin (who died in 1924) and the anonymously collective "Central Committee" of the party, or "the party" itself.

To correct this lopsided historical record, *Problems of Communism* will publish, in its next (November-December) issue, a series of appreciations of some of the (officially) forgotten figures of the Bolshevik past: Bukharin, Trotsky, Zinoviev, and the "Left Opposition" of 1920-21 (Aleksandr Shliapnikov, Aleksandra Kollontai, and others). In addition, two powerful movements—the Mensheviks and the Social Revolutionaries—which were instrumental in bringing about the downfall of Tsarism and which in fact enjoyed far greater popular support than the Bolsheviks, will also be given their due. By doing so, we hope not only to fill in a few missing pages in current Soviet historiography, but also to examine the various alternatives that faced the Russian people in 1917; to do the same for the 1920's when the Soviet Union was being torn by a violent struggle for power whose outcome was to determine the future course of the country; to consider the theory—implicitly and explicitly stated by the party "Theses"—that the victory of Bolshevism in 1917 or of its special variety ten years later was somehow "inevitable;" in brief, by providing an important historical dimension, to contribute to a fuller and more objective understanding of a momentous historical event.

—The Editors

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